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Das osterreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG, 1920) wurde um ein Jahr spater verabschiedet als die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (WRV, 1919). Wahrend der Verabschiedung beobachtete man sorgfaltig die verfassungsrechtlichen Entwicklungen in Deutschland, und an einigen Stellen (vor allem bezuglich der bundesstaatlichen Kompetenzordnung) wurden sogar Textstellen ubernommen. Den wichtigsten Einfluss auf das B-VG hat die WRV 1929 ausgeubt, als die bis dahin eindeutig parlamentarische Regierungsform des B-VG nach Weimarer Muster in eine halb-prasidentielle umgewandelt wurde. Diese Anderung war sowohl demokratietheoretisch, als auch verfassungspolitisch eine eindeutige Verschlechterung des ursprunglichen Konzeptes von 1920. Jedoch pragt diese Anderung bis heute das osterreichische Modell. Fecha de envio / Submission date: 29/04/2019 Fecha de aceptacion /Acceptance date: 14/05/2019

Las instituciones se elaboran como la interacción, de los siguientes tres componentes: reglas formales, practicas reales y narrativas (los dos últimos, las prácticas y las narrativas, se configuran conjuntamente como los «elementos informales»). Sin embargo, los juristas en los estados postsocialistas no ven la ley a través de la lente institucional, y a menudo alimentan una idea falsa y simplista de la ley: en tanto que la consideran como la suma de reglas, normalmente disociadas de su práctica real, de las normas y de las narrativas adjuntas (acompasando todo desde la razón de ser y la finalidad de la institución, su simbolismo, el discurso público que las rodea y las actitudes sociales respecto de la institución). Esta visión restrictiva hace a los juristas húngaros ciegos y en ciertas situaciones los deja indefensos ante las actuales tendencias totalitarias. El fortalecimiento institucional ha alcanzado un logro moderado en Hungría. Por decirlo de forma más pesimista, ha fallado parcialmente desde el fin del socialismo, particularmente en relación con las actuales prácticas y narrativas. En el contexto húngaro, las consideraciones sobre los problemas del fortalecimiento institucional sugieren dos conclusiones generales: de una parte, la falta de coherencia entre los elementos individuales (normas, prácticas y narrativas) conduce a unas instituciones menos estables y consecuentemente menos capaces de inducir a la observancia del Derecho; de otra parte, las instituciones que se han establecido han fallado en la tarea de brindar prosperidad a la comunidad política. Este trabajo describe la elaboración de la Constitución del 2010/2011 desde la perspectiva del fortalecimiento institucional. Esta aproximación institucionalista de carácter general ofrece dos conclusiones: (1) La experiencia histórica muestra que, más allá de una honesta determinación, una reforma institucional radical de todo el sistema jurídico legal solo puede tener éxito si existe presión internacional que, lamentablemente en este caso, ha disminuido desde la entrada Hungría en la Unión Europea. Esto es, el fortalecimiento institucional debe ir de la mano de las obligaciones tanto de la Unión Europea como internacionales, que han sido adoptadas en los momentos políticos más solemnes, a fin de garantizar que la comunidad política no pueda entrar posteriormente en un modo autodestructivo. (2) Es preciso tener en cuenta y de forma consciente aquellos elementos que están más allá de las reglas formales —como son las prácticas reales y las narrativas— tanto en el ámbito de la legislación, como en de la aplicación del Derecho o en el de la formación jurídica, ello dará como resultado un fortalecimiento paulatino de los elementos culturales sustantivos necesarios para el Estado de Derecho y la democracia. Esto requiere, sin embargo, de una acción política, más concretamente del ajuste de las reglas formales. En tanto que esto no forme parte del interés de los legisladores a quienes esta tarea incumbe, será poco probable superar el punto muerto en que nos encontramos.Institutions are made up of the interplay of three components: (1) formal rules, (2) actual practices and (3) narratives (the two latter ones are referred to jointly as informal institutional elements). However, lawyers in post-socialist countries do not see law through institutionalist lenses, but often nurture a false and simplistic idea of the law: they consider it to be the sum of rules, often disregarding the actual practices of the rules’ addressees and narratives attached to the law (encompassing everything from the raison d’etre and goal of the institution, its symbolism, the public discourse surrounding it, and social attitudes towards the institution). This restricted view makes Hungarian lawyers blind and to a certain extent also defenceless against recent authoritarian tendencies. Institution-building has been a moderately successful feat in Hungary. To put it more pessimistically, it has partially failed since the end of socialism, in particular when it comes to actual practices and narratives. In the Hungarian context, consideration of the problems of institution- building suggests two general conclusions: on the one hand, the lack of unison among the individual elements (rules, practices, narratives) renders institutions less stable and consequently less capable of inducing compliance with the law; on the other, the institutions that have been established have failed to deliver prosperityto the political community. This paper describes the constitution-making of 2010/11 from the perspective of institution-building. This institutionalist view of the law yields two main specific findings: (1) Historical experience shows that besides honest determination, the radical institutional overhaul of a complete legal system can only be successful in the presence of external pressure, the effect of which has unfortunately decreased with Hungary’s accession to the EU. That is, institution-building should go hand-in-hand with effective international and EU obligations undertaken in more sober political moments to guarantee that the political community will not later enter into a self-destructive mode. (2) Taking elements beyond mere rules more consciously into account, such as actual practices and narratives in the realm of legislation, the application of the law and legal training would ideally result in the gradual reinforcement of substantive cultural elements. This, however, requires political action, more precisely the adjustment of formal rules. Since this is not in the interest of the incumbent decision-makers, overcoming the impasse seems unlikely for the time being.

Constitutional reasoning can be approached from various perspectives, using tools and insights from a wide range of disciplines. While reflecting on the conceptions and perspectives featured in this Special Issue, this Foreword takes both a look back and a look ahead at the research on constitutional reasoning. We identify distinct research programmes and discuss new as well as older methodological approaches to the study of constitutional reasoning. Constitutional reasoning, we argue, is a multifaceted phenomenon, but one which, despite the vast literature it has fostered, remains only partially understood. Yet new research designs – combining a more comprehensive and comparative theoretical framework with new techniques for the analysis of legal texts – promise to advance substantially our understanding of constitutional discourse.

Hungarian constitutional law – New Basic Law – Continuity with the previous democratic Constitution – Vision of the political community embedded in the new Basic Law – The level of protection of fundamental rights – Continuity and lack of foreseeability in the organisation of the state – European legal procedures against or about Hungary – The life prospects of the new Basic Law – Danger of constitutional crisis whenever the government does not hold a constitution-amending majority

If the task of constitutional theory is to set out a language in which the discourse of constitutional law may be grounded, a question of the utmost importance is how this terminology is created, defined and interpreted. In this groundbreaking new work, András Jakab maps out and analyses the grammar and vocabulary on which the core European traditions of constitutional theory are based. He suggests understanding key constitutional concepts as responses to historical and present day challenges experienced by European societies. Drawing together a great and diverse range of literature, much of which has never before been touched upon by scholarship in the English language, Jakab reconceptualises and argues for a new understanding of European constitutional law discourse. In so doing he shines new light on what constitutes its distinctively European nature. This remarkable book is essential reading for all scholars and students of constitutional theory in Europe and beyond.

In the present paper I am going to analyse the discourse about the conflict between the rule of law and the responses to the terrorist challenge in the US and in Europe (especially in Germany).1 Besides showing that the structure of the discourse is complicated but also surprisingly similar, we are going to see what kind of implied presuppositions explain disagreements in the debates. I am also going to argue on a pragmatic2 basis that a new paradigm (or rather: loosening our idea) of the rule of law is unnecessary, even dangerous as we might be unable to tackle the original challenge for which rule of law was developed, namely the limitation of or fight against the arbitrary use of government power. Giving up this idea, especially an integral part of it, the prohibition of torture, would also endanger the identity of Western societies. In exceptional situations, on an ad hoc basis, the breach of constitutional requirements might, however, be morally justifiable in order to save lives or the constitution as a whole. But the illegality of these acts has to remain clear.

Namjera ovoga rada pokusaj je otkrivanja temelja dvaju sustava ustavnopravnog misljenja. U tom cilju dokazuju se sljedece hipoteze: (1) Teorijska podloga austrijske javnopravne doktrine kelzenovska je cista teorija prava, a temelji njemacke javnopravne doktrine određeni su smitovskim decizionizmom, smendovskom teorijom integracije i naravnim pravom. (2) Austrijska pravna doktrina, osobito u podrucju izvora prava i ustavnosudskog odlucivanja, vrlo je podrobno razrađena, ponekad cak i dosljednije od svojih njemackih pandana. (3) Na nekim je podrucjima, djelomicno uslijed pojacanog njemackog utjecaja, osebujnost austrijske javnopravne doktrine umanjena. Međutim, to ni na koji nacin ne podrazumijeva isceznuce njezinih specificnih obilježja; zamijetiti se može tek određeni stupanj približavanja (konvergencije). (4) Naposlijetku, ne zbog razlicitih opojmovljenja prava, nego jednostavnom povijesnom i politickom slucajnoscu, pojavila su se i neka neocekivana doktrinarna rjesenja. Zakljucno, u svjetlu izloženih razlika između austrijskog i njemackog pravnog sustava kao međusobno bliskih, bit ce izneseno i stajaliste o izgledima za nastanak zajednicke europske javnopravne doktrine.

LB

Social function of sovereignty – Taming sovereignty through compromise strategies – The sharing strategy – The creation of a new unreal bearer of sovereignty – Leaving sovereignty itself untouched but forbidding the use of it – Abolishing the concept – Redefining the concept – Challenges to the Westphalian paradigm of international legal sovereignty – National answers to the challenges put by European integration – A new compromise formula – Neutralizing the sovereignty question.