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Humans consistently make predictions about the valence of future events and use feedback to validate initial predictions. While the valence of outcomes provides utilitarian information, the accuracy of predictions is crucial for future performance adjustment. The feedback related negativity (FRN), identified as a marker of reward prediction error, possibly encodes social rejection and social prediction error. To test this possibility, we used event related potential (ERP) techniques combined with social tasks in which participants were required to make explicit predictions (whether others will accept their "friend request" or not, Experiment 1) or implicit predictions (whether they would like this person or not, Experiment 2) respectively, and then received social feedback. We found that the FRN is sensitive to social rejection and explicit social prediction error in Experiment 1 but not implicit social prediction error in Experiment 2. We conclude that the FRN encodes social rejection and explicit social expectancy violation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two experiments we examined the role of emotion, specifically worry, anxiety, and mood, on prospection during decision-making. Worry is a particularly relevant emotion to study in the context of prospection because high levels of worry may make individuals more aversive toward the uncertainty associated with the prospect of obtaining future improvements in rewards or states. Thus, high levels of worry might lead to reduced prospection during decision-making and enhance preference for immediate over delayed rewards. In Experiment 1 participants performed a two-choice dynamic decision-making task where they were required to choose between one option (the decreasing option) which provided larger immediate rewards but declines in future states, and another option (the increasing option) which provided smaller immediate rewards but improvements in future states, making it the optimal choice. High levels of worry were associated with poorer performance in the task. Additionally, fits of a sophisticated reinforcement-learning model that incorporated both reward-based and state-based information suggested that individuals reporting high levels of worry gave greater weight to the immediate rewards they would receive on each trial than to the degree to which each action would lead to improvements in their future state. In Experiment 2 we found that high levels of worry were associated with greater delay discounting using a standard delay discounting task. Combined, the results suggest that high levels of worry are associated with reduced prospection during decision-making. We attribute these results to high worriers' aversion toward the greater uncertainty associated with attempting to improve future rewards than to maximize immediate reward. These results have implications for researchers interested in the effects of emotion on cognition, and suggest that emotion strongly affects the focus on temporal outcomes during decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans make predictions and use feedback to update their subsequent predictions. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) has been found to be sensitive to negative feedback as well as negative prediction error, such that the FRN is larger for outcomes that are worse than expected. The present study examined prediction errors in both appetitive and aversive conditions. We found that the FRN was more negative for reward omission vs. wins and for loss omission vs. losses, suggesting that the FRN might classify outcomes in a "more-or-less than expected" fashion rather than in the "better-or-worse than expected" dimension. Our findings challenge the previous notion that the FRN only encodes negative feedback and "worse than expected" negative prediction error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human decision making can be influenced by emotionally valenced contexts, known as the framing effect. We used event-related brain potentials to investigate how framing influences the encoding of reward. We found that the feedback related negativity (FRN), which indexes the “worse than expected” negative prediction error in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), was more negative for the negative frame than for the positive frame in the win domain. Consistent with previous findings that the FRN is not sensitive to “better than expected” positive prediction error, the FRN did not differentiate the positive and negative frame in the loss domain. Our results provide neural evidence that the description invariance principle which states that reward representation and decision making are not influenced by how options are presented is violated in the framing effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Input-matching is a key mechanism by which animals optimally distribute themselves across habitats to maximize net gains based on the changing input values of food supply rate and competition. To examine the neural systems that underlie this rule in humans, we created a continuous-input foraging task where subjects had to decide to stay or switch between two habitats presented on the left and right ofthe screen. The subject's decision to stay or switch was based on changing input values of reward-token supply rate and competition density. High density of competition or low-reward token rate was associated with decreased chance of winning. Therefore, subjects attempted to maximize their gains by switching to habitats that possessed low competition density and higher token rate. When it was increasingly disadvantageous to be in a habitat, we observed increased activity in brain regions that underlie preparatory motor actions, including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the supplementary motor area, as well as the insula, which we speculate may be involved in the conscious urge to switch habitats. Conversely, being in an advantageous habitat is associated with activity in the reward systems, namely the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, amygdala and dorsal putamen activity steered interindividual preferences in competition avoidance and pursuing reward. Our results suggest that input-matching decisions are made as a net function of activity in a distributed set of neural systems. Furthermore, we speculate that switching behaviors are related to individual differences in compe-tition avoidance and reward drive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cross-sectional study with the 3-dimensional (3D) MRI reconstruction technique was conducted to investigate cerebral complexity changes related to age differences in native Taiwanese population. In our sample of 85 participants aged between 25 and 81, age was associated with gradual ventricular expansion. A nonlinear quadratic relationship between white matter volume and age was found overall in the brain. Widespread age-related reduction in white matter was detected from late adulthood onwards. However, no significant age-related changes in the cortex and whole brain volume were determined throughout adulthood. These findings provided information in describing brain structural complexity, which might in the future serve as an objective diagnostic index or as a predictive parameter for neurological diseases. Our method then may be used for cross-cultural longitudinal studies to evaluate the effect of disease, environment and aging on the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans are creatures of routine and habit. When faced with situations in which a default option is available, people show a consistent tendency to stick with the default. Why this occurs is unclear. To elucidate its neural basis, we used a novel gambling task in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Behavioral results revealed that participants were more likely to choose the default card and felt enhanced emotional responses to outcomes after making the decision to switch.Weshow that increased tendency to switch away from the default during the decision phase was associated with decreased activity in the anterior insula; activation in this same area in reaction to "switching away from the default and losing" was positively related with experienced frustration. In contrast, decisions to choose the default engaged the ventral striatum, the same reward area as seen in winning. Our findings highlight aversive processes in the insula as underlying the default bias and suggest that choosing the default may be rewarding in itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The functional significance of error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), which occurs at approximately the same time as erroneous responses, has been investigated extensively using reaction time (RT) tasks. The error detection theory assumes that the Ne/ERN reflects the mismatch detected by comparing representations of the intended and the actually performed actions. The conflict monitoring theory asserts that the Ne/ERN reflects the detection of response conflict between intended and actually performed actions during response selection. In this study, we employed a gambling task in which participants were required to choose whether they would take part in betting in each trial and they were presented with gain or loss feedback in both the ''to bet'' and the ''not to bet'' trials. The response-locked ERP magnitudes were more negative for ''to bet'' than for ''not to bet'' choices for both large and small stakes and were more negative for choices involving large rather than small stakes. Dipole source analysis localized the ERP responses to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These findings suggest that the ACC signals the riskiness of choices and may function as an early warning system that alerts the brain to prepare for the potential negative consequence associated with a risky action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

McCullough et al. argue that revenge has a future-oriented function, that is, to deter future harms by changing other individuals' incentives toward the self. Recent research has shown that people seek revenge even when harms are unintentional. This commentaiy reports these results and proposes that revenge may also serve to reduce the immediate psychological pain resulting from unfair treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses research on the psychophysiology of vicarious reward through experimentation with individuals who were shown films of contestants competing in game shows. In the experiments, volunteers made subjective ratings of socially desirable and undesirable contestants. As the volunteers watched, magnetic resonance brain imaging was conducted to assess the reward that they perceived.

Many older adults hold powerful positions in governments and corporate boards throughout the world. Accordingly, older adults often have to make important financial decisions on behalf of others under risk. Although it is common to observe younger adults taking more risks when making financial decisions for others, it is unclear if older adults exhibit the same self-other discrepancies. Here, we conducted 2 studies (88 and 124 participants, respectively) to examine self-other discrepancies in financial decision making under risk in older adults. We focused on 3 aspects of financial decision making: loss aversion (a tendency to weight potential losses more strongly than potential gains), risk-aversion asymmetry (a tendency to be risk-averse for potential gains and risk-seeking for potential losses), and risk preferences separately in gain and loss domains. Using computational modeling and behavioral economics tasks, we found weaker self-other discrepancies in older adults (compared with younger adults) across all 3 aspects. We also replicated the age differences in self-other discrepancies in loss aversion across 2 largely nonoverlapping cohorts. Thus, it appears that when making financial decisions on behalf of others, older adults, relative to younger adults, have a stronger disposition to regard others' financial outcomes as important as their own. (PsycINFO Database Record [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]