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The authors draw on their new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess different governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of different regulatory and supervisory policies. First, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to support political constituencies. Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include the following: Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce. Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks. Regulations on capital adequacy. Design features of deposit insurance systems. Supervisory power, independence, and resources; stringency of loan classification; provisioning standards; diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt corrective action. Regulations governing information disclosure and fostering private sector monitoring of banks. Government ownership of banks. The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a country's adherence to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. The findings, which are much more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the helping-hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.

Costly bank failures in the past two decades have focused attention on the need to find ways to improve the performance of different countries'financial systems. Belief is overwhelming that financial systems can be improved but there is little empirical evidence to support any specific advice about regulatory and supervisory reform. With scant cross-country comparisons of financial regulatory and supervisory systems, economists cannot decide how to correct incentives and moral hazard problems in developing economies--whether, for example, to require higher (and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset ratios, to mandate stricter definition and disclosure of non-performing loans, to require that subordinated debt be issued, or to install world-class supervision. Proposed reforms usually involve changes in financial regulations and supervisory standards, but many pressing questions about reform remain unanswered. Making use of a new database, the authors come up with brief answers to three key questions: Do countries with relatively weak governments and bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on bank activities? Yes. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory regimes have poorly functioning banking systems. No--or at least the evidence is mixed. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have less probability of suffering a banking crisis? No. In fact, the reverse is true. In countries where banks'securities activities are restricted, the likelihood of a banking crisis is greater, other things being equal.

International consultants on bank regulation, and supervision for developing countries, often base their advice on how their home country does things, for lack of information on practice in other countries. Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped by bias rather than facts. To better inform advice about bank regulation, and supervision, and to lower the marginal cost of empirical research, the authors present, and discuss a new, and comprehensive database on the regulation, and supervision of banks in a hundred and seven countries. The data, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory, supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers, and policymakers around the world. The data cover such aspects of banking as entry requirements, ownership restrictions, capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance schemes, loan classification and provisioning requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, troubled bank resolution actions, and (uniquely) the quality of supervisory personnel, and their actions. The database permits users to learn how banks are currently regulated, and supervised, and about bank structures, and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad cross-section of countries. In addition to describing the data, the authors show how variables ay be grouped, and aggregated. They also show some simple correlations among selected variables. In a comparison paper ("Bank regulation and supervision: What works best") studying the relationship between differences in bank regulation and supervision, and bank performance and stability, they conclude that: 1) Countries with policies that promote private monitoring of banks, have better bank performance, and more stability. Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank performance, and more bank fragility. 2) Diversification of income streams, and loan portfolios - by not restricting bank activities - also tends to improve performance, and stability. (This works best when an active securities market exists). Countries in which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios, domestically and internationally, suffer fewer crisis.

The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms'ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks'ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks'ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.

The authors of this brief propose a series of reforms aimed at making bank regulations compatible with the changing financial system. They present evidence to support their contention that change in the market for financial services has reduced the importance of depositories as they have traditionally operated. A dramatic increase in nonbank competition has contributed to a substantial shrinkage in the proportion of total financial assets held by depository institutions. The authors assert that any reforms should take into account the dynamic nature of the financial marketplace. Effective reforms tackling bank regulation must pass a two-part test: they must protect the payments and credit mechanisms in order to promote systemic stability, and they must promote competition within the financial services industry.