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The Wikileaks cables on Turkey reveal a surprising paradox. U.S. diplomats present themselves as highly-informed, perspicacious observers of Turkey with more insight than one would expect into the Islamist complexes and prejudices of Turkey's governing AKP, the role of the Gulen movement in Turkey, the political talent and personality of Prime Minister Erdogan, his increasing isolation from competent advisors, and the central problems that characterize AKP governance: lack of technocratic skill, corruption, and influence-peddling. Yet time and again, these diplomats fail to draw from these observations the obvious conclusion: This represents a risk to Turkey, the United States, and its regional interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After nearly nine decades of benign neglect, Turkey has set about reestablishing its influence in the Middle East. Although most observers agree that the United States and Turkey share a number of overlapping goals in the Middle East, Turkey's recent rapprochement with Iran has drawn the ire of the United States. In tandem, Turkey's relations with Israel, Washington's closest ally in the region, have deteriorated rapidly following Israel's war in Gaza and the events aboard the Mavi Marmara. These coinciding events have further complicated U.S.-Turkish relations and have led a number of pundits in Washington to openly question Turkey's ideological orientation. If Ankara and Washington want to mend relations they should acknowledge that their disagreements are not about their overall vision or intention for the region, but over how to implement and carry out foreign policy. Both Ankara and Washington should do a better job of enumerating their long-term regional policy goals and engage in a broader dialogue to clearly transmit these ideas to each other, while working together to achieve them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary attempts to make a conceptual evaluation of the phrase "model partnership" as a definition of US-Turkey relations. Against the background of much debate about the "viability" or "possibility" of "model partnership," it argues that "model partnership" as an empty signifier does not represent either the ideal or the fully accomplished state of Turkish-American relations. he current problems in the bilateral relations derive from the gradual transformation in the nature of Turkish-American relations from a hierarchical relationship into a complementary one, i.e. from a "strategic partnership" to a "model partnership." As we are going through a structural change, "policy recommendations" alone will not suice to remedy the broader problem of necessary adjustments. he option for a "model partnership" is still on the table, however, it requires a serious, engaged, and conceptual discussion as the two sides adjust to and negotiate the new form of the relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Republicans, in a classic midterm "wave election, " supplanted the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives with a large majority of their own and substantially reduced the Democratic majority in the Senate. Yet, despite their electoral success, this victory should not suggest to Republicans that the electorate has granted them any sort of broad policy mandate. Such mandates are illusory in the American political system. As such, President Obama's impressive string of legislative victories in the past few years will most likely remain in place, though his relationship with Congress will undoubtedly become more complicated. Moreover, the Turkish-American relationship should be largely unafected. In fact, the new majority in the House may be more sympathetic to Turkish interests than the previous Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey is becoming more independent and self-confident. Yet, the current analysis on Turkey in most American circles tirelessly refers to the tension between secularism and Islam or Eastern versus Western proclivities. Such focus often comes at the expense of the most powerful force driving Turkish foreign policy: nationalism and self-interest. Turkish-American relations are witnessing a paradigm shift that can be best defined as the rise of Turkish Gaullism. A Gaullist Turkey may in the long run decide to no longer pursue an elusive EU membership. It may even question its military alliance with the United States. Burdened by a sense that it never gets the respect it deserves, Turkey may increasingly act on its own in search of full independence, full sovereignty, strategic leverage and, most importantly, Turkish glory and grandeur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has to deal with a very different Turkey today than the Turkey during the Cold War. he disappearance of the Soviet threat has reduced Turkey's dependence on the United States for its security and deprived the U.S.-Turkish security partnership of a clear unifying purpose. At the same time, Turkey's geographic role and interests have expanded. Turkey now has interests and stakes in various regions it did not have two decades ago. It is thus less willing to automatically follow the U.S.'s lead on many issues, especially when U.S. policy conflicts with Turkey's own interests. his does not mean that Turkey is turning its back on the West or the United States. Turkey still wants--and needs--strong ties with the United States. But the terms of engagement have changed. Ankara is a rising regional power and is no longer content to play the role of junior partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Turkish foreign policy towards the USA in 2009. After putting the Turkish-US relations into historical and political context it focuses on a set of developments that affected bilateral relations in 2009. It argues that Turkish-American relations in 2009 were shaped and influenced more by "third party" problems and issues, than by bilateral ones. The set of such issues were categorized and examined under three levels- bilateral, global and regional. The year 2009 could be seen as a positively exceptional span of time for Turkish foreign policy, because of Turkey's high level of cooperation with the USA. The term developed to describe this new era, model partnership, could be defined as extensive and intensive collaboration between Turkey and the USA to set up a new regional order in the countries and regions around Turkey. Thus, during 2009, Turkey and the USA actively cooperated for the resolution of crises pertaining to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Armenia, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey takes into consideration the fact that her interests could be hampered in case of a participation in the project, but on the other hand she is concerned about the potential impact of an axis shift, which may lead to a serious deteriotation in her relations with the U.S., NATO, and her allies. Concludingly, the work outlines a roadmap how Turkey, under consideration of its national interests, can both reach its national goals and fulfil its role within the global system as foreseen by the NATO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the strained U.S.-Turkey relations due Iran's nuclear program. It notes that Turkey advocated for a diplomatic effort to resolve the nuclear crisis while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the U.S. hard-line towards Iran. The conflict with Turkey reportedly grew worse on U.S. President Barack Obama despite meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul.

Accession to the European Union (EU) constitutes one of Turkey's primary foreign policy objectives. However, to establish whether the country would benefit from becoming part of an integrated Europe, its foreign policy alternatives to EU membership must also be examined. The first part of this article analyses Turkey's changing relations with Europe. Against this backdrop, the article then moves to assess Turkey's partnership with the USA and the potential of maintaining a close relationship independent from Europe. The role of Russia, Turkey's old neighbours and relations with the Turkic states, as well as the potential for attaining a leading role among them, are also considered. The argument is that Turkey may exploit its geostrategic position to pursue its core foreign policy interests and even assume an important regional role. However, Ankara ought to concentrate on what has long been its priority - full Turkish membership of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Turkey had remained indifferent towards the Iranian nuclear program for a long time, due to the ensuing conflicts raised between Iran and the West the nuclear issue has become one of the hot-topics in Turkey's relations with the United States, the Western countries and Iran. Because of its concerns deriving from regional implications of the Western efforts such as seeking heavy sanctions including military strikes to constrain Iran's nuclear program, Turkey has increasingly interested in mediation efforts between the conflicting parties. On May 17, as result of Turkey's mediation efforts together with Brazil, Iran agreed to swap some part of its low enriched uranium with uranium fuel that would be supplied by the Vienna Group. This article reviews Turkey's position regarding the Iranian nuclear program, its mediation efforts, and the uranium swap agreement. Finally, it briefly analyzes UN Security Council Resolution 1929 that added new sanctions on Iran and its possible repercussions on Turkey- Iran relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article first examines Turkish foreign policy shortly prior to and following the nation's military coup in 1960 in the context of its relations with the superpowers of the time, particularly with the USA, and in the face of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. It then discusses the Menderes administration's search for a multilateral foreign policy and the American response. Focusing on the question of why Turkey was so eager to receive the Jupiter missiles, even though it was already known shortly prior to installation that these missiles constituted a surplus, the article examines the factors shaping Turkey's approach to the missile crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of UNISCI Discussion Papers is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research examines propositions of international image theory in the context of Turkey-U.S. relations. Study 1 derives and tests hypotheses regarding the interrelationships among theory components—perceived strategic relations, images, and behavioral tendencies. In addition, it extends image theory research by examining (1) the role of emotions, as well as (2) how variations in the strength of ingroup identifications (national and religious identity) inform our understanding of international images. Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 by considering different dimensions of cultural status (cultural heritage vs. modernity) and by differentiating two targets of emotion: the U.S. government versus American citizens. Evidence is provided regarding the need for incorporation of emotions and group identifications onto the image theory framework. The results point to the need for more investigation of images and their relationships with other components of the theory in various intergroup contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses Turkey's relations with the U.S. under the administration of President Barack Obama. The author suggests that, although there is goodwill on both sides, issues of substance remain. He mentions that the U.S. will have to redefine itself in a world of emerging nations and regional actors in such areas as world public opinion, multiculturalism, diplomacy and economic interdependency. The U.S. will have to find new ways in which to partner and engage with nations at the planning stage.

Turkey’s decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities. If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base for the Iraq invasion challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to many interest-based explanations of foreign policy). This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of parliaments in foreign policies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the rise of anti-American nationalism in Turkey. While Turkish public opinion has developed strong views against a set of foreign policies furthered by the United States, recent findings allude to the development of an emerging anti-US bias in large segments of Turkish society. The deterioration of the US image in Turkey could be considered a result of the recent US involvement in the Middle East, as well as socio-political shifts inherent to Turkey's democratization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları is the property of Turk Dunyasi Arastirmalari Vakfi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the state laws repealed by U.S. federal courts due to their conflict with federal foreign relations. It states that the California Law to Extend Statute of Limitations for Armenian Genocide Claims that benefits Armenian Genocide victims from insurers was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in August 2009 in accordance with the review which shows that the law would prejudice diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Turkey. It also cites the preemption of U.S. District Court for Southern District of Florida for amendments to Florida's Sellers of Travel Act, which discourages travel to Cuba, due to interference with U.S. President Barack Obama's plan to improve its Cuban relation, and lack of rights for Florida state to adopt foreign policy.

The article presents an overview of the history of the ambivalent relationship that the country of Turkey has with the United States, the European Union and other western countries. A discussion of public opinion polls which were conducted in Turkey to determine how Turkish citizens feel about the U.S. and the European Union and their country's relationship with other countries is presented. The influence that western countries have had on Turkish society are examined. The history and development of the Ottoman Empire and periods in Turkey's political history are discussed.

The central argument of this article is that although national interests, as perceived in Greece and Turkey in the 1970s, took priority over loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, Cold War considerations retained a certain degree of validity in their strategic thinking. Although participation in NATO did not prevent the outbreak of crises between the two allies, the US and NATO connections actually functioned as a useful framework for the prevention of escalation of this controversy to war and the establishment of a sort of equilibrium in the determination and crystallization of which Washington was able to play a crucial role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study states that Turkish President İsmet İnönü did not use democracy merely as a tool to bring his country into the US-led Western alliance at the onset of the Cold War. Instead, Inonu was inspired by a true sense of mission to fulfil Ataturk's legacy to bring democracy to Turkey. Admittedly, the Truman administration used democracy as rhetoric in order to realize its strategic goals in, and secure congressional aid for, Turkey, and yet Washington did not put pressure on Turkey to democratize faster or more thoroughly. There is no causal link between Turkey's democratization and either the Truman Doctrine or Turkey's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first relationship between Turkish Republic and the United States of America was established by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed on August 6, 1923. However, the political relations were halted when the US Senate rejected to approve the Treaty of Lausanne. Until the appointment of ambassadors by reciprocal countries in the second half of 1927, the commercial activities proceeded on modus vivendi terms. The Turkish- American relations took a new turn with the establishment of the Ford Motor Company in Istanbul in 1930. This study gives the details of the establishment procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları is the property of Turk Dunyasi Arastirmalari Vakfi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkish-American relations seem to have taken a turn for the worse, and Turkey has been breaking records of anti-American sentiments for the last five years. Although this represents an unprecedented decline in this 60-year-old strategic alliance, the relationship has been of a highly dialectical nature throughout time, encompassing factors of both continuity and change. This essay identifies the geostrategic dimension, Turkish domestic politics, and the role of ethnic lobbies in the United States as factors of continuity, whereas the new paradigms of Turkish foreign policy, the war in Iraq, and the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey appear as factors of change. The final synthesis of this equation will be determined as much by international circumstances as by internal developments in both countries, including the new administration in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Turkish-American relationship experienced the most difficult period of its history after the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on 1 March 2003 to allow US troops to open a northern front to Iraq from Turkish territory. By the time a new administration took power in Washington in early 2009, the badly damaged relationship had recovered somewhat and recently has even taken a positive turn. Although the parameters of the recovered relationship are not yet clear, by analyzing the intricacies of diverging and converging world views and interests of the two states in the post-Cold War era, one can understand what happened to the strategic partnership of the 1990s and how Turkish-American relations may develop in the future. Accordingly, this paper will first look at the constraints and limitations of the current relationship through diverging interests and contextual viewpoints in the post-Iraq War world. It will then highlight the areas of convergence that existed even during the lowest point of the relationship. Finally, I will argue that, while the strategic partnership may have ended, a strategic relationship between the two states will continue to exist and may even produce a newer form of connection and cooperation, the contours of which will also be outlined for the coming years, taking into account the opportunities and hurdles ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Obama administration American foreign policy will be engaged in genuine coalition building with allies. Such a return to multilateralism will have a positive impact on transatlantic and Turkish-American relations. Just like under the Clinton presidency during the late 1990s, Turkey needs American support to undo the deadlock with the European Union. America's return to Middle East diplomacy will also improve Turkish-American relations since the Obama administration is much more likely to support Ankara's openings to Damascus. Turkey should make an effort to host a new Arab-Israeli peace process in the framework of an international conference in Istanbul. In the short run Ankara can avoid problems with Washington on the Armenian issue if it decides to enhance its military and civilian support to NATO forces in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Obama's election represents an important opportunity to put US-Turkish relations on a new, more cooperative footing. On many issues -- especially those related to the Middle East -- Obama's positions overlap or closely coincide with those of Turkey more than the policies pursued by the Bush administration. This is particularly true regarding Iran and Syria, which should help to reduce these issues as irritants in US-Turkish relations. The critical question mark is what position Obama will take regarding the Armenian genocide resolution, which is likely to be reintroduced in Congress in 2009. Passage of the resolution could deal a severe blow to prospects for putting US-Turkish relations on a new, more stable footing as well as undermine recent efforts at promoting Turkish-Armenian reconciliation that have opened up since President Gul's historic visit to Yerevan in September. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several excerpts from the speech "Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," by Matt Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, which was delivered at the Turgot Ozal Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, D.C. on June 24, 2008 are presented.

American and Turkish leaders typically describe ties between the U.S. and Turkey as based on "common values and interests." Yet given that the Bush administration's relationship with Turkey has been marked by dysfunction and crisis, is that still true? A tendency to see Turkey as a function of Washington's big idea of the moment, insensitivity to a broadening perception in Turkey of U.S. disregard for Turkish interests, inaction in the face of PKK terror, weak leadership on energy security, and schizophrenia toward Turkey's internal politics have left U.S.--Turkish relations worse than when George W. Bush came to office. If U.S. and Turkish interests remain largely convergent at the strategic level, a more independent Turkish diplomacy will likely be part of the Bush legacy. As for "common values," there is reason to hope that the real damage done to mutual perceptions is reversible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent closure case brought against the ruling Justice and Development Party is a direct assault on Turkey's democracy. For this reason, America should not lose the opportunity to swiftly and unequivocally repudiate the establishment's attempts to re-assert control over Turkish politics by undemocratic means. The lack of a concrete resolution on the part of the U.S. in regard to the case has already resulted in a credibility gap. Given America's emphasis on and interest in Turkey's democracy and attendant reform process, a simple re-affirmation of its commitment to citizen's choices in free and fair elections would send a powerful message to a country that is on edge. Instead, Turkey is left with 'friends' who lack credibility and resolve at the worst possible moment. If the ruling party and its leadership are banned from political life, not only will Turkey lose its credibility in the Middle East as the only indigenous Muslim-majority democracy, the United States will also lose credibility in the world theatre for failing to support democracy in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and the future orientation of the foreign policy in Turkey. It explores several factors that contribute to the problems in the alliance including the deteriorating condition in Iraq, the threat of the Turkish use of force in Iraq and the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a political force in the country's politics. It also considers the impacts of the national elections, which place the AKP at the forefront of foreign policy making and alliance relations.

The article analyzes the controversy surrounding the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkish-American relations. Details are given noting the PKK's designation as a terrorist organization and the popular opinions of Turkey suggesting the U.S. is at fault for its continued activities. An overview is given of U.S.-Turkish relations throughout the 1990s, focusing on the national and international security policies which were enacted concerning the PKK. Focus is given to the differences in perception of threat and interest posed by the group to the U.S. and Turkey.