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Suppose we embrace the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination: freedom as immunity to arbitrary interference. In that case those acts that call uncontroversially for criminalization will usually be objectionable on three grounds: the offender assumes a dominating position in relation to the victim, the offender reduces the range or ease of undominated choice on the part of the victim, and the offender raises a spectre of domination for others like the victim. And in that case, so it appears, the obvious role for punishment will be, so far as possible, to undo such evils: to rectify the effects of the crime that make it a repugnant republican act. This paper explores this theory of punishment as rectification, contrasting it with better established utilitarian and retributivist approaches.

Unlike that of most liberal thinkers, Kant's theory of punishment is unabashedly retributive. For classical liberals punishment is justified only by the harms it can prevent, not by any allegedly intrinsic good served by making the guilty suffer. Here Hobbes' blunt insistence that the aim of punishment ‘is not a revenge, but terror’ is prototypical in substance, if not in style. Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Bentham and Beccaria, for all their differences, agree that punishment must look to future good rather than to avenging past wrongs. This attitude on the part of classic liberalism toward retribution is not surprising, given its association with the kind of theocratic politics liberalism arose to combat.

The ongoing debate about the state's use of capital punishment to deter crime can be traced to the emergence of ‘the state.’ Discussed are methods of execution, general and specific deterrence, research findings regarding its ability to deter crime, criminologists' perspectives about capital punishment as a deterrent, impact of capital punishment on society, and regional differences in the use of capital punishment. Keywords: crime prevention; death penalty; punishment; sanction; utilitarianism

Models using rational choice and game theory as their starting point for the study of social norms are reviewed. Two models exploring how cooperation is possible under the assumption of the rationality of human decision-making are discussed. This approach largely relies on deterrence and the difference between centralized and distributed punishment is discussed.

Introduction DEFENDING RETRIBUTIVISM 1. Desert and the Justification of Punishment 2. Brute Retributivism INCOMPATIBILISM AND RETRIBUTIVISM 3. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishmen 4. Why Do We Resist Hard Incompatibilism? Thoughts on Freedom and Punishment COMPATIBILISM AND RETRIBUTIVISM 5. Criminal Common Law Compatibilism 6. Neuroscience, Normativity, and Retributivism 7. Cognitive Neuroscience, Moral Responsibility, and Punishment PUNISHMENT AND FOLK INTUITIONS 8. Free Will, Science, and Punishment 9. The Mind, the Brain, and the Law 10. Moralistic Punishment as a Crude Social Insurance Plan THE SCOPE OF JUSTIFIED PUNISHMENT 11. Punishing the Addict: Reflections on Gene Heyman 12. Free Will, Responsibility, and the Punishment of Criminals

Introduction 1. A Christian approach to punishment, Alan Duce 2. Punishment: a psychological perspective, L.R. Huesmann and C.L. Podolski 3. Lost youth and the futility of deterrence, Mark Fleisher 4. Punishment, markets, and the American model: an essay on a new American dilemma, Marcellus Andrews 5. States of insecurity: punishment, populism and contemporary political culture, Richard Sparks 6. Penal theory and penal practice: a communitarian approach, Nicola Lacey 7. Restorative justice and punishment, Richard Young and Carolyn Hoyle 8. The necessity of chance, Sean McConville

Several Supreme Court opinions that reject capital punishment specifically or retributive punishment generally as inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution characterize those practices as vengeance or as revenge. These opinions apparently reflect the premise that vengeance is self-evidently evil. Non-judicial participants in the legal, political, and public debates regarding capital punishment specifically or retributive punishment generally sometimes demonstrate a similar tendency to repudiate capital punishment or retributive punishment as revenge without further justification, suggesting that the mere characterization of behavior or of an institution as revenge is sufficient to establish that it is illegitimate. This Article examines the relevant passages in these opinions and the central notions at issue in order to distinguish several possible interpretations of the positions asserted. It then evaluates the broader interpretations in the context of one traditional moral theory. Finally, it clarifies the significance of this analysis for the underlying debate regarding the justification (or lack thereof) of retributive punishment generally or of capital punishment specifically.

In his 1979 lectures at the College de France, The Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault discussed and analyzed Gary Becker’s economic theory of crime and punishment, originally published in The Journal of Political Economy in 1968 under the title “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” In this historic, second encounter at the University of Chicago, Gary Becker responds to Foucault’s lectures and possible critical readings of his writings on crime and punishment, in conversation with Professors Francois Ewald (who was, at the time in 1979, Foucault’s assistant at the College and one of Foucault’s closest interlocutors) and Bernard Harcourt (a punishment theorist and an editor of Foucault’s lectures). The rich encounter explores potential overlaps, complementarities, and conflicts between Foucault’s theoretical work on punishment (both in Birth of Biopolitics and Discipline and Punish) and Becker’s economic theory of crime, builds on the previous confrontation over American neoliberalism, and provides a bridge between contemporary French philosophy and American economic theory.

Just as it was important in the previous chapter to articulate some desiderata of a theory of moral responsibility, it is also vital to elucidate some of the desiderata of a normative theory of punishment.1 First, it is desired that a theory of punishment provide a definition of “punishment” so as to avoid conceptual confusion. This leads naturally to a recognition of various senses of “punishment,” from imprisonment to physically hard treatment, compensation, among other means of dealing with criminals, each of which would properly constitute punishment. For some alleged theories of punishment which are proposed as positive theories (i.e., those which hold that punishment is sometimes morally justified) do not seem to be punishment theories at all, but something else, perhaps even negative theories of punishment (e.g., those which deny that punishment is ever morally justified). Second, it is desired that a theory of punishment respect John Rawls’ distinction between the justification of the institution of punishment and the justification of particular forms of punishment. For what justifies the former might not justify the latter, for example. It might well be the case that it is morally justified to punish criminals, but of the particular forms of punishment available for specific criminal cases, none is morally fitting. In any case, it is desired that a theory of punishment say what justifies punishment in both Rawlsian senses.

There seems to be nearly universal agreement that society cannot do without some form of criminal punishment. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that punishment, involving as it does the imposition of hardship and suffering, stands in need of justification. What form such a justification should take, however, is a matter of considerable contention, in part because of basic theoretical disagreements on the nature of moral obligation, and in part because of disagreements concerning the nature and purpose of criminal punishment itself.These disagreements have given rise to a number of rival ‘theories’ of punishment - rival accounts of the purposes of punishment and the conditions which justify it. The traditional theories can be broadly categorized as deterrence theories, incapacitation theories, retributive theories, and rehabilitative theories (broadly conceived to include moral education theories). My purpose here is to contribute to this discussion on punishment by introducing a largely overlooked theory of punishment, one whose outlines can be found in the writings of Simone Wei!, but which has yet to be fully developed and discussed. This theory, which I call the ‘reintegrative theory,’ has, I believe, a number of advantages over more traditional theories of punishment.

An integral part of any criminal law theory is punishment. Criminal law theory includes not only the law for imposing criminal liability but also the law of punishment. Punishment is the infliction of suffering on the offender for committing an offense. As discussed below, this definition is based on a retributive view of punishment. Three other views look at punishment from the perspective of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The type of punishment may vary in different societies and at different times, but its essence, an expression of condemnation for the commission of an offense, remains constant.

While much research shows that people punish free-riders, recent studies find evidence that people also engage in antisocial punishment. That is, they sometimes punish those who contribute generously to collective actions. Such sanctioning is puzzling because generous individuals increase the welfare of all group members. When and why are such individuals punished? In this paper, we propose that descriptive norms are part of the explanation. People may sanction those whose behavior is atypical – even when that behavior benefits the group. We test our theory with a laboratory experiment. We examine the effect of descriptive norms on sanctioning of generous and stingy deviants and find that descriptive norms encourage antisocial punishment, but not punishment of free-riders.

State execution is not a major part of America's system of criminal punishment, but it casts a long shadow over the principles and practices of the rest of criminal justice. This essay discusses four negative impacts of the death penalty on the larger system: (1) The hyper-extension of the substantive criminal law; (2) The symbolic transformation of harsh punishment to a private reward; (3) The creation and overuse of Life Without Possibility of Parole (LWOP) sentences; and (4) The diversion of legal and judicial resources from other pressing problems in the criminal system.

Policies against crime often focus on more extensive crime control schemes and more severe punishments (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001). Examples are the ‘zero tolerance’ policy or the program ‘three strikes and you’re out’ (Cohen, 1985; Dreher and Feltes, 1997; Austin et al., 1999; Zimring, 2001; Hudson, 2002).

The general public knows practically nothing about the prison and appears to be little concerned about how it is managed and how prisoners are treated. Not until the average man finds himself behind steel bars does he realise how indifferent he has been to a problem in which he should have felt himself vitally concerned. (Debs, 1927, p. 128) The above quotation is taken from the book Walls and Bars, by Eugene V. Debs, published in 1927. It is an unusual treatise within the literature on prisons.

Much of this book has thus far been concerned with demythologising the assumed purposes of the prison by highlighting its symbolic functions both as a place of punishment and as a mechanism through which dominant ideologies and existing political and economic structures are reinforced. It has also focused on revealing the role the prison is poised to play in socially and economically precarious, yet simultaneously more security- focused global conditions. This chapter moves on to consider, in more detail, the reasons why the failure of prisons and criminal justice systems remain obscured from public view and why it is that they are not the most effective means for responding to problems of harm and violence. To do so, it reflects on and grapples with a number of moral, philosophical and practical problems.

Punishment is a topic of increasing importance for citizens and policymakers. Why should we punish criminals? Which theory of punishment is most compelling? Is the death penalty ever justified? These questions and many others are addressed in this highly engaging guide.Punishment is a critical introduction to the philosophy of punishment, offering a new and refreshing approach that will benefit readers of all backgrounds and interests. The first critical guide to examine all leading contemporary theories of punishment, this book explores – among others – the communicative theory of punishment, restorative justice, and the unified theory of punishment. Thom Brooks examines several case studies in detail, including capital punishment, juvenile offending, and domestic abuse. Punishment highlights the problems and prospects of different approaches in order to argue for a more pluralistic and compelling perspective that is novel and groundbreaking.

This chapter sets out the problem of punishment. Punishment involves inflicting massive harm (loss of life, freedom, etc.) on many millions of people, yet we have no clear idea whether the practice is morally justified. Indeed, we have no clear idea as to the very purpose of punishment: do we punish to prevent crime? Or to give the criminal his “just deserts”? Or some combination of these two? Or something else? It is simply extraordinary that we continue to inflict these tremendous harms on people without even having a clear idea of why we are doing it. Even worse, the two leading theories of punishment (deterrence and retribution) are themselves morally problematic. Deterrence, a theory based on the utilitarian moral theory, is flatly inconsistent with basic moral principles in that it permits harming people as a means to a greater good. But retribution seems no better, for it seems to be gratuitous, pointless harm inflicted after the crime is already finished, and hence seems morally incomprehensible. The moral situation is so bad that a growing movement called Abolitionism has begun to call for the elimination of punishment, on moral grounds. It is the aim of this book to provide a new defense of the retributive theory that is consistent with moral principles.