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This book focuses on border deaths at sea. It unravels how the interplay of the law of the sea and rules on jurisdiction widen the opportunity for states to make and enforce rules outside their territory, and questions whether this is also accompanied with an obligation to respect the right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when doing so.By embarking upon the challenge of analysing a cross-border phenomenon in which direct encounters between state agents and the victims are few through the lens of legal obligations, the book unearths avenues for arguing that the ECHR is applicable to border deaths on the high seas and showcases the Court’s creativity in bridging the gap between the Convention and people in need of protection. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the ECHR is applicable to border deaths occurring within the territorial seas of states. It discusses the right to life, as well as the specific obligations of states in respect to border deaths at sea, and demonstrates that in many instances, EU policies fall short of the standards set under the right to life.This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in migrant rights, international human rights law, public international law including, refugee and migration law, maritime law, and security studies.

Van Leeuwen betoogt dat als een erkende technische toepassing (ETT) in een bouwproject te specifiek en beperkt blijkt in het toepassingsbereik en toch tegemoet zou moeten worden gekomen aan specifieke wensen of eisen die volgen uit de locatie, het verstarrend en vertragend werkt als het aantonen dat aan de bouwtechnische regels wordt voldaan via de ETT-benadering zou kunnen. Ik begrijp dit niet. Er is toch niet gepleit voor een wettelijke verplichting om te werken met ETT’s? In een ETT moet rekening worden gehouden met lokale omstandigheden en daarover moet de bouwer verantwoording afleggenAan een erkende kwaliteitsverklaring worden binnen en buiten de toekomstige regeling voor kwaliteitsborging voor de bouw anders dan aan een erkende technische toepassing uitdrukkelijk rechtsgevolgen verbonden. I De ETT zou met een wettelijke verankering de kans kunnen worden geboden om zich te bewijzen, zoals dat ook is gebeurd met erkende kwaliteitsverklaringen.

This paper analyses the engagement of non-state actors (NSAs) in regional migration policy processes in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It identifies four categories of NSAs...

In response to the 2015 migration ‘crisis’, the European Union intensified the externalisation of its migration policies, in particular through the EU Trust Funds for Syria and Africa, and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The legal construction of these financial measures is such that in many projects, normal implementation and public procurement procedures are not applied. This creates opportunities for clientelism. A limited number of actors (Europe’s ‘clients’) has emerged to implement European policies in third countries. This way of implementing externalisation projects will first be analysed in functionalist terms and in terms of path dependency. The paper will conclude by arguing that, in addition to such analyses, this way of implementing externalisation is to be understood as (a) expanding the scope of legitimate action of European states outside their territory; and (b) setting norms for international actors such as non-European states, international organisations and corporations.

Smart city projects in Europe and North America are employing a novel approach to data analysis that processes hardly any or no personal data at all. As such, these projects—at least, for the most part—escape the scope of (European) data protection law. The idea behind this new approach to smartness can be condensed in the statement: “smart cities are only Big Brother to the masses.” In other words, if the data collected within smart city projects do not identify any individuals, then there are no issues with privacy and data protection law. This problematic assumption relies on two reductive understandings of key notions in this context: that of “personal privacy” and “personal surveillance.” In this contribution, I focus on the latter and call for a broader understanding of surveillance as a set of diverse modes of social control by privacy law scholars. After all, in order to reveal the underlying dynamics of power and how these might lead to surveillance abuse—even, or especially, when surveillance is based on the processing of seemingly non-personal data—concrete surveillance practices and their logics need to be examined. For this purpose, I take the example of the Stratumseind Living Lab in the Netherlands and examine it through the lens of Foucault’s notion of security. This examination leads to two valuable insights for privacy and data protection law scholars. First of all, it strengthens the argument of contemporary group privacy scholars that a narrow focus on individual privacy and surveillance is inadequate and that the regulatory framework needs to be adapted. The second insight raises another broad issue: smart cities, which function according to the securitizing logic of surveillance, such as the Stratumseind Living Lab, are transforming public spaces into consumption spaces. Yet, the protection of privacy in public can and should serve to protect key aspects of public space—political participation and sociability—as well.

Het Hof van Justitie heeft op 24 februari 2022 geoordeeld dat de uitsluiting van huishoudelijke werkers uit een Spaanse werkloosheidsverzekering ongerechtvaardigde discriminatie op grond van geslacht oplevert. De auteur gaat na wat de implicaties van deze uitspraak (kunnen) zijn voor de rechtspositie van huishoudelijk werkers in Nederland. Daarbij bespreekt ze ook de uitspraak van de Rechtbank Rotterdam van 16 december 2021.

Constitutional pluralism tries to provide a legitimating theoretical frame for stubborn disagreements between the European Court of Justice and national constitutional courts. However, in accepting the legal separateness of constitutions and EU law it offers a depressingly Cold War vision of the European constitutional space. Interpretative pluralism instead conceives of these texts as a composite whole, with the task of courts to read them as such, seeking interpretations of one that do not do violence to the other. The disagreements between courts should not be about which text takes precedence, but about what they mean. The difference in practice is that national constitutional courts should never say that EU law conflicts with their constitutions. Rather, they should read it so that it does not, even if that means disagreeing with an interpretation offered by the European Court of Justice. Normatively this approach has the merit that it encourages national courts to engage more deeply with EU law, a necessary step in the construction of a working and legitimate European legal order. Descriptively, it also corresponds increasingly to what national apex courts actually do.