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Insufficient attention has been given in cost-benefit analysis to whose benefits are to be counted. Foreigners, illegal aliens, fetuses, and criminals are problematic cases. Persons or entities may be given “standing” by participation in decision processes; by having their preferences counted, if meaningful preferences exist; by having their welfare counted, if they cannot express their preferences; or by representation by others whom they do not choose. Problems of standing arise in the valuation of life, the consideration of future generations and nonhuman entities, and equity weighting. These problem may be treated by altering the scope of the expert community or by interaction between that community and the political community. They are not always resolvable, but should be treated more explicitly.

The traditional theory of family labor supply based on utility maximization subject to a budget constraint implies that there is a reduced form relationship between hours supplied by family members and the market wages of individual workers and family nonlabor income. Using this theory, and assuming that families do not regard taxes as payment for collective goods, Kosters [11] has analyzed effects of the personal income tax on family labor supply by converting the tax into a change in wage rates at the marginal tax rate. This technique is appropriate for a proportional tax but not for a progressive income tax in which average and marginal rates diverge. Using other approaches to the determination of labor supply behavior, Hall [7] and Wales [12] have developed appropriate procedures for dealing with the effects of a personal income tax. Hall develops a model in which labor supply is a function of primary and secondary worker wages and family wh le income, where whole income is the sum of non-labor income and family earnings calculated under the assumption that ach wo ker is employed full time. Hall adjusts for the presence of the personal income tax by interpreting the tax as a combined wage tax at the marginal tax rate and lump sum tax reducing whole income. The lump sum tax is equal to the total tax that would be paid if gross income were equal to whole come nd if the prevailing marginal tax rate remained constant for all higher levels of income. Following Cooper [5], Wales [12] handles a progressive income tax by maximizing n explicit utility function for a single worker family subject to a budget constraint that includes the tax schedule. He rejects the reduced form estimation apoach because "it is not clear how the afterax wage rate and the gross wage rate would be incorporated in an ad hoc reduced form regression analysis." The purpose of this paper is to present the generalized analysis of reduced form labor supply functions in the presence of a progressive income tax. We demonstrate that within

Twenty years ago the publication of Toward a Social Report by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare was hailed as a major forward step in developing indicators of conditions in society into a national system of social accounting of relevance to public policy. The resulting social indicators movement quickly mobilized able social scientists to produce a variety of indicators monitoring trends in their society, and internationally. National governments too began to sponsor new types of social reports. The years since have seen an apparent decline in the momentum of the social indicators movement. Hence, to evaluate developments, the Journal of Public Policy invited a number of distinguished pioneers in the movement in Europe and America to give their individual assessment of what has happened to social indicators.

The model describes the demand and supply of low-skill labor (private household workers, other service workers, and nonfarm laborers) by state. The parameters of the model are estimated primarily with data aggregated from the March 1970 Current Population Survey for 43 states and groups of states by a simultaneous-equations method. The estimates indicate that demand is slightly inelastic, while both primary (heads of families) and secondary (other family workers) supplies are backward bending, with the large states being on the negatively sloped range. For all but the smallest states, the explanatory power of the model as a whole in 1969 is good. The incidence of poverty in the United States has proved remarkably resistent to a variety of social programs designed to narrow income disparities among families. It is partly for this reason that there is widespread interest in new approaches to closing the poverty gap. The negative income tax, family allowances, wage subsidies, and training subsidies are among the most widely discussed of these approaches. Central issues in nearly all discussions are the effect Dr. Crandall is in the Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. MacRae is on the Senior Research Staff of the Urban Institute; and Dr. Yap is in the Department of Economics of the State University of New York at Binghamton. * This research was supported by funds from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, and the Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Urban Institute, U.S. Department of Labor, or U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. We wish to thank Christine deFontenay and Christopher Gibbons for proficuous programming assistance and Judith Greenwald and Valerie James for valuable research assistance. We are grateful to Herrington Bryce, Alan Fechter, Charles Holt, and Terence Kelly for helpful comments. [Manuscript received October 1973; accepted June 1974.] The Journal of Human Resources * X * 1 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.120 on Wed, 14 Sep 2016 05:49:23 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 4 I THE JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES of such proposals upon the incentive to work and the distribution of the benefits and costs of these programs between the subsidized and unsubsidized. Many of the uncertainties surrounding new proposals for social programs may be traced to lack of information on very basic parameters of low-skill labor markets. The poor are poor in part because they have little human capital and are, therefore, relegated to lower skill jobs. In order to evaluate the aggregate work incentive effect of any direct income maintenance program information on the wage and income responses of the low-skill labor supply is needed. Similarly, if the choice of policy instrument is to be wage or training subsidies, knowledge of lowand intermediate-skill labor demand elasticities would be especially useful. Moreover, when the choice among competing strategies to raise incomes of the poor must be made, a consistent framework in which to evaluate demand-oriented and supply-oriented programs is crucial. Much of our empirical knowledge about labor market parameters has been derived from separate studies of either demand or supply, but few studies have attempted to estimate a market model of demand and supply utilizing simultaneous-equation techniques.1 This is particularly true of the market for lowskill labor, the market most relevant for an evaluation of policies dealing with poverty. Clearly, a complete, detailed model of the operation of labor markets in these skill categories is needed if sound judgments on the wage and employment effects of alternative policy strategies are to be reached. The purpose of this paper is to develop an econometric model of the low-skill labor market. We begin by reviewing the labor demand and supply theory which is used in formulating the model. The data and method of estimation employed in the model are described. Then we present the parameter estimates and compare the values predicted by the entire model with the actual values used to estimate the model.

Electronic computation allows cliques or subgroups within a larger group to be separated by "direct" factor analysis of sociometric choices, followed by analytic rotation. Information on the positions of individuals within subgroups is also provided by this procedure, which is illustrated here with a group numbering 67. Existing computer routines permit extension to groups as large as 125; the principles may be extended to larger groups by additional programming. Most previous work on the identification of cliques or subgroups has centered about the linkage structure of the larger group; proposed methods have included graph theory (9, 10, 11) and raising the sociomatrix to higher powers (17). Computer programming of these methods for large groups becomes difficult because in principle they require storage capacity that increases rapidly with the number of links in the graph, or with the power of the matrix. It has also been proposed that rows and columns of the sociomatrix be permuted so as to bring choices nearer to the main diagonal (1), but computer programming of several methods of this type has shown that they do not always reveal subgroups satisfactorily (6). These difficulties can be circumvented by factorial examination of similarity of choices given or received by group members, a method used by Bock and Husain (2) and Gouldner (8), and discussed by Glanzer and

deviance and deviant behavior in a preliminary way. There are at least two directions in which it can be explored. First, the main components and types of deviance and of deviant behavior, as analyzed by Parsons in The Social System, should be systematically studied in their relation to various types of reference group behavior. Second, looking into the development of deviant reference group orientations, and identification with them should prove fruitful. It seems that here, once more, an analysis in terms of communication, and similar terms, may be very profitable.

WITH THE GROWING UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONTROL of aggregate demand is limited in its ability to regulate both unemployment and inflation has come the recognition that structural changes in the economy must be sought if continuing full employment and price stability are to be obtained. Our work at the Urban Institute supports this conclusion and has convinced us that structural changes in the labor market are essential to the resolution of the inflation-unemployment dilemma.'

In a rapidly advancing scientific discipline, new contributions will supersede older ones. This selection in favor of recent literature should be observable in the distribution of footnote citations in a given discipline, by age of article cited. However, the age distribution of citations also depends on the rate of growth of the disciplinary literature. The effects of growth of the literature and of selection favoring recent articles can be separated, if certain assumptions hold, by use of an exponential model that expands and clarifies earlier findings by Price. This model provides a reasonably good fit to age-distributions of footnotes in several disciplines, and its application suggests that citations in sociology tend to refer to older articles than those in the natural sciences. A parameter in the model, measuring the degree of selectivity in favor of recent articles, can be estimated and may be useful in comparative studies of the communication systems of various disciplines.

The advantages of defining thermodynamic temperature in terms of entropy are believed greatly to exceed its disadvantages.