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The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) has generated much excitement inside and outside the scientific community, and seems to many the leading contender for a satisfactory theory grounded in systems neuroscience. It is a bold theory, one that provides plausible explanations for various recognized neuroscientific facts, makes surprising predictions that go beyond current scientific orthodoxy but are potentially testable, and has inspired development of what appears to be an effective technique for detecting the presence of consciousness in organisms incapable of verbal report, such as non-human animals, neonates, and severely brain-damaged adults. Despite these virtues, IIT appears fundamentally flawed: This paper first revisits some key conceptual and technical issues that have been raised previously but remain unresolved—in particular, issues concerning IIT’s concept of “information” and its approach to the “hard problem”—and then focuses on several empirical phenomena that IIT seems unable to handle satisfactorily. These include: 1. cases of multiple personality or dissociative identity disorder in which complex and overlapping centers of consciousness co-occur in single human organisms; 2. the failure of the intense phenomenology of psychedelic states to be straightforwardly reflected in accompanying neuroelectric activity; and, most critically; 3. the occurrence of profound and personally transformative near-death experiences (NDEs) under extreme physiological conditions such as cardiac arrest, in which IIT predicts that no conscious experience whatsoever should be possible. These empirical arguments show that IIT itself is untenable, and they apply also to its physicalist competitors. Scientifically and philosophically respectable alternatives, however, are available.

Moral panic studies embodies a stubborn paradox. On the one hand, the field is characterized by a steady accumulation of conventional paradigmatic research. The central limitation of paradigmatic research is that it hinges on reductively negative normative judgements to denounce ostensibly regressive moral panics. On the other hand, a growing number of revisionists is laying the groundwork for a paradigm shift. They are doing so by deconstructing and reconstructing the conventional paradigm's normative orientation. Although revisionists propose ways to move beyond naïve forms of normative reductivism in the conventional paradigm, they have been unable to completely reconcile the normative tensions running through moral panic studies. To organize the normative aspects of moral panic studies in a way that lessens the distance between the two perspectives, this article sketches the parameters for an overtly normative framework. Owing to the fact that moral panic studies is, as it has always been, a normative field of inquiry, an explicit but reflexive two-pronged normative framework is proposed to help moral panic studies respond to overlapping charges of normative reductionism, paradigmatic rigidity, and, ultimately, analytical irrelevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that, on a reductionist reading of Buddhist no-self ontology, Buddhists could not have sincere ethical intentions toward persons. And if Buddhists cannot have sincere intentions toward persons, they cannot have second-personal moral reasons for acting. From this I conclude that Buddhists fail to qualify as genuine members of the moral community if, as some contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophers argue, such membership depends on an individual agent's having the capacity to be motivated by second-personal moral reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While respecting the ontological assumption of the unconscious, the author systematically critiques the concept of the death drive. It clashes with the dictates of contemporary biology, disrupting communication between disciplines. In clinical application, the death drive as metaphor demonstrates little utility. It also invites reductionism, risking oversimplification of extremely complex phenomena like aggression. Perhaps most importantly, the construct places the entire psychoanalytic project, already in an existential crisis, in peril. The author briefly introduces a complex alternative view of aggression, driven solely by eros but involving many complicated intrapsychic, interpersonal, and sociocultural factors. He suggests the death drive, however thoughtfully utilized, hinders the forward movement of psychoanalysis for reasons of consilience, incommensurability, clinical utility, cross-disciplinary communication, and political survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the courageous concept of Western philosophy as causa sui, there is much evidence of a significant exchange of thoughts between Europe and the Orient in the early modern period. In David Hume's case, the Oriental influence was long ignored, but in recent decades several studies have highlighted significant affinities between Hume's ideas and those of Buddhism. In what follows, I'll try to show, rethinking Humean and Buddhist no-self, why A. Gopnik's "Jesuits hypothesis" is more plausible than the explanation which connects both conceptions via Pyrrhonian skepsis. Regardless of both hypotheses, I offer some arguments in favour of spontaneous convergence with no need for the intercultural transfer of thoughts, and point out some problematic aspects of a thought which promotes (with no good reasons) an impersonal description of our lives above that which is based on our intuitions and first-person perspective characterized by the sense of self and ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a brief philosophical introduction to, and an annotated translation of, the section on absence from Śālikanātha's Pramāṇapārāyaṇa (Study of the Instruments of Knowledge), a foundational work of Prābhākara epistemology. In this section, which focuses on the epistemology of absence, Śālikanātha argues against the Bhāṭṭa view that there is a sui generis instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which we learn of absence (abhāva). He does so by arguing for a subjective reductionist thesis about absence, according to which the absence of a perceivable (dṛśya) object at a locus is identical with a positive state of awareness (buddhi) whose content includes the locus but not the perceivable object. If correct, Śālikanātha argues, we should therefore learn of absence in the same ways we acquire self-knowledge more generally. While developing his reductionism about absence, Śālikanātha responds to a range of concerns, including the objection that his view cannot explain causation by absence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of mechanistic explanation in neuroscience has been a subject of recent discussion. There is a lot of interest in understanding what these explanations involve. Furthermore, there is disagreement about whether neurological mechanisms themselves should be viewed as reductionist in nature. In this paper I will explain how these two issues are related. I will, first, describe how mechanisms support a form of antireductionism. This is because the mechanisms that exist should be seen as involving part-whole relations, where the behavior of a whole is more than the sum of its parts. After this, I will consider mechanistic explanations and how they can be understood. While some people think the explanations concern existing entities in the world, I will argue that we can understand the explanations by viewing them in terms of arguments. Despite the fact that it is possible to understand mechanistic explanations in this manner, the antireductionist point remains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the transmethodical rhizomatic inquiry with the complex transparadigm, and the transmethod rhizomatic deconstruction, planetary decoloniality is analyzed - complexity theory as apodictic of liberation, and anthropophagy? In the reconstruction, onto-epistemological essences hidden in coloniality are released, such as reductionism, the oppression of the research subject and other prohibitions that distorted and mechanized our way of living on Earth; that camouflage themselves in decoloniality. Complexity theory is not anti-analytic, it is not anti-disjunctive. Exclusions that we cannot commit. We embrace liberation in every way on the planet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Enlightenment, reductionism has been an important part of the development of science and civilization. The process of abstracting features of the world and reducing them to their most basic components has greatly increased our grasp of the physical and chemical rules that govern physical reality at all levels. However, central aspects of reductionism have been challenged with the growing literature on religious/spiritual experiences after near-death experiences (NDEs) that challenge standard reductionistic models of the brain. In this paper, an alternative model of emergent dualism is proposed for examining NDEs and the mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fifth chapter of Experience Embodied is devoted to Herder's theory of cognition and the epistemic merits of the capacity for 'sympathy', or 'empathy' – what Herder calls Einfühlung, and which Waldow renders more accurately as 'affective immersion'. I situate Waldow's reading of Herder as a member of the epistemological tradition within the debate on Herder's relationship to the Enlightenment. Waldow's reading, I contend, is congruent with the view of Herder as an Enlightenment, rather than anti-Enlightenment, figure. I focus on what Waldow calls 'the problem of the conceivability of difference' (Waldow 2020, 185) and how she charts Herder's proposed method of Einfühlung and the need for 'affective immersion' to address this problem. However, I also identify three potential problems, which Waldow does not address, that can arise when Einfühlung is taken too far: the first is that it may lead to relativism, and thus to incoherence; the second is reductionism, which can eliminate, rather than draw attention to, difference – thereby achieving the opposite goal; while the third is that relying solely on Einfühlung as a method can lead us into error, as it is speculative and lacks an external truth criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term neuroscience originated in the early 1960s, but the questions it asks date to antiquity. The nineteenth-century reticular view of the brain as a diffuse net-like synctium was negated by the neuron doctrine, but certain aspects (e.g. glial cells) are better described as a synctium. System views of the brain were popular in the first half of the twentieth century, but a reductionist focus has since dominated with the development of experimental tools that focus on components. This article will begin by considering twentieth-century views of both philosophers and scientists that highlight the tension between integrating in a field while retaining the ability to think critically. This will be illustrated by considering two common assumptions in neuroscience: that reductionist approaches will explain the brain; and the technological metaphor that sees the brain as a computer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical reductionism is a program based on the claim that the sole relevant information in the sphere of practical deliberation (and of its moral evaluation) is how good the envisaged action is, while the other traditional concepts offering practical and moral orientation - especially virtues - are at best superfluous (if they recommend the same as the inquiry of goodness) and in all other cases unintelligible and harmful (in so far as they pretend to be something good but recommend suboptimal action). Practical reductionism can be utilitarian, if the sole or dominant criterion of goodness is utility, and it can be cognitively optimistic, if it counts with the possibility to achieve perfect knowledge of the good itself and of the situation in which it should be applied. Such utilitarian and cognitively optimistic practical reductionism is a main topic in Plato's Laches, and it (or some of its relatives) is present in several other dialogues, notably in the Charmides and the Protagoras. My aim in this paper is to elaborate the concept of practical reductionism (in close regard to the Laches), to show its presence in some other texts, and finally to consider the philosophical contribution of such a bizarre thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the nature of the relationship between mental processes and activity in the brain is not the prerogative of philosophers. All professional scientists involved in studying the human brain must, one way or another, decide this question for themselves. The dominant approach in the modern scientific worldview is reductionism, which holds that mental states can in principle be reduced to activity in the brain. Here I review some of the data obtained in recent years that shed light on the nature of the relationship between the content of mental processes and cerebral activity. These data on the encoding of sensory and semantic linguistic information, as well as more complex information related to the content of abstract concepts, show that the cerebral activity accompanying the extraction of meaning is widely distributed and probabilistic in nature and does not correspond to the nature of mental content, which is generally certain and holistic. Thus, currently available empirical data indicate that reductionism cannot reasonably be seen as a viable option and the only variant possible within the framework of materialism is that of recognizing mentality as an emergent entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the literature on complexity and macroeconomic models by exploring the analytical relationship and tensions between complex phenomena and macroeconomics. By evaluating the properties of organised complexity, this article suggests alternative strategies for analysing the macroeconomy. Drawing on F. A. Hayek's notion of organised complexity, I examine how its causal properties relate to the analytical criteria and assumptions that contemporary macroeconomic models use. The purpose is twofold: first, I associate the properties of complexity to the idea of the macroeconomy as an emergent totality arising from the causal interplay between individuals and the organising structure. This conceptually challenges modern macro and frames analytical tensions between complexity and macroeconomic analysis. Second, introducing complexity facilitates breaking away from current analytical and conceptual straitjackets in macroeconomics. Economic inquiry requires looking for alternative ways beyond standard models to analyse the macroeconomy as an emergent totality. This suggests stepping away from current formalistic methods and radical reductionism, in favour of unconventional strategies and approaches that are sensitive to rules, structures, and the causal properties of organised complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eudaimonia , that is, the experience of flourishing and welfare at the center of Greek philosophical investigations, describes the qualitative experience of being able to feel well in our bodies. Reductionism in medicine as well as in philosophy would instead reduce well-being to a set of standards that the human body or its mind must meet in order to be recognized as functioning. This journal issue, dedicated to a phenomenological approach in bioethics, represents a way to overcome this dangerous constraint thanks to the methodological support of the phenomenological investigations. The authors invited to write in this journal issue will tackle the problem of reductionism in bioethics through a phenomenological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke's argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, complexity theory, which is designed to deal with systems of multiple interdependent variables, has been increasingly applied to analyse and shed light on various aspects of education. So far, however, complexity theory has rarely been used, if at all, to examine questions related to educational justice. This article offers a theoretical examination of some possible links between complexity theory and distributive justice in education. It asks how accepting the premise that education is a complex dynamic system should shape the way distributive justice in education is conceptualized and approached. It is argued that complexity theory challenges many assumptions on which the dominant approach for dealing with distributive justice in education rests. The article focuses on three subjects that stem from complexity theory but have implications for dealing with distributive justice in education: system diversity, reductionism, and change. Each of these subjects is examined separately, and some possible contributions of complexity theory to illuminating these subjects in relation to distributive justice in education are discussed. The article ends with a brief illustration of where a complexity-based approach to educational justice leads that focuses on school choice and contrasts it with Brighouse's views on this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to argue that our understanding of the issue of institutional group minds might be broadened if we consider alternative meta-metaphysical frameworks to those which are presently presupposed in the field. I argue that the two major camps in the contemporary philosophical debate about group beliefs, namely strong realism and eliminative reductionism, share a commitment to some form of meta-philosophical realism. Two alternative metaontological frameworks for the discussion of the issue of group belief are outlined: fictionalism and deflationism. Fictionalism about group minds, although unpopular in the philosophical debate, is still a much-discussed option in legal theory and the theory of the firm in economics. I argue that, once formulated properly, the fictionalist position deserves serious consideration. The other alternative option is deflationism: I develop a sketch of the deflationary approach to group beliefs that is based on Thomasson's approach to the existence of groups. The final parts of the paper are devoted to a discussion of the resulting four-element classification of the possible views on the reality of group minds: realism, eliminative reductionism, fictionalism, and deflationism. I offer some proposals with regard to the criteria that might be used to choose between these theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'First impressions' are a popular topic in social psychology. They are researched because the initial judgments of others are consequential in everyday life (such as job interviews, first dates, justice outcomes). In the context of broader concerns about the credibility of psychological science, first impressions research has developed commendable initiatives for improving reliability (open stimulus databases, international collaborations, replication studies and reanalyses). However, these initiatives can impact the validity of studying how people form first impressions. There is a long history of critiquing the usefulness of passive-observer judgments of controlled, reduced, presentations of people—and these concerns are still relevant today. Here, we highlight the praiseworthy practices improving reliability in first impressions research, before moving on to identify persistent methodological concerns in the field. This includes inadequate stimulus sampling and diversity, constrained participant response options, limited consideration of study context, and limitations of atomised presentations of target people. We identify how these methodological limitations impact theory development, how we might be over/underestimating everyday experience, and even misunderstanding social differences in autism and mental health. Finally, we identify opportunities for methodological reform, focusing on codifying instead of controlling interactions, promoting inductive, participant-led, methodologies, and asking for stronger theory development and clarity on 'can' vs. 'do' research questions. Overall, we praise reforms for improving the reliability of first impressions research, but improvements to making scientific predictions about first impressions require renewed consideration of validity. Highlights: First impressions research has responded to the replication crisis in many ways, including making stimulus sets open, sharing data for re-analysis, replication studies, and worldwide collaborations. However, the validity of common paradigms might be questioned given the asocial nature of participants observing and forced-responding to restricted, atomised, stimuli. We need to consider validity in first impressions as we lack models which can be readily applied to everyday experiences—and we may even be misunderstanding social differences such as in autism and mental health. We encourage researchers to consider validity and ask if they are studying 'can' or 'do' questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that complexity scientists have been searching for a universal complexity in the form of a “theory of everything” since some important theoretical breakthroughs such as Bertalanffy’s general systems theory, Wiener’s cybernetics, chaos theory, synergetics, self-organization, self-organized criticality and complex adaptive systems, which brought the study of complex systems into mainstream science. In this respect, much attention has been paid to the importance of a “reductionist complexity science” or a “reductionist theory of everything”. Alternatively, many scholars strongly argue for a holistic or emergentist “theory of everything”. The unifying characteristic of both attempts to account for complexity is an insistence on one robust explanatory framework to describe almost all natural and socio-technical phenomena. Nevertheless, researchers need to understand the conceptual historical background of “complexity science” in order to understand these longstanding efforts to develop a single all-inclusive theory. In this theoretical overview, I address this underappreciated problem and argue that both accounts of the “theory of everything” seem problematic, as they do not seem to be able to capture the whole of reality. This realization could mean that the idea of a single omnipotent theory falls flat. However, the prospects for a “holistic theory of everything” are much better than a “reductionist theory of everything”. Nonetheless, various forms of contemporary systems thinking and conceptual tools could make the path to the “theory of everything” much more accessible. These new advances in thinking about complexity, such as “Bohr’s complementarity”, Morin’s Complex thinking, and Cabrera’s DSRP theory, might allow the theorists to abandon the EITHER/OR logical operators and start thinking about BOTH/AND operators to seek reconciliation between reductionism and holism, which might lead them to a new “theory of everything”.

Literary criticism and theory, due to its interdisciplinary approach, often encompasses literary, philosophical, social, and historical concepts. This makes understanding theories and applying them to literary texts complex and difficult. Against this background, Issa Amankhani's book "A New Look at Literary Theory" (1400) is an original and critical study that aims to explain and refine literary theories, sources, and also the application of these theories in literary texts with a new approach and in simple language. The main principle and premise of the book is that literary theories have emerged through "self-grounded authoritarianism" and the emergence of any "theory" is due to its "parallel work" and "opposition" with the theory. Therefore, the basic premise of the book is based on the emergence of "anti-authoritarian" theories, and based on this, all literary theories are divided into three approaches or three subgroups of author/subject-oriented theories. It divides the anti-author/subject theories and the anti-structural theories and classifies them into one of the three approaches mentioned above on the basis of the "dominant element" and "family resemblance" of each theory. However, the approach of the new foundation of the book, which, besides its value and originality, comes from the innovative mind of the writer, critic and inquisitor, suffers from frequent simplifications and reductionisms, limitations and finally "contradictions" in the course of writing. "Fundamental" that we will explain in detail the various aspects in the rest of the article. The present article, while reading and carefully examining the said book; It suggests and shows that the respected author, in the next editions, even if possible, points such as the book as a textbook, more flexibility, avoiding restrictions on categories, comprehensiveness and avoiding simplification and reduction. - Zeid's diligence. Extended abstract 1. Introduction Literary criticism and theory, due to its interdisciplinary approach, often encompasses literary, philosophical, social, and historical concepts. This makes understanding theories and applying them to literary texts complex and difficult. Against this background, Issa Amankhani's book "A New Look at Literary Theory" (1400) is an original and critical study that aims to explain and refine literary theories, sources, and also the application of these theories in literary texts with a new approach and in simple language. The main principle and premise of the book is that literary theories have emerged through "self-grounded authoritarianism" and the emergence of any "theory" is due to its "parallel work" and "opposition" with the theory. Therefore, the basic premise of the book is based on the emergence of "anti-authoritarian" theories, and based on this, all literary theories are divided into three approaches or three subgroups of author/subject-oriented theories. It divides the anti-author/subject theories and the anti-structural theories and classifies them into one of the three approaches mentioned above on the basis of the "dominant element" and "family resemblance" of each theory. However, the approach of the new foundation of the book, which, besides its value and originality, comes from the innovative mind of the writer, critic and inquisitor, suffers from frequent simplifications and reductionisms, limitations and finally "contradictions" in the course of writing. "Fundamental" that we will explain in detail the various aspects in the rest of the article. The present article, while reading and carefully examining the said book; It suggests and shows that the respected author, in the next editions, even if possible, points such as the book as a textbook, more flexibility, avoiding restrictions on categories, comprehensiveness and avoiding simplification and reduction. - Zeid's diligence. 2-Theoretical framework Based on the theoretical and philosophical foundations of literary theories, the present article has criticized the views, opinions and divisions of the book "A new look at literary theory" written by Isa Amankhani. 3- Research method This article is based on a library study and was written with a descriptive-analytical method. The present article is written based on "sympathetic" dialectic and dialogue and "critical" attitude and avoiding "sentimentalism" in order to "scientifically" explain some ambiguities, shortcomings and conflicts in the book. 4- Findings of research and discussion The book "A New Look at Literary Theory" is one of the critical and scholarly books on literary theories that aims to analyze, review and classify literary theories with a new approach. Through discussions and new classifications, this book has thoughtful words about literary theories. However, the fact that it is new leads some parts of the book to be questioned. By finding some common elements in literary theories and relying on the greatest "family resemblance" that the theories have with each other, Amankhani intends to divide all modern literary theories into three subgroups of "subject" theories: Author-Centered," "Subject/Author-Anti-Author," and "Anti-Structuralist." At first glance, this categorization leads the audience, especially students, to encounter specific, revised, and transparent discussions. But this approach of the book ultimately leads to simplification, generalization, restriction, inflexibility, reductionism, and distortion of the chronological and temporal line of theories. With its new approach and through the classifications it presents, the aforementioned book needs to be put through its paces and will eventually, if its approach is accepted, become a comprehensive and consensus-based "textbook" for students. This is because the author's perception of the theories and their classification into only one of the three approaches mentioned, as shown throughout the article, causes many conflicts and contradictions. 5-Conclusion It is suggested that the respected author, in the next editions, pay attention to points such as whether or not the book is a textbook, more flexibility in demarcating and delimiting theories, avoiding restrictions on categories, comprehensiveness and avoiding simplification. References: Eagleton, Terry (2013), Introduction to Literary Theory, translated by Abbas Mokhbar, 6th edition, Tehran: Nash-e-Karzan. Bertens, Hans (1391), Basics of Literary Theory, translated by Mohammad Reza Abolqasmi, 3rd edition, Tehran: Mahi. Cohen, Tams (2014), The structure of scientific revolutions, translated by Saeed Zibakalam, 5th edition, Tehran: Samit. Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1998, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings; Translated and edited by Andrew Bowie; first published, United Kingdom, by Cambridge University. Terdiman, Richard, 1989, Discourse/Counter-Discourse, The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France, Cornell University Press.

Historically and today, the movement of naturalism affirms the reality of the natural world, rejecting religious views of God, the soul, and values when these are understood to be supernatural or transcending the natural world. There are two forms of naturalism. According to scientific naturalism, what exists is ultimately describable and explainable by the natural sciences (physics, biology, chemistry). More liberal, expansive forms of naturalism allow for the social sciences, nonreductive views of the self, and values. Scientific naturalism faces substantial philosophical objections. More expansive forms of naturalism have been more philosophically resilient and been more hospitable to theological developments, even (according to some) allowing for a non-supernatural form of theism. Theological responses to both forms of naturalism have ranged from a defence of non-naturalist religious ideas to the appropriation of some forms of naturalism, including what is referred to as religious naturalism.

Chemistry is a science fundamentally characterized by the ability of making its own study objects. Chemistry's unique sign language and representations of structural formulas are highly predictive tools. These aspects, together with the richness of qualitative models, make chemistry highly attractive for philosophical studies. However, philosophy of chemistry is, within the philosophy of science, a still relatively young discipline.

Napriek odvážnej predstave "západnej filozofie" ako causa sui existujú početné príklady signifikantného toku myšlienok medzi Orientom a Európou v ranej ére osvietenstva. V prípade Davida Huma sa vplyv Orientu dlhý čas nepredpokladal, no od konca 70. rokov bolo uverejnených viacero štúdií poukazujúcich na významné afinity medzi Humovou filozofiou a filozofiou buddhistických autorov. Minimálne dve z nich vysvetľujú danú podobnosť medzikultúrnou výmenou myšlienok - v jednom prípade mala byť spojovacím článkom pyrrhónska skepsa, v druhom jezuitskí misionári z La Fleche. V nasledujúcom príspevku sa pokúsim ukázať, prečo je A. Gopnikovej "jezuitská hypotéza" plauzibilnejšia, no súčasne predostriem niekoľko argumentov v prospech hypotézy, ktorá medzikultúrny prenos nepredpokladá. V texte sa tiež pokúsim identifikovať vzorce myslenia, ktoré nie je jednoduché ohraničiť na konkrétnu historickú epochu alebo miesto a ktoré z istých nesamorejmých d´ôvodov povyšuje neosobný opis našich životov nad ten, ktorý nachádza oporu v našich intuíciách a prvo-osobovej perspektíve vyznačujúcej sa vedomím ja a mojosti.

The Covid-19 pandemic has challenged both medicine and governments as they have strived to confront the pandemic and its consequences. One major challenge is that evidence-based medicine has struggled to provide timely and necessary evidence to guide medical practice and public policy formulation. We propose an extension of evidence-based corona medicine to an organismic systems corona medicine as a multilevel conceptual framework to develop a robust concept-oriented medical system. The proposed organismic systems corona medicine could help to prevent or mitigate future pandemics by transitioning to a bifocal medicine that extends an empirical evidence-based medicine to a theory-oriented organismic systems medicine.

The article presents the text of a keynote address delivered by the late American ecologist and philosopher of science Richard Levins at the New York Marxist School's Conference on Dialectical Materialism held in October 1979. Topics include the contradiction between science as the growth of human knowledge and science as ideology of oppression, economic reductionism as exemplified in some of the works of Soviet theoretician Bonifati Kedrov, and the relations between science and colonialism.

This paper is a response to multiculturalism's reductionist and othering constructions of Black presence in Canadian early childhood research and practice. We engage in possibilities for creating movement away from multiculturalism as the primary way of responding to anti-Blackness in Canadian early childhood education. We put forward orientations that emerge when we imagine the abolition of Canadian early childhood education pedagogies and curriculum that are shaped by neoliberal multiculturalism. We organize our abolitionist praxis in relation to what kinds of stories and modes of storytelling of Black life might be needed in early childhood education in Canada. We focus our attention on three interconnected pedagogical orientations: storying abolition geographies, storying Black ecologies, and storying Black aliveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ross's Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis pertains more to moral philosophy than to the philosophy of law, even if its contents are important for the latter, too. Its main objective is to show the theoretical groundlessness of any evaluative judgment. This happens when Ross takes the behaviourist approach of reducing psychology to physiology, which opens up fruitful comparisons with Marxist materialism, and in particular with that of Georges Politzer. Another fundamental question concerns the assumption that theoretical nihilism would lead to practical nihilism, as argued by Theodor Geiger (but denied by Ross). And yet, if Geiger is right, can this have no effect on people's everyday lives? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With renewed interest in Marxism, class is back on the intellectual agenda. But so too is the familiar charge of "class reductionism." This charge conflates two distinct claims regarding what we term the structural and political primacy of class. Structural primacy refers to the determinant role of class in social explanation, whereas political primacy refers to its centrality in radical politics. Crossing these distinct claims, we identify four possible positions on the primacy of class. Here, we focus on the two that affirm the structural primacy of class. What we call "class abstractionism," which presumes to derive the political primacy of class from an account of its structural primacy, ultimately relies on an abstract conception of class that effectively presupposes its political primacy. In contrast, a more adequate account of structural primacy—what we call "class dynamism"—requires us to abandon the presupposition of class's necessary political primacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]