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The article presents the revised Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (MAI)-Civil Instruction adopted and approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri, in an order dated February 8, 2022. These include the general - jury instructions, rulings of law and bench conferences, and prohibition of juror research for communication about this case.

The article talks about the role of model jury instructions in reasonable royalty patent damages in the U.S. civil litigation. Topics discussed include U.S. law of patent damages; "Model Jury Instructions: Patent Litigation" book by American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litigation on model jury instructions; and establishment of National Jury Instruction Project by Chief Judge Paul R. Michel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for addressing patent infringement cases.

The article reports on the reasonable royalty damages in patent infringement cases in the U.S. Topics discussed include District of Georgia court case Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood, in which the court held that the reasonable royalty owed to a patent holder should be determined based on the consideration of fifteen different factors; Ericsson v. D-Link court case on patent infringement; and Fair Credit Billing Acts (FCBA's) 2016 model jury instructions.

The article focuses on decision on Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case Commonwealth v. Crayton and Commonwealth v. Collins which crafted a provisional model eyewitness identification jury instruction. It mentions suggestive procedures and whether existing model jury instructions provide adequate guidance to juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony. It also mentions wrongful convictions which is an invaluable law enforcement tool in obtaining accurate convictions.

The article focuses on relevance of jury instructions for maintaining fidelity to the antitrust law in the U.S. including use of empirical testing for improvements in jury instructions of jurors and need for inculcation of empirical assessment as integral part of jury instructions drafting.

The article reports the decision of the British Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in different cases including 'R. v Fanning (David),' 'R. v Kerner (Stuart Robert John),' and 'R. v Osianikovas (Tomas)' concerning jury verdicts. The court dismissed the appeals and refused the applications on the basis inconsistency in verdicts that advanced as a ground of appeal against conviction.

The article focuses on the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in the several cases related to civil procedure and practice Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia on fire insurance, Kambis v. Considine on attorneys' fees and Ragland v. Soggin on improper jury instructions.

The article looks at the decision of Great Britain's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case R. v Ogden (Neil) regarding the concealment of criminal property contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977. It mentions that the proceeds of crime with the unlawful supply of drugs on jury instructions. It also mentions that conspiracy regarding the drug supply.

We investigated whether the Interview-Identification-Eyewitness factors (I-I-Eye) educational aid could sensitize mock jurors to the quality of eyewitness evidence in criminal cases which also contained circumstantial and forensic evidence. After participants were randomly assigned to read either the I-I-Eye or a control aid, they read a trial transcript containing either strong or weak eyewitness evidence. The police consistently followed scientific interviewing and identification procedures in the strong case, but not in the weak case. In two experiments, the I-I-Eye participants were approximately three times more likely than the control participants to enter guilty verdicts in the strong case than in the weak case. Thus the I-I-Eye educational aid increased participants' sensitivity to the eyewitness evidence. The I-I-Eye method provides a valuable analytical framework for evaluating eyewitness evidence in criminal cases. It may be capable of becoming "a standard feature for criminal cases" with eyewitness evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports results from a survey measuring the acceptability of jury decision‐making research practices. Historically, there has been wide variability in the methodology used to conduct experimental jury decision‐making research. Samples can be drawn from different populations, the format of stimulus materials can vary, key elements of a trial, including jury instructions and deliberation, can be omitted, and different types of dependent measures can be used to assess decisions. The acceptability of evaluating different approaches for conducting research ultimately becomes a subjective process. The present study sought to identify professional standards regarding acceptable and unacceptable research practices by assessing the perceptions of individuals involved in conducting, reviewing, and publishing jury research. Overall, respondents (N = 74) placed greater weight on internal rather than ecological validity, and rated the utilization of theory to guide research as the most important factor. The inclusion of jury instructions was rated as the most important specific trial element, while deliberations received the least support. The findings present a guide for researchers designing materials, provide a framework for objective evaluation of manuscripts based on professional standards, offer guidance to courts seeking to determine the general acceptance of jury decision‐making research methodologies, and create a foundation for the development of more standardized practices in the field. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Supreme Court of Missouri's interpretation in court case 'State v. Jackson.' It reports that the court held that a jury's disbelief of the State's evidence, in whole or part, suffices to require instructing down on a nested lesser included offense. It mentions the court's failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense.

The article looks at the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the case State v. Austin on criminal law. It mentions that the Court adjudicated a second-degree sexual assault case regarding the admissibility of a complainant's out-of court identification procedure of the defendant. It also mentions that the court denied the motion to use the defendant's proposed jury instructions and denying the motion to suppress evidence and for a new trial.

The article looks at the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the case State v. Matthews regarding the violation of free speech rights of criminal defendant under the provision of the disorderly conduct statute. It mentions that protection of speech under the constitutional law. It also mentions that the trial justice instructed the jury in accordance with the defendant's jury instructions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.

The primary contribution of this paper is to challenge the accepted wisdom that jury instructions are an ineffective safeguard against wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eyewitness identification. It argues that such a conclusion is based on an erroneous interpretation of the available experimental evidence and that, in fact, there are grounds for optimism about the effectiveness of jury instructions in educating jurors about the risks posed by eyewitness identification evidence and sensitising them to the factors relevant to its evaluation. In order to play a useful role in safeguarding against wrongful conviction, however, instructions need to be easily comprehensible; to reflect the relevant scientific findings; and be provided to jurors in writing (or an alternative format for those who would find written instructions inaccessible). The paper also makes a secondary contribution, which is to warn of the dangers of accepting uncritically the findings of mock jury research as the basis for legal policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, along with its importance to individuals and society; reports the truth-related language used in multiple state and federal jurisdictions in the U.S.; and mentions the use of truth-based jury instructions.

The article focuses on the concerns of musicians regarding copyright infringement for composing new music with the rise in music copyright infringement claims brought in the U.S. It mentions the approach adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the model jury instruction in copyright infringement of a musical work. It also mentions model jury instruction that instructs jurors on the Ninth Circuit's applicable copyright law.

The article focuses on the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that will impact the various stages of litigation through discovery took effect from on December 1, 2015. It mentions that discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) with pre-litigation to discovery motions and rely on the advisory notes in making rulings. It also mentions that dverse inference jury instructions could be imposed for negligent or grossly negligent loss of ESI.

Belief-state ascription—determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc.—is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology—falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology”—reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea concepts differ systematically from what scholars, courts, and perhaps legislators, have assumed. As implemented, mens rea concepts are much more context-dependent and normatively evaluative than the conventional wisdom suggests, even assuming that jurors are following jury instructions to the letter. As a result, there is less difference between knowledge and recklessness than is typically assumed; jurors consistently “over”-ascribe knowledge to criminal defendants; and concepts like “belief,” “awareness,” and “conscious disregard” mean different things in different contexts, resulting in mens rea findings systematically responsive to aspects of the case traditionally considered irrelevant to the meaning of those terms. This Article provides the first systematic account of the factors driving jurors’ ascriptions of the specific belief states criminal law invokes. After surveying mens rea jury instructions, introducing the Experimental Epistemology literature to the legal literature on mens rea, and examining the implications of that literature for criminal law, this Article considers ways to begin bridging the surprisingly large gap between mens rea theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines laws concerning police brutality and minority prosecution in the U.S. Topics discussed include killing of Michael Brown, African-American teenager by a Darren Wilson, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri; social climate related to police brutality and legal framework surrounding jury instructions about police testimony.

The article focuses on the rule Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its restrictive language to allow for substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements by witnesses. It mentions that the landscape of pattern criminal jury instructions for witness impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. It also propose a revised jury instruction designed to clarify juror confusion for critical safeguards for substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statement.

The article examines the attorney accountability for jury nullification arguments in criminal trials in the U.S. Topics discussed include jury nullification arguments; history and purpose of jury trials; and jury's inherent power to nullify and various judicial attempts to curb that power; and need of reforms in rules of professional conduct be amended to expressly prohibit jury nullification arguments.

The article discusses the role and purpose of juries in federal criminal trials in the U.S. Topics discussed include advantages and disadvantages of allowing juries to return partial verdicts; laws concerning jury deliberations and partial verdicts; and the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision in the case 'United States v. Ruffin.'

Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on 'pivotal reasoning'. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a 'detail-free' environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Circuit in the case Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc. regarding the jury instruction for the fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) royalty for standard-essential patents (SEPs). It mentions that difference between the value of the technological invention and the added value of that invention's standardization. It mentions that network effects generated by interoperability between standard-compliant products.

The article discusses the 2018 British court case R. v. Miah which demonstrates the need for judges to provide a clear direction to the jury with regards to not convicting unless they are sure of the accused's guilt.

The article focuses on decision of Great Britain's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case R. v Daley (Carlyle) on hearsay evidence revealing bad character of defendant under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 with proper direction to jury.

The article focuses on decision of Great Britain's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case R. v Hay (Daniel Glen) on evidence admissible to rebut defence of innocent association or coincidence and provision limited to propensity with the conviction of robbery.