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The article presents the author's views on his classroom 706 in context to the significance of English teachers' life changing philosophical work for students in classrooms like this. He opines on his meaningful decor in the classroom which include empty picture frames, and a print of the book "The Persistence of Memory," by Salvador Dali. He comments on English teachers' sacred work to foster individual expression and helping students to find their voice.

The current study tested whether men and women receive different degrees of social punishment for violating norms of emotional expression. Participants watched videos of male and female targets (whose reactions were pre-tested to be equivalent in expressivity and valence) viewing either a positive or negative slideshow, with their emotional reaction to the slideshow manipulated to be affectively congruent, affectively incongruent, or flat. Participants then rated the target on a number of social evaluation measures. Displaying an incongruent emotional expression, relative to a congruent one, harmed judgments of women more than men. Women are expected to be more emotionally expressive than men, making an incongruent expression more deviant for women. These results highlight the importance of social norms in construing another person’s emotion displays, which can subsequently determine acceptance or rejection of that person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses inversion as a linguistic strategy characterized by coding units of content through alternating exponents associated with corresponding units of expression (apud Hetzron 1967). This is a basic pattern that can be carried out in many different ways (and hence is somewhat productive). I will discuss two types of inversion that I have identified and will offer several examples from a synchronic perspective (many in Spanish, but also in other languages of very different linguistic affiliation). In type i, the inversion of formal exponents (AB vs BA) is necessarily associated with two different units of content ('X', 'Y'). In type ii, the inversion of formal exponents (AB vs BA) does not imply the transition to units of different content, but the creation of alternative paradigms for the same categories or functions. The results will show that inversion represents a linguistic strategy that favors the economy of the language system because it does not require a multitude of different features for each case, but rather uses the functional exchange of components of expression associated with the instances of content involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps predictably, the 2000s saw a slew of critical rejections of the view. It is now becoming evident that, while several objections to expressivism have found their way into print, three concerns are proving particularly popular. So the time is right for a big picture assessment. What follows is an attempt to show that these three dominant objections are not decisive reasons to give up the most plausible forms of the view. Moreover, in addition to the three common objections, expressivism has an acknowledged question mark concerning whether the value of punitive expression outweighs its drawbacks. Here I also map out some promising avenues that the expressivist can take to answer this question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is it for a person to have style? Philosophers working in action theory, ethics and aesthetics are surprisingly quiet on this question. I begin by considering whether theories of artistic style shed any light on it. Many philosophers, artists and art historians are attracted to some version of the view that artistic style is the expression of personality. I clarify this view and argue that it is implausible for both artistic style and, suitably modified, personal style. In fact, both theories of style crack along the same line, which suggests that they can indeed be mutually illuminating. I articulate and defend a view of personal style according to which, roughly, having style is a matter of expressing one's ideals. I show how this illuminates the widely neglected value of personal style and propose a new, analogous theory of artistic style: artistic style is the expression of the ideals the artist has for her art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The city's pivotal role in generating, assembling and mobilizing differences provides fertile ground for examining a spectrum of ‘close’ and ‘strange’ encounters between people, the accompanying expressions of emotion and the circulation of embodied affect as they unfold in a culturally diverse world. In this context, I first attend to the different ways in which the papers in this special feature demonstrate the significance of affective practices in influencing urban encounter in the European city of difference. I then explore from the vantage point of a very different site—the newly independent, post-colonial, multicultural, rapidly globalizing city of Singapore located in Asia—the conditions that go into the production of ‘different’ or ‘similar’ affective practices shaping human encounters with difference. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Alpha: Revista de Artes, Letras y Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Los Lagos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contemporary discussions of self-knowledge share a presupposition to the effect that the only way to vindicate so-called first-person authority as understood by our folk-psychology is to identify specific “good-making” epistemic features that render our self-ascriptions of mental states (‘avowals’) especially knowledgeable. In earlier work, I rejected this presupposition. I proposed that we separate two questions: (i) How is first-person authority to be explained? (ii) What renders avowals instances of a privileged kind ofknowledge? In response to question (i), I offered aneo-expressivistaccount that, I argued, is compatible with a variety of non-deflationary, substantive answers to question (ii). Here I re-evaluate the relative merits of the neo-expressivist account in light of some recent attempts to capture first-person authority by appealing to the so-calledtransparencyof mental self-attributions. I then canvass two recent appeals to transparency that give priority to question (ii). Bearing in mind difficulties with the recent attempts, I return (in Section 3) to relevant aspects of my own neo-expressivist account, which, instead, begins with question (i). I conclude by offering reasons for thinking that the neo-expressivist approach is better suited for integration with a folk-psychologically grounded understanding of ourselves than the alternatives canvassed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or (as I prefer to call them) “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed as implausible and unwarranted by advocates of rationalism. In this article, I argue that rationalists should revise their attitude towards interpretationism: they can, and ought to, accept themselves a form of interpretationism. First, I argue that interpretationism is correct at least for a substantive range of cases. These are cases in which we respond to a question about our attitudes by a conscious overt or inner expression of our attitude, and form a self-ascriptive belief on the basis of that expression. Second, I argue that rationalists can adopt interpretationism without abandoning their basic tenets: the assumption that both approaches are incompatible is unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

First-person present-tense self-ascriptions of belief are often used to tell others what one believes. But they are also naturally taken toexpressthe belief they ostensibly report. I argue that this second aspect of self-ascriptions of belief holds the key to making the speaker's knowledge of her belief, and so the authority of her act of telling, intelligible. For a basic way to know one's beliefs is to be aware of what one is doing in expressing them. This account suggests that we need to reconsider the terms of the standard alternative between “epistemic” and “non-epistemic” explanations of first-person authority. In particular, the natural view that the authority we accord to self-ascriptions reflects a distinctive way we have of knowing our own beliefs should not be conflated with the traditional epistemological thesis that such knowledge reflects a private “mode of access”. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

My goal in this paper is to discuss the ‘Fregean’ account of inferences proposed by Recanati in hisMental Files(Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve ‘the same file’ in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are ‘the same’ only in a loose sense, then the notion of file sameness plays no role in accounting for rational inferences, contra Recanati’s Fregean account. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I intend to show that Merleau-Ponty's conception of movement as primordial expression, whereby movement is a shaping force that can be discerned in the forms it creates, allows us to go beyond the superficial definition of movement as "change of place" and discover its most essential characteristic: that is the expression of a motion--intrinsic to feeling--which can take on the form of either a generative thrust or an act that traces out and sheds light on the reserve of shapes that everything we have felt has silently traced within us. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I intend to show that from Merleau-Ponty's reflections on pictorial movement there emerges a richer and more refined definition of movement that brings together the two meanings of Aristotelian dunamis (daµ): potentia passiva, or being acted upon, and potentia activa, or tending towards act. Second, I will show that this particular understanding of movement allows us to uncover the lived dimension of movement that is intrinsic to sense experience and enacts the metamorphosis of our impressions into the expression that reveals to us the carnal obverse [envers charnel] of our experiences of the visible world. Finally, I will show that this particular understanding of movement proves to be a strategy for thinking of both the emergence of sense within the flesh of the world and the advent of history that unravels at its heart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While spiritual well-being is integral to health, little is known about the spiritual lives of children in the context of illness. Because the spiritual is often a hidden domain of life, exploration of the topic can be challenging, especially when dealing with children. Language is not always sufficient for describing such deeply held experiences, even for adults. Therefore, finding creative ways to elicit experiences of the spiritual is important when attempting to gain a more robust understanding of this phenomenon. Drawing from a larger study that used hermeneutic phenomenology to explore spirituality among ill children, this paper provides an interpretation of ill children’s play experiences and describes how these experiences provide a means of uncovering the spiritual in children’s everyday lives as they cope with life-threatening illness. Findings also provide insight into how play can be used in the promotion of spiritual well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the centre of Arthur Prior's 'Thank goodness' argument for the A-theory of time is a particular form of relief. Time must objectively pass, Prior argues, or else the relief felt when a painful experience has ended is not intelligible. In this paper, I offer a detailed analysis of the type of relief at issue in this argument, which I call temporal relief, and distinguish it from another form of relief, which I refer to as counterfactual relief. I also argue that existing discussions of the 'Thank goodness' argument-including Prior's own-fail to give a satisfactory account of temporal relief, and that it needs to be seen as an emotion linked to the ability to engage in fairly sophisticated forms of planning. I also suggest that this has an impact on Prior's claim that the idea of points in time plays no fundamental role in the semantic analysis of tenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Cantares mexicanos, an alphabetic manuscript of Central Mexico which comprises 85 folios of song dances in Nahuatl's Uto-Aztecan language, traditional song metaphors and realm of the Christian deity. Other topics discussed includes representations of Christian figures, festival month of Tlacaxipehualiztli and parallel expressions.

Cyclin H is an important cell protein that plays a crucial role in cell division. In the present study, the cDNA of cyclin H (designated as Pmcyclin H) was identified from black tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon) by expressed sequence tag (EST) analysis, and RACE techniques. The full length cDNA of Pmcyclin H is 1280bp, including a 5'-terminal un-translated region (5'UTR) of 63 bp, a 3'UTR of 218 bp with a poly (A) tail, and an open reading frame (ORF) of 999 bp encoding a polypeptide of 332 amino acids with a predicted molecular weight of 39 kDa, predicted pI of 6.39. Both Blast, and phylogenetic analysis, confirmed that Pmcyclin H is a new member of the shrimp cyclin H family. Using real-time PCR the mRNA expression of Pmcyclin H in eight tissues was examined, and mRNA transcript of Pmcyclin H was predominantly detectable in ovarian tissue, and to a lesser degree in the tissues of intestine, testis, stomach, and heart, but almost undetectable in the tissues of liver (hepar), brain, and muscle. The temporal expression of Pmcyclin H in different developmental stages of the ovaries was investigated by real-time PCR. During the six stages of ovarian development, one peak expression of Pmcyclin H was detected in stage II. All these results indicated that Pmcyclin H might be involved in the regulation of cell cycle and ovarian development of P. monodon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines how the legacy of Marx's emancipatory commitments continues to be intertwined wit.li his critique of religion. This is illustrated wit.li refer-ence to Raymond Geuss's claim that Marxism's political failure is related its lack of an adequate moral theory, a view that leads him to suggest that Marxism needs to function more like a 'pseudo-religion'. These issues are analysed by drawing from Max Horklieimer's writing on Christianity, which imply that, materialist, critical theory will be resourced by attention to particular historical expressions of religion. The paper argues that, such an approach requires a distinction between two strands of Marx's critique of religion an 'eliminat.ionist.' and a 'descriptive functionalist.' perspective and involves privileging the second strand over the first. The implication is not. that, religion resolves the question of the ground of Marxism's normative critique: rather, what, is advanced is view that, the critical theory can be supported and resourced by a critique of the 'religion of everyday life'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dance is proposed as the most representative of somaesthetic arts in Thinking Through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics and other writings of Richard Shusterman. Shusterman offers a useful, but incomplete approach to somaesthetics of dance. In the examples provided, dance appears as subordinate to another art form (theater or photography) or as a means to achieving bodily excellence. Missing, for example, are accounts of the role of dance as an independent art form, how somaesthetics would address differences in varying approaches to dance, and attention to the viewer,s somaesthetic dance experience. Three strategies for developing new directions for dance somaesthetics are offered here: identify a fuller range of applications of somaesthetics to dance as an independent art form (e.g. Martha Graham); develop somaesthetics for a wider range of theatre dance (e.g. ballet, modern and experimental dance); and relate somaesthetics to more general features of dance (content, form, expression, style, kinesthetics) necessary for understanding the roles of the choreographer/dancer and the viewer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of learning in computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL) environments by investigating the co-occurrence of uncertainty expressions and expressions of learning in a graduate course in which students collaborated in classroom computer-mediated discussions. Results showed that uncertainty expressions appeared related to the kinds of intellectual work engaged by students in online discussion, co-occurring with learning in systematic ways. For example, direct expressions of uncertainty were likely to co-occur with learning categories associated with presenting a new idea and with applications of an idea whereas indirect expressions were more strongly associated with elaborating on a new idea. These findings suggest that the ability to deal with and express uncertainty appropriately may be related to learning as it takes place in online environments. We contend that the role of uncertainty in learning is currently undervalued, and that educators and researchers may benefit from considering how uncertainty can be productive for learning in CSCL environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the approach of American artist and educator Ernest Batchelder towards the aesthetics of craftsmanship. Topics discussed include establishment of an aesthetic standard of balance being the approach of Batchelder, dependency of contemporary reinterpretation of an existing visual language on a designer's ability to provoke the essential visual interest, and Batchelder's motivation to develop individual designer expression.

Cross-dressing, as a cultural practice, suggests gender ambiguity and allows freedom of self expression. Yet, it may also serve to reaffirm ideological stereotypes and the binary distinctions between male and female, masculine and feminine, homosexual and heterosexual. To explore the nature and function of cross-dressing in Chinese and Western cultures, this paper analyzes the portrayals of cross-dressing heroines in two Chinese stories: The Ballad of Mulan (500-600 A.D.), and The Butterfly Lovers (850-880 A.D.). Distorted representations in the English translated texts are also explored.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of our paper is to explore one of the functions of everyday expressions of likelihood; more specifically, to propose that they play an important role in negotiating not only likelihood but also perspective. We will examine examples of such expressions in the context of conversational interactions, identifying the roles of such expressions along with partner responses to them. Our analyses will be integrated with previous models from laboratory research on the production and comprehension of expressions of quantity and frequency (e.g., Moxey and Sanford 2000). Findings will also be interpreted in the context of ongoing discussions on the nature and role of perspective-taking (e.g., Duran, Dale, and Kreuz 2011). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall argue that expressivism does not have the resources to adequately account for ethical vagueness, while cognitivism does. This demonstrates an advantage that cognitivism holds over expressivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from the antirealist notion of truth, alethic antirealism should probably be rejected. In this paper we analyse the conditional fallacy from a semantic (i.e. model-theoretic) point of view. This allows us to identify with precision the philosophical commitments that ground the validity of this type of argument. We show that the conditional fallacy arguments against alethic antirealism are valid only if controversial metaphysical assumptions are accepted. We suggest that the antirealist is not committed to the conditional fallacy because she is not committed to some of these assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rush Rhees identified the question of 'what language is' as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees's elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating 'the grammars of particular expressions.' The failure to fully acknowledge Rhees's contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both Wittgenstein and Rhees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression 'being moved' is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper's first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode is a distinct emotion. Indeed, being moved, we claim, is the experience of a positive core value (particular object) perceived by the moved subject as standing out (formal object) in the circumstances triggering the emotion. Drawing on numerous examples, we describe the distinctively rich phenomenology characteristic of the experience as well as the far-reaching action-tendencies and functions associated with it. Having thus shown that the candidate emotion seem to satisfy the five criteria, we go on, in section three, to compare it with sadness and joy, arguing that it should not be confused with either. Finally, in section four, we illustrate the explanatory power of our account of 'being moved' by showing how it can shed light on, and maybe even justify, the widespread distrust we feel towards the exhibition of 'sentimentality'. On the whole and if we are right, we have uncovered an emotion which, though never or rarely talked about, is of great interest and no small importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-compassion and rumination have been conceptualized as emotion regulation strategies, the former effective and the latter maladaptive, however, the relationship between these two approaches is largely unknown. This relationship was explored in 186 participants who completed a negative mood induction, and were randomly allocated to write about a negative event in either a self-compassionate or emotionally expressive way. Results showed that self-compassionate writing significantly predicted improved mood more so than writing in an emotionally expressive way. Greater rumination inhibited the degree to which mood improvements were made after writing, while trait self-compassion significantly predicted mood improvements. The present findings suggest that interventions to increase self-compassion can be therapeutically beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The different occurrences of a word in a sentence cannot be identified with the one word type, nor with its many tokens. What then are occurrences of a word? How can one type occur more than once in another type? Is the conception of ‘structural universals’ that leads to these questions incoherent, as Lewis maintained? I argue against the answer Wetzel suggested, which identifies sentences with functions from numbers to expressions, and propose instead that occurrences of one type in another are subtypes with different relative positions in the whole. Types have subtypes as well as tokens. Occurrences in non-symmetrical types like sequences are individuated by their relative positions in the type. Occurrences in a symmetrical whole have different positions but stand in the same relations to the other components. They are numerically different subtypes that do not differ from each other qualitatively. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms 'free will' and 'moral responsibility' in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies to it are unconvincing. This, however, does not mean that the objection succeeds. Starting with the debate about moral responsibility, I attempt to show that there is an account of moral responsibility which enables us to defend the compatibilism debate against the charge of triviality-namely, the normative conception of moral responsibility. If 'moral responsibility' is defined in normative terms, then we cannot distinguish between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist sense of 'moral responsibility', because such a disambiguation would be inconsistent with the essential action-guiding force of normative expressions. Finally, I examine how the normative conception of moral responsibility can help us to defend the free will debate against the triviality objection and draw some general conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Caracteres: Estudios Culturales y Criticos de la Esfera Digital is the property of Editorial Delirio and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Effective psychotherapy is often held to involve the expression of feelings. Within the person-centred approach, this view has been especially emphasised by Carl Rogers and Eugene Gendlin. I am concerned with the question of why the expression of feelings can be therapeutically effective. Many psychotherapists picture feelings as 'inner experiences' for which the client tries to find appropriate words, but the difficulties with this picture, which were highlighted by Wittgenstein, seem to call for a very different approach. Here, I develop a Wittgensteinian account of the expression of feelings that avoids the difficulties to which Wittgenstein draws attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quantification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has criticized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show that Linnebo's objection rests on the assumption of a notion of semantic value or contribution which both applies to expressions of any order, and picks out, for each expression, an extra-linguistic correlate of that expression. I go on to argue that higher-orderists can plausibly reject this assumption, by means of a hierarchy of notions they can use to describe the extra-lingustic correlates of expressions of different orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" by David Enoch is presented. It looks on the deep meaning of the book's subtitle on the issue on realism that constitutes to normative truths and facts, expression of any practical attitude and a representation. It examines Enoch's arguments found at the second chapter which are complex and nuanced in conveying views through streamlined and simplified manner.