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Copyright of Cayapa is the property of Universidad de Los Andes (Venezuela) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We model a corporate firm with a variable internal organizational structure that adapts to various degrees of technological cooperation. The entrepreneur determines the organizational structure that maximizes profits under participation constraints. Wages are determined by an internal cooperative pay-system, constrained by external reservation wages. We show that closer cooperation between production-workers results in a shorter organization with enhanced positional wages relative to the external benchmarks. The corporate firm is embedded in a competitive market economy that determines reservation wages and market prices. We also allow for more general technologies and provide conditions guaranteeing a finite optimal size of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Profit allocation in uncertain product cooperative game is studied. Axioms of Shapley value as given by Shapley are extended to the interval Shapley value. The explicit and exclusive interval Shapley values are put forward. A new interval Shapley value has been proposed. The profit allocation scheme based on interval Shapley value is the interval range including all the real imputation by any possibility. Because the interval number is a special kind of fuzzy numbers, the results of this paper lays a foundation for the research on solutions of cooperative games in other fuzzy forms of payoffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La creación de las UBPC a finales de 1993 y hasta el momento, confronta dificultades endógenas y exógenas que son analizadas en este trabajo, así como las dificultades del Mercado Libre Agropecuario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo trata las cooperativas de trabajo asociado (CTA) en Colombia. Afirma que el número de las CTA se triplicó y el número de trabajadores asociados se aumentó en más de 40% entre 2002 y 2007. Identifica los determinantes económicos y políticos de estos aumentos, describe la historia y objeto de las CTA, analiza varios rasgos sociales y laborales del empleo asociado y hace un examen de la política relativa al cooperativismo asociado.

Copyright of Cayapa is the property of Universidad de Los Andes (Venezuela) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this work is exposed the measurement of the technical relative efficiency of a set of Basics Units of Cooperative Production, dedicated to the culture of the sugar cane in Villa Clara. The used methodology -- non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis - allows to compare Units that have the same economic purpose. Considering the inputs and products of each entity an ordering of these entities is provided, granting a score of relative efficiency; those that obtained the greater product level with the smaller amount of inputs will be more efficient and therefore, will obtain the highest punctuation. The obtained results demonstrate that there are still unexploited reserves of efficiency as far as the unused productive resources persist: area of cultivateable earth and number of workers. The proposed methodology was validated and is recognized the necessity to continue the study of the relevant variables in the search of the most trustworthy solutions to propose improvement plans that entail to extend the capacity of action and decision of these producing cane cooperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cayapa is the property of Universidad de Los Andes (Venezuela) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Agricultural producer cooperatives, especially dairy cooperatives, have been dominant in the agri-food sector, especially in Northern Europe. Recently there has been significant concentration and internationalization amongst dairy cooperatives as many have been transformed into large international growth orientated organizations. In this article, the development of dairy cooperatives in Ireland and Denmark is explored from a regulationist perspective. In particular, the Mode of Social Regulation (MSR) is explored using empirical evidence from the Irish and Danish processing industries. Marden's (1992) understanding of the MSR - based on five interrelated elements (monetary and credit relationships, the type of competition, the wage-labor relation, the mode of adhesion to the global regime, and the form of state intervention) - is employed. The research has found that the type of accumulation has a significant influence on national MSRs and a distinction is drawn between producer-led accumulation and investor-led accumulation in the dairy processing industry. As the national MSRs have evolved, hegemony has shifted from a group or coalition of national organizations and dairy processing companies to globally-orientated and integrated companies. There is evidence of increasing global adhesion in the MSRs of both national industries, although the changing MSRs do not represent a clean break with the past. Rather, contemporary MSRs build upon and are contingent on past MSRs; indeed elements of past MSRs co-exist alongside elements of new MSRs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employee retention and satisfaction are key concerns for employers. In this article, I explore a variety of worker characteristics that affect how workers respond to troubling events and circumstances in the workplace. I examine how they approach their workplace problems, focusing on the value of their loyalty and how this loyalty might affect their problem-related decisions. This research suggests that worker loyalty presents an irony for managers, which I call the ironic value of loyalty: workers with greater loyalty are less likely to exit when they encounter workplace problems, decreasing turnover problems, yet when more loyal workers choose to remain at work, they are more likely to raise grievances, either formally or informally, to confront the problems. Thus, worker loyalty appears both to solve and create problems for managers dealing with worker discontent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to examine the weights of criteria and identify the choice of cooperation patterns simultaneously while evaluating and selecting suppliers for a manufacturing company. While the weighting process for the criteria is affected by the cooperation pattern that the company intends to pursue, the cooperation patterns are also affected by the emphasis on some specific criteria. The analytic network process that draws support from the concept of the Markov process is used to manipulate the interdependence situation. The decision-maker becomes aware of the choice of cooperation patterns with the suppliers by analyzing the weighting process for the criteria in the supplier selection process. It is different from the general way of determining the cooperation pattern subjectively. This also gives the decision-maker a chance to examine his previous decision. A numerical example has been used to verify the effectiveness of the approach. Although, in our example, only a single evaluator is involved in the evaluation process, the proposed approach is still applicable to the situation of multi-evaluators provided that data have been preprocessed appropriately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent European literature on ‘alternative’ food networks (AFNs) draws heavily upon an apparently accessible and diverse body of non-conventional food networks in the agro-food sector and whilst researchers frequently refer to individual examples of farmers markets, box schemes, producer cooperatives and community-supported agriculture projects, less attention is given to the methodological processes that facilitate the identification and examination of these networks. From the preliminary stages of a research project focusing on examples of AFNs, 2 this paper examines the process of operationalizing AFNs research and reviews the difficulties associated with identifying, comparing and characterizing AFNs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds upon recent advances in the corporate governance framework to extend and complement the economic literature on producer cooperatives. We argue that the problem of governance in a cooperative is twofold and consists in designing mechanisms and setting up institutions that (1) encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes workers' welfare and (2) induce managers to pursue and internalize such a broad goal. When compared to capital-controlled firms, the agency problems become more complex and harder to solve in the cooperative framework. As empirical evidence of this problem and its corresponding solution, we illustrate the case of the Mondragón cooperatives, explaining in detail the incentive system and the control mechanisms now in place in this successful business group. The study of the governance architecture of Mondragón may help us to propose solutions to traditional problems of the cooperative firm and to reach a better understanding of both the governance of cooperatives and corporate governance in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A survey of the history and development of worker self-management is presented, describing the different interpretations and facets ascribed to the concept during its development. The experiences and lessons gained from examples of self-management are analyzed on three different levels: the national, organizational, and work group. A quite paradoxical metamorphosis of the concept of self-management occurred along its way from the revolutionary of the Paris commune in the nineteenth century to its contemporary use in behavioral sciences or as a managerial strategy to increase worker motivation and product quality. In spite of these transformations, the term has not, however, lost its emancipatory meaning. There is no generally agreed definition of self-management. Usually it is conceived of as the highest possible degree of member participation in decision-making in organizations and communities and in the implementation of those decisions. The term is used most frequently in reference to worker or employee participation in decision-making in work organizations. Worker participation is generally limited to specific organizational issues or to specific levels of the organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nonsmooth analysis and exact penalty methods give much prominence to functions that exit from certain lower-level sets with positive upward slope. A novel, weak version of such slopes is formalized here and studied in terms of differential properties. Applied to inf-convolutions, those properties help to recover and extend recent results on nonconvex separation, cooperative production (or market) games, and welfare economics.non [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the growing worker cooperative movement in Argentina since 2001, which has occupied factories and other enterprises that were either abandoned by their owners or were in various stages of bankruptcy proceedings. Developments in labor relations in the country since the rebellion of 2001; Implications of the movement of worker-led factories and enterprises for traditional Argentine labor relations; Factors that gave rise to worker cooperative movement in the country.

The purpose of this article is to identify the fundamental factors that are key determinants in promoting effective operation of Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APCs). A theoretical framework “determinants of APCs' performance” was used to analyze the links between the webs of factors. A survey method was used to collect data from two southern provinces in Iran. Data were collected from 52 managers and 260 member farmers in 52 APCs using a stratified random sampling method. It is concluded that the theoretical model can to a great extent predict the performance of APCs. Cooperative structure and government support factors are the most important factors explaining the performance of APCs. Also, policy strategies need to focus on conditioning variables that affect the performance of APCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how partners in an audit firm can use profit-sharing rules to induce optimal partner behavior from the firm's point of view, taking into account the strategic competition of firms in an auditing oligopoly. We use a linear contracting framework to investigate the effects of profit-sharing rules on individual partners' various decisions, including their pricing strategies and effort choices. We assume that efficient audits of different types of clients require different effort profiles with respect to degree of partner cooperation. For example, the audit of a complex company requires different amounts of partner collaboration than does the audit of a simple company. Moreover, since it is too costly for an enforcement party, such as the head office of an audit firm or a court, to verify each client's type in order to resolve compensation disputes among the firm's partners, it is reasonable to assume that client type cannot be contracted upon for partner compensation purposes. Given this assumption, we derive conditions under which there exists an equilibrium in which audit firms strategically choose different profit-sharing rules to specialize in different types of clients, thereby earning positive economic profits. Our analysis provides insights into the strategic competition among the big audit firms, and helps to explain the observed differences in the compensation plans of these firms and in the nature of their client portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how ownership structure affects endogenous quality choice and the subsequent equilibrium outcomes. Investor owned firms (IOFs) and producer cooperatives (COOPs) are analyzed within a duopoly framework including a primary and a secondary level. The firms play a two-stage game, first simultaneously choosing the level of quality to produce and then compete in prices. It is shown that if the cost of quality at primary level is fixed, and/or variable exhibiting non-constant returns to scale, firms can have a structural cost advantage due to ownership structure in addition to the high-quality advantage identified in the previous literature. In the case of a fixed cost of quality at primary level, it is shown that although IOFs charge higher prices they generate a larger consumer surplus than COOPs by marketing higher qualities. Cooperatives generate a larger producer surplus while the market share of the high-quality good is independent of ownership structure. In the case of a variable cost of quality at primary level, a cooperative firm possesses a structural cost advantage which is used to market larger quantities of higher levels of quality generating larger profits, larger consumer surplus and larger social welfare. Policy implications of the different structures are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper has a dual aim: first, to draw attention to a number of passages in which Marx explicitly extolled the cooperative movement and thereby confute the wrong but widely held assumption that Marx was inimical to the market and rejected cooperation as a production mode even for the transition period; second, to argue that the continuing neglect of Marxists both of the co- operative movement and of the passages from Man (and Engels) that present a system of producer cooperatives as a new production mode can be traced back in part to the late emergence of an economic theory of producer cooperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the direct and indirect effects of financial participation (FP) and participation in decision-making (PDM) on employee job attitudes. The central premise is that both financial participation and participation in decision-making have effects on job attitudes, such as integration, involvement and commitment, perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, satisfaction and motivation. After reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, developed by Long (1978a) and Florkowski (1989), a new model was constructed to consider a combined effects of both FP and PDM, herein referred to as employee participation (EP). The underpinning of the model is based on the assumption that both (a) the combination of financial participation and participation in decision-making ('employee participation'), and (b) participation in decision-making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes. The test of the new model showed that employee participation does not produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes, than does participation in decision-making on its own. The data were gathered from a questionnaire study administered in a large British retail organization that operates two types of ownership schemes -- profit-sharing and SAYE schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main characteristics of French worker cooperatives is the principle of collective entrepreneurship. The aim of this article is to understand how it is applied, and in particular how the board of directors and the managing director work together. To answer this question, an exploratory study focused on ten French worker cooperatives in 1998 and 1999, during which we conducted interviews with their managing directors. The results show that three forms of collective entrepreneurship can be distinguished and that these forms depend on the context and the management of these worker cooperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper situates contemporary evaluations of the 'success' of Spain's Mondragon cooperative complex within a tradition of debate about the politics of economic transformation. It traces the long-standing suspicion of worker cooperatives among political and social analysts on the left, revisiting both the revolutionary and gradualist socialist critiques of cooperativism. Taking the set of problems identified by Beatrice and Sidney Webb as leading to the inevitable failure of producer cooperatives, the paper examines Mondragon for evidence of 'degeneration.' The ethical decisions made by Mondragon cooperators with respect to product, pay, profit, innovation, management, disputes and membership are discussed with a particular focus on the management of surplus production, appropriation and distribution. The paper calls for more sophisticated analyses of the economics of surplus distribution and the centrality of ethical debate to the construction of diverse economies and non-capitalist economic subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though innovations in the organization of work have prompted a transition in work systems, the effect of the organization on employees is often not considered. Using personal interviews, direct observations, and relevant documents over a 17-month period, this case study of a worker-owned and -managed producer cooperative was undertaken to understand how fundamental changes in the organization of work affect workers and their families. The findings affirm that the organization of work is a pivotal aspect of individuals' quality of life, principally in that expanding personal choice--in a context of income security and an absence of formal hierarchy--enhances personal and familial well-being. From a policy perspective, the study demonstrates the potential for organizing work so that market demands are balanced with concerns for social well-being [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative rural development has been the subject of much scholarship, yet little attention has been paid to the importance of cooperative spatial strategies. In this study, the efforts of an Oaxacan (Mexican) rural producer cooperative to construct a co-op building appear to far exceed the structure's potential contribution to commodity production. This research argues that the outsized investment into co-op infrastructure is explicable when the cultural and political economy of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that (1) well-defined co-op spaces are necessary if co-op members are to meet market-driven quality standards, yet these autonomous production spaces exclude nonmember villagers upon whom the co-op depends. Given this sentiment, (2) the co-op building plays an important political role in persuading villagers to provide social support and access to communal resources by (3) demonstrating that production cooperation presents a reasonable development alternative and that co-op members have the managerial capacity to achieve it. The article finishes by calling for a greater attention to co-op member development visions and spatial strategies, and to the contributions that geographic and ethnographic research may make to the analysis of co-op formation and survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stochastic programming offers handy instruments to analyze exchange of goods and risks. Absent efficient markets for some of those items, such programming may imitate or synthesize market-like transfers among concerned parties. Specifically, using shadow prices (Lagrange multipliers) on aggregate endowments, one may identify side-payments that yield core solutions to cooperative production games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of the theory of compensation of producers fro the costs associated with environmental regulations. Role of existence of transfers on the counter-intuitive effects of environmental policy on output and trade flows; Impact of environmental regulations on trade patterns; Use of the theory in agricultural sector.

Focuses on the changing conditions of academic labor, products and the respective imperatives of both the publishing industry and higher education. Legacy of consumption in relation to production; Intersections of the academic publishing industry and the academy; Forms of writing.

Discusses the possibilities for Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (MCC) to compete in the global market. Record of business creation that MCC has achieved; Actions taken by the company in response to the changing economic condition; Economic potential of worker cooperatives.

Deals with the role of Catholic Church in workplace democracy. Actions taken by the Catholic Church to support producer cooperatives; Information on day workers in California; Background of LISTO, a cooperative work-development enterprise.

In the absence of incentive-compatible control mechanisms, subordinate managers may misrepresent private information to advance their self-interests at the expense of the firm. Analytical research has proposed incentive mechanisms to motivate truthful upward communication of private information. Yet incentive mechanisms observed in practice seldom are as complex as those proposed by theoretical research. This study contributes evidence that may help to explain this divergence between theory and practice, and for identifying potential directions for the further development of both. In a laboratory experiment, four control mechanisms--two suggested by analytical research, and two proxying for practice--were tested. Both analytically derived mechanisms were found to reduce subordinate misrepresentations relative to the reportedly common linear profit-sharing arrangement. However, superiors who were allowed to use costly and imperfect audits, and who could exercise subjective judgment, outperformed all of the other mechanisms at inducing truth-telling, though this superior truth induction did not translate into a significantly lower level of firm losses from suboptimal project selections. Results also indicated that none of the mechanisms tested was able to eradicate subordinate misrepresentations and the profit losses that they induced. Together, these findings provide a possible explanation for the analytically derived mechanisms' lack of real-world adoption. Further, they suggest ways for both theory and practice to advance through more extensive cross-fertilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]