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We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of interbank competition and bank-capital market competition on the portfolio choices of banks and the welfare of borrowers in a regulatory environment of (de facto) complete deposit insurance. Our focus is on an industry characterized by 'relationship banking', i.e. a setting involving repeated, bilateral credit transactions between banks and borrowers. A key feature of relationship banking is the intertemporal accumulation of proprietary borrower-specific information in the hands of the bank, and the consequent creation of informational rents. To the extent that these rents are shared by the bank and the borrower, both parties see a value in continuing their relationship. The desire to protect such relationships affects the bank's asset portfolio choice.

We rationalize fixed rate loan commitments (forward credit contracting with options) in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality. Future interest rates are random, but there are no transactions costs. Borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs. Credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a (non-cooperative) Nash game between the bank and the borrower. The initial formal analysis is basically in two steps. First, we show that the only spot credit market Nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank's informational handicap. Second, we show that loan commitments, because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank's expected profit and the loan interest rate, enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly Pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium. Perhaps our most surprising result is that, if the borrower has some initial liquidity, it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing.

We examine the financing and incorporation modes for new projects. There are two objectives. The first is to provide a theory of optimal capital structure that links risk, leverage, and value and is particularly applicable to large firms. Counter to conventional wisdom, we show riskier firms acquire more debt, pay higher interest rates, and have higher values in equilibrium. Second, we provide an economic rationale for project financing which entails organizing a new project legally distinct from the firm's other assets. We explain why project financing involves higher leverage than conventional financing and why highly risky assets are project-financed.

This paper develops a model in which managers can signal their firms' true values by using either a dividend or a stock repurchase or both. The authors explain a number of stylized facts about these cash disbursement mechanisms, particularly those concerning the relative magnitudes of stock price responses to dividends and repurchases. Most importantly, they explain why a stock repurchase elicits a significantly higher price response, on average, than a dividend announcement. Copyright 1987 by American Finance Association.

This work develops a portfolio model of the banking firm where both the size and composition of the portfolio are jointly determined. The model provides a quite simple micro-foundation of the credit channel of the transmission of monetary policy. It allows analysing the pricing policies of the banking firm, and shows how interest rate shocks and credit quality shocks (the real shocks that change expected default costs) affect the equilibrium level of loans and deposits.

Capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. The model predicts that the bank's decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower's stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital-constrained the bank. I provide empirical support for this prediction. The model explains the recent inability of the Federal Reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply. I show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk.

The behavior of economic agents in the presence of uncertainty about exogenous events and imperfect information about the endogenously influenced actions of other agents with whom they contract has been receiving growing attention. In particular, the economic theory of agency explicitly recognizes that when agents enter into synergistic relationships, each agent will act in a manner consistent with the maximization of its personal welfare, thus giving rise to a phenomenon called moral hazard. Harris and Raviv [8], Holmstrom [10], and Shavell [21] have analyzed the nature of Pareto-optimal contractual mechanisms designed to ameliorate moral hazard and achieve efficient risk sharing. Jensen and Meckling [12], Grossman and Hart [6], and Thakor and Gorman [22] have explored the impact of moral hazard on the capital structure decisions of firms. Arrow [1] explained the absence of complete contingent claims markets on the basis of moral hazard, and Harris and Raviv [7] have examined the impact of moral hazard on the structure of health insurance contracts.

Examined in this paper is the choice between private and public incorporation of an asset for an entrepreneur (asset owner) who hires a manager with superior information about the asset's return distribution. Public sale of equity is shown to be the preferred alternative when (a) capital market issue costs are low or (b) the asset's idiosyncratic risk is high and the owner is either sufficiently risk averse or sufficiently "optimistic" about the asset's expected return. Thus, those as,sets deemed most valuable by their owners will tend to be publicly incorporated. The paper also explores the impact of incorporation mode-private versus public-and information structure on the firm's investment policy and ownership distribution. THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE ownership structure have attracted much attention. (See, for example, Demsetz and Lehn [7 ].) The recent spate of leveraged buyouts (LBO's) and other activities designed to consolidate ownership structure-and often to take it out of the public domain-have raised questions about the optimality of public ownership of corporations. A related issue is the link between real output and the mode of incorporation in firms with a separation of ownership and control. Do privately incorporated firms have systematically different investment policies from publicly incorporated firms? If so, aggregate output must be a function of the cross-sectional distribution of incorporation modes in the economy. There is also considerable interest in the impact of insider information, a topic that concerns us in this paper.' We have two principal objectives. The first is to explore the conditions that determine an asset owner's choice of incorporation for the asset. That is, when would the owner prefer to keep asset ownership private as opposed to having a portion of that ownership publicly traded? In particular, what is the role of the owner's perception of the value of the asset in this determination? Are the assets being taken privately more or less valuable than those that are publicly traded? Insights on this score should help in understanding corporate ownership structure evolution. Our second objective is to examine the impact of information structure-symmetric versus asymmetric information-and the firm's incorporation

This paper presents a multiperiod model of a deposit-type mutual financial institution and analyzes the manager's capital accumulation and deposit pricing decisions under uncertainty. The model is meant to describe a mutual savings and loan association (SLA) or a credit union in which there are no stockholders and nominal ownership is widely diffused (see [12] and [14]). The resulting paucity of monitoring gives rise to an agency problem (see [13]) in which the manager maximizes his multiperiod expected discounted utility with minimal intervention from nominal owners.

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well-known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral. THIS PAPER EXPLORES THE allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications. We model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions. Borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral. Our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium. Under both, banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits. However, under the first concept of equilibrium (Ti), as in Jaffee and Russell [11], all rents accrue to borrowers, whereas, under the second concept (T2), all rents accrue to depositors, as in Stiglitz and Weiss [17]. Our research makes two main points. First, we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations. Specifically, one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of Stiglitz and Weiss [17] and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used. For instance

We complement the theory of tick-by-tick dynamics of financial markets based on a continuous-time random walk (CTRW) model recently proposed by Scalas et al [4], and we point out its consistency with the behaviour observed in the waiting-time distribution for BUND future prices traded at LIFFE, London.

Over the last two decades MENA countries as much of the developing countries have experienced a wave of liberalization of financial sector. The purpose of this paper is three fold: to review the literature on the rationale for financial repression, examining why governments adopt financial repression policies; to examine the theoretical and empirical literature on the links between financial liberalization, savings and investment; to assess the effect of financial reforms on economic performance in the specific case of MENA countries. The paper attempts to capture the effects of both banking sector and stock market developments, focussing on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey between 1970-1998.

Since the second half of the ‘70s, those institutions aimed at granting the banking and financial system stability (Central Banks, Supervisory Authorities, Deposit Insurance Systems, etc.) have been employing monitoring techniques in order to evaluate the situation of banks, some of which makes use of statistical and econometric methodologies. The banking crises of the last twenty years have shown that a need exists to strengthen the tools which are currently used in ascertaining the state of a single bank, so that an intervention could be undertaken before problematic situations degenerate. The present essay, after a survey of the main techniques used for the evaluation of banks’ condition, employs one of the said techniques, a logit-model, to verify, on the one hand, its capability to predict the crisis state of a set of banks, and, on the other, to test the signalling effectiveness of the balance-sheet indicators of the Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi (FITD), which have been employed as explanatory variables of the banks state. The results obtained with the econometric technique can be considered, on the whole, satisfying: it is able to predict correctly the banks state in the 80% of the cases, showing, at the same time, a good signaling capability for the FITD indicators. Moreover, in addition to this, the exercise has shown that only a sub-set of the FITD indicators are statistically significant to explain the banks’ state, and that the statistical model has led to classification results which are significantly more precise than those obtained with the application of the system implied in the criteria of FITD’s Statutes.

This paper analyses risk arbitrage in U.S. financial markets. The study by Mitchell, Mark and Todd Pulvino (2001) has been extended to study the U.S. financial markets scenario from 1963 to 2004. In particular, two research questions are pursued-(1) What are the effects of stock market, business conditions as well as the Merger and Acquisition Trend on risk arbitrage activities in the U.S (2) What is the current trend and effect of the U.S. financial regulatory mechanism on risk arbitrage? The results of the paper are: 1)Returns associated with risk arbitrage are more pronouncedly decreased in down/severely depreciating stock market and business conditions especially when there is possibility of deal failure but remain rather uncorrelated with market returns when the market is flat and appreciating. 2)The probability of a merger failing is a decreasing function of market returns in the last two months, indicating that deals are more likely to fail following market downturns. 3)There has also been a growing trend in US financial market regulatory mechanism to reduce systemic risk, eliminate legal uncertainty, control regulatory arbitrage and to have a closer look on derivatives trading which could be potentially used for fraud or manipulation. The current focus of the financial regulatory mechanism is to curb illegal trading in risk arbitrage activities through limits on trading volume and control of regulatory arbitrage opportunities which should continue into the future.

This essay discusses first two competing hypotheses of market efficiency: the classical Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Samuelson and Fama, and the Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) of Mandelbrot and Peters and their weaknesses. The EMH depends on the empirically uncorroborated i.i.d. (= independence & stationarity) assumption of market innovations. The time - invariant FMH risk depends on the lengths of time horizons, as measured by the Hurst exponent. By way of empirical examples in the cash, bond and options an futures markets, it is demonstrated that scientifically a much broader concept of financial market risk is needed. This new risk concept should allow for the measurement of the degree of market efficiency, which is time and horizon dependent. The proposed definition of financial market risk is a time - frequency distribution function P, where the shape of the function is determined not only by the second-order moments σ, differentiated by the investment asset return categorizations ω, but also of the length investment horizons, or maturities of the investment securities τ, and of the time period t. In other words, the new concept of financial risk P(ω,τ,t) should be able to account for both LT and ST nonlinear time dependence and for strict non- stationarity to be empirically compatible and thus scientifically acceptable. Such a time - frequency distribution P(ω,τ,t) can be measured and identified by modern forms of time - frequency signal processing analysis, like windowed Fourier and wavelet multiresolution analysis.

This five-chapter introduction into international money and foreign exchange markets covers all the basics, theoretical, institutional, as well as empirical. After a brief review of the money market, we discuss the size and structure of the foreign exchange markets. This information is then used in discussing purchasing power parity and interest rate parity. We conclude with an overview of the main international money organizations and the institutional framework of the past 150 years.

Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors utility model. We show that the impact of ambiguity on the option exercise decision depends on the relative degrees of ambiguity about continuation payoffs and termination payoffs. Consequently, ambiguity may accelerate or delay option exercise. We apply our results to firm investment and exit problems, and show that the myopic NPV rule can be optimal for an agent having an extremely high degree of ambiguity aversion.

In generally rural industries self financed their activities. by their holder’s own capital. In the situation where other financial sources were limited, the own capital is very important for rural industries. The question is what are the sources of this capital? We are talking about household saving, now. In the relation with the development of rural industries there is a need to explore the behavior of this kind of saving in order to increase the role of rural financial institutions. Based on a case study at a sub-district in Yogyakarta, I found that rural industry households have sufficiently ability to save. They were also save in financial assets, beside real assets. However it also important to underlined that these saving more in the non-bank financial institution than in the banking institution, included the Village Units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). This situation could be indicated that banking institution just gives little attention on the rural households saving ability. Since saving ability could be argue as a repayment ability indicator, this finding also explained why there were very limited rural industries that got credit from banking institution. Using an econometric model of life-cycle theory, this study also found that household saving was determined by household’s income, both of education level and sex of the industry holders, and the varieties of industries. This mean that in order to solve the lack capital problem in rural industries we also have to consider those variables, especially the education and the varieties of industries.

To be relevant to a firm a real option needs to fit into a theory of the firm explaining its existence, exercise conditions and value. We make a step toward an option based-theory of the firm by describing the emergence of a firm’s options and the strategic building of new competences for exercising these options. We explain the creation of a real option as an entrepreneurial process which transform inventive ideas into profitable innovation. The subsequent development of competence necessary to exercise the option gives boundaries, based on theories of the firm, for the often overoptimistic real option evaluation.

This paper analyzes the performance of the Arab stock market during the period (1994-2003).Data of the Arab monetary fund (AMF) indicates that Arab stock market performance become stronger during the period under review. The AMF indicator jumped by 40.9% reaching 141.9 point in 2003,the highest level since 1994.The market capitalization increased rapidly from $72.5 billion in 1994 to $361.8 billion in 2003,by 20% annual growth rate in average. Moreover, the value of trading increased to $59.7 billion in 2003 compared with $10.5 billion in 1994.While the rate of turn over declined to 16.5% in 2003 compared with 43.9% in 1997.On the other hand, the total companies listed in the Arab stock exchange increased in 2003 by 103 companies compared with the total companies listed in 1994,reaching 1723 companies. Finally, the paper tries to recommend a number of policies to activate the Arab stock market and increase the cooperation between them.

The indicators refer to a significant drop down in the Egyptian securities market performance during the period from 1999 to 2003.The total issues declined from LE 55.6 billion in 1999 or 17% of GDP and 146.7% of gross saving to LE 18.5 billion in 2003 and or 4.6% of GDP and 31.5% of gross saving .The total value of trading also dropped down from LE 42.1 billion or 12.9% of GDP and 111% of gross saving to LE33.7 billion or 8.3% of GDP and 57.2% of gross saving during the period under review. On the other hand ,in spite of the market capitalization for the listed companies has increased in 2003 to reach LE 171.9 billion or 42.4% of GDP compared with LE 112.3 billion in 1999 or 34.4% GDP ,the picture become clear if we know that the number of public joint stock companies, which reflects the real performance of the market, constitute 17.5% of total companies listed in 2002 and it's market capitalization constitute 27% of total market capitalization, has increased in 2003 reached 37.4% of total market capitalization. So, the purpose of this study is to recommend a number of axes to develop and activate the securities market generally and its role in saving development particularly.

The paper discusses the possible effects of short sales on the operation of a very small stock market such as the Maltese one. After studying the basic mechanics of short selling procedures, the paper reviews the salient literature with particular reference to how short sales may enhance informational efficiency and their relationship with liquidity. The paper proceeds by examining these relationships in the context of the Maltese securities market. The study reveals that short sales may be desirable on the Maltese stock market for enhancing price efficiency and liquidity, yet a more formal framework for conducting such transactions is required. In addition, short positions may be particularly risky in the context of the Maltese stock market, due to low liquidity levels., N/A

We document the behavior of over-the-counter currency option prices across moneyness, maturity, and calendar time on two of the most actively traded currency pairs over the past eight years. We find that the risk-neutral distribution of currency returns is relatively symmetric on average. However, on any given date, the conditional currency return distribution can show strong asymmetry. This asymmetry varies greatly over time and often switch directions. We design and estimate a class of models that capture these unique features of the currency options prices and perform much better than traditional jump- diffusion stochastic volatility models.

1. Bedeutung der Unternehmensplanung 2. Unternehmensplanung im derzeitigen Wirtschaftsrecht 3. Erfordernis gesetzlicher Regelung von Pflichten und Mindestinhalten der Unternehmensplanung 4. Wirtschafts- und ordnungspolitische Vorteile einer Gesetzesänderung 5. Konkretisierung des Änderungserfordernisses handelsrechtlicher und gesellschaftsrechtlicher Bestimmungen zwecks Verankerung der Unternehmensplanung im Wirtschaftsrecht 6. Auswirkungen einer Planungspflicht auf die Abschlussprüfung Anhang: Musterentwurf der Gesetzesänderungen

It is well known that risk increases the value of options. This paper makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theorem says that the value of an option does not fall if the underlying option becomes riskier in the conventional sense of the mean-preserving spread. This paper uses two new definitions of ``riskier'' to show that the value of an option strictly increases (a) if the underlying asset becomes ``pointwise riskier,'' and (b) only if the underlying asset becomes ``extremum riskier.''

This paper documents some stylized facts about Canadian banking. I explore these empirical facts in the context of the Canadian financial legislation. I find that, over the 1990s, Canadian businesses became more heavily dependent on financial markets as their primary source of external funding. Data display a trend towards a more ``market- oriented'' financial system. The analysis also suggests that this new trend started after the 1980 banking legislation amendments. The trend was considerably accentuated after the 1992 amendments. I construct a new series for market-oriented activities of Canadian banks that converts the non-interest income of banks into an asset equivalent. Combined with other evidence, this credit equivalent series suggests a healthy growth trend in banking. Financial institutions are broadening their business lines and participating more actively in the arrangement of market financing, a phenomenon that could be called new banking.

When a k period future return is regressed on a current variable such as the log dividend yield, the marginal significance level of the t-test that the return is un- predictable typically increases over some range of future return horizons, k. Local asymptotic power analysis shows that the power of the long-horizon predictive regression test dominates that of the short-horizon test over a nontrivial region of the admissible parameter space. In practice, small sample OLS bias, which differs under the null and the alternative, can distort the size and reduce the power gains of long-horizon tests. To overcome these problems, we suggest a moving block recursive Jackknife estimator of the predictive regression slope coefficient and test statistics that is appropriate under both the null and the alternative. The methods are applied to testing whether future stock returns are predictable. Consistent evidence in favor of return predictability shows up at the 5 year horizon.

Many performance measures, such as the classic Sharpe ratio have difficulty in evaluating the performance of mutual funds with skewed return distributions. Common causes for skewness are the use of options in the portfolio or superior market timing skills of the portfolio manager. In this article we examine to what extent downside risk and the upside potential ratio can be used to evaluate skewed return distributions. In order to accomplish this goal, we first show the relation between the risk preferences of the investor and the risk- adjusted performance measure. We conclude that it is difficult to interpret differences in the outcomes of risk-adjusted performance measures exclusively as differences in forecasting skills of portfolio managers. We illustrate this with an example of a simulation study of a protective put strategy. We show that the Sharpe ratio leads to incorrect conclusions in the case of protective put strategies. On the other hand, the upside potential ratio leads to correct conclusions. Finally, we apply downside risk and the upside potential ratio in the process of selecting a mutual fund from a sample of mutual funds in the Euronext stock markets. The rankings appear similar, which can be attributed to the absence of significant skewness in the sample. However, find that the remaining differences can be quite significant for individual fund managers, and that these differences can be attributed to skewness. Therefore, we prefer to use the UPR as an alternative to the Sharpe ratio, as it gives a more adequate evaluation of the use of options and forecasting skills.

This study uses both unconditional and conditional risk analysis to investigate the day-of-the-week effect in 21 emerging stock markets. In addition, risk is allowed to vary across the days of the week. Different models produce different results but overall day-of-the-week effects are present for the Philippines, Pakistan and Taiwan even after adjusting for market risk. The results in this study show that while the day-of-the-week effect is not present in the majority of emerging stock markets studied, some emerging stock markets do exhibit strong day-of-the-week effects even after accounting for conditional market risk.

We introduce two "event" scales for financial markets, called "scale of market shocks" (SMS), which measure the importance of the market movements. These indices are based on the price volatility and are computed by integrating mapped asset volatilities over time horizons that range from 1 hour to 42 days. The first SMS is an absolute scale, or universal scale, allowing values of different assets to be compared directly. The second SMS is an adaptive scale, calibrated to the typical behavior of each asset, allowing the relative importance of market movements to be assessed. In principle, the SMS can be constructed for any market: the indices are computed from the price time series. In the foreign exchange (FX) market, each index is associated with a currency pair and we derive from it an index per currency and an index for the whole market. In order to define the most appropriate SMS, the probability distribution for the volatilities is studied first. Then, the probability distribution of the two scales is computed. For USD/DEM and USD/JPY, the relations between peaks for the SMS and major "world events" is put forward. In addition, we also measure the correlation between the Scale of Market Shocks index and the size of the next price movements, which shows a high correlation for short time intervals.

Estimates of daily volatility are investigated. Realized volatility can be computed from returns observed over time intervals of different sizes. For simple statistical reasons, volatility estimators based on high-frequency returns have been proposed, but such estimators are found to be strongly biased as compared to volatilities of daily returns. This bias originates from microstructure effects in the price formation. For foreign exchange, the relevant microstructure effect is the incoherent price formation, which leads to a strong negative first-order auto- correlation for tick-by-tick returns and to the volatility bias. On the basis of a simple theoretical model for foreign exchange data, the incoherent term can be filtered away from the tick-by-tick price series. With filtered prices, the daily volatility can be estimated using the information contained in high-frequency data, providing a high-precision measure of volatility at any time interval.

The article substantiates the hypothesis that the profitability of small firms is above all determined by qualitative variables. In this respect a low standardization of goods and even more importantly, the high significance of governance structures play a crucial role rendering the quality of the firm’s human capital, the flexibility of its machinery but also externalities of business networks, an appropriate integration of the family into business affairs as examples of qualitative information which also bear a high degree of privacy. Whereas the literature suggests relational contracts as a way how qualitative and private information can be credibly conveyed to the lender, it is shown that even in the German housebank-dominated financial system borrower- lender relationships of the kind recommended by the literature are hardly to be found. Rather, German banks, too, respond to information gaps with unfavourable loan conditions. As an alternative specialized information intermediation is briefly discussed.

This paper offers analysis of corporate governance issues behind stock market performance (stock returns and activity) in Moldova - one of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Born during the years of mass privatization, securities market of Moldova enjoyed the support for the growth from U.S. Government on behalf of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), The Western NIS (New Independent States) Enterprise Fund (WNISEF) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Moldova is a member Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges (FEAS), but has joined neither The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), nor The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). On the basis of three variables, reflecting the development of Stock Exchange, market capitalization of listed companies over gross domestic product (GDP), Value traded over gross domestic product (GDP), Value traded over market capitalization (also known as turnover ratio), I find that the securities market in Moldova is still undeveloped and of very low liquidity. This fact can be explained by a high level of shadow economy (60%), weak macro-economic situation in the country and imperfect Corporate Governance framework. In its turn this leads to a very low investment activity, almost total absence of IPO and prevalence of Off-exchange market. Furthermore, I see the investment funds in Moldova as having a lot of potential to facilitate the development of the capital market of Moldova. However, these funds, being established in the years of mass privatization for vouchers (bonds) have not invested any real capital into the owned companies and continue to be holding companies rather than actively engaged in portfolio investment. Therefore I support the process of reorganization of investment funds and turning them into really Investment and not just Asset Management Institutions. And I find that the enforcement of adequate regulations would give a highest positive impact for the development of the stock market in Moldova under condition of the positive growth in the country's economy.

The paper gives picture of enrichment to economic and financial system analysis using agent-based models as a form of advanced study for financial economic data post-statistical-data analysis and micro-simulation analysis. Theoretical exploration is carried out by using comparisons of some usual financial economy system models frequently and popularly used in econophysics and computational finance. Primitive model, which consists of agent microsimulation with fundamentalist strategy, chartist, and noise, was established with an expectation of adjusting micro-simulation analysis upon stock market in Indonesia. The result of simulation showing how financial economy data resulted analysis using statistical tools such as data distribution and central limit theorem, and several other macro-financial analysis tools previously shown (Situngkir & Surya, 2003b). This paper is ended with several further possible advancements from the model built., 10 pages, 6 figures

This paper considers the conditions that are necessary for market discipline to complement prompt corrective action (PCA) by the authorities in handling problem banks. We initially consider precisely what market discipline means in this context, who exercises it and the preconditions that are necessary for it to operate effectively. We explore the incentives that are necessary for PCA and market discipline to reinforce rather than cancel each other and in particular consider the limits to market discipline in this context from corporate governance and from difficulties in valuation. While our analysis is primarily aimed at advanced countries, we also examine problems in emerging markets and how deposit insurance arrangements might conflict with the aims of both PCA and market discipline.

We show that truncated Levy flights appear due to the presence of particular features of autocorrelation in data. We present and analyze ‘physical’ reasons sufficient to ensure the scaling power laws and sluggish convergence associated with truncated Levy flights. Our approach is exemplified with currency data for the British pound and Chinese yuan against the US dollar. We further compare these examples with a simulated Lorentzian distribution.

The financial system consists of specialized and non-specialized financial institutions, of organized and unorganized financial markets, of financial instruments and services, which facilitate transfer of funds. Procedures and practices adopted in the markets, and financial interrelationships are also parts of this system. In product or other service markets, purchasers part with their money in exchange for something now. In finance, money “now” is exchanged for a “promise to pay in the future”. However, in product or service markets, if the object sold – from a car to a haircut – is defective, the buyers often find out relatively soon. On the other hand, loan quality is not readily observable for quite some time and can be hidden for extensive periods. Moreover, banks and non-bank financial intermediaries can also alter the risk composition of their assets more quickly than most non-financial industries, and banks can readily hide problems by extending loans to clients that cannot service previous debt obligations. Theoretically, the financial market facilitates allocation of resources efficiently, which involves quick dissemination of information and reaction to it. The financial markets are susceptible to manipulation as some participants have information that others do not that is information asymmetry is ubiquitous in financial markets. To overcome this problem corporate governance is required to ensure that suppliers of finance to corporations are assured that they get their return on their investment . Despite the existence of institutional and legal framework numerous financial scams continue to be perpetuated both in developed and developing countries. 1.2 The objectives of this study are : a) To examine some of the major misdemeanors which perpetuated in the financial system in 1991 and 2001 in India . b) Understand the financial regulatory measures which have been adopted after the 1991 share scam in India and why despite such measures adopted a security scam has recurred in 2001. c) Examine the theoretical structure of corporate governance for analyzing security scams that have occurred in the 1990s and the new millennium. The second section contains a summary of the events that occurred leading to the share scams and financial frauds in India and abroad during the recent decade that shook the financial markets. The third section surveys the rationale for regulation of securities markets and the functional procedures adopted in India in the aftermath of the scams. The fourth section looks at the theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance which, is followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the regulatory set up in India which fails to prevent the recurrence of financial misdemeanors. Financial Liberalization is a phenomenon that is almost all pervasive in the world today. While liberalization has led to substantial benefits in terms of increased transparency, it has ushered in opportunities of corporate misgovernance. This implies that the mechanism by which legal institutions ensure that suppliers of funds receive the return on investment is not sufficient or appropriate. Recent trends through the 1990s in India and abroad reveal how corporate governance has not been effective permitting unscrupulous and opportunistic individuals to manipulate the market in their favor. The process of financial market regulation ensures that important guidelines are issued regarding how primary dealers (brokers) should operate with regards to mode of operation, conduct, litigation, amount of business to be handled, management of risk, internal control etc. These security scams and financial scandals discussed here involved the manipulation of huge amounts of money. The perpetrators of these gross transgression had such a comprehensive knowledge of how the system worked that they manipulated it to their advantage operating in an opportunistic manner . The essence of the argument in is that the occurrence and reoccurrence of such security scams and financial scandals can be attributed to a failure of corporate governance in finance despite the existence of an functioning regulatory authority empowered with the legal sanctions.

Questo paper considera il venture capital come forma di finanziamento che si realizza in quegli ambienti dove i fallimenti di mercato causati da problemi informativi sono tali da non rendere possibile l'affermazione di altre istituzioni finanziarie, e dove questa si affermi come unica forma di finanziamento nell'ambito della finanza d'impresa. Definiremo allora il venture capital come un intermediario finanziario altamente specializzato in grado di operare in certi ambienti, caratterizzati da livelli elevati di incertezza e dalla presenza di forti asimmetrie informative, in cui la capacità nell'affrontare le inefficienza strutturali del mercato risiede nell'abilità di raccogliere e trattare le informazioni rilevanti per prendere decisioni ottimali di investimento. Gli ambienti in cui i venture capitalist sono prevalenti sono i settori innovativi delle imprese ad alta tecnologia, dove a causa dell'elevata intensità di ricerca e sviluppo e della sostanziale intangibilità dei beni, si generano considerevoli livelli di incertezza e di asimmetrie informative, rendendo estremamente difficoltosa la selezione delle opportunità di investimento e il controllo dei comportamenti opportunistici degli imprenditori.