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Nanocrystalline spinel LiMn(2)O(4) has been prepared and treatment of LiMn(2)O(4) with dilute nitric acid solution resulted in the delithiation of the framework, while maintaining the spinel structure, lambda-MnO(2). LiMn(2)O(4) is not a catalyst for water oxidation. Upon removal of the lithium, the cubical Mn(4)O(4) cores become active sites for oxidizing water to molecular oxygen, which was investigated with the photochemical [Ru(2+)(2,2'-bpy)(3)]/persulfate system at pH 5.8. The nanosize lambda-MnO(2) obtained from the nanocrystalline LiMn(2)O(4), which was synthesized by the citrate route, shows a significantly higher water oxidation catalytic activity (Turnover Frequency: 3 x 10(-5) mol O(2)/s/mol Mn) than that obtained via solid state reaction with micrometer and irregular particle sizes (Turnover Frequency: 5 x 10(-6) mol O(2)/s/mol Mn).

This collection of essays reveals the Ming court as an arena of competition and negotiation, where a large cast of actors pursued individual and corporate ends, personal agency shaped protocol and style, and diverse people, goods, and tastes converged. Rather than observing an immutable set of traditions, court culture underwent frequent reinterpretation and rearticulation, processes driven by immediate personal imperatives, mediated through social, political, and cultural interaction.The essays address several common themes. First, they rethink previous notions of imperial isolation, instead stressing the court's myriad ties both to local Beijing society and to the empire as a whole. Second, the court was far from monolithic or static. Palace women, monks, craftsmen, educators, moralists, warriors, eunuchs, foreign envoys, and others strove to advance their interests and forge advantageous relations with the emperor and one another. Finally, these case studies illustrate the importance of individual agency. The founder's legacy may have formed the warp of court practices and tastes, but the weft varied considerably. Reflecting the complexity of the court, the essays represent a variety of perspectives and disciplines - from intellectual, cultural, military, and political to art history and musicology.

To start the case study section of this book, I begin with an area that has an ancient Islamic identity. Moroccans, in the form of Berbers who converted to the faith, participated in great numbers in the conquest of the Iberian peninsula beginning in 711 c.e . The officer who led the campaigns was Berber. At this juncture the area we now call Morocco was under limited control from the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus and its governor in Qayrawan, the main city in Tunisia. Morocco began to acquire a regional identity, as distinguished from Tunisia and Algeria, in the late eighth century c.e . This came when a descendant of the Prophet settled in the area, and since that time the rulers of Morocco have claimed a genealogical connection to Muhammad. They refer to their monarchy as the “Sharifian throne.” But this Islamic identity at the center of Moroccan life has not always brought satisfaction or prosperity to its citizens. In this chapter we look at what it has meant, over the centuries, to be Muslim in a state with a strong Islamic identity. The Beginnings The name Morocco means “far west” in Arabic, because the region stood at the westernmost limits of the Islamic world. One of the early Arab generals rode his horse into the Atlantic Ocean before turning back, and shortly after that the combined Arab and Berber force crossed the straits and started the Spanish Muslim regime we call Andalusia.

This paper outlines a methodology for digital representation and preservation of Pulaar language data.

Why did the United States offer permanent resettlement to Kosovar refugees during Operation Allied Force? Neither the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) nor the Government of Macedonia (GOM) requested U.S. resettlement assistance. Even the three federal agencies with principal responsibility for refugee admissions--State, Justice, and Health and Human Services--balked at the idea. Most importantly, the refugees themselves strongly resisted being moved from the close proximity to home of the camps in Macedonia to safer, more pleasant quarters elsewhere. Nevertheless, during a speech at Ellis Island on April 21, 1999, Vice President Gore announced that the United States would immediately begin processing for American residency up to 20,000 ethnic Albanians who had fled Serb persecution in Kosovo. His decision caught the bureaucracy off-guard. The U.S. Coordinator for Refugees, Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft, learned of it only an hour before the speech was carried live on national news. The next day, an interagency team, led by the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and including representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Rescue Committee, flew to Skopje. Its mission was twofold: first, to convince the UNHCR, the GOM, and the refugees that U.S. resettlement was a preferred option; and second, to build an in-country processing program from scratch. The team succeeded, but the question remains. Why did the White House insist on this particular course of action?