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We develop new aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) growth estimates for the USA between 1899 and 1941, and sectoral estimates at the most disaggregated level so far, 38 industries. We include hard-to-measure services, and a refined measure of sectoral labour quality growth. The resulting data set supersedes Kendrick (1961), showing TFP growth lower than previously thought, broadly based across industries, and strongly variant intertemporally. The four ‘great inventions’ that Gordon (2016) highlighted were important but less dominant in TFP growth than their predecessors in the British industrial revolution. The findings also make it unlikely the 1930s had the twentieth century's highest TFP growth.

We develop new aggregate and sectoral Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimates for the United States between 1899 and 1941 through better coverage of sectors and better-measured labor quality, and find TFPgrowth was lower than previously thought, broadly based across sectors, and strongly variant intertemporally. We then test and reject three prominent claims. First, the 1930s did not have the highest TFP-growth of the twentieth century. Second, TFP-growth was not predominantly caused by four ‘great inventions’. Third, TFPgrowth was not driven indirectly by spillovers from great inventions such as electricity. Instead, the creativedestruction-friendly American innovation system was the main productivity driver

We develop new aggregate and sectoral Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimates for the United States between 1899 and 1941 through better coverage of sectors and better measured labor quality, and show TFP-growth was lower than previously thought, broadly based across sectors, strongly variant intertemporally, and consistent with many diverse sources of innovation. We then test and reject three prominent claims. First, the 1930s did not have the highest TFP-growth of the twentieth century. Second, TFP-growth was not predominantly caused by four leading sectors. Third, TFP-growth was not caused by a ‘yeast process’ originating in a dominant technology such as electricity.

This is a revised version of a previous working paper, of the same name, which incorporates corrections to errors in our estimates of TFP growth. This paper examines major privately-owned British railway companies before World War I. Quantitative evidence is presented on return on capital employed, total factor productivity growth, cost inefficiency, and speed of passenger services. There were discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and TFP typically fell during our period. Cost inefficiency rose before 1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse loomed. Without the discipline of either strong competition or effective regulation, managerial failure was common. This sector is an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late-Victorian Britain did not fail.

This paper explores the location of industry in pre-World-War-I Britain using a model that takes account both of factor endowment and also of new economic geography influences. Broadly speaking, the pattern of industrial location in this period was quite persistent and regional specialization changed little. The econometric results show that factor endowments had much stronger effects than proximity to markets, although the latter was an attraction for industries with large plant size. Overall, falling transport costs had relatively little effect on industrial location at a time when proximity to natural resources, notably coal, mattered most.

This paper revisits the issue of the productivity performance of pre-World War I Britain’s railway system with an improved dataset and with modern time-series econometrics. We find a slowdown in TFP growth between 1850 and 1870, after which it stabilized at about 1.1%. An analysis of company-level productivity rejects the claims that there was a regulation-induced revival of productivity performance in the railway sector after 1900 but, on the other hand, it supports the claim that there was some managerial failure during the period.

This paper constructs measures of market potential for British regions based on the spatial distribution of GDP and its accessibility. The results show that the North, Scotland and Wales were much less 'peripheral' before World War I than in 1985. The main reason for the deterioration in their position was changing transport costs. The marginalization of coastal shipping and the rise of road haulage had markedly accentuated the 'peripherality' of outer Britain by 1931. The sensitivity of market potential to changes in relative transport costs has gone unnoticed but it underlines the danger of conflating 'peripherality' with competitiveness.

The paper builds on a method proposed by Geary and Stark (2002) for estimating regional incomes in Victorian Britain. This is modified by using tax data to allocate non-wage income across regions. The results suggest that the coefficient of variation of regional GDP per head was rising rapidly prior to World War I in similar fashion to the late twentieth century such that its level in 1911 and 2001 was about the same. In both episodes of globalization there were big winners and big losers among British regions.

This paper uses a stochastic cost frontier model to investigate the efficiency of Britain’s private railways during the period 1893-1912. We find that there was substantial inefficiency in the industry with no sign of reduction over time. Our main conclusion is that principal agent problems were pervasive in railway management at this time. Our results suggest that private ownership per se is not sufficient to promote efficiency in the railway industry; it should be supported by competition for franchises and price-capping regulation as in the 1990s.

We find little support for the Schumpeterian hypothesis of a positive relationship between market power and innovation in 1950’s Britain even though many economists and policymakers accepted it at the time. Pricefixing agreements were very widespread prior to the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act and they seem to have had adverse effects on costs and productivity. Competition policy appears to have been much too lenient but the productivity problems of British industry at this time are best viewed as arising largely from the difficulties of reaping the benefits of innovation rather than from a failure to innovate per se.

This paper examines major privately-owned British railway companies before World War I. Quantitative evidence is presented on return on capital employed, total factor productivity growth, cost inefficiency, and speed of passenger services. There were discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and TFP typically fell during our period. Cost inefficiency rose before 1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse loomed. Without the discipline of either strong competition or effective regulation, managerial failure was common. This sector is an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late-Victorian Britain did not fail.

The paper sets out estimates for various aspects of well-being during British industrialisation. Judgements about changes in living standards are shown to be sensitive to weighting procedures. It is argued that recent participants in the famous standards of living controversy have assigned undue importance to trends in heights and that concern for quality of life rather than real wages need not imply a pessimistic view of changes in aggregate well-being during the industrial revolution. Urban mortality experience is shown to be the least satisfactory aspect of well-being and it is suggested that this reflects difficulties of financing local public goods.

This paper argues that a geographical perspectie is fundamental to understanding comparative economic development in the context of globalization. Central to this view is the role of agglomeration in productivity performance; size and location matter. The tools of the new economic geography are used to illuminate important epidsodes when the relative position of major eeconmies radically changed; the rise of the United States at the beginning and of East Asia at the end of the twentieth century. It is suggested that while lack of high quality institutions has been a major reason for falling behind geographic disadvantage also merits attention.