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Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one's interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD) and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them and received tactile stimulations. We manipulated their senses of body-location and 1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition), asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera away from their body (Visual condition). In the Walking condition, the participants watched their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily interrupted. Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect.” We further suggest that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.

This paper studies how new players approach first-person games using a controller. By observingthe behaviour of five mostly inexperienced individuals as they play through the first few levelsof the game Portal 2 , the following patterns for barriers to entry can be observed:The game presumes common knowledge of its player that new players lack.Uninitiated have a hard time using buttons and sticks simultaneously for complicatedmaneuvers.New players primarily use the buttons that they can see with a casual glance, causingsome buttons to be less used.Misunderstanding due to not clearly have been shown possibilities in the gameworld.New players are unaware of the Options menu.Players find navigation and orientation difficult when lacking all the senses of a physicalbody.The fear of not being good enough causes distress.Players find it a waste of time to redo previously conquered challenges or not makingprogress fast enough.The paper then discusses possible solutions to these problems. Denna rapport studerar hur nya spelare närmar sig förstapersonsspel som kontrolleras medhandkontroll. Genom att observera beteendet hos fem till mestadels oerfarna individer medan despelar igenom några av de första få banorna i spelet Portal 2 kan följande mönster som hindrardem från att börja spela urskiljas:Spelet förutsätter att dess spelare har en gemensam allmän kunskap. Kunskap som nyaspelare saknar.Oinvigda har svårt att använda både knappar och spakar simultant för att utförakomplicerade manövrar.Nya spelare använder primärt knapparna som de kan se vid en flyktig blick, vilketorsakar att vissa knappar blir mindre frekvent använda än andra.Missförstånd på grund av att icke klart och tydligt blivit meddelade spelvärldenmöjligheter.Nya spelare är omedvetna om Options-menyn.Spelare finner att röra sig i spelvärlden är svårt när de inte har tillgång till alla sinnen enfysisk kropp har.Rädslan för att inte vara bra nog orsakar oro.Spelare finner att det är slöseri med tid att göra om tidigare erövrade utmaningar eller attinte göra framsteg i tillräckligt hög fart.Denna rapport diskuterar möjliga lösningar på dessa problem.

What is the relevance of the body and body-transformed sensory information for subjective experience? In the last two decades, paradigms from cognitive neuroscience have demonstrated that the subjective sensations of possessing a body (body ownership, BO), of being located in space (self-location) and being directed at the world (first-person perspective, 1PP), crucially rely on and can be manipulated by exposure to conflicting sensory information in so called bodily illusions. These aspects of subjective experience that are attached to the body, or bodily self-consciousness (BSC), are therefore malleable in healthy participants and accessible to experimental manipulations. BSC is argued to rely on multisensory integration mechanisms within the space directly surrounding the body (i.e. the peripersonal space, PPS). Amply supported by behavioral evidence, data from the brain is sparse. To help elucidate, in terms of neural activity, the relationship between PPS and an aspect of BSC, namely BO, in the first part of my thesis, I will present the results from an fMRI study and a meta-analysis, whereby I globally show that visual and tactile information presented within PPS is processed predominantly within the fronto-parietal and temporo-parietal regions of the brain whereas BO is processed in fronto-parietal and insular regions. Critically, both PPS and BO processing converges only in the left superior parietal cortex (intraparietal sulcus and area 2), thus suggesting both a level of neural integration and dissociation. The subjective 1PP is also argued to rely on multisensory mechanisms and in particular vestibular signals, but the underlying behavioral and neural mechanisms remain largely unexplored. Thus, in the second part of my thesis, I present a behavioral study and a clinical case report. In the prior, we exposed healthy subjects in a supine posture to touch on their backs and synchronous or asynchronous touch on the back of an observed avatar. We further simulated visual gravity using virtual balls falling either in the same or opposite direction with respect to the pull of physical gravity. In line with our expectations, the latter biased the direction of the 1PP to that suggested by the visual gravity (thus subjects reported looking downwards). The visual gravity information also interacted with the synchrony of stroking to affect 1PP and a more frequent downward 1PP was associated with a higher self-elevation rating. Also in line with the idea that BSC and in particular the 1PP relies on multisensory (in particular visuo-vestibular) integration, in the clinical case report we describe a male patient with peripheral vestibulopathy experiencing out-of-body experiences, who fails to integrate visual and vestibular information and is sensitive to visuo-tactile conflicts in bodily illusions. The results from my thesis collectively reinforce the current view that BSC can be manipulated by and thus crucially relies on multisensory mechanisms within PPS as shown both behaviorally for 1PP and in terms of neural correlates for BO. The results also suggest that different combinations of sensory stimuli manipulate most effectively these aspects, with synchronous visuo-tactile stroking affecting BO whereas asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking and vestibular information affecting 1PP. Apprehending better these mechanisms will be an important milestone to understanding how sensory information shapes subjective experience.

Deficits in social communication and interaction have been identified as distinguishing impairments for individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD). As a pivotal skill, the successful development of social communication and interaction in individuals with ASD is a lifelong objective. Point-of-view video modeling has the potential to address these deficits. This type of video involves filming the completion of a targeted skill or behavior from a first-person perspective. By presenting only what a person might see from his or her viewpoint, it has been identified to be more effective in limiting irrelevant stimuli by providing a clear frame of reference to facilitate imitation. The current study investigated the use of point-of-view video modeling in teaching social initiations (e.g., greetings). Using a multiple baseline across participants design, five kindergarten participants were taught social initiations using point-of-view video modeling and video priming. Immediately before and after viewing the entire point-of-view video model, the participants were evaluated on their social initiations with a trained, typically developing peer serving as a communication partner. Specifically, the social initiations involved participants’ abilities to shift their attention toward the peer who entered the classroom, maintain attention toward the peer, and engage in an appropriate social initiation (e.g., hi, hello). Both generalization and maintenance were tested. Overall, the data suggest point-of-view video modeling is an effective intervention for increasing social initiations in young students with ASD. However, retraining was necessary for acquisition of skills in the classroom environment. Generalization in novel environments and with a novel communication partner, and generalization to other social initiation skills was limited. Additionally, maintenance of gained social initiation skills only occurred in the intervention room. Despite the limitations of the study and variable results, there are a number of implications moving forward for both practitioners and future researchers examining point-of-view modeling and its potential impact on the social initiation skills of individuals with ASD.

The aim of this dissertation project is to describe the ways people experience parenting a deaf child who uses a cochlear implant. Within a framework of social science studies of disability this is done by combining approaches using ethnographic and netnographic methods of participant observation with an interview study. Interpretations are based on the first-person perspective of 19 parents against the background of their related networks of social encounters of everyday life. The netnographic study is presented in composite conversations building on exchanges in 10 social media groups, which investigates the parents’ meaning-making in interaction with other parents with similar living conditions. Ideas about language, technology, deafness, disability, and activism are explored. Lived parenting refers to the analysis of accounts of orientation and what 'gets done' in respect to these ideas in situations where people utilize the senses differently. In the results, dilemmas surrounding language, communication and cochlear implantation are identified and explored. The dilemmas extend from if and when to implant, to decisions about communication modes, intervention approaches, and schools. An important finding concerns the parents’ orientations within the dilemmas, where most parents come up against antagonistic conflicts. There are also examples found of a development process in parenting based on lived, in-depth experiences of disability and uncertainty which enables parents to transcend the conflictive atmosphere. This process is analyzed in terms of a social literacy of dis/ability.

This commentary aims to find the right description of the pre-reflective brain mechanisms underlying our phenomenal experience of being a subject bound to a physical body (bodily self) and basic cognitive, perceptual, and subjective aspects related to interaction with other individuals (social cognition). I will focus on the proposal by Gallese and Cuccio that embodied simulation, in terms of motor resonance, is the primary brain mechanism underlying the pre-reflective aspects of social cognition and the bodily self. I will argue that this proposal is too narrow to serve a unified theory of the neurobiological mechanisms of both target phenomena. I support this criticism with theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggesting that multisensory spatial processing, which is distinct from but a pre-requisite of motor resonance, substantially contributes to the bodily self and social cognition.My commentary is structured in three sections. The first section addresses social cognition and compares embodied simulation to an alternative account, namely the attention schema theory. According to this theory we pre-reflectively empathize with others by predicting their current state of attention which involves predicting the spatial focus of attention. Thereby we derive a representational model of their state of mind. On this account, spatial coding of attention, rather than motor resonance, is the primary mechanism underlying social cognition. I take this as a theoretical alternative complementing motor resonance mechanisms.The second section focuses on the bodily self. Comparison of the brain networks of the bodily self and social cognition reveals strong overlap, suggesting that both phenomena depend on shared multisensory and sensorimotor mechanisms. I will review recent empirical data about altered states of the bodily self in terms of self-location and the first-person perspective. These spatial aspects of the bodily self are encoded in brain regions distinct from the brain network of embodied simulation. I argue that while motor resonance might contribute to body ownership and agency, it does not account for spatial aspects of the bodily self. Thus, embodied simulation appears to be a necessary but insufficiently “primary” brain mechanism of the bodily self and social cognition. The third section discusses the contributions of the vestibular system, i.e., the sensory system encoding head motion and gravity, to the bodily self and social cognition. Vestibular cortical processing seems relevant to both processes, because it directly encodes the world-centered direction of gravity and allows us to distinguish between motions of the own body and motions of other individuals and the external world. Furthermore, the vestibular cortical network largely overlaps with those neural networks relevant to the bodily self and social cognition. Thus, the vestibular system may play a crucial role in multisensory spatial coding relating the bodily self to other individuals in the external world., Open MIND

Consciousness and monitoring of the source : the contribution of neuropsychology and psychopathology. In this article we defend the hypothesis that the phenomenal properties of conscious experience play a functional role in cognition. Specifically, we propose that their function is to inform the cognitive systems involved in decision-making and action monitoring about the nature and origin of the information being processed. Many studies in experimental psychology, in neuropsychology and in psychopathology bear on impairments of a specific type of memory, distinct from semantic or episodic memory, that we call "source memory". The term "source" refers to a type of qualitative attributes and dimensions which specify the conditions under which the knowledge has been acquired, namely the perceptive details and contextual information of the representations. These properties which are perceived in a "first person" perspective allow to discriminate between memories and general internal knowledge, between imagined events and perceived events, and more generally between self-generated representations and perceptions of external states which have the same representational content. Overall, these studies show that the identification of the source of information plays an important role in a large number of cognitive tasks. They also go against the hypothesis that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon., Dans cet essai, nous défendons l'hypothèse selon laquelle les propriétés phénoménales de l'expérience consciente jouent un rôle fonctionnel dans la cognition. Plus précisément, leur fonction est d'informer les systèmes cognitifs de prise de décision et de monitoring de l'action sur la nature et l'origine de l'information traitée. De nombreuses recherches en psychologie expérimentale, en neuropsychologie et en psychopathologie portent sur l'étude des dysfonctionnements d'une forme particulière de mémoire, distincte de la mémoire sémantique ou épisodique, que l'on appelle mémoire de la source d'une représentation. Le terme "source" fait référence à une variété de caractéristiques qualitatives qui spécifient les conditions dans lesquelles les connaissances ont été acquises, à savoir les détails perceptifs et les informations contextuelles des représentations. Toutes ces propriétés perçues à la "première personne" permettent de discriminer les souvenirs des connaissances générales internes, les événements imaginés des événements perçus, et d'une manière générale, les images internes des perceptions des états externes ayant le même contenu représentationnel. Dans l'ensemble, ces travaux montrent que l'identification de la source de l'information joue un rôle important dans un grand nombre de tâches cognitives. Ils vont ainsi à l'encontre de l'hypothèse épiphénoménaliste de la conscience., Zalla Tiziana, Vignemont Frédérique de. Conscience et monitoring de la source. Apport de la neuropsychologie et de la psychopathologie. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°31, 2000/2. Recherches sur la conscience en sciences cognitives. pp. 175-190.

The potential of skills in design is intriguing; as skills open up new perceptions of the world they allow meaning to arise as we engage with the world. Several skills-based techniques that leverage this potential have been developed, and integrated into the Designing in Skills framework. The framework builds on personal engagement of designers in their practice, and promotes them to take a first-person perspective, enabling designs to be enriched with meaning. In this paper, we present the most recent workshop based on this approach, which specifically focuses on employing the Designing in Skills framework as a starting point and catalyst for design practice. We briefly introduce the Designing in Skills framework and present the DiffractMe! project in which we built on this approach to explore its potential for design practice. We conclude with reflections on the process and result by the involved designers. These reflections offer insights into the value of this approach for enriching interactive design with experiential qualities.

Self-consciousness is the remarkable human experience of being a subject: the “I”. Self- consciousness is typically bound to a body, and particularly to the spatial dimensions of the body, as well as to its location and displacement in the gravitational field. Because the vestibular system encodes head position and movement in three-dimensional space, vestibular cortical processing likely contributes to spatial aspects of bodily self- consciousness. We review here recent data showing vestibular effects on first-person perspective (the feeling from where “I” experience the world) and self-location (the feeling where “I” am located in space). We compare these findings to data showing vestibular effects on mental spatial transformation, self-motion perception, and body representation showing vestibular contributions to various spatial representations of the body with respect to the external world. Finally, we discuss the role for four posterior brain regions that process vestibular and other multisensory signals to encode spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness: temporoparietal junction, parietoinsular vestibular cortex, ventral intraparietal region, and medial superior temporal region. We propose that vestibular processing in these cortical regions is critical in linking multisensory signals from the body (personal and peripersonal space) with external (extrapersonal) space. Therefore, the vestibular system plays a critical role for neural representations of spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness.

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a “first-person perspective” on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

I argue for a pattern theory of self as a useful way to organize an interdisciplinary approach to discussions of what constitutes a self. According to the pattern theory, a self is constituted by a number of characteristic features or aspects that may include minimal embodied, minimal experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended and situated aspects. A pattern theory of self helps to clarify various interpretations of self as compatible or commensurable instead of thinking them in opposition, and it helps to show how various aspects of self may be related across certain dimensions. I also suggest that a pattern theory of self can help to adjudicate (or at least map the differences) between the idea that the self correlates to self-referential processing in the cortical midline structures of the brain and other narrower or wider conceptions of self.

Recent advances in experimental science have made it possible to investigate the perceptual processes involved in generating a sense of owning an entire body. This is achieved by full-body ownership illusions which make use of specific patterns of visual and somatic stimuli integration. Here we investigate the fundamental question of the reference frames used in the process of attributing an entire body to the self. We quantified the strength of the body-swap illusion in conditions where the participants were observing this artificial body from the perspective of the first or third person. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of this full-body ownership illusion. This demonstrates that the multisensory integration processes producing the sense of corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.

PurposeOver 100 years ago, Emil Kraepelin revolutionised the classification of psychosis by identifying what he argued were two natural disease entities: manic depressive psychosis (bipolar disorder) and dementia praecox (schizophrenia). Kraepelin's discoveries have since become the “twin pillars” of mainstream psychiatric thinking, practice, and research. Today, however, a growing number of researchers, clinicians, and mental health service users have rejected this model and call for a symptom‐led approach to prioritise subjective experience over diagnostic category. The purpose of this paper is to ask: how can the published first‐person accounts of experts by experience contribute to these debates?Design/methodology/approachThis paper analyses the representation of psychiatric diagnosis in two prominent autobiographies: Kurt Snyder's Me, Myself, and Them: A Firsthand Account of One Young Person's Experience with Schizophrenia (2007) and Elyn Saks' The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness (2007).FindingsAs well as providing a prognosis and a plan for treatment, the psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia gives shape and meaning to the illness experience and ultimately becomes the pivot or platform from which identity and memoir unfold.Practical implicationsThe paper introduces two popular autobiographical accounts of schizophrenia which may be useful resources for mental health service users and clinicians.Social implicationsThe paper highlights the complex ways in which people interpret and make meaning from their psychiatric diagnosis.Originality/valueThe paper demonstrates that first‐person accounts make an important, if frequently overlooked, contribution to debates about psychiatric diagnosis.

The concept of self has preeminently been asserted (in its many versions) by anti-reductionist, anti-naturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, with the exception of some hybrid or intermediate positions which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of ourselves as 'selves', therefore the self belongs to the natural world (Merleau-Ponty, Varela). My goal in this paper is to argue for a theory of the self according to which (1) the self belongs to the world of external relations (Spinoza), such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is only accessible to a single person; (2) the self can be reconstructed as a "sense of organic unity," partly analogous to what has been described as "biological individuality" (from Diderot to Goldstein, Canguilhem, Simondon); yet this should not lead us to espouse a Romantic concept of organism (3) what we call 'self' might simply be a dynamic process of interpretive activity within a "world," undertaken by the brain. This materialist theory of the self should not neglect the nature of experience, but it should also not have to take at face value the recurring invocations of a better, deeper "first-person perspective" or "first-person science." As Althusser said, the materialist philosopher is the person who catches the train already in motion; the world is more fundamental than the thinker.

This study investigates the influence of a first-person perspective (1PP) and a third-person perspective (3PP), respectively, on the affective appraisal and on the user engagement of a three-dimensional virtual environment in SECOND LIFE. Participants explored the environment while searching for five targets during a limited time span, using either a 1PP or a 3PP. No significant overall effect was found for viewing perspective on the appraisal of the three-dimensional virtual environment on the dimensions of arousal and valence. However, a 3PP yields more perceived control over the avatar and the events, which is a requirement for engagement. Analysis of the performance on the search task shows that participants using a 3PP find more objects but also need more time to find them. The present results suggest that a 3PP conveys a more distinct impression of the environment, thereby increasing engagement, and probably induces a different viewing strategy. Hence, a 3PP appears preferable for simulation and training applications in which the correct assessment of the affective properties of an environment is essential. © 2010 SAGE Publications.

This study investigates the influence of a first-person perspective (1PP) and a third-person perspective (3PP), respectively, on the affective appraisal and on the user engagement of a three-dimensional virtual environment in SECOND LIFE. Participants explored the environment while searching for five targets during a limited time span, using either a 1PP or a 3PP. No significant overall effect was found for viewing perspective on the appraisal of the three-dimensional virtual environment on the dimensions of arousal and valence. However, a 3PP yields more perceived control over the avatar and the events, which is a requirement for engagement. Analysis of the performance on the search task shows that participants using a 3PP find more objects but also need more time to find them. The present results suggest that a 3PP conveys a more distinct impression of the environment, thereby increasing engagement, and probably induces a different viewing strategy. Hence, a 3PP appears preferable for simulation and training applications in which the correct assessment of the affective properties of an environment is essential. © 2010 SAGE Publications.