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China and India’s rapid growth in the last couple of decades is unparalleled in terms of scope and impact in recent history. If one includes Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian countries, it is not a surprise that many call the 21st century the Asian century. The prominence of Asia will continue to grow, in both absolute and relative terms in the global economy; so Latin America can ill afford to ignore Asia. Global Latinas will have to both cooperate and compete with Asian firms to succeed on the global stage.

In the first chapter of The Factory (2005) the Australian protagonist Hilda, writing from a Japanese prison, says,I remember someone saying to me when I first came to this country, "You may speak perfect Japanese. You may live like the Japanese, sound like the Japanese, believe what the Japanese believe. But you will never be Japanese:" (2).This statement provides the spur for the novel's sustained engagement with the nature of national, cultural, and racial identity. This essay highlights the way the novel both problematizes and reproduces the borders that govern who is Japanese and who is Australian and, by extension, who is not Japanese and who is not Australian. The above extract presents Japanese identity as incommensurable with Australian identity, and in turn sees Australia as distinct from Asia:The label "Australian" [. . .] separates Australia from its place in the AsiaPacific region and from the plethora of its connections with and interests in other parts of the world; one of the effects of this is to assimilate it to a model of white and settled Australianness that does little justice to its internal heterogeneity. (Frow 60)Suvendrini Perera characterizes the imaginary borders between Australia and Asia as not simply territorial or national but defined by racial identities as well: "the geographical differentiation of the island-body, Australia, from the islands of Asia is paralleled by a process of racial differentiation" (3).However The Factory also problematizes this border thinking with its genuine desire to integrate with Asia, despite the "nationalising forces" showcased above (Iwabuchi 17). The increase in rhetoric around the issue of Australia entering the so called "Asian Century" and the various anxieties surrounding "Rising Asia" (Walker and Sobocinska 1), highlight the topical nature of the novel's attempts to become "part of Asia" (O'Carroll and Hodge 157). O'Reilly wrote the novel with the help of an Asialink writing-in-residence scholarship. Asialink, an affiliate of the University of Melbourne, focuses on "public understanding of the countries of Asia and of Australia's role in the region," something echoed in its tagline "Building an Asia-capable Australia" (Asialink). In addition, the novel clearly represents what is being termed the "transnational turn" in Australian literature (Ommundsen 2), typifying the urge to turn Australia's gaze to areas "beyond the nation" (Dixon 20).This transnational gaze reflects Benedict Anderson's metaphor of the inverted telescope in The Spectre of Comparisons. For Anderson, while the telescopic gaze of Europe on Asia highlights a traditional authoritative gaze, the reciprocal gaze that looks back through the telescope, now an inverted telescope, sees Europe as not enlarged but a miniaturized object. For Anderson this makes it "forever impossible to take Europe for granted" (20), and he therefore questions the West's assumed centrality in cross-cultural comparison. The Factory does indeed stage this questioning of the authoritative gaze of the Westerner or Australian, especially as it seriously calls into question the legitimacy of Hilda's authorial voice and the way that voice represents Japan from an authoritative perspective. However, this destabilization of the authoritative Western gaze takes place in the displaced transnational space of Japan, significantly not in the space of Australia. The Australian inflection of Anderson's telescope ventures into the space of Japan, and yet the reciprocal gaze does not extend back into the land of Australia. Thus, to follow Harry Harootunian's critique that "in Anderson's gaze Europe still appears dangerously magnified" (141), the novel risks guarding Australia from outside transnational, as well as internal, scrutiny.The novel's interplay between national and transnational thinking culminates, at the end of the novel, in Hilda's retreat from Japan and the tacit acknowledgement that she will never, indeed, be Japanese. …

Summary The “rise of Asia” is something of a myth. During 1990–2005 China accounted for 28% of global growth, measured at PPP. India accounted for 9%. The rest of developing Asia, with nearly a billion people, accounted for only 7%, the same as Latin America. Hence there is no general success of Asian developing economies. China has grown better than its developing neighbors because it started its reform with a better base of human capital, has been more open to foreign trade and investment, and created good investment climates in coastal cities. China’s success changes the equation going forward: its wages are now two to three times higher than in the populous Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia), and China will become an ever-larger importer of natural resource and labor-intensive products. Developing countries need to become more open and improve their investment climates to benefit from these opportunities. China itself faces new challenges that could hamper its further development: unsustainable trade imbalance with the U.S., energy and water scarcity and unsustainable use of natural resources, and growing inequality and social tension. To address the first two of these challenges, good cooperation between China and the U.S. is essential. I conclude that we are more likely to be facing a “multi-polar century,” than an Asian century.

When the 1997 Asian financial crisis brought down many of the so-called miracle economies, it dealt a seemingly fatal blow to those claims about the functional superiority of a highly centralized, state-led system of “Asian capitalism” and expectations of an imminent Asian Century that had been so central to the rhetoric of many Asian political leaders in the previous decade.1 For neoliberal reformers within the World Bank and the IMF, and in the treasuries and finance ministries of Western governments, the crisis confirmed that the various models of “Asian capitalism” were in fact outmoded and dysfunctional in an age of global markets. Convergence, once again, became part of the vocabulary of policy-makers in the West as Asian governments were urged to eliminate cronyism and embrace the natural efficiency of the market.2

This is a book review of Stepping Up: Lead Culture Change for Diversity and Growth in the Asian Century by Pamela Young.

No abstract received.

101 Wikipedia defines the Asian Century as “a term used to describe the belief that, if certain demographic and economic trends persist, the 21st century will be dominated by Asian politics and culture (and science), similarly to how the 20th century is often called the American Century, and the 19th century the British Century”. Accordingly, in the coming decades, Asian readers of the Journal of the Formosan Medical Association (JFMA) could look forward to being at the epicenter of rapid scientific progress in biology and medicine. What are the factors that are poised to shape scientific progress in the 21st (Asian) century differently from that in the 20th (American) and 19th (British) centuries? There are many, but here, in brief, two potentially pivotal trends are discussed. The first factor for change is the booming economic growth of Asia. Several respected projections have indicated that by 2040, China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy, with India capturing third place. These predictions appear to be credible since extant statistics from the World Bank show that when calculated on a purchasing power parity basis, the top five countries worldwide in total 2006 gross domestic product already include three Asian nations: China, India and Japan (Table 1). Reassuringly, this rapid economic growth is paralleled by an Asian willingness to invest in research and development (R&D). Hence, 2002 statistics show Asia contributing a 31.5% share of the world’s gross expenditure on R&D, with North America and Europe contributing 37% and 27.3%, respectively.1 Asian R&D spending produces results. A recent report from the United States National Science Foundation revealed that whereas American scientists and engineers have not enhanced their recent rate (an average of

Australia's Asia is a timely collection that offers an historical background to the recent debates on Australia's Asian Century. As the use of the term 'yellow peril' in the subtitle suggests, there is a strong emphasis in this book on Australia's ongoing anxieties about the rise of Asia.

The victory of the conservative Liberal Party led by Tony Abbott in the September 2013 general elections means that Australia is now committed to the preparation of a new defence white paper --the country's third in six years--to be released in early 2015. The timing was pre-determined on the back of public promises by Abbott and then shadow defence minister David Johnston during the campaign to deliver the new white paper within eighteen months of entering government. Plans are already underway to ensure that the document will be delivered on time. (1) While the top priority for defence planners over several decades has been to ensure the "defence of Australia" by acquiring military capabilities to repel any direct enemy advances against the mainland, the 2000, (2) 2009 (3) and 2013 (4) defence white papers delivered by the John Howard, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard governments, respectively, have all upheld the importance of "ensuring strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific" as a critical national security interest. This was reaffirmed in the pre-election policy document released by Senator Johnston who has now been sworn in as Australia's Defence Minister. (5) Although the somewhat meaningless phrase "Asian Century" (6) is now widely used in Australian strategic, defence and economic discourse, some of Australia's neighbours suspect that Canberra focuses too heavily on large Northeast Asian powers such as China and Japan, and not enough on major Southeast Asian players, the latter region defined in this article as the subregion of Asia consisting of countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of Papua New Guinea and north of Australia. To be fair, Canberra's attention is appropriately directed towards its three largest trading partners in Asia--China, Japan and South Korea --which are all in Northeast Asia, while the structural causes of potential region-wide instability is primarily a Northeast Asian phenomenon as possible instability is primarily driven by China's re-emergence as a Great Power. Even so, previous Australian defence white papers have tended to take a predominantly "risk management" approach to Southeast Asia in that they posit that Canberra should ensure that it has adequate military capabilities to manage and contain risks to its national interests should adverse developments occur in that region. While this is a sensible and prudent position to take, little ground has been made in terms of exploring the strategic possibilities of Southeast Asia, and in particular how Australian relationships in Southeast Asia and the capabilities that it brings to the table can contribute to the broader objective of ensuring strategic stability in Asia. In other words, the strategic analysis underpinning the next defence white paper ought to do several things. Rather than treating Southeast Asia as a standalone strategic region, it needs to link bilateral and multilateral opportunities in Southeast Asia with the future shape of strategic decisions made by powerful players in East Asia, and China in particular. In addition, in conceiving of Australia's future place and role in Southeast Asia, Canberra needs to go beyond its risk management approach. Instead, Canberra should view Southeast Asia as a region filled with strategic opportunity, which directly feeds into the goal of ensuring greater stability throughout Asia. In making this argument, the paper comprises three parts. First, it offers a brief summary of recent Australian strategic and defence thinking on Southeast Asia. Second, it outlines why China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability or instability in the region, and how China's strategy in achieving its objectives can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia. Finally, the paper offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that will contribute to strategic stability in Asia more generally. …

For at least three decades, it has been quite common in the United States to talk of the coming of the Asian century. Americans have been fascinated with the rise of Japan and then China, and the corresponding reports of the decline of the United States. This psychology may have intensified with the 2008-09 financial crisis and the understanding that China is now playing a central role in assuring global financial, and thereby political, stability. Notwithstanding some Orientalist hyperbole, there is no doubt that Asia has been, and will continue to be, a region of rising power, responsible for an increasing share of world output, innovation, and power, even as the United States declines in relative terms. What will the rise of Asia mean for global governance? Oddly, I believe that any "Eastphalian" world order will mean a return to Westphalia, at least as modern international lawyers understand the term. Drawing its name from the 1648 treaties ending the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War, Westphalia stands for principles of mutual noninterference, an emphasis on sovereignty, and formal equality of states. Eastphalia, should it materialize, will emphasize similar structures, putting an end to the brief interlude of European universalism and global constitutionalism that intensified after the Second World War.