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Plato noticed a sizeable problem apropos of establishing his republic-that there was always a ready pool of zealous potential rulers, lying in wait for a suitable opportunity to rule on their own tyrannical terms. He also recognized that those persons best suited to rule, those persons with foursquare and unimpeachable virtue, would be least motivated to govern. Ruling a polis meant that those persons, fully educated and in complete realization that the most complete happiness comprises solitary study of things unchanging, would have to compromise their happiness for the wellbeing of their polis and of the people in it. Plato's solution, in effect that the aristoi would merely recognize their duty to sacrifice personal happiness for the happiness of the polis, has perplexed and continues today to perplex scholars. Like Plato, Jefferson recognized that there was always a pool of eager sharks, ready to govern. His republicanism, comprising a ward system and general education, was founded on the fullest participation of its citizenry, suitably educated and a governing aristoi. The true aristoi, the 'natural aristoi', are the intelligent and virtuous and that government is best which allows for a 'pure selection' of the natural aristoi into the governing offices. Nonetheless, as Jefferson's own life shows, non-parochial governing meant being rent from domestic tranquility, being forced to leave behind one's personal affairs to decay, and being tossed willy-nilly into the coliseum of nonstop political wrangling. Why would anyone, particularly one wanting to be happy, wish to govern? Thus, Jefferson faced the same problem that Plato faced. How could a state be structured so that the wisest and most virtuous would be motivated to rule? In this paper, I argue that Jefferson, in full recognition of the problem of encouraging the most intelligent and virtuous to govern, the problem of public service, offers a solution that is remarkably Platonic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents reflections on the political ideals of capitalism, democracy and liberalism in the United States throughout the 20th century. Connections are made between common 20th-century views portraying the capitalism and democracy as being related and complimentary. Discussion is then offered charting the growth of these social values throughout the century alongside the liberal movement, contrasting them with the growing social-political controversy of economic inequality in the 21st century. Illustrations of these various ideals are highlighted through the life of the mid-century American author and liberal activist Lillian Hellman.

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For Durkheim, sociology, as a new kind of science, is part and parcel of the constitutional process of modern societies. This conception of sociology rests on two fundamental theses. First, society, as a normative realm made up of ideas, and especially of ideals, is an ontological novelty: it shows itself in the constitution of individuals, since human beings are persons able to think and act only as long as they are social individuals. Second, modern society is an historical novelty, constituted by an ideal of the person which asks and enables each social individual to become a fully autonomous being. The aim of this paper is to clarify these two basic foundations of Durkheimian sociology. Part I focuses on the first thesis: Durkheim’s reconstruction of the sociological tradition as a conceptual struggle toward the idea of society, conceived as a new order of reality. It examines the social philosophy Durkheim developed in order to account for the relation between society and the individual; the conceptualization of the human individual as social in The Division of Social Labor, its later development in the framework of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Part II, to be published in a second volume, will focus on the second thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Trakya University Journal of Social Science is the property of Trakya University, Institute of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the social role of Japanese girls during the period of total war from 1937 to 1945 through examining the girls' magazines "Shōjo no tomo (Girls' companion)" and "Shōjo kurabu (Girl's club)." The girls' magazines' relationship with the Japanese education system is discussed. The representation of the ideal Japanese girl, including as being willing to sacrifice for the nation, nursing wounded Japanese soldiers and in having strength over beauty, is also discussed. The author contends that girls' magazines transformed from a focus on fashion, domesticity and motherhood in pre-war Japan into a portrayal of the ideal girl as classless, ageless and genderless during the period of total war.

Despite its many strengths Terryl Given's When Souls Had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in Western Thought folds heterodox thinkers like Boehme and Schelling into the larger tradition of pre-existence in which the pre-existing human soul falls into time from timeless eternity, and where God, in His perfection, is exempt from the trials of change and evolution. Boehme and Schelling actually provide us with a different interpretation of the pre-existence that is not present in the Platonic strain of pre-existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will explore some of the original gold standards of scientific knowledge, and, as such, it will discuss whether true scientific knowledge must defer to some kind of unique, personal foundation. It will begin with an Aristotelian understanding of what constitutes true, scientific knowledge, and then use these Aristotelian criteria to examine whether or not Aquinas' understanding of Ipsum Esse Subsistens provides the 'necessary nexus' to connect 'middles' in scientific thought to real causes in nature. It will also consider whether Aquinas source for true scientific knowledge-this Ipsum Esse-must also be a person, if it is deemed to be the scientific cause of all rationality, subjectivity, and agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on Wallace Stevens' ideal of ordinary experience. It says that Stevens starts with contempt for ordinary life and repetition of temporality, but he realized that there is no escape from alienation and pseudo-heroics without balancing with everyday life. The author mentions that Stevens concept provides the context to develop second-order reflections on the construction of aspects.

Copyright of Education. Physical Training. Sport / Ugdymas. Kûno kultûra. Sportas is the property of Lithuanian Sports University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The recent prominence of the ideal/non-ideal debate is largely due to the fact that it offers a vocabulary in which to diagnose what many see as a key problem of political theory: its relative unwillingness to provide solutions to urgent problems facing people here and now; or for people as they are rather than as they should be. The primary aim of this article is to offer an improved understanding of the territory that the ideal/non-ideal debate relates to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the myths and truths behind test and evaluation (T&E). The author refers to the definition of the word myth fro Google as a popular belief, a story that has associated with a person, institution, or occurrence, or an event illustrating a cultural ideal. One of the myths mentioned is the Us versus Them mentality, wherein in reality, it should have been one team from the start to represent the T&E community.

We present a method to iterate finitely splitting lim-sup tree forcings along non-wellfounded linear orders. As an application, we introduce a new method to force (weak) measurability of all definable sets with respect to a certain (non-ccc) ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Translated by Phillip Griffith [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I consider the significant but generally overlooked role that the French Revolution played in the development of German Idealism. Specifically, I argue that Reinhold and Fichte's engagement in revolutionary political debates directly shaped their interpretation of Kant's philosophy, leading them (a) to overlook his reliance upon common sense, (b) to misconstrue his conception of the relationship between philosophical theory and received cognitive practice, (c) to fail to appreciate the fundamentally regressive nature of his transcendental argumentative strategy, and, ultimately, (d) to seek to deduce his philosophy from a single first-principle, one grounded in the immediate awareness of the subject's mental life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author offers his opinion on moral dilemmas and analyzes its implications for the structure of normative moral systems. He examines two criteria of consistency that can be used to evaluate a given moral system. The first criterion assumes that a satisfactory moral system will not allow irresolvable moral conflicts to occur and the second criterion allows irresolvable moral conflicts to occur, but also holds that there are possible worlds in which no such conflicts occur. He believes that the second criterion is more plausible, however the respective roles that the criterions assign to moral dilemmas appear similar. He also discusses several concepts related to the issue.

Copyright of Politica: Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab is the property of Politica: Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

If instructional designers hold limited views about their practice they sometimes adopt formulaic routines that do not help them accomplish the goals they believe are important, or develop instruction of a quality envisioned by the field's innovative theorists. Fortunately, designers can avoid these unfavorable results in part by understanding and exemplifying the creative spirit of design. In this article the author examines the creative spirit of design, exploring its imaginative, creation-oriented, and inter-disciplinary character. The author also describes how the creative spirit can help instructional designers remain flexible and perceptive in their practice, and by so doing be better able to create effective and innovative instruction of a quality consistent with their ultimate ideals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Student affairs professionals should value the ideals of transformational leadership, but they need to navigate the realities of institutional power structures, if they want to maintain their political viability and improve organizational integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on ideology and hegemony and how they affect human understanding of communication. Topics include the practical recognition of human limitations and tacit acceptance of discursive practices, the need for ideological movement to implement radical social change, and the role of communication and context in the formation of ideological ideals and rhetoric. The idea of naturalization in the form of social injunctions and expected practical recognition is discussed, as well as the issues of domination and exploitation.

The article offers a history of the law as a conglomeration of referent ideals emanating from the minds of those who create them as separate from the concept of codes, acts and constitutions and examines the supranational continuity in the law, the ontological foundations of law and sociological law. The author relates that the law as referent is a consequence of the human mind as focused on certain ideals.

This paper discusses the theory of socialism endorsed by Li Dazhao, China's first Marxist, as an effort to integrate western ideas into the traditional Chinese thinking during the chaotic years of the 1920s. There are two aspects of Li's theory of socialism which, while related, are distinct: (1) a theory about the nature of socialist society, and (2) a theory about how a socialist society can be achieved in China. Li's development of (1) is influenced by his acceptance of the classical Confucian notion of the Great Harmony while his account of (2) draws upon both his acceptance of the Daoist account of historical change and on classic Confucianism. Understanding his theory of socialism thus requires locating it within these two doctrines of classical Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article we argue that a positively formulated theory of education ought to take into consideration empirically based knowledge. Theories of education are normative theories, because they are mainly focused on how the world ought to be: they present ideals, they prescribe preferred repertoires of actions, and they describe valued attitudes. However using a recent example of an ideal of cosmopolitan education, we here reveal some ways in which prevalent theories of education quickly become remote and powerless if they rebuff empirically based knowledge about peoples' actual experiences and ways of being in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National identity, how one sees oneself as a member of a given nation, is an important form of social identity. Feelings toward one's country are a matter of both individual and collective concern. In an increasingly diverse world, the issue of identifying with a nation is complex and consequential for individual identity formation as well as collective political identity. How do young people think about what it means to be an American in the United States of America today? Using an in-depth interview approach, I investigate youth experiences in micro-contexts, the local contexts in which young people have concrete experiences that inform their developing identities, to illuminate important elements of the multiple pathways to American identity. Results point toward specific experiences that affect how young people form American identity: attachments to the ideals of America, the mismatch between American ideals and reality, experiences with diversity, opportunities for civic and political participation, and ideas about concepts such as the American dream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we defend a moral conception of cosmopolitanism and its relevance for moral education. Our moral conception of cosmopolitanism presumes that persons possess an inherent dignity in the Kantian sense and therefore they should be recognised as ends-in-themselves. We argue that cosmopolitan ideals can inspire moral educators to awaken and cultivate in their pupils an orientation and inclination to struggle against injustice. Moral cosmopolitanism, in other words, should more explicitly inform the work that moral educators do. Real-world constraints on moral action and the need to prioritise one's sometimes conflicting responsibilities will often qualify cosmopolitan justice as supererogatory. This fact does not absolve persons from aspiring to see themselves as having the moral obligation to help others in need, while recognising that their factual obligations are more modest in being bound by what they are actually able to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stein Ringen's theory of democratic purpose cannot do the work expected of it. Ringen's own criteria oscillate between being too vague to be useful (i.e. 'freedom') or, when specified more fully, conflicting, so that almost all democracies will seem to be potentially at cross-purposes with themselves rather than their purposes or sub-purposes being mutually reinforcing. This reflects a bigger and more theoretical problem. Disagreement about the purpose of democracy is built into democracy itself. The whole point of many (perhaps all) of our democratic institutions is to arrive at conditionally legitimate decisions in spite of such disagreement. So-called regime bias, i.e. the tendency to assess democracies according to the form and stability of their institutions rather than their results or their ability to serve certain purposes, does not in fact arise from bias. It arises on the contrary from a determination to avoid the bias inherent in giving some-inevitably partisan-ideals of what democracies should do pride of place over others in a scheme of measurement or evaluation. And even a regime-based definition of democracy must itself make simplifying assumptions that elide possible normative controversies over how the democratic game is best played. Vindicating one's preferred set of democratic ideals against alternatives is a completely legitimate enterprise and lends richness to debates within and across democracies. But it is an inherently ideological and political enterprise, not a neutral or scholarly one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach of implementing of social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the social dynamics of shame in restoration in the book of Ezekiel and argues that shame in restoration cannot be interpreted by the normal patterns of shame and honor. It says that shame and honor work against social and moral ideals, in which shame is caused by failure, while honor is a status caused by success. It states that shame in restoration has two dimensions such as the location of shame after the restoration of exiles and it exists only in relation to YHWH. Furthermore, it mentions that the normal pattern of shame is an important theme in the book of Ezekiel, which cannot explain the prophecy that restored Israel will be ashamed of YHWH.

Copyright of Intersecciones en Antropología is the property of Universidad Nacional del Centro de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines a selection of nineteenth-century appraisals of the mothers in Shakespeare's plays. Nineteenth-century interest in motherhood is hardly surprising, since society at this time regarded the family as the foundation stone of social order, with the mother figure at its ideological centre. The royal family itself set the standard with Queen Victoria, mother of nine, representing the ideal. The significance of motherhood at this time coincided with a rising wave of enthusiasm for Shakespeare's plays and the characters he created, characters that subsequently became role models for real women to emulate. Moreover, where the plays appeared to be wanting in respect of ideal mothers, nineteenth-century critics supplied the void with speculative adaptations and interpretations. In reality, however, notions of the ideal mother were fraught with difficulties and the evidence presented here suggests that whilst many nineteenth-century appraisals of Shakespearean mothers helped to perpetuate notions of the ideal and thereby uphold this significant part of the dominant ideology, others were clearly an attempt to negotiate a place between the real and the ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I analyze how Eduardo Barrios articulates a bidimensional type of satire in his novel Gran Senor y rajadiablos (Great Lord and Hellraiser), underscoring both the anachronism linked to the ideological perception that favored Peninsular lineages as hegemonic signs of aristocratic status, generally associated with the traditional sector of the hacienda, and the preference of the bourgeoisie for the rituals of buen tono as a formula to acquire the emerging forms of social aristocratic prestige based on economic solvency. Satirizing the ideological battle for the appropriation of the signs of aristocratic prestige stresses the persistence of a social differentiation construct, incompatible with the new democratic ideals promoted by the Chilean republican government of the time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response on the essay "Aesthetic Economy of Howells's The Rise of Silas Lapham," by Neil Browne. It discusses the commonplace of the scholarship of the book's author as well as his attention to everyday objects. It mentions that Browne's essay adverts his focus on ordinary materials in which the book's author was dedicated. It also focuses on one of the crucial issue concerning the old money that Browne has neglected on his essay as well as the issue regarding the discrepancy between a writer's ideals and the books of author Thomas Pynchon.

My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories - ideals and aspirations - which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral concepts such as duty, virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal formoral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]