201. Taxation, Information, and Withholding : Evidence from Costa Rica
- Author
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Brockmeyer, Anne and Hernandez, Marco
- Subjects
COMMUNICATIONS ,TAX COMPLIANCE ,TAX RATES ,INVESTMENT ,TAX ,TAX LIABILITIES ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ,MARGINAL TAX RATES ,DIVIDEND TAX ,ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ,TAX CREDITS ,CREDIT CARD ,OPTIMAL TAXATION ,TAX PAYERS ,RISK AVERSION ,CORPORATION TAX ,INCOME ,BORDER TAXES ,INSTRUMENT ,FEDERAL RESERVE ,MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY ,TAX STRUCTURES ,TAXPAYER ,PERSONAL INCOME ,CORPORATE TAXATION ,TAX RETURN ,WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ,RETURNS ,SAVINGS ACCOUNTS ,SHARES ,TRANSACTIONS ,ADDED TAX ,GOODS ,RETIREMENT SAVINGS ,RENT ,TAX COLLECTION ,CHECK ,INTERESTS ,PAYMENT METHODS ,TAX LIABILITY ,INTERNAL REVENUE ,INCOMES ,HOLDING ,TAX REFORM ,REMITTANCE ,CREDITORS ,AUCTION ,FINANCE ,SALE OF GOODS ,TAX REVENUE ,VALUE ADDED TAX ,LEVIES ,LIABILITIES ,LABOR MARKET ,PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS ,DEFAULTS ,SALES TAX ,COMPLIANCE GAPS ,LIQUIDITY ,DUMMY VARIABLE ,CORPORATE INCOME TAX ,INCOME LEVELS ,TRADE ,CORPORATE TAX ,TAX RETURNS ,MARKET ,DIVIDEND ,SAVING ,TAX INCENTIVE ,PROPERTY ,BUSINESS TAX ,AUCTIONS ,RETURN ,TAX RATE ,ENFORCEMENT ,TAX SYSTEMS ,TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE ,DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ,TAX BRACKETS ,CAPITAL TAX ,AUDITS ,PROPERTY TAXES ,CUSTOMERS ,TAX ENFORCEMENT ,TAXPAYERS ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,TAX BASE ,FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ,EXCHANGE ,TAXATION ,INCOME TAX ,EXPORTS ,WEALTH TAX ,PROPERTY TAX ,GOVERNANCE ,TAX SALES ,PAYMENT OBLIGATION ,DEDUCTIONS ,OUTPUT ,RESERVE ,LIABILITY ,ASSESSMENT ,TRANSACTIONS COSTS ,REVENUE ,TAXABLE INCOME ,TAXES ,TAX REPORTS ,PERSONAL INCOME TAX ,GOVERNMENT REVENUE ,DEFAULT ,LATE PAYMENTS ,PUBLIC FINANCE ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,INTERNATIONAL BANK ,CASH TRANSACTIONS ,FUTURE ,DERIVATIVE ,INTEREST ,POWER PARITY ,INPUT TAX ,SAVINGS ,TAX AUDIT ,TRANSACTION COST ,TAXABLE ACTIVITIES ,DEBTORS ,TAX ADMINISTRATION ,CHECKS ,SHARE ,AUDIT ,INCOME VOLATILITY ,TAX EVASION ,COMPLIANCE GAP ,VOLATILITY ,TAX SYSTEM ,TRANSACTION - Abstract
This paper studies tax withholding on business sales, a widely used compliance mechanism which is largely ignored by public finance theory. The study introduces a withholding scheme, whereby the payer in a transaction collects tax from the payee, in a standard evasion model. If the taxpayer can fully reclaim the tax withheld, withholding is irrelevant to her evasion decision. If reclaim is costly, however, withholding establishes a compliance default. To show this empirically, the analysis exploits a ten-year panel of registration, income tax and sales tax records from 400,000 firms in Costa Rica, and over 20 million third-party information and withholding reports. The paper first documents the anatomy of compliance, providing novel measures of compliance gaps on the extensive, intensive and payment margins. It then shows that interventions leveraging the existing third-party information reduce these compliance gaps only marginally. Coverage by a withholding scheme, in contrast, is correlated with higher reported taxable income both across firms and within firms across time. Quasi-experimental estimations show that a doubling of the withholding rate leads to a 40 percent increase in tax payment among treated firms and a 10 percent increase in aggregate revenue. The mechanisms are incomplete reclaim of the tax withheld and reduced misreporting.
- Published
- 2016