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The construct of a ‘21st Asian century’ revolves around the trajectory of China’s enormous rise simultaneously in economic stature and political prowess. China’s steep growth in a short span has el...

For Asia to realize the Asian Century in 2050 and reach per capita income levels similar to Europe today, its fast-growing converging economies must sustain their growth momentum. The slower growing countries must accelerate their growth to achieve convergence status during this period. The underlying requirement for both groups is continued rapid improvement in total factor productivity (TFP). Although it may sound ambitious and though it is definitely not preordained, Asia can reach this dream if its economies strive for excellence in the areas of productivity and innovation, while learning from the best practice in the region and beyond. This article addresses the TFP level and performance of Asian economies, the salient underlying factors, and the strategies that Asian economies must pursue to make further improvement.

Development of the corporate public affairs management function in Asia over the past three decades has occurred in three waves, from one with a focus on basic public relations, market access and product regulation, to a sophisticated management function that is central to how the corporation interacts with and seeks to influence the socio-political environment in which it operates. If this new millennium is indeed the ‘Asian Century’, the public affairs function will become more valuable to companies trading in Asia. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Australian foreign and strategic policy has not yet begun to address the implications for Australia's international situation of China's growing power. China today already challenges the American leadership that has kept Asia peaceful and Australia secure for many decades. There are real and growing risks that Washington and Beijing will not find a way to work together peacefully as relative power shifts from one to the other. Unless they do, Asia's future is bleak, and so is Australia's. Australia therefore needs to work to promote a new order in Asia which accommodates China's power without conceding more than is necessary to keep the peace. This will mean encouraging America to forgo primacy in Asia in favour of working with China and others in a shared regional leadership. Australia also needs to start preparing for the possibility that Asia will nonetheless become a more contested and dangerous place over coming decades, and consider what its options would be. None of them appear attractive.

Hugh White has advanced a lucid, provocative but ultimately unduly pessimistic assessment of the region's strategic trajectory in his latest Quarterly Essay. While White argues that American primacy has underwritten the past forty years of peace, and that shifting power relativities will likely catalyse a revival of regional strategic contestation, I contend that Asian states have themselves played a critical role in consolidating and deepening the post-1972 peace through their adoption of self-strengthening strategies that link their continued security and prosperity to the preservation of the existing international order. Whereas the region's demographic giants (China, India and Indonesia) once pursued self-strengthening strategies involving a mixture of autarky at home and revisionism abroad, they have each since progressively abandoned these policies in favour of self-strengthening programs that seek to enhance states' security and prosperity through their deeper integration within a predominantly lib...

For all its economic might, Asia remains, overall, so much poorer than the United States that the region will take decades to catch up—if it catches up at all.

El autor muestra los principales focos de conflicto y tensión en una región, Asia-Pacífico, que está llamada a liderar políticamente y económicamente el mundo. Este presente siglo es el siglo de Asia y por ello los conflictos mostrados son el principal obstáculo para que Asia ostente el poder hegemónico en el futuro. La situación de inestabilidad en Pakistán y su vecina Afganistán y la evolución económica de China y su relación con sus vecinos regionales determinará la evolución de esta región estratégica. The author shows the main hotspots of tension and conflict in Asia-Pacific, an area that will lead the world in economic and political terms. This current century is the Asian century and due to that the conflicts explained in the article are the main obstacle to the Asia hegemonic power in the future. The situation of instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the economic evolution of China and the relationships with its neighbors will determine the evolution of this strategic region.

Within the foreign policy community, no shortage of emphasis is placed on the importance of U.S.–China relations. We are, after all, in “the Asian century,” having emerged from the cold war into a ...

Many are today arguing that the 21st century will be “the Asian Century,” and much ink has been spilled over the splendid achievements of Asia as evidence of such arguments. However, this paper suggests some reservations regarding that argument, though also some distant hopes. First of all, we do not know yet what Asia really is, as there are too many geographical Asias. More effort should be made to conceptualize the geographical, or geopolitical, boundaries of Asia, which are both too blurred and too intertwined among sub-identities within Asia, and without. Second, Asia still has a lot of matters that need to be resolved by Asians themselves before the optimistic and audacious expression “Asian Century” can be legitimately used. In resolving those matters by themselves through international cooperation, the conceptual boundary of Asia could become clearer and a shared Asian geopolitical identity would have more possibility of emerging.

As we move further and further into the twentieth century, the Western ‘global governance’ norm of interventionism is being challenged by East Asian norm of non-interference and territorial integrity. The two sets of norms are historically and philosophically rooted and have influential backers. Intriguingly, while the two approaches appear irreconcilable, some countries have lent their support to both sets of norms. As East Asia emerges as a major force in global relations can a way be found for the two sets of contrasting norms to exist side-by-side, perhaps each governing particular regional relations, or is it even possible that a compromise set of ‘global’ norms might be developed?

This paper very briefly surveys current research on Asian economic development, and also discusses several recent papers on the contributions of economic history to understanding development. I then review the contributions of the papers in this special volume of Explorations in light of these two literatures.

This collection of papers focuses on the domestic and international politics of Australia's recent engagement with Asia. The theme of Asian engagement appears to be of particular pertinence to the current study of Australian politics given numerous pronouncements that we are entering an ‘Asian century’ during which key Asian economies will gain greater ascendancy and certain Asian states will come to play a more prominent role in global politics. We employ the idea of ‘re-engagement’ in order to show how engagement with Asia has been turned to again and again by Australian governments, albeit in different political and strategic contexts. This collection aims to consider the politics of re-engagement from a number of different theoretical positions, as well as from a number of different perspectives (be it international relations/foreign policy, domestic politics, identity politics, or from the perspective of bilateral Asian partners). Emphasis is placed not simply on the foreign policy prerogatives behin...

Because of Asia's remarkable economic performance since the 1980s, some observers have predicted Asia's rise and the coming of a Pacific Century. We doubt this optimistic view. In the knowledge-based economy, ways of amassing wealth have changed, and better criteria for evaluating economic development are needed. This study compares research and development activities of four Asian developing countries – China, India, South Korea and Taiwan – with those of two advanced economies – the USA and Japan – to emphasise a neglected trend. The Asian cases do succeed in the information technology industry, a typical sector in the knowledge-based economy. None the less, Asia may be lagging further behind in relative terms. We show that this may not be the Asian century. In addition, it is possible that the battlefield between multinationals will switch from markets to intellectual property courts.

Though the founding father of a tiny country on the tip of the Malay peninsula, Lee Kuan Yew is one of the giants of the arriving Asian century. Fifty years from now monuments will commemorate the legendary feats of this British-trained barrister who only learned Chinese when he became prime minister in 1959. Not only did he miraculously transform the impoverished colonial entrepot of Singapore, rife with drugs and prostitution, into a gleaming model city state of the 21st century; his practical vision of soft-authoritarian capitalism also became the template for Deng Xiaoping's “opening up and reform” in China, laying the basis for the stunning rise of a prosperous East Asia. We met twice, in 1992 and 1995, in steamy Singapore, sitting in the icily air-conditioned salon at Istana, the former British governor's residence, looking out over the manicured lawns, as we delved deep into the conflicts and complementarities of Confucian communitarianism and Western individualism. We met one last time in a snowbound chalet in Davos, Switzerland, in 1999 after his formal retirement as “senior minister” and graduation to “minister mentor,” the sage behind the throne.

For over 30 years, East Asia has been free of major wars. But East Asia's stable order is based on a unique and remarkable triangular relationship among the region's three biggest powers, and that relationship is now under pressure from China's growth. Asia's future peace will depend on the ability of the United States, China and Japan – and eventually India – to create a new regional order which reflects the emerging economic and power relativities of the Asian Century. Creating a stable new order will require major sacrifices from all three powers: America will have to concede primacy and learn to treat China and Japan as equals; China will have to forgo its own dreams of primacy and accept Japan as a legitimate major power; and Japan will have to accept the costs and complexities of strategic independence. We cannot assume they will meet these challenges successfully.

The moment has come for fresh US policy on East Asia. This should be priority number one for the next president.

A key focus of this book is the importance of intellectual engagement with Asia. Particular emphasis is placed on the new theoretical and practical insights that can be gained by doing so that are relevant to a range of social scientists, regardless of their regional specialisation. In that context, the performance of the Chinese economy in the past 30 years provides a smorgasbord of food for thought (and rethought) about the role of the state in economic development and in the economy more generally. The insights to be gained from examining the Chinese case can be used to reflect on the specificities of the relationship between state nd market in other national contexts and the resulting implications for economic theory.

The issue of engaging with Asia raises a question posed by Mahatma Gandhi almost 70 years ago: ‘Which Asia?’ In March 1947, the first major postwar Asian gathering, the Asian Relations Conference, was held in New Delhi to ‘foster mutual contact and understanding’ among the nations of the region. One of the speakers was Gandhi, who addressed the closing session. When first invited to this meeting of representatives from all over Asia, though, Gandhi’s characteristic response had been to pose a question: which Asia, he asked, would be present at the conference (cited in Samaddar 1996: 40). Reading the White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century, I found myself recalling Gandhi’s question. The White Paper’s executive summary begins with a series of ringing declarations

This volume engages with debates about research and study on Asia and engaging with the knowledge produced in the Asian region in the next few decades.1 My argument is simple: the advent of the so-called Asian Century is not simply about making us knowledgable about Asia or developing institutional capacities for such knowledge. Rather, it also challenges some of the fundamental assumptions of the social sciences. This has become problematic for some of the key assumptions driving Asian studies. It has also become problematic, in the Australian context, for some of the public policy assumptions about ‘Asia literacy’, or ‘Asia capability’ as it is called in its latest incarnation (Asialink 2013; Department of Education 2014; see also Heryanto in this volume). In turn, this has a number of implications for the way we do research on Asia as well as broader public policy implications for research investment—particularly in which research programs to invest, as well as the kinds of skills and expertise we need to ‘study Asia’.

The following sections are included:INTRODUCTIONAUSTRALIA'S ASYLUM SEEKER POLICYWHY DO THESE ISSUES MATTER TO AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ASIAN CENTURY?THE REMEDYCONCLUSIONENDNOTESREFERENCESLEGISLATION, CASES AND TREATIES

Since the 1980s, global foreign investment flows have at times grown faster than world output and world trade. Many advanced and emerging economies have welcomed, indeed actively encouraged, foreign direct investment (FDI) from abroad, cognisant of the new technology and expertise it transfers. Even though governments of different ideological persuasions around the world are actively vying to increase their relative shares of transnational investment flows, the Australian government, through the operations of the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), continues to deter certain forms of foreign investment, particularly in the financial, media, real estate and transport sectors of the economy. Indeed, there is a widespread view that Australia's foreign investment policy is not restrictive enough, particularly as it relates to foreign takeovers of Australian enterprises. Australia has persistently attracted foreign investment over more than two centuries. As a percentage of Australia's gross domestic product (GDP), foreign investment flows were proportionately greater in earlier times, such as the late 19th century, compared to the experience since 2000.2 No separate body oversaw FD! proposals until the FIRE was formally established by the Fraser government in 197 6. Before then, and especially from the 1960s, federal governments of both political persuasions had intervened in an ad hoc way.

The following sections are included:INTRODUCTIONDEFINING ‘FINANCIAL STABILITY’ AS A NATIONAL INTEREST OF AUSTRALIAOUT OF THE GFC AND HEADING INTO THE ASIAN CENTURY — IS FINANCIAL STABILITY ON THE REGULATORY AGENDA?NEW (AND SOME OLD) CHALLENGES ON THE HORIZON IN THE ASIAN CENTURY THAT COULD IMPACT UPON AUSTRALIA'S FINANCIAL STABILITYOUTLINING THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY IN AUSTRALIACONSIDERATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY IN AUSTRALIACONCLUSIONENDNOTESREFERENCES

The following sections are included:INTRODUCTIONFINANCIAL INTEGRATION TO FINANCIAL STABILITY — DISCUSSION AND EVIDENCEFINANCIAL OPENNESS AND INTEGRATION — THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCECONCLUSIONENDNOTESREFERENCESAPPENDIX

In this chapter, the elusive nature of the ‘national interest’ is pursued and identified. The question of cross-border people movements is then put to the ‘national interest’ test. How do the global movements of people for purposes of migration match up with national criteria for the public interest? What is the relation to actual policies adopted in this area?

The following sections are included:INTRODUCTIONRESOURCE ENDOWMENT AND AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTGROWING ENERGY DEMAND IN ASIAROLE OF AUSTRALIAN GAS IN SECURING ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTGROWING IMPORTANCE OF AUSTRALIAN GASROLE OF UNCONVENTIONAL GAS IN MEETING ENERGY SECURITYEFFECT OF ASIAN ENERGY DEMANDS ON AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITYCONCLUSIONENDNOTESREFERENCES

This Special Issue had its origins in a panel held at the 4th Asian Society of International Law Biannual Conference in New Delhi from 14–16 November 2013. It addressed the international investment policies of China, Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and their potential global impact. The New Delhi papers were reworked and complemented by further contributions to form the present Special Issue.

The history of the Korean Peninsula is one of subjugation, of a country trampled on as its neighbours have pursued their own broader strategic goals. Today, still, South Korea (also known as the Republic of Korea—ROK) finds itself flanked by the central players of the ‘Asian century’: the United States, China and Japan. Recognising that traditional patterns of hard-power dominance are shifting around it, South Korea’s response has been to develop its foreign policy strategy in two directions. On the one hand, South Korea has been looking to strengthen and stabilise relations with key emerging regional players, such as China and, more recently, India. Its aim of strengthening the relationship with China can largely be explained in pragmatic terms: China is central to the ROK’s economic and strategic future. As well as South Korea’s economic dependency on the Chinese economy, China would also play a significant role in any future Korean reunification scenario (Snyder, 2014, pp.308–9). Yet, with this awareness in mind, South Korea exhibits a great deal of caution, which stems from a troubled historical relationship with its powerful neighbour. There is real concern in Seoul that the country may one day find itself in an unenviable position of having to weigh the value of its relationship with China against its strategic alliance with the United States.

The United States has been the regional power in Asia since the end of World War II. But change is under way.

Management in China has become a topic that is more and more under the spotlight of attention both from an academic as well as from a practitioner’s viewpoint. However, much of the large body of li...

[Figure][1] CREDIT: STEFAN POSTLES Australians are constantly told that our economy is ‘“in transition.”’ We need to move up the global value chain, build knowledge-based industries, prepare for the Asian Century, and be the “food bowl of the world.” These are grand ambitions that we share with many other nations, in our region and beyond. The question for all of us is: How? I am not one of those who think that good things will happen just because we expect them to, in Australia or anywhere else. I think we need to organize, evaluate, and cohere; to make sure that we align our efforts and investments with our national interests, focus on areas that are of particular importance or where there is a particular need, and build to a scale that will make a difference both to ourselves and to a changing world. It is the knowledge that science will offer, and the sensible application of that knowledge to agreed-on goals, that will build stronger national economies and societies. ![Figure][1] “If we are serious in our wish for a fair and prosperous Australia, in a better and happier world, then we will look to science to sustain us.” CREDIT: VLADGRIN/ISTOCKPHOTO As Australia's Chief Scientist, my role is to advise the federal government on matters of science policy and advocate a better understanding of science in industry and the community. Like the rest of Australia's scientific community, I was disappointed by cuts in our recent federal budget. My real concern, however, is the lack of a strategy that would help us maximize the value of the science resources we do have. This is not a new problem. It is one that has been allowed to persist for decades. Our support for science is the victim of short-term, on-again, off-again, thinking, terminating programs rather than giving them sustained support. We seem reluctant to identify national priorities and make sure we fund them appropriately—areas where we have the advantage, or need, or capacity to grow to scale or to take new products to the global market. This puts us at odds with an emerging global consensus. This week, science advisory delegations from around the world convene in Auckland, New Zealand, to discuss the importance and challenges of providing policy-relevant science advice to governments. Policy-makers globally have recognized the obvious point: Science isn't like a toothbrush. You can't buy it when you get there if you forgot to pack one. To build both capacity and capability, we need strategic investment supported by good planning and long-term commitment. It troubles me that Australia remains the only country among the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) without a science or technology strategy. The consequences are and will be felt in our performance, in a world more reliant than ever before on science and science-trained people. We often claim to “punch above our weight,” but in reality our research effort could and ought to be better. School participation in science and mathematics, particularly at senior levels, has fallen, when the trend should be heading the other way. The level of collaboration between our researchers and our businesses is one of the poorest in the OECD. If we are serious in our wish for a fair and prosperous Australia, in a better and happier world, then we will look to science to sustain us. And we will need to be strategic. We will get the future we earn. [1]: pending:yes