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Reductionism relies on expectations that it is possible to make sense of the whole by studying its parts, whereas emergentism considers that program to be unattainable, partly due to the existence of emergent properties. The emergentist holistic stance is particularly relevant in biology and cognitive neuroscience, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. Here we consider Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy as providing important insights to metaphysics of science in general, and to the reductionism vs. emergentism debate in particular. An appraisal of Whitehead’s perspective reveals a difficulty shared by both approaches, referred to him as “simple location”: the commitment to the idea that the nature of things is exhausted by their intrinsic or internal properties, and does not take into account relations or dynamic interactions denoting “togetherness.” In a word, that things are simply where they are. Whitehead criticizes this externalist ontological perspective in which each interacting element exists, and can be thought, without essential reference to other elements. The aim of this work is to uncover such a stance, particularly in the context of dynamical systems, and to show its shortcomings. We propose an alternative relational approach based on Whitehead’s notion of “internal relations,” which we explicate and illustrate with several examples. Our work aims to criticize the notion of simple location, even in the framework of emergentist accounts, so as to contribute to a “relational turn” that will conceive “inter-identities” as “intra-identities” in which interactants are not enduring substances, but internally related processes. In sum, we argue that the notion of internal relations has a strong theoretical power to overcome some fundamental difficulties in the study of life and mind., Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities BFU-2015-74241-JIN RyC-2017-23599

In this paper I present Popper’s three worlds, the theory of creative evolution and the emergence of new forms. I further analyse Popper’s concept of emergence and his claim about the strong relationship between novelty and unpredictability. I analyse two different senses in which Popper uses the concept of emergence: (1) emergence as the unpredictability/nonderivability/nondeducibility of properties, and (2) emergence as the absolute unpredictability of events (Stephan 1992). This distinction parallels the distinction between the epistemological and ontological concepts of emergence. I argue that Popper, despite some examples which point to an epistemological notion, suggests ontological emergentism with “downward causation”. In this way consciousness possesses its own independent causal power. This enables Popper to see humans as autonomous and free. However, it is also vulnerable to the problems of interactionist dualism, particularly the question of its compatibility with some basic principles of physical science. This paper concludes with a discussion of how Popper’s position differs from the weaker emergentism present in various theories in cognitive science, such as the theories of emergent properties in connectionism and neural networks.

On the assumption that phenomenal consciousness (the what-it-is-like) is real, and ruling out Cartesian isolation from the non-mental world, we have two choices for its introduction: either it comes about in the course of the development of the non-conscious realm or it was there from the beginning. The latter comprises versions of panpsychism, a recently trending view in some quarters. In their view the former are broadly taken to be versions of emergentism, embracing even non-eliminatiivist materialisms. After producing what seem to me to be powerful objections to panpsychism, I defend emergentism against pansychist attacks on it. As I explain, my version is also dualist. Finally, with respect to both outlooks I briefly review the prospects of a rapidly advancing AI for expanding (or replacing!) the current population of natural mental subjects.

The emergentist reading of Descartes that I propose in this book is mainly challenged by Descartes’s real distinction argument found in the Sixth Meditation. In this argument, Descartes concludes that the mind can exist without the body. Many scholars argue that, for him, the mind does not need the brain to exist. If this separatist interpretation is true, then Descartes’s real distinction argument is not consistent with any kind of emergentism requiring a physical basis. That is why I will begin on this thought. In this section, I will provide a detailed analysis of the argument and argue that it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the mind can exist apart from the body. Instead, I argue that the real distinction argument proves that the mind and the body are different and opposite kinds of subjects of inherence. As we shall see, this soft substance dualism fits better with Descartes’s views of the substance and of human beings.

This chapter is an expository essay on Alexander’s character as a philosopher and his philosophical system. Alexander’s belief in the substance of philosophy and its classical problems is compared and contrasted with positivism and linguisticism, arguing that the latter schools of thought are anti-philosophical at root. The main aspects of Alexander’s philosophy are outlined such as his theory of space and time, the categories, emergentism, realist epistemology, and God, with various criticisms. It is further argued however that Alexander’s approach to philosophy has value in large part because he proposed a constructive hypothesis about reality that allows us to consider a comprehensive vision of the world’s structure.

This article analyzes the treatment of vegetative powers in Nicolaus Taurellus’s critical response to Andrea Cesalpino. Taurellus’s interest in this topic derives from larger metaphysical and theological concerns. His concern is that Cesalpino’s view that vegetative powers are due to a divine principle of activity inherent in natural particulars leads to a version of substance monism that is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of creation. Taurellus’s critique can best be understood within the context of his defense of an immaterialist account of the basic constituents of reality, which is connected with an emergentist account of the origin of vegetative powers.

This chapter places Alexander in his intellectual context, focusing on his early 1880s work, and exploring how that flows into his mature work. It considers Alexander’s views on two major late nineteenth century debates about the mind. First, what is the relationship of mind to nature? During this period, idealists were battling with realists over whether mind should be identified with nature. I argue Alexander was always a realist, and speculate on his association with Oxford realism. Second, how did our minds evolve biologically? Some theorists argued for naturalism, whilst others argued for supernaturalism. I argue Alexander was always a naturalist. Despite Alexander’s realism and naturalism, he leans towards both idealism and supernaturalism, sharply distinguishing his realism from that of early analytic philosophers. The final part of the chapter explains that while Alexander’s system won few converts, it was widely admired and remains a grand edifice in the history of speculative metaphysics.

This chapter considers and evaluates the philosophical relationship between Alexander and R.G. Collingwood, focusing particularly on metaphysics and the philosophy of history. Their relationship was founded not on their agreement but to a considerable extent on their differences and their willingness to offer and accept critical commentary on each other’s writings. Following the publication of his An Essay on Philosophical Method in 1933, Collingwood sought to develop his own positive metaphysical system, which consists of a developmental and historical view of reality. It is argued that Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity played a central part in Collingwood’s construction of his system, supplemented by the work of Whitehead and other process and emergence philosophers.

Glavni cilj ovog rada jeste formulisanje modela svesti koji bi uspeo da prevaziđe prigovore i probleme sa kojim su se suočavali svi dosadašnji neurobiološki modeli. Najveći izazov je odgovor na pitanje kako je moguće da neki materijalni sistem, poput mozga, proizvede subjektivno iskustvo. Kao što ću pokazati, odgovor se nalazi u načinu na koji je mozak organizovan i njegovoj sposobnosti da proizvede posebnu vrstu kauzalnih interakcija (neprekidnu kauzalnu samoreferencu). Model svesti koji predlažem se oslanja na dinamičke modele prema kojima je svest globalno sistemsko svojstvo. Prema hipotezi neprekidne kauzalne samoreference koju ću zastupati, organizacija ima nesvodivu ulogu u stvaranju novih svojstava. Svest se ne može u potpunosti objasniti svođenjem na osnovne materijalne konstituente, već je ona suštinski relaciono svojstvo tih konstituenata. Objašnjenje svesti ne možemo naći u pojedinačnim gradivnim jedinicama mozga, neuronima, već u načinu na koji su oni organizovani. Istraživanja (Bressler and Kelso, 2016) (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014) (Kelso, 2012) pokazuju da postoje svojstva koja se nalaze na nivou celog sistema, koja proizilaze iz relacija među konstituentima a koja se ne mogu pronaći na nivou bazičnih konstituenata. Svest je dinamički proces, neprekidno menjajuća struktura kauzalnih relacija među konstituentima sistema. U skladu sa tim pokušaću da pokažem da se svest kao svojstvo pojavljuje u slučajevima kada materija i relacije između njenih elemenata imaju posebnu kauzalnu konfiguraciju. Kao glavnu teorijsku i empirijsku podršku toj hipotezi koristiću modele i eksperimentalnu evidenciju različitih autora koji zastupaju dinamičke teorije svesti poput Tononija, Edelmana, Spornsa i drugih. Navedeni autori implicitno podržavaju ontologiju u kojoj relacije spadaju u osnovna primitivna svojstva stvarnosti. (Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser and Hilgetag, 2004) (Edelman and Tononi, 2000) (Olaf Sporns, 2010) (Tononi and Koch, 2015). U prvom poglavlju ću pokazati kakav je uticaj teorija dinamičkih sistema imala na druge nauke i koliko je uticala na promenu ontoloških pretpostavki. Ukazaću na važnost teorije dinamičkih sistema u argumentima u debati između redukcionizma i emergentizma. Kroz debatu između dva suprotstavljena stanovišta videćemo kako se fokus u razumevanju fizičkog sveta, pre svega funkcionisanja sistema, pomerio sa delova (mikro nivo) na celinu (makro nivo). U ovom poglavlju ćemo kroz različite teorijske hipoteze i empirijske primere videti da je teorija dinamičkih sistema osnov za prihvatanje savremene forme emergentizma, koja je od suštinske važnosti za uspostavljanje i odbranu teze prema kojoj je svest emergentno svojstvo u dinamičkim sistemima. Drugo poglavlje će fokus istraživanja staviti na teorijske okvire i osnovne pojmove teorije dinamičkih sistema. Pojmovi kojima raspolaže teorija dinamičkih sistema poput samoorganizujuće kritičnosti, metastabilnosti, tranzicije faza, emergencije, integracije i informacije su od suštinske važnosti za objašnjenje ponašanja kompleksnih sistema u koje spada i mozak. Kakva je empirijska primena ovih pojmova biće predstavljeno kroz analizu ponašanja gomile peska, zemljotresa, feromagnetnih materijala i kompjuterski model „Game of Life“. Navedeni primeri će imati poseban doprinos u odgovoru na pitanje kako jedan fizički sistem može da poseduje emergentno svojstvo koje prevazilazi ponašanje njegovih pojedinačnih elemenata. U ovom poglavlju načiniću i korak dalje pa ću pokazati koje su osobine mozga koje mu omogućavaju da proizvede emergentno svojstvo (svest). Kroz mnogobrojne primere iz kliničke prakse i simulacije pokazaću koliko je svesno iskustvo povezano sa sposobnošću sistema da integriše velike količine informacije. Kao što ćemo videti, sposobnost integracije velike količine informacije je posledica posebne arhitekture i funkcionalne dinamike mozga i upravo zahvaljujući njima mozak može da proizvede svesno iskustvo. U trećem poglavlju predstaviću najvažnije modele svesti koje se oslanjaju na teoriju dinamičkih sistema. Prvo ćemo videti modele koje svoje hipoteze zasnivaju na procesu integracije informacije (teorija dinamičkog jezgra, teorija integrisane informacije). Nakon toga ćemo videti kako se kompleksna dinamika polja može dovesti u vezu sa svesnim iskustvom. U okviru teorije polja će biti prikazani i modeli koji koriste pojam informacije da bi objasnili svesno iskustvo, ali treba imati na umu da takvi modeli informaciju koriste u kontekstu teorije polja. Na kraju ovog poglavlja će biti predstavljena teza proširene svesti koja dovodi u pitanje prostorno vremenske okvire u kojima se realizuje svesno iskustvo. U četvrtom poglavlju ću izložiti slabosti predloženih modela, pokazati njihovu nepotpunost i izložiti dodatne argumente kojima bi se otklonili problemi i dao potpuniji dinamički model svesti. Pokazaću da nijedan od navedenih dinamičkih modela svesti nije uzeo u obzir fundamentalnu osobinu fenomenalnog iskustva, usmerenost na samu sebe (samoreferentnost). Izložiću svoju osnovnu hipotezu koju sam nazvao „neprekidna kauzalna samoreferenca“ a koja se zasniva na procesu cirkularne kauzalnosti. Prema modelu koji ja zastupam subjektivno iskustvo je proces u kome dolazi do balansa kauzalnog uticaja između top down kauzalnosti koju sprovode elektromagnetna polja unutar mozga i bottom up kauzalnosti koju sprovode pojedinačni neuroni kroz svoje pražnjenje. Pokazaću da je glavni mehanizam svesti cirkularna kauzalna petlja koja se ostvaruje u talamokortikalnom sistemu gde dolazi do uspostavljanja kauzalne samoreference. Na samom kraju ćemo kroz nekoliko empirijskih primera testirati predviđanja HNKS i pokazati da ona bolje od ostalih prikazanih modela odgovara na svakodnevno shvatanje pojma svesti. Dakle, da bismo objasnili svest potrebno je da objasnimo kako je moguće da materijalni sistem proizvede fenomenalnu svest, egzistenciju doživljenu iz perspektive prvog lica. U pokušaju da odgovorim na ovo pitanje pošao sam od fenomenološke činjenice, da je svest uvek usmerena na samu sebe, da je subjektivno iskustvo uvek „zaključano“. Mi nikada ne možemo izaći van njega i pristupiti objektivnoj stvarnosti. Svesno iskustvo je uvek usmereno na sopstvene sadržaje. Pojam samoreferentnosti sam iskoristio za formulisanje hipoteze „neprekidne kauzalne samoreference“ koja nam pruža objašnjenje moždanih kauzalnih mehanizama koji stoje u osnovi svesti. Kako nijedan dinamički model do sada nije na zadovoljavajući način iskoristio tu činjenicu, smatram da predložena hipoteza predstavlja unapređenu verziju dosadašnjih dinamičih modela The main goal of this paper is to formulate a model of consciousness that would overcome the objections and problems faced by all neurobiological models to date. The biggest challenge is answering the question of how it is possible for a material system, such as the brain, to produce subjective experience. As I will show, the answer lies in the way the brain is organized and its ability to produce a special kind of causal interactions (continuous causal self-reference). The model of consciousness I propose relies on the dynamic models according to which consciousness is a global property of the system. According to the hypothesis of continuous causal self-reference that I will present, organization plays an irreducible role in creating new properties. Consciousness cannot be fully explained by reduction to basic material constituents, but it is rather essentially a relational property of those constituents. We cannot find an explanation of consciousness in the individual building blocks of the brain, neurons. It is in the way they are organized. Research (Bressler and Kelso, 2016) (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014) (Kelso, 2012) shows that there are properties that can be found on the level of the system as a whole, that arise from relationships among constituents, but that cannot be found at the level of basic constituents. Consciousness is a dynamic process, a constantly changing structure of causal relations between the constituents of a system. Accordingly, I will try to show that consciousness as a property occurs in cases where matter and the relations between its elements have a special causal configuration. As the main theoretical and empirical support for this hypothesis, I will use models and experimental record of various authors representing dynamic theories of consciousness such as Tononi, Edelman, Sporns and others. Listed authors implicitly support the ontology in which relations belong to the basic primitive properties of reality. (Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser and Hilgetag, 2004) (Edelman and Tononi, 2000) (Olaf Sporns, 2010) (Tononi and Koch, 2015). In the first chapter, I will show what impact the theory of dynamical systems has had on other sciences and how much it influenced the change in ontological assumptions. I will point out the importance of the theory of dynamic systems in the arguments from the debate between reductionism and emergentism. Through the debate between the two opposing viewpoints we will see how the focus has shifted from the parts... to the whole... in the understanding of the physical world, above all of the functioning of the system. In this chapter, through various theoretical hypotheses and empirical examples, we will see that the theory of dynamical systems is the basis for adopting the contemporary form of emergentism, which is essential for establishing and defending the thesis that consciousness is an emergent property in dynamic systems. The second chapter will focus on the research on theoretical frameworks and basic concepts of the dynamical systems theory. Concepts in the theory of dynamic systems such as self-organizing criticality, metastability, phase transition, emergence, integration and information are essential for explanation of the behavior of complex systems, including the brain. Empirical application of these terms will be presented through an analysis of the behavior of sand piles, earthquakes, ferromagnetic materials and the computer model of the “Game of Life“. The examples mentioned above will give a special contribution to answering the question of how a physical system can have an emergent property that goes beyond the behavior of its elements. In this chapter, I will make a step further and show what are the characteristics of the brain that enable it to produce an emergent property (consciousness). Through numerous examples from clinical practice and simulation, I will demonstrate how conscious experience is related to the ability of the system to integrate a large quantity of information. As we shall see, the ability to integrate a large quantity of information is a result of the unique architecture and functional dynamics of the brain and due precisely to them the brain can produce conscious experience. In the third chapter, I will present the most important models of consciousness that rely on the theory of dynamical systems. We will first see the models that base their hypotheses on the process of information integration (Dynamic Core Theory, Integrated Information Theory). We will then see how complex field dynamics can be related to conscious experience. Within the field theory, models that take the notion of information to explain conscious experience, but which use information in the context of field theory, will also be shown. Field theory will also include models that use the notion of information to explain conscious experience, but we should have in mind that such models use information in the context of field theory. At the end of this chapter, the theses of extended consciousness that question the spatio-temporal boundaries in which conscious experience is realized will be presented. In the fourth chapter, I will outline the weaknesses of the proposed models, demonstrate their incompleteness, and present additional arguments to solve the problems and provide a more complete dynamic model of consciousness. I will show that none of these dynamic models of consciousness have taken into account the fundamental feature of phenomenal experience, self-directedness (self-referentiality). I will present my basic hypothesis, which I have called "continuous causal self-reference", which is based on the process of circular causality. According to the model that I am presenting, subjective experience is a process in which there is a balance of causal influence between top-down causality carried out by electromagnetic fields inside of the brain and a bottom-up causality carried out by firing of the single neurons. I will show that the main mechanism of the consciousness is the circular causal loop which is realized inside of the thalamocortical system, where causal self-reference is established. At the very end, through several empirical examples, we will test the predictions of HCCS and show that it fits the everyday understanding of the notion of consciousness better than other models presented. Hence, in order to explain consciousness, we need to explain how it is possible for the material system to produce phenomenal consciousness, existence experienced from a first-person perspective. In an attempt to answer this question, I started from the phenomenological fact that consciousness is always self-directed, that subjective experience is always "locked". We can never go beyond it and approach objective reality. A conscious experience is always focused on its own content. I used the term self-referentiality to formulate the hypothesis of “continuous causal self-reference” that provides us with an explanation of the brain’s causal mechanisms underlying consciousness. As no dynamic model has satisfactorily exploited this fact, I believe that the proposed hypothesis represents an advanced version of the dynamic models so far

According to evolutionism, the difference between the human species and the animal species is only gradual and quantitative, depending on the amount of reflexes capable of learning each species. For dialectical materialism the difference is qualitative; Each of these two species has a different brain with different functions. Según el evolucionismo la diferencia entre la especie humana y la especie animal es tan solo gradual y cuantitativa, dependiendo de la cantidad de reflejos capaces de aprender cada especie. Para el materialismo dialéctico la diferencia es cualitativa; cada una de estas dos especies tiene un cerebro diferente con funciones diferentes.

Ovaj diplomski rad bavi se pitanjem veze između ontologije, metodologije i praktične teorije pojedinih socioloških autora. Glavna hipoteza rada je da razina emergencije koja je prisutna u načinu na koji autori koncipiraju društvo (njihova društvena ontologija) uvelike utječe na metodologiju i praktičnu teoriju. Kako bismo ovo analizirali, odabrali smo nekoliko poznatih socioloških autora te ih, po razini emergencije u njihovim društvenim ontologijama, podijelili u tri „tabora“: atomistički, holistički i emergentistički. Potom smo istaknuli neka zajednička obilježja koja autori unutar istog tabora dijele te ustvrdili da razina emergencije u ontologiji uistinu uvjetuje kakvu će metodologiju i praktičnu teoriju autori razviti. Jedan od glavnih kriterija usporedbe pojedinih autora bio je smijer kauzalnosti koji pronalazimo u njihovim teorijama. Ovo se zbog jednostavnosti pokazalo kao dobar princip analize i usporedbe pojedinih socioloških teorija te se preporučuje kao metoda za potencijalne srodne radove u budućnosti. This paper deals with the link between ontology, methodology and practical theory of individual sociological authors. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the emergence that is present in the way in which the authors conceptualize society (social ontology) greatly affect methodology and practical theory. In order to analyze this, we selected several well-known sociological authors and, according to the level of emergence in their social ontologies, divided them into three “camps”: atomistic, holistic and emergentist. We then highlighted some common features shared by the authors within the same camp and argued that the level of emergence in ontology did indeed condition what kind of methodology and practical theory the authors would develop. One of the main criteria for comparing individual authors was the direction of causality that can be found in their theories. Because of simplicity, this has shown to be a good principle for analyzing and comparing individual sociological theories and is recommended as a method for potential related works in the future.

Recent technological advancements encompassed under the Mobile Brain/Body Imaging (MoBI) framework have produced exciting new experimental results linking mind, brain and behaviour. Nevertheless, novel hypotheses, measures and experimental paradigms are needed in order to tackle MoBI's ultimate goal: to model and understand cognition, behaviour and experience as it emerges and unfolds unto and from the world. Such a goal is not completely novel or unique to the MoBI framework; it is at the core of a long-standing scientific and philosophical challenge. The ages-long debate revolves around the role of the body and the world on the emergence of the mind. Considering this, the present work has two goals. Our first goal is to briefly summarize some of the main ideas encompassed by the materialist/naturalist view of cognition as a complex emergent phenomenon. Our second and main goal is to argue that thanks to both MoBI and recent theoretical advances encompassed under the 4E-Cognition banner, theory and methodology might be finally synchronized, giving way to a revitalized form of emergentism, which lays new grounds for the understanding of cognitive phenomena. Finally, we offer the reader what we consider to be the main objective for the MoBI/4E framework and the understanding of the functional role of brain/body/world couplings in the emergence of cognition.

W XIX wieku teoria ewolucji nie była jeszcze powszechnie przyjmowana i dopiero upowszechniała się w środowisku naukowym, a tym samym i wśród brytyjskich emergentystów. Pierwszymi przedstawicielami nurtu emergentyzmu brytyjskiego są John Stuart Mill oraz George Henry Lewes. Mill uważany jest za ojca tego kierunku, a Lewesowi zawdzięcza się ukucie terminu emergentny na określenie, tego, co Mill nazywał skutkiem heteropatycznym. Celem tego artykułu jest ukazanie odmiennego podejścia Milla i Lewesa do teorii ewolucji, a tym samym do emergentyzmu.

I discuss two extreme views about emergence and explanation in the face of the following facts. The continuum equations of fluid mechanics and material behavior (bending of beams) are remarkably successful. They continue to be used for engineering and building purposes despite the fact that they almost completely ignore lower scale structure and detail. In fact, they treat fluids and steel beams as continuous blobs with no lower scale (atomic/molecular) structure whatsoever. The explanatory question is how such equations can be so successful. Extreme reductionists views expect that a bottom-up explanation from the actual fundamental lower scale structure will answer this explanatory question. Extreme emergentist views deny such reductionist pictures and hold that no bottom-up explanation is possible. The paper argues for a more sophisticated analysis that recognizes the importance of structures at scales intermediate between the atomic and the continuum. It is an analysis that appeals to sophisticated mathematics called “homogenization theory.” One can, in fact, provide a nonreductive explanation of the relative autonomy of the continuum equations from the lower scale details.

The article presents an overview of the key arguments of Terrence Deacon's theory of how mind emerged from matter. Deacon’s emergentism is analyzed as a way of refocusing the «hard problem» of consciousness. He suggests considering the phenomenon of consciousness as a dynamic coupling of mutually constraining processes. Such coupling is the defining feature of the subjective self and other teleodynamic phenomena. So self cannot be found as something embodied in existing material substrates. Consciousness is not present in such substrates themselves, but in the way different processes unfolding in these substrates constrain each other. Deacon shows that even looking at the simplest forms of life (autogens) one can observe that in them each part, interacting with other parts, creates the whole, and the whole as a synergetic complex makes possible the reproduction of its parts. The same principle underlies the organization of subjective consciousness, as subjective consciousness is hierarchically entangled with other levels of sentience. Thus, Deacon's emergentism is an attempt to take seriously the problem of the interrelation of spirit and matter by not simply to disregarding explanations that refer to the spiritual substance, but by offering the models of consciousness, sentience and purposiveness that could convincingly solve fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness in an alternative way. It is also an attempt to avoid the «naturalistic dualism» of David Chalmers, which involves splitting material information into physical and phenomenal aspects. According to Deacon, in explaining subjective self, one can do without both Cartesian spiritual substance and Chalmers' phenomenal information, but then what is necessary is to acknowledge the significance of absential phenomena (the phenomena that are intrinsically existing in relation to something missing, separate or nonexistent).

Structural realism holds that ontological commitments induced by successful scientific theories should focus on the structures rather than the objects posited by the theories. Thus structural realism goes beyond the empirical adequacy criterion of traditional (or constructive) empiricism. It also attempts to avoid the problems scientific realism faces in contexts of radical theory change accompanied by discordant shifts in posited theoretical objects. Structural realism emerged in the context of attempts to interpret developments in twentieth-century physics. In a biological context, Stanford (2006) provided pre-emptive criticism. French (2011, 2012) has since attempted to answer those criticisms and extend structural realism to the biological realm. This paper argues that, though Stanford’s criticism may be misplaced, and structural realism fares much better than traditional scientific realism in biological contexts, it remains a promissory note. The promise is based on shifting the focus of the debate from the status of biological laws to that of biological organization, an issue that remains a live debate within biology

When one says, “I had a desire to have a glass of water and this was followed by my action to fetch the glass of water” then the common-sense observation would assume that one’s mind caused this action. In this paper, I assume that there is a mind or there are ‘mental states’ which either belong to an enduring self or constitute a selfless stream of consciousness. I will provide the debate between Advaita Vedanta and Abhidharma Buddhism to present this tension between enduring self and the selfless stream of consciousness clearly. However, the aim of this paper is to look at how the mind is assumed to have causal powers. Is this assumption valid or not? Jaegwon Kim presents three problems that arise out of this assumption: “mental anomalism,” content externalism and causal exclusion. I shall look at these problems in detail in part I. In part II, I shall provide Buddhist arguments in favour of mind especially consciousness that can escape the reductionist arguments formulated by Kim by looking at the recent debates in contemporary physics especially quantum mechanics.

Автор анализирует понимание исторического события в рамках современной философии и исторической науки. Согласно философии М. Хайдеггера только крупномасштабные феномены, которые превосходят границы повседневности, могут рассматриваться как событие. Явления повседневности не являются событием. Принимая во внимание тесную связь крупных исторических событий и происшествий повседневности и на основе учета роли конкретики в рамках современной постнеклассической научной парадигмы, автор полагает, что социальные феномены повседневности должны в исторических исследованиях также рассматриваться как события. Анализируется роль математических методов в исторической науке при изучении отдаленного прошлого. Учитывается роль современной постнеклассической научной парадигмы. Выводы иллюстрируются с помощью примеров византийской истории., Цивилизация и варварство, Выпуск 9 (9) 2020

In this study, in order to discuss the pairing of form and function in early language development, we present the method proposed by Vihman and McCune (1994) for the categorization of baby’s initial productions in the transition between babbling and words. Before presenting the method, we discuss the emergentist / functionalist models that guide the method proposed by the authors, namely Locke’s biological model (1993), Kent’s self-organization model (1984) and Bates and MacWhinney (1989)’s Functionalist model. After presenting the method, through the analysis of transition data from seven children, three from the city of São Paulo and four from the city of Vitória da Conquista in Bahia, we exemplify the steps for data categorization and we observe that the pairing of form and function starts at one year and seven months. Finally, we discuss inter and intradialect variability regarding the pairing of form and function in early language development. Neste estudo, com o intuito de discutir o pareamento de forma e função no desenvolvimento linguístico inicial, apresentamos o método proposto por Vihman e McCune (1994) para a categorização das produções iniciais do bebê na transição entre balbucio e palavras. Antes de apresentar o método, discutimos os modelos emergentistas/ funcionalistas que norteiam o método proposto pelos autores, a saber, o modelo biológico de Locke (1993), o modelo de auto-organização de Kent (1984) e o modelo funcionalista de Bates e MacWhinney (1989). Após apresentar o método, por meio da análise de dados de transição de sete crianças, três da cidade de São Paulo e quatro da cidade baiana de Vitória da Conquista, exemplificamos os passos para categorização dos dados e observamos que o pareamento de forma e função ocorre após 1 ano e 7 meses. Por fim, discutimos a variabilidade inter e intradialetos no que se refere ao pareamento de forma e função no desenvolvimento linguístico inicial.

With reference to Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology (PoM) in my paper, I will address three points, namely: To what extent Schelling’s PoM provides us with arguments in favor of 1. Realism, 2. Emergentism and 3. Documentality. Accordingly, in the first section, Reality, I will present Schelling’s PoM as realism, arguing that in mythology Schelling finds the traces of the developing of conscious- ness, regarded as a real fact. But, as this latter can only be real if having a history, i.e. if emerging from a previous natural status, which is devoid of any consciousness, PoM should be regarded as strongly related to a sort of emergentism. This will thus be the object of the second section, where I will investigate the genetic interpretation of Schelling’s Weltalter proposed by Wolfram Hogrebe (Hogrebe 1989) and suggests that precisely this analysis of the Weltalter explains also why Schelling’s project couldn’t but fail. In fact, against its intention, the Weltalter, as it was trying to explain the rise of semantics together with it the true genesis of our acknowledgment of the world, still remains affected by an idealistic stance and hence couldn’t succeed in becoming positive philosophy. Eventually, in the third section of this paper, Documentality, I argue, that a solution to the problems left open by Schelling’s Weltalter and positively addressed in the PoM is offered by the interpretation of this latter as a contribution to Documentality, a concept which indeed would provide us with an important theoretical framework to understand the hidden presuppositions of Schelling’s PoM and to relate this latter to its realistic and emergentistic character.

Summary Discussions on soul origins are perceived as antiquated at best. However, there is a recent resurgence of interest in the nature and origins of the mind. This is due in part to the recent developments on the nature of “emergent” properties and/or substances in the contemporary literature on the philosophy of mind. As a contribution to this discussion, I examine the two most prominent theories of mental origins (e. g., Timothy O’Connor and William Hasker) and find that each encounter some noteworthy problems. With these in mind, I recommend that some form of Creationism deserves our attention. It provides a solution to the various philosophical and theological concerns associated with the previously mentioned emergence theories of the mind. Finally, I lay out a more satisfying theory of the soul’s creation in a way that accounts for the benefits of emergentism.

The present paper proposes an emergentist reading of Peirce, with special reference to his concept of evolution. Although the author never adopts the word “emergence” in a technical manner, it will be demonstrated that the core problem of emergence lies at the heart of his evolutionary doctrine, generally displayed by the interplay of his three well-known categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Indeed, although the Classical pragmatists most quoted in connection to emergentism are Dewey and Mead (and William James to some degree), scholars have recently suggested some emergentist readings of Peirce’s thought (cf. above all Tiercelin 1998, Quieroz & El-Hani 2006, Rose 2016), in particular with regard to semiotic process and cosmogony. Exploring further the path opened by those researches, the present paper aims to clarify the theoretical problem of emergent evolution from a pragmatist perspective and especially to illustrate Peirce’s emergentist standpoint. In order to reach this goal, the article is divided into four parts: after (1) a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on emergence, (2) I give a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists, (3) with a special focus on the common roots of the British Emergentists and Peirce on evolution. Finally, (4) I offer an emergentist reading of Peirce’s theory of evolution. In particular, I show how his strong emphasis on chance and the “growth” of the universe go together with his arch-stone of synechism (that is his theory of continuity), through what he calls agapasm.

A distinction often drawn in the literature on emergence is that between epistemological emergence and ontological emergence. I argue that the position that there are instances of ontological emergence in the world (radical emergentism) and the position that all instances of emergence are epistemological (ontological reductionism) are both problematic. My aim in this paper is to outline a third form of emergence, inspired by the philosophical ideas of Charles S. Peirce and Daniel Dennett, which will allow us to avoid both radical emergentism and ontological reductionism. Since what emerges in this kind of emergence is a real pattern, I call it real pattern emergence (RP emergence). A defining characteristic of a pattern is that it is more general than the elements or processes instantiating it. That is, the same pattern can be instantiated by different individual elements or processes. This generality of patterns makes them perfect candidates for applying Peirce’s rich theory of generals, including his pragmatism and Scholastic realism. I will argue that a real pattern is what Peirce calls a real general (or real Third), and like a real general, it is autonomous from the elements or processes instantiating it, because it supports predictions about not only what will happen in a given situation, but also what would happen in an indefinite variety of possible micro situations that are not actualized. This autonomy of real patterns will be the key feature that sets RP emergence apart from mere epistemological emergence, without, on the other hand, collapsing it into ontological emergence. The difference between RP emergence and Mark Bedau’s related notion of weak emergence will also be clarified.

Emergence is a pivotal concept for interpreting the reality of natural and social human life in all its processual complexity. The recently renewed debate about this concept and the different forms of emergentism is particularly varied, widely referring to biology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind (Kim 1999, 2005, 2006a,b; Cunningham 2001; Pihlstrom 2002; El-Hani 2002; El-Hani & Pihlstrom 2002; Chalmers 2006; Bedau & Humphreys 2008; Corradini & O’Connor 2010; Okasha 2012; Humphreys 2016; Sarte...

The notion of “emergence” has recently received renewed attention in research fields ranging from biology to cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. Today’s concept of “emergence” incorporates a long history of philosophical debates and reflections that can be traced back to James and John Stuart Mill and nineteenth-century associationist philosophy. This tradition reached its theoretical maturity in the early twentieth century with so-called classical British emergentism, which gained the attention of pragmatist philosophers from the beginning. In the current literature exploring the relationship between Pragmatism and the emergentist tradition, almost nothing is said about the interesting case of Chauncey Wright (1830-1875), a follower of J. S. Mill and A. Bain, and a crucial figure for the origins of pragmatist philosophy. After a brief historical introduction about the history of the notion of “emergence” and its relationship to classical Pragmatism, the paper aims to examine Wright’s philosophy in relation, on one hand, to the pragmatist tradition and, on the other hand, to the problem of emergence. In the wake of Wright’s original interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, the article focuses on the key notions of “novelty” and “new uses,” through which Wright developed an “emergentist” philosophy that was well ahead of its time and attracted the interest of Samuel Alexander, one of the major philosophers of classical British emergentism. In the second part, the paper analyzes Wright’s reflections about the origin of human self-consciousness as a paradigmatic case of authentic evolutionary novelty. In the final part, the article focuses on the kind of pragmatic realism sketched out by Wright and summarizes the most important aspects to have emerged during the scholarly debate on the topic.

This paper addresses, fundamentally, a single issue: assessing whether the currently very influent approach in cognitive sciences, i.e., Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (from now on, RECS), is committed to some version of emergentism. The structure of the paper is the following. In the first section I introduce the leading ideas of RECS. In the second section I compare certain standard formulations of emergentism with the main claims of RECS, trying to assess whether the latter involve some emergentist tenets. Some conclusions, in the third section, follow. My conclusion will be that, on the one hand, there are some substantive epistemological analogies between RECS and emergentism, but, on the other hand, the metaphysics of RECS is not of an emergentist kind, in spite of some shallow similarities. Therefore, depending on one’s taking emergentism as an epistemological rather than a metaphysical thesis, RECS will be considered as being committed to emergentism or not (as it happens, I take emergentism in its standard formulation essentially as a metaphysical thesis, so my answer to the question addressed in this paper is more negative)., Philosophy Kitchen - Rivista di filosofia contemporanea, N. 11 (2019): Parti, insiemi, sistemi. Il concetto di emergenza in filosofia

Following suggestions by Joseph Margolis and Richard K. Sawyer, in this paper I apply the notion of emergence to the philosophy of art. I will argue that the interpretation of works of art cannot be reduced either to the perceptive experience of the manifest qualities of the art object (empiricism), nor to the identification of the author’s intentions (intentionalism), nor to the understanding of the practices of the historic context of production (contextualism). I suggest, instead, that the identity of a work of art emerges, on the one hand, from the artist’s interactions with forms, materials and artistic genres and, on the other, from the relationships between the artwork and the changing contexts of its reception. Moreover, I maintain that artistic categories are (trans)formed through artistic practices and that, therefore, they cannot be assumed as undisputable criteria for the identification and evaluation of artworks. I will thus argue that the emerging normativity of improvisational interaction in the performing art provides a suitable model to account for the “dynamic” ontological identity of artistic phenomena., Philosophy Kitchen - Rivista di filosofia contemporanea, N. 11 (2019): Parti, insiemi, sistemi. Il concetto di emergenza in filosofia

In this paper, I assume that, if knowledge does not refer to something other than itself, the words ‘subject’, ‘object’, ‘epistemology’, ‘ontology’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘reflection’ would be meaningless. I define the transcendental fallacy as involving faith in the existence of a spirit independent from matter, capable of producing representations and things. In terms of matter and memory, the fact that the past is repeated by matter is even more important than the fact that it is recalled by memory, because without matter there would be no memory and no ability to remember. I remind the reader that only individuals exist and that the first character of individuals is that they are external with respect to others. Finally, I consider how epistemology should be considered in terms of Pentecostal meaning and emergent meaning: Pentecostal meaning follows the path Meaning → Expression → Inscription. Emergent meaning goes from Inscription → Expression → Meaning.

espanolSe propone entender la relacion mente-cuerpo partiendo del emergentismo, aunque esta propuesta no ha estado exenta de dificultades. Los esfuerzos del fisicalismo emergentista por encontrar poderes causales en lo mental han derivado en un liminativismo de lo mental o a aceptarlo como fenomeno superveniente. En este articulo se intenta mostrar lo mental como un estadio emergente de lo fisico pero sin perdida de propiedades, pasando necesariamente por lo biologico como otro estadio de lo fisico. Las propiedades mentales y biologicas, entonces, no se restringen a un ambito separado del mundo fisico, sino que constituyen formas diferentes de la fisicalidad pura EnglishI propose to understand the mind-body relationship on the basis of emergentism, although this proposal has not been without difficulties. The efforts of emergentist physicalism to find mental causal powers have resulted in either an eliminativist stance regarding the mental or in its acceptance as a supervenient phenomenon. This article sets out to present the mental as an emerging stage of the physical but without any loss of properties, necessarily passing through the biological as another stage of physical. So mental and biological properties are not restricted to an area separate from the physical world, but represent different kinds of pure physicality

Se presenta una lectura crítica de Zubiri, imprescindible para comprender la actualidad de su pensamiento, porque pone a prueba sus potenciales aportaciones y propone correcciones y prolongaciones creativas en el horizonte contemporáneo de la filosofía, en relación con la fenomenología, la hermenéutica, las neurociencias y el emergentismo. El libro se centra principalmente en la evolución de la filosofía de Zubiri, su metafísica, noología, antropología y la relación entre ciencia y filosofía, pero también en sus graves crisis. Y cabe contextualizarlo relacionándolo con las propuestas actuales de un nuevo realismo, que están ligadas a nuevas formas tanto de ontología como de hermenéutica.

Following an emergentist approach, the authors examined the comprehension of four different types of restrictive relative clauses (direct object/oblique vs. subject/indirect object) with animate/inanimate referents by Iranian EFL learners. To this end, an Oxford placement test and two sets of comprehension tests within a week’s interval were administered. Of the two comprehension tests, one was used to examine the comprehension of direct object/oblique RC’s with inanimate NP referents, and the other one investigated the understanding of subject/indirect object RC’s with animate referents. The results of the first comprehension test showed that there was no significant difference in the comprehension of direct/oblique RC’s with inanimate referents. But the result of the second comprehension test showed their better performance in the subject RC’s than indirect object RC’s with animate referents. The findings of the experiments showed that animacy influenced the processing difficulty of relative clauses which can be considered as a significant reasoning for these preferences or equalities. Current significant theories of relative clause processing can account for these results when additional assumptions are introduced showing that the possibility of semantically driven cues can be considered as a serious alternative.

Theories of how religion shapes business tend to focus on dominant religious institutions. What happens in the case of minority religions, where the alignment of religion with other dominant institutions may be weak at best? To answer this question, I first develop an emergentist account of religion, explaining how macro-level conditioning shapes meso- and micro-level interactions in religious contexts, leading to either structural change or stasis in business contexts. I illustrate this account by examining how Roman Catholicism as a minority religion shapes corporate capitalism in two cities: Bangalore, India, and Dubai, UAE. Drawing on in-depth interviews ( N=200) and 12 months of participant observation, I show how countervailing mechanisms create both assets and liabilities for Catholic professionals’ success in workplaces, contributing to morphostasis rather than change. I argue that such processes cannot be adequately understood without specifying their “macrofoundations,” and identify corresponding macro-level influences at global and local levels. By specifying such macro-micro linkages, this article improves our understanding of how religion shapes business.

The rationale for thinking in terms of complex systems today is its fitness to help understand the global problems and alleviate, if not solve, them. The tenets of complexity thinking can be identified, drawing upon the path-breaking assumptions of Bertalanffy’s General System Theory that revolutionises the way of thinking, the world picture, and the worldview of scientific disciplines.

Although in the sixteenth century some pharmacological powers were widely ascribed to celestial influences, alternative views of the nature of such powers began to be developed: Reductionism, accor...