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An essay on the intellectualism about know-how and the phenomenon of gradability is presented. It responds to "The Argument from Gradability" by defending and motivating a particular diagnosis of gradability. It argues that the phenomenon should be discounted as a superficial linguistic phenomenon, which can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state. It discusses the distinction between two types of gradability which are the quantitative and qualitative gradability.

The article is about the main subjects of Kant's theoretical philosophy, that determine the meaning of the concept of «transcendental idealism», the problems, that have arisen in connection with these subjects, as well as the main trends in the solution of these problems from the time of Kant until nowadays. A wide range of modern English and German Kant scholarship is being analyzed in a systematic connection with the classical interpretations of F. Jacobi andH. Veihinger Considerable attention is paid to the tradition of analytical Kant scholarship, represented by the figures of H. Allison, R. Langdon, J. Van Cleve, K. Ameriks and others. The arguments of these researchers deal with the problems of things in themselves and representations, affection and discursive cognition. The author concludes that the researches of Kant's theoretical philosophy have not been yet exhausted, and the modern approaches, which put Kant's philosophy in actual scientific contexts, contribute to the actualization of the traditions of Neo-Kantianism and German idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his three courses of lectures on general linguistics given between 1907 and 1911, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) sometimes drew diagrams and figures on the chalkboard to add a visual dimension to the novel and challenging theoretical concepts he was laying out. Those which the editors redrew for inclusion in the Cours de linguistique générale (1916) - in some cases with significant changes - have had a surprisingly strong impact on readers ever since. If Saussure hoped that the drawings would clear up ambiguities in his verbal text, he might have been disappointed; for while they extend a hand to students and readers to guide them into his conceptual world via the steppingstones of the semi-familiar, accessible and concrete, they have opened up whole new realms of ambiguity, and strengthened the ones already present in the verbal text. This article examines seven of the illustrations or sets of illustrations in the CLG and the various interpretations to which they have given or could give rise, treating these not as erroneous but as contrapuntal to the text when the two appear to be in contradiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to experiential revelation, phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of the phenomenal properties they refer to. Some see experiential revelation as posing a direct challenge to physicalism. The basic idea is this: given experiential revelation, were phenomenal properties physical/functional in nature they would be presented as such when you think of them under phenomenal concepts, but phenomenal concepts don't present their referents in this way. I argue that, while this argument on a plausible reconstruction fails, the thesis of experiential revelation nevertheless indirectly challenges physicalism. In particular, it potentially undermines the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, a key defense maneuver of the physicalist for responding to dualist arguments concerning experience. The moral is that issues concerning revelation do indeed pose a problem for physicalism, but not for the reasons you might think. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pedestrian evacuation becomes more complicated when different human behaviors are considered. In this paper, pedestrian evacuation considering two different kinds of human behaviors is studied by using a cellular automaton (CA) model. Two types of evacuees, cooperators and defectors, are initially randomly distributed in a square room with one exit and they interact with their neighbors following the snowdrift game theory (characterized by the parameter '') during the evacuation process. Cooperators and defectors are mutually changed according to two typically different kinds of evacuees' judgements, namely, judgement based on neighbors' strategies (we call it herding behavior) and judgement based on neighbors' payoffs (we call it independent behavior), which leads to the corresponding evacuee clusters. It is found from a large amount of numerical simulations that the proportions of the corresponding evacuee clusters are evolved to respectively consistent states despite 11 typically different initial evacuee cluster ratios, largely owing to self-organization effect. Moreover, for other 200 randomly chosen initial evacuee cluster ratios, Monte-Carlo simulations show that the proportions of the corresponding evacuee clusters are evolved stably, without any oscillation, and when the initial number of pedestrians of two different kinds of behaviors are comparable, the proportions are evolved to respectively consistent states despite different initial evacuee cluster ratios, indicating that some regular phenomena occur during the evacuation process. Furthermore, it is found that the moderate values of is necessary for short evacuation time, and for the fixed values of , the initial ratio of pedestrians of herding behavior has a great influence on the final evacuation time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of the linear waves in infinitely-long square and triangular lattice strips of identical particles with nearest neighbour interactions for all combinations of fixed and free boundary conditions, as well as the periodic boundary, is presented. Expressions for the dispersion relations and the associated normal modes in these waveguides are provided in the paper; some of which are expressed implicitly in terms of certain linear combinations of the Chebyshev polynomials. The effect of next-nearest-neighbour interaction is also included for the square lattice waveguides. It is found that localized propagating waves, so called surface wave modes, occur in the triangular lattice strips, as well as square lattice strips with next-nearest-neighbour interactions, when either or both boundaries are free. In this paper, the even and odd modes are also discussed separately, wherever applicable. Graphical illustrations of the dispersion curves are included for all waveguides. The discrete waveguides analysed in the paper have broad applications in physics and engineering, including their merit in classical problems in elasticity, acoustics and electromagnetism, as well as recent technological issues involving various transport phenomena in quasi-one-dimensional nano-structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In "Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument," Mabaquiao presents the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists in light of the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy vis-à-vis Chalmers' master argument. He argues that, as it currently stands, the debate is at an ontological stalemate. This paper argues that this indictment is not fair given an alternative picture of the current dialectical status of the debate. Furthermore, it suggests that, given this picture, we could have reasons to favor the anti-physicalists over the physicalists just by following how the debate has currently been pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'The Uses of Argument' Toulmin introduces a number of concepts that have become popular in argumentation theory, such as data, claim, warrant, backing, force, field, and, most fundamentally, the concept of a 'logical type'. Toulmin never defines the concept of a logical type or a field very clearly, and different interpretations can be found in the literature, either reconstructing what Toulmin has in mind, or revising his concepts to suit other concerns. A natural history of these concepts is not my concern. I will analyse logical types according to what Toulmin uses this concept for, namely to raise a problem with deductive logic and motivate its replacement with the Toulmin model. I will argue that a logical type and the distinction he draws between different logical types resembles distinctions made in logical positivism between the directly and the indirectly verifiable, and the problem raised is, in essence, the positivist's problem of how indirect propositions can be justified on the basis of direct propositions. I will show that Toulmin makes a straw man of the positivists' own solution to the problem and hence does not prove there to be an adequate motivation for replacing deductive logic with the Toulmin model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one's own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e., the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the phenomenal intentionality view (PIV), according to which intentionality is in some strong way dependent on phenomenal character. If this line of argument succeeds, then not only TE does not speak in favor of Representationalism, but it actually speaks against it, contrary to the philosophical common-sense of the last two decades. Moreover, the representationalist project of naturalizing phenomenal character turns out to be seriously undermined on the same intuitive grounds that were supposed to make it plausible. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV and argue that our introspective intuitions (TE) do not push us in the direction of PIV. On the contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak to force us to conclude that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required for PIV to be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument-due to Mehta (J Philos 111:311-331, 2014)-that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson (Philos Stud, 2016) successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2):451-460, 2016). However, all parties to this dispute have missed the real problem with Mehta's argument. As I see it, the real problem is twofold. First, despite his claims to the contrary, the experiences Mehta cites are phenomenally similar. Moreover, finding experiences that are in no way phenomenally similar turns out to be a difficult task. Second, there are motivated versions of naïve realism that are immune to Mehta's argument. The upshot is that even if Mehta's argument is sound, the most that it can show is that one version of naïve realism is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Berkeley holds that the esse of sensible objects is percipi. So, sensible objects cannot exist unperceived. Naturally, this has invited questions about the existence of sensible objects when unperceived by finite minds. This is sometimes called the Problem of Continuity. It is frequently said that Berkeley solves the problem by invoking God's ever-present perception to ensure that sensible objects maintain a continuous existence. Problems with this line of response have led some to a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley's claim. This paper argues that neither of these are Berkeley's solutions since he recognizes no such problem. The paper sketches a new interpretation of sensible objects that obviates the need for a "solution" by avoiding the "problem" in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the forms in literary criticism. It states the revisionist formalism which is dispositional and is the practice of attending to a text or artwork. It notes the formalism of surface that understands that form is something to be interpreted accurately. It mentions that form is an entity that is known by occasion through encounters with subsidiary phenomena.

ABSTRACT When is an artwork complete? Most hold that the correct answer to this question is psychological in nature. A work is said to be complete just in case the artist regards it as complete or is appropriately disposed to act as if he or she did. Even though this view seems strongly supported by metaphysical, epistemological, and normative considerations, this article argues that such psychologism about completeness is mistaken, fundamentally, because it cannot make sense of the artist's own perspective on his or her work. For the artist, the question is not about his or her own psychology, but about the character of the work and the context in which he or she works. A nonpsychological account of completeness, on which completeness is a question of whether the work satisfies the conditions implicit in the artist's plan, avoids this problem and is equally or better able to explain the metaphysical, epistemic, and normative phenomena which appeared to support psychologism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Article, I conduct a long overdue assessment of Henry Maine's "from Status to Contract" thesis in light of two essentially modern phenomena: contract standardization and relational contracting. Drawing on comparative legal history, classical sociological and anthropological literature, contemporary contract law theory, and recent works in the field of (behavioral) law and economics, I discuss the claim that modern private law is witnessing a reverse movement "from Contract to Status." I show that this claim is historically inaccurate and conceptually simplistic in that it attributes shades of meaning to status that Maine never contemplated. I dedicate the remainder of the Article to exploring why-in the face of clear countervailing evidence-modern private law scholars continue to engage in Mainean "status"-speak. For this purpose, I tease out several interesting parallels between status as part of Maine's theory and "status" as part of modern private law discourse. I firstly suggest that scholars mirror Maine's thesis with their argument that interpersonal rights and obligations frequently result from naturally occurring societal processes that the law normatively reflects; conversely, that said rights and obligations are not necessarily the result of private-autonomous agreements between freestanding individuals. While this argument strikes me as plausible, the conceptual problems that transplanting Maine's categories into contemporary private law discourse entails call for additional justification. I therefore, secondly suggest that it is the directional appeal of Maine's linear or absolutist view that has led modern private law scholars to engage in Mainean "status"-speak. In order to assess the defensibility of this claim, I consider whether the "from Status to Contract and back again" thesis has any merit. Are we witnessing a reverse movement from the mostly privateautonomous creation of contractual rights and obligations to the heteronomous imposition of such rights and obligations on the part of society or the state? To answer this question, I examine a variety of conceptual forces struggling for dominance in modern private law. Two complementary tensions present themselves as relevant to my discussion: the tension between freedom of contract and constitutional paternalism, and the tension between perfect contracting solutions and second-best alternatives. I go on to show that "status"-like elements-i.e., elements that play on the rhetoric and directionality rather than the substance of Maine's thesis-and contractual elements interact to mediate both tensions. Linear (or absolutist) and dialectical (or "pendulum swing") theories of socio-legal evolution consequently fall short. Mainean "status"-speak is equally unable to account for the conceptual interaction that my discussion brings to light. To clarify any such interaction between "status"-like and contractual elements, I introduce, explain, and to some extent defend, two hybrid types-contract-status and status-contract. These hybrid types, I argue, go some way toward capturing current tendencies in modern private law. Inconsistencies, however, remain even if we reconstruct modern private law along the lines of contract-status and status-contract. Hence, I call for an update of modern private law's terminological toolbox. To this end, it is imperative to draw on Maine's very own methodological postulates. Contemporary scholars intent on saying anything of interest about modern private law would thus be welladvised to emulate Maine's approach of combining empirical inquiry into economy and society with categories and concepts from the realm of legal theory-all the while freeing themselves from the overbearing influence of his original, loaded categories. In light of these exhortations, I look at one final answer to the question of why modern jurists continue to engage in Mainean "status"-speak. Might increasing references to Maine's conceptual categories be evidence of a rediscovery of the value of macro-historical approaches for engaging critically with (private) law as a fundamental social institution? I contend that employing such macro-historical approaches is indeed necessary if modern jurists are to take seriously their duties as members of the legal profession, as participants in a broader intellectual and academic discourse, and as citizens of their respective societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spheres floating at liquid-fluid interfaces cause interfacial deformations such that their weight is balanced by the resultant forces of surface tension and hydrostatic pressure while also satisfying a contact angle condition. Determining the meniscus shape around several floating spheres is a complicated problem because the vertical locations of the spheres and the horizontal projections of the three-phase contact lines are not known a priori. Here, a new computational algorithm is developed to simultaneously satisfy the nonlinear Laplace-Young equation for the meniscus shape, the vertical force balance, and the geometric properties of the spheres. We implement this algorithm to find the shape of the interface around a pair of floating spheres and the horizontal force required to keep them at a fixed center-center separation. Our numerical simulations show that the ability of a pair of spheres to float (rather than sink) depends on their separation. Similar to previous work on horizontal cylinders, sinking may be induced at close range for small spheres that float when isolated. However, we also discover a new and unexpected behavior: at intermediate inter-particle distances, spheres that would sink in isolation can float as a pair. This effect is more pronounced for spheres of radius comparable to the capillary length, suggesting that this effect is a result of hydrostatic pressure, rather than surface tension. An approximate solution confirms these phenomena and shows that the mechanism is indeed the increased supporting force provided by the hydrostatic pressure. Finally, the horizontal force of capillary attraction between the spheres is calculated using the results of the numerical simulations. These results show that the classic linear superposition approximation (due to Nicolson) can lose its validity for relatively heavy particles at close range. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Greater Cape Floristic Region (GCFR) in South Africa has been extensively investigated for its phenomenal angiosperm diversity. A key emergent pattern is the occurrence of older plant lineages in the southern Fynbos biome and younger lineages in the northern Succulent Karoo biome. We know practically nothing, however, about the evolutionary history of the animals that pollinate this often highly-specialized flora. In this study, we explore the evolutionary history of an important GCFR fly pollinator, Megapalpus capensis , and ask whether it exhibits broadly congruent genetic structuring and timing of diversification to flowering plants within these biomes. We find that the oldest M. capensis lineages originated in Fynbos during the Miocene, while younger Succulent Karoo lineages diverged in the Pliocene and correspond to the proposed age of this recent biome. A strong signature of population expansion is also recovered for flies in this arid biome, consistent with recent colonization. Our first investigation into the evolutionary history of GCFR pollinators thus supports a recent origin of the SK biome, as inferred from angiosperm phylogenies, and suggests that plants and pollinators may have co-diverged within this remarkable area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I consider Franz Brentano's theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano's arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that 'feeling and will' are united into the same fundamental class. I summarize two of his arguments for this claim, what I call 'the nature of desire' argument and 'the transition' argument. I show how a central plank of these arguments relies crucially on Brentano's epistemology of value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano's solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano's solution commits him to unperceivable intentional objects (the chessboard's tiles). Second, his chessboard account fails in the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We finally sketch an alternative account of compound colours, which, while holding fast to their phenomenal compoundedness and to the impenetrability of colours, avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived nonspatial parts of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many contemporary views on unity of consciousness adopt a bottom-up approach: a subject has several conscious experiences at a time, which are unified in virtue of a special relationship. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject has one single conscious experience at a time. I present three top-down approaches: Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism. The first two are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object composition. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano's view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I raise the question about consciousness, which stems from a philosophical issue. Distinguishes here two ontologies: the fi rst resulting from the existence of the physical world, including biological, and the other, resulting from the assessment of the existence of non-biological beings, focusing primarily on the artifi cial intelligence. Ontological origins is crucial here to a finally modal treatment of such phenomena as intelligence or consciousness. I'm going to describe these phenomena as arising from these two ontologically diff erent substrates, but in some way being similar. Th e consequence of this expanded understanding of intelligence and consciousness shows that they are the feature, and not the property of human. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with different symbols expressed in different fables. A fable is a short allegoric story which has animals, birds, humans and various natural phenomena as characters and it mainly ends with a moral . One of the main functions of fables is didactics. Symbolic expressions represent main parts of fables. Animals are represented with humans' features. Different symbols acquire different characteristics in various cultures. If a snake can be a kind creature in Georgian culture, Aesop considers it as an evil creature. If a donkey is foolish for Aesop and for Greek culture, Sulkhan-Saba sometimes considers it as a sly and clever creature. One of the dominant characters for all the cultures is a cat. If a cat is a creature, that never changes its nature for Aesop, Sulkhan-Saba considers it as a wise and prudent creature. But we cannot refuse that Aesopian cat can also be prudent and wise. For Dodsley a cat is greedy, but for Thurber a cat is self-confident and selfish creature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After making the case that phenomena can be the primary unit of classification (Part 1), some basic principles to group and sort phenomena are considered. Entities can be grouped together on the basis of both their similarity (morphology) and their common origin (phylogeny). The resulting groups will form the classical hierarchical chains of types and subtypes. At every hierarchical degree, phenomena can form ordered sets (arrays), where their sorting can reflect levels of increasing organization, corresponding to an evolutionary order of appearance (emergence). The theory of levels of reality has been investigated by many philosophers and applied to knowledge organization systems by various authors, which are briefly reviewed. At the broadest degree, it allows to identify some major strata of phenomena (forms, matter, life, minds, societies and culture) in turn divided into layers. A list of twenty-six layers is proposed to form the main classes of the Integrative Levels Classification system. A combination of morphology and phylogeny can determine whether a given phenomenon should be a type of an existing level, or a level on its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article aims to analyse the concept of the state of exception in the context of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, we discuss the potential phenomenalizations and functions of a state of exception in a present-day democracy, as well as the effects that it could have on the political system. We believe that this topic is important and deserves a detailed analysis because, subsequent to the two World Wars, the rapport between the state of affairs and the proclaimed rule of law has suffered drastic changes. If the exception is truly becoming the rule, we have to question and to redefine our political system's entitlement. The article follows the perspectives of two authors, namely Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen, as well as the contribution of Giorgio Agamben, who summarizes the two views. Schmitt associates the state of exception with sovereignty and with the open possibility for a decision, while Kelsen's viewpoint revolves around the concept of norm and therefore excludes any possibility of an exception. The norm-decision duality serves as a guideline throughout this article and proves its usefulness for understanding the state of exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that Phenomenalists about pleasure can concede a key claim, Heterogeneity, commonly used to object to their theory. They also can then vindicate the aspirations of J. S. Mill's doctrine of higher pleasures, while grounding their value claims in a naturalistic metaethics. But once Phenomenalists concede Heterogeneity they can no longer consistently endorse Hedonism as the correct theory of wellbeing, since they implicitly commit to recognizing distinct kinds of pleasure that are independently good-making. I also explore further issues that arise for a Pluralist theory of pleasure: How could there be distinct kinds of pleasure? How can pleasures be measured? Is it possible for some pleasures to be superior in kind to others? What unifies the category of pleasant experiences? Is the value of pleasant experiences natural or non-natural? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a critical assessment of Michael Tye's and David Chalmers' criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy. The assessment is done with a view to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Tye's and Chalmers' arguments. The phenomenal concept strategy is a strategy developed by physicalists to defend physicalism in the attempt to address the problem of consciousness. For Michael Tye, who was previously an advocate of the phenomenal concept strategy, there is the possibility that two or more distinct phenomenal concepts can refer to the same phenomenal experience and this indicates that phenomenal concepts have no special status as claimed by physicalists and are, in turn, not concepts at all. David Chalmers, on the other hand, raises a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy by stating that it is either that the strategy cannot explain the epistemic reality (i.e. knowledge) of consciousness or that the strategy cannot explain this knowledge in physicalist terms. Any of these two indicates that the phenomenal concept strategy is unsuccessful. This paper posits that Tye's and Chalmers' criticisms misrepresent the stance of the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper maintains that the phenomenal concept strategy, if understood differently, still provides a plausible support for physicalism in addressing the problem of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation.We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstraction play the ontic role of identifying the specific complex components, subsets of causal powers, and organizational relations that produce a suitably general phenomenon. Therefore, abstract constitutive explanations are both legitimate and mechanistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research reported in this study examines the very first time the participants planned for and enacted science instruction within a 'best-case scenario' teacher preparation program. Evidence from this study indicates that, within this context, preservice teachers are capable of implementing several of the discursive practices of science called for in standards documents including engaging students in science investigations and constructing evidence-based explanations. The participants designed experiences that allowed their students to interact with natural phenomena, gather evidence, and craft explanations of natural phenomenon. The study contends that the participants were able to achieve such successes due to their participation in a teacher education program and field placement, which were designed using a comprehensive, conceptual framework. Video of the participant's teaching and annotated self-analysis videos served as the primary data for this study. Implications for future research and elementary science teacher education are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lukács's late ontological turn is an attempt to go beyond the limitations of his early thesis of the identical subject-object and to better understand those forms of objectivity that appear as a consequence of social existence. In this category of social forms of objectivity he includes the phenomena of fetishism and reification, determined by the dual character, simultaneously material and social, of the objects produced under the rule of commodity form and of exchange value. Closeley related is the phenomenon of alienation, caused by the difference between the developement of society and that of human personality, crushed under the weight of fetishism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The starting point of this paper is the intriguing observation that Goodman has defended a phenomenalist point of view in his epistemological works and a physicalist one in aesthetics. In fact, it would certainly be more accurate to say that his focus was anti-physicalist in epistemology and anti phenomenalist in aesthetics. In any case a majority of interpreters would spontaneously have waited for a diametrically opposite choice, more consistent indeed with the positions taken by the representatives in these fields. Yet Goodman’s strategy is not arbitrary, it has deep roots in the general context of the philosophy in the twentieth century and in return contributes to clarify some of its features and motivation.

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy ( PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition, focuses on features of physical concepts, and succeeds in explaining the appearance of contingency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize experiences as “another one of those.” Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form “another experience of the same type,” which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we avoid the circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same type without appealing to any further phenomenal concepts. However, he argues, this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, unable to reveal anything about their referents, which seems problematic. In this paper, I present a new version of the recognitional account that avoids the circularity worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's argument on psychism, physicalism and phenomenalism. Topics mentioned include the "Hempel's dilemma" which is a physics-based approach, the term "psychism" that refers to mental entities in the metaphysical level, and the inconsistency of physicalism with phenomenalism.

This is the first part of a study on the classification of phenomena. It starts by addressing the status of classification schemes among knowledge organization systems (KOSs), as some features of them have been overlooked in recent reviews of KOS types. It then considers the different dimensions implied in a KOS, which include: the observed phenomena, the cultural and disciplinary perspective under which they are treated, the features of documents carrying such treatment, the collections of such documents as managed in libraries, archives or museums, the information needs prompting to search and use these collections and the people experiencing such different information needs. Until now, most library classification schemes have given priority to the perspective dimension as they first list disciplines. However, an increasing number of voices are now considering the possibility of classification schemes giving priority to phenomena as advocated in the León Manifesto. Although these schemes first list phenomena as their main classes, they can as well express perspective or the other relevant dimensions that occur in a classified item. The independence of a phenomenon-based classification from the institutional divisions into disciplines contributes to giving knowledge organization a more proactive and influential role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L1-ordered FePt/Fe thin bi-layers were grown using a molecular beam epitaxy onto (100)-MgO substrates changing the soft Fe layer thickness. The study of the intermixing phenomena occurring at the hard/soft interfaces was carried out using surface Mössbauer spectroscopy. The magnetic properties of the samples were analyzed with a magneto-optical Kerr effect magnetometer. The surface morphology and the magnetic domains were analyzed with an UHV atomic and magnetic force microscopy in tapping and lift mode respectively.The present work clearly demonstrates that the degree of interface intermixing and reactions is the responsible for the coercivity behavior in exchange-spring magnets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack ofreality testingduring dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract. According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed theories that aims to explain and argue for justifiedness of intuitions, claims that intuitions are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of intuitions. In this paper, however, we shall argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of sensory perception which is relevant to its justifiedness, that is self-correction. Although sensory perception is highly self - correcting, intuitions normally resist self - correction , even in the case of further recalcitrant evidences. The disanalogy threatens phenomenalist analogy for justifiedness of intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Sensorama," by Michael Pelczar is presented. Topics discussed include the analysis of Pelczar's notion of live prospect of physical spacetime in the phenomenalist reduction aspect, the theory of physical objects and consciousness considering claims of counterfactual conscious experiences, and Pelczar's claims on the temporality of consciousness.

The author comments on the notion of Michael Pelczar on the metaphysics of conscious experiences and its existence in time and the human construction of the spatio-temporal physical world through experiences, reflecting to his book "Sensorama." Topics discussed include the author's objection on the notion of the temporality of consciousness, the evidences showing the experiences in time, and the role of consciousness on the unification of experiences.

A literary criticism of the book "Sensorama," by Michael Pelczar is presented. Topics discussed include the aspects of phenomenalism and phenomenalist metaphysics, the exploration of the core components of the radical phenomenalism according to the author's defence, and the presentation of the physical world and the physical objects within the experiential potential.

The article offers the author's insights regarding the objections on his book "Sensorama" which include the way he describe experience's phenomenal features, the reliability of cautious introspection on the phenomenal features of mental lives, and the ad hoc restriction to human which is presuppose by introspective access. Topics include his definition of experiences, the aspects of phenomenalism and its qualities, and the issues on the concept of introspection principle.