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Purpose: The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of acute and 4-week Rhodiola rosea intake on physical capacity, muscle strength, speed of limb movement, reaction time, and attention. Methods: PHASE I: A double blind placebo-controlled randomized study (n = 24) was performed, consisting of 2 sessions (2 days per session). Day 1: One hour after acute Rhodiola rosea intake (R, 200-mg Rhodiola rosea extract containing 3% rosavin + 1% salidroside plus 500 mg starch) or placebo (P, 700 mg starch) speed of limb movement (plate tapping test), aural and visual reaction time, and the ability to sustain attention (Fepsy Vigilance test) were assessed. Day 2: Following the same intake procedure as on day 1, maximal isometric knee-extension torque and endurance exercise capacity were tested. Following a 5-day washout period, the experimental procedure was repeated, with the treatment regimens being switched between groups (session 2). PHASE II: A double blind placebo-controlled study (n = 12) was performed. Subjects underwent sessions 3 and 4, identical to Phase I, separated by a 4-week R/P intake, during which subjects ingested 200 mg R/P per day. Results: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the study of the dynamics of the restoration of physical activity tolerance (PAT), cognitive functions and mental performance (MP) in patients who completed the program of cardiac rehabilitation after aortocoronary bypass surgery. The results of the study showed that for the majority of patients before inclusion in the program of cardioresistance, PAT and MP indicators were reduced, mild and moderate cognitive impairment was detected. At the end of the rehabilitation program, the normalization of PAT was noted in 80% of patients, there were no signs of cognitive impairment in 60% of patients. The indicators of MP corresponded to the norm in the majority of those surveyed. Thus, the majority of patients who completed the program of cardiac rehabilitation II stage after aortocoronary shunting achieved restoration of cognitive functions, MP and physical performance.

Object - to evaluate effect of trimetazidine on functional and mental capacity in patients undergoing II stage of cardiac rehabilitation after coronary artery bypass grafting. Material and methods. 125 patients referred for cardiac rehabilitation after coronary artery bypass grafting were divided in two groups. Patients of control group received pharmacotherapy according to current guidelines on secondary prevention of coronary heart disease. Active treatment group patients (n=30) received trimetazidine 35 mg bis in day additionally. Functional capacity was assessed by six-minute walk test. Mental capacity was evaluated by psychomotor performance express-test of M.P.Moroz. Results. Majority of patients had reduced functional and mental capacity on admission. Performing of cardiac rehabilitation program comes with increase in six-minute walk test distance and psychomotor performance test scores in both groups. An increase in six-minute walk test distance and psychomotor performance test scores in active treatment group was significantly greater than in control group. Conclusion. Trimetazidine therapy improves both functional and mental capacity in patients undergoing II stage of cardiac rehabilitation after coronary artery bypass grafting.

BackgroundComplex challenges may arise when patients present to emergency services with an advance decision to refuse life-saving treatment following suicidal behaviour.AimsTo investigate the use of advance decisions to refuse treatment in the context of suicidal behaviour from the perspective of clinicians and people with lived experience of self-harm and/or psychiatric services.MethodForty-one participants aged 18 or over from hospital services (emergency departments, liaison psychiatry and ambulance services) and groups of individuals with experience of psychiatric services and/or self-harm were recruited to six focus groups in a multisite study in England. Data were collected in 2016 using a structured topic guide and included a fictional vignette. They were analysed using thematic framework analysis.ResultsAdvance decisions to refuse treatment for suicidal behaviour were contentious across groups. Three main themes emerged from the data: (a) they may enhance patient autonomy and aid clarity in acute emergencies, but also create legal and ethical uncertainty over treatment following self-harm; (b) they are anxiety provoking for clinicians; and (c) in practice, there are challenges in validation (for example, validating the patient’s mental capacity at the time of writing), time constraints and significant legal/ethical complexities.ConclusionsThe potential for patients to refuse life-saving treatment following suicidal behaviour in a legal document was challenging and anxiety provoking for participants. Clinicians should act with caution given the potential for recovery and fluctuations in suicidal ideation. Currently, advance decisions to refuse treatment have questionable use in the context of suicidal behaviour given the challenges in validation. Discussion and further patient research are needed in this area.Declaration of interestD.G., K.H. and N.K. are members of the Department of Health's (England) National Suicide Prevention Advisory Group. N.K. chaired the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guideline development group for the longer-term management of self-harm and the NICE Topic Expert Group (which developed the quality standards for self-harm services). He is currently chair of the updated NICE guideline for Depression. K.H. and D.G. are NIHR Senior Investigators. K.H. is also supported by the Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust and N.K. by the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust.

Although significant progress has been made in Irish mental health law in recent decades, the Mental Health Act, 2001 still falls short of properly protecting human rights. A consideration of human rights developments, both domestically and internationally, highlights the urgent need for reform. In this paper we consider Sections 4 ('Best interests'), 3 ('Mental disorder') and 57 ('Treatment not requiring consent') of the 2001 Act and related recommendations in the 2015 Report of the Expert Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act, 2001, and suggest specific areas for reform. Just as medicine evolves over time, so too does our understanding of human rights and law. While embracing a human rights-based approach to the extent suggested here might be seen as aspirational, it is important to balance achievable goals with higher ideals if progress is to be made and rights are to be respected.

In severe dysphagia, risk of aspiration or choking can make it unsafe to swallow food and drink. Nutrition can instead be delivered via tube feeding with a gastrostomy, but this can be contraindicated and denies patients the pleasure and social connection of eating and drinking. Therefore, patients may prefer to continue unsafe oral intake, known as risk feeding. Patients should undergo assessment of dysphagia and be asked about their preferences before deciding how to proceed. According to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, if patients are not competent to provide valid informed consent, a person with power of attorney or treating clinician must make the decision in their best interests and in respect to their previously expressed or implied wishes. Decision-making should be shared between members of the multidisciplinary team and the patient's family. Huntington's disease is a progressive neurological condition that, in its later stages, is associated with dysphagia and cognitive or communication impairments that can hinder capacity to consent. A case study is presented of a patient with Huntington's and dysphagia, which illustrates the importance of a collaborative, structured approach to advanced care planning for managing nutrition in a progressive neurological disease in an inpatient setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Research into dementia and other conditions connected with cognitive impairments is essential but conducting research with populations who lack capacity to provide consent involves a number of ethical, legal and practical challenges. In England and Wales, family members can act as a consultee or legal representative on behalf of someone who lacks capacity. However, there is a paucity of research about how family members make decisions concerning research participation. Objective To explore family members' experiences of proxy decision-making for research. Understanding how proxy decisions are made could lead to interventions to support greater inclusion of individuals in research who have impaired decision-making capacity. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of 17 family members who had experience as a proxy for making decisions about participation in research, including those who had agreed to participation and those who declined. Thematic analysis was used to examine experiences and generate findings for research practice and to develop future supportive interventions. Results Proxy decision-making is highly contextualised. Proxies balance a number of factors when deciding about research participation, including the person's values and preferences, within the specific context of the study, and the practicalities of being involved. Proxies use these factors to construct a decision that is authentic to the person they care for. Conclusions Proxy decision-making for research is a complex process with inter-woven layers of decision-making. Decisions can be problematic for some proxies who may benefit from decision support to make an informed decision about research participation on behalf of a family member. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Valid consent to healthcare treatments depends upon a person having the capacity to give it. The Mental Health Act not only requires a presumption of capacity but also expects clinicians to take reasonable steps to establish whether the patient lacks capacity. The facts are that (1) lack of capacity is common among hospital inpatients and people in the community needing care, but is often not recognized. (2) Capacity must not be judged on the basis of the decision made: an unwise decision is not evidence of a lack of capacity, and a decision expected by the clinician is not evidence of capacity. Capacity is decision-specific and must be considered critically without preconceptions. There is no valid other test. (3) Clinically people will fall into four groups: (a) obviously lack capacity and will not recover it, (b) obviously lack capacity but will recover soon, (c) obviously have capacity, (d) capacity is in doubt and major healthcare decision needed. Only the last group need more detailed attention. (4) Capacity is (a) relative to the complexity of the information; (b) on a spectrum, not categorical; (c) decided using clinical judgement; and (d) subject to disagreement among assessors. The recommendations are as follows: (1) capacity should always be considered within the decision-making process, and the outcome should be documented, with sufficient information to understand the opinion given. (2) Detailed assessment should be reserved for situations when (a) a major decision is needed and (b) there is time to assess and discuss the assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: To clarify the concept of best interests, setting out how they should be ascertained and used to make healthcare decisions for patients who lack the mental capacity to make decisions. Context: The legal framework is the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, which applies to England and Wales. Theory: Unless there is a valid and applicable Advance Decision, an appointed decision-maker needs to decide for those without capacity. This may be someone appointed by the patient through a Lasting Power of Attorney, or a Deputy appointed by the court. Otherwise the decision-maker is usually the responsible clinician. Different approaches exist to surrogate decision-making cross-nationally. In England and Wales, decision-making is governed by the MCA 2005, which uses a person-centred, flexible best interests (substituted interests) approach. Observations: The MCA is often not followed in healthcare settings, despite widespread mandatory training. The possible reasons include its focus on single decisions, when multiple decisions are made daily, the potential time involved and lack of clarity about who is the responsible decision-maker. Solution: One solution is to decide a strategic policy to cover more significant (usually health-related) decisions and to separate these from day-to-day relational decisions covering care and activities. Once persistent lack of capacity is confirmed, an early meeting should be arranged with family and friends, to start a process of sharing information about the patient's medical condition and their values, wishes, feelings and beliefs with a view to making timely treatment decisions in the patient's best interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychiatric advance directives (PADs) are documents by means of which mental health service users can make known their preferences regarding treatment in a future mental health crisis. Many states with explicit legal provisions for PADs have ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). While important UN bodies consider PADs a useful tool to promote the autonomy of service users, we show that an authoritative interpretation of the CRPD by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has the adverse consequence of rendering PADs ineffective in situations where they could be of most use to service users. Based on two clinical vignettes, we demonstrate that reasonable clinical recommendations can be derived from a more realistic and flexible CRPD model. Concerns remain about the accountability of support persons who give effect to PADs. A model that combines supported decision making with competence assessment is able to address these concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Mental capacity assessments currently rely on subjective opinion. Researchers have yet to explore the association between key cognitive functions of rational decision making and mental capacity classifications for people with intellectual disabilities. Method: Sixty‐three adults completed the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, which yielded estimates of their overall cognitive ability (MoCA‐LD) as well as their memory, attention, language and executive functioning. Differences in scores were explored for those who had, and lacked, capacity, and logistic regression was used to test the predictive validity of each measure. Results: There were significant differences between both groups for all measures. Logistic regression identified MoCA‐LD as a significant predictor of capacity assessment outcomes. ROC curve analysis provided novel, evidence‐based benchmarks to help guide clinical practice based on MoCA‐LD scores. Conclusion: This study offers a foundation for more objective approaches to mental capacity assessment. This demonstrates that assessments of cognitive ability can yield information that is helpful for mental capacity evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This article is about interactions that occur when someone with intellectual disabilities is engaged in everyday activities with a personal assistant (PA) or a support worker. Method: We examine the detail of nine hours of naturally occurring video‐recorded interactions, to explore how "relational autonomy" is done in practice. Nine people with ID and seven staff took part in the research, which took place in England from 2016–17. Results: We selected six extracts to illustrate different types of joint decision‐making. Informed by inclusive research with a drama group of people with intellectual disabilities, we focus on the ways in which (a) future plans are discussed; (b) choices are offered during an activity; (c) people reflect on their decisions. Conclusion: The article concludes with discussion about the teaching and learning content of choice‐making, on relational autonomy, and the practice learning for PAs, support workers and for people with intellectual disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Brain Injury Case Managers (BICMs) work closely with individuals with Acquired Brain Injury (ABI), assessing needs, structuring rehabilitation interventions and providing support, and have significant experience of clients with impairments to decision making. The purpose of this paper is to explore the application of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) and its guidance when applied to ABI survivors. This research aimed to: first, highlight potential conflicts or tensions that application of the MCA might pose, and second, identify approaches to mitigate the problems of the MCA and capacity assessments with ABI survivors. It is hoped that this will support improvements in the services offered. Design/methodology/approach: Using a mixed method approach, 93 BICMs responded to an online questionnaire about decision making following ABI. Of these, 12 BICMs agreed to take part in a follow-up semi-structured telephone interview. Findings: The data revealed four main themes: disagreements with other professionals, hidden disabilities, vulnerability in the community and implementation of the MCA and capacity assessments. Practical implications: The findings highlight the need for changes to the way mental capacity assessments are conducted and the need for training for professionals in the hidden effects of ABI. Originality/value: Limited research exists on potential limitations of the application of the MCA for individuals with an ABI. This paper provides much needed research on the difficulties surrounding mental capacity and ABI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores participation in Court of Protection (COP) proceedings by people considered vulnerable. The article is based on original data obtained from observing COP proceedings and reviewing COP case files. It is argued that the observed absence of the subject of proceedings is a form of testimonial injustice, that is, a failure to value a person in their capacity as a giver of knowledge. The issue of competence to give evidence is considered but it is argued that it is not the formal evidential rules that prohibit a vulnerable adult from giving evidence. Instead, it is the result of a persistent assumption that they are inherently vulnerable and therefore lack credibility as a knowledge giver. This assumption results in the voices of vulnerable adults being routinely absent from legal proceedings. It is argued that having a voice in the courtroom is essential and has a number of intrinsic and instrumental benefits. The article concludes with a discussion about the implications of the research, including the current trend towards the increased use of special measures, and recommends a presumption in favour of the subject of COP proceedings giving evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• More than one third of psychiatry inpatients (34.9%) lack the mental capacity for treatment decisions. • Capacity assessments based on legislative criteria accord closely with those based on clinical criteria. • This study highlights the significance of implementing Ireland's new mental capacity legislation. This study aimed to compare assessments of mental capacity based on legal criteria with assessments based on clinical criteria among psychiatry inpatients to establish the concordance, if any, between these two approaches to assessing mental capacity. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients (176 voluntary and 39 involuntary) in four psychiatry admission units in Ireland using both legal criteria (Ireland's Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015) and clinical criteria (the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment; MacCAT-T). Over one third of participants (34.9%) lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions according to the legal criteria. Mental incapacity was associated with involuntary admission status, being unemployed, a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related disorder, and older age. Patients who lacked mental capacity according to the legislation scored significantly lower on all subscales of the MacCAT-T than patients who had mental capacity. We conclude that mental capacity assessments based on legal criteria correlate closely with those based on clinical criteria. These findings support current legal definitions of mental incapacity in Ireland and other jurisdictions with similar legislation (e.g. England and Wales). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that existing English and Welsh mental health legislation (The Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA)) should be changed to make provision for advance decision-making (ADM) within statute and makes detailed recommendations as to what should constitute this statutory provision. The recommendations seek to enable a culture change in relation to written statements made with capacity such that they are developed within mental health services and involve joint working on mental health requests as well as potential refusals. In formulating our recommendations, we consider the historical background of ADM, similarities and differences between physical and mental health, a taxonomy of ADM, the evidence base for mental health ADM, the ethics of ADM, the necessity for statutory ADM and the possibility of capacity based 'fusion' law on ADM. It is argued that the introduction of mental health ADM into the MHA will provide clarity within what has become a confusing area and will enable and promote the development and realisation of ADM as a form of self-determination. The paper originated as a report commissioned by, and submitted to, the UK Government's 2018 Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions among psychiatry inpatients in Ireland and explore the relationship, if any, between mental capacity and various demographics and clinical variables. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients in four psychiatry admission units. Almost half of the participants were female and the most common diagnoses were schizophrenia or a related disorder and affective disorders. Overall, 1.9% of participants lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions; 50.7% had partial mental capacity; and 47.4% had full mental capacity. These proportions did not differ between female and male patients. On multi-variable regression analysis, greater mental capacity was significantly associated with, in order of strength of association, voluntary admission status, Irish ethnicity, being employed and younger age. However, while these relationships were statistically significant (i.e. were unlikely to have occurred by chance), together they accounted for just 27.6% of the variance in mental capacity between participants (i.e. they were not very strong). The relatively high rate of "partial mental capacity" identified in our work suggests that decision-making supports are likely to be of substantial importance in assisting psychiatry inpatients making decisions about treatment, especially involuntary inpatients whose mental capacity is especially likely to be impaired. Future research could usefully clarify and quantify the role of cognitive and other factors in relation to the unexplained variance (72.4%) in mental capacity identified in this study; and explore which models of supported decision-making are most likely to assist the substantial proportion (50.7%) of psychiatry inpatients who have partial mental capacity for treatment decisions, as well as the minority lacking such mental capacity (1.9%). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental Healthcare Act (MHCA), 2017 aims to protect and promote the rights of patients during mental health care. This Act promotes patient's autonomy and choice for those with ability to make decisions on mental health care, independent of the level of risks or complexities. Supported decision-making can vary from minimal or no support to complete support for decision-making. A decision by a nominated representative is restricted to those with incapacity for mental healthcare decisions. Capacity assessment for mental healthcare is a specific task in the clinical application of the act. This article is meant to guide clinicians on capacity assessment during the implementation of MHCA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implicit in the assertion that an individual has consented to/has capacity to decide, is the concept that the individual has understood that which needed to be understood, retained the same and used/weighed this information as part of their decision-making process and thereafter communicated their wishes in whatever way possible. What invariably underpins the decision-making process is the information available to the individual (relevant information) and how this information is influenced by the functioning of their mind/brain. Consent given without an individual having processed the information relevant to the decision at hand is arguably invalid. This paper seeks to draw attention to the underpinning role of "what the patient needs to know" – (relevant information) in the correct determination of an individual's decisional capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the effectiveness of mental capacity tests in helping address problems of control such as anorexia nervosa and alcoholism. Topics discussed include the Mental Capacity Act, the case A NHS Foundation v. Ms X, and a case wherein heroin was prescribed as treatment for drug dependency.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present findings from a research project which investigated the approaches of different groups of assessors to the mental capacity assessments which are required to be conducted as part of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS).Design/methodology/approach Four case study vignettes were given to participants. Three groups involved in the DOLS assessment process were interviewed by telephone about the factors that may influence their capacity assessments.Findings Most assessors did not refer to the required two-stage test of capacity or the "causative nexus" which requires that assessors must make clear that it is the identified "diagnostic" element which is leading to the inability to meet the "functional" requirements of the capacity test. The normative element of capacity assessments is acknowledged by a number of assessors who suggest that judging a person's ability to "weigh" information, in particular, is a subjective and value-based exercise, which is given pseudo objectivity by the language of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA). A number of elements of good practice were also identified.Research limitations/implications In this exploratory study, participant numbers were small (n=21), and the authors relied on self-report rather than actual observations of practice or audit of completed assessments.Practical implications The findings are of relevance to all of those working in health and social care who undertake assessments of mental capacity, and will be helpful to all of those tasked with designing and delivering training in relation to the MCA 2005. They also have relevance to policy makers in the UK who are involved with reforms to DOLS regulations, and to those in other countries which have legislation similar to the MCA.Originality/value Much existing literature exhorts further training around the MCA. The authors suggest that an equally important task is for practitioners to understand and be explicit about the normative elements of the process, and the place of ethics and values alongside the more cognitive and procedural aspects of capacity assessments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the current Mental Health Act of England and Wales, it is lawful to perform deep brain stimulation in the absence of consent and independent approval. We argue against the Care Quality Commission's preferred strategy of addressing this problematic issue, and offer recommendations for deep brain stimulation-specific provisions in a revised Mental Health Act.Declaration of interestT.A. is a paid consultant for Boston Scientific, Medtronic and St. Jude Medical. He has received honoraria from Abbott, Boston and Medtronics and served as consultant to all three. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]