Search

From March 30 to April 12, 2021, members of the French Senate considered the government-prepared draft law on «countering separatism». His ideology is primarily aimed at curbing the increased activity of supporters of «political Islam» (Islamism) in France. Earlier, on February 16, 2021, the National Assembly (lower house of parliament) had approved the document. As shown in the first part of the article, the discussion of the draft deepened the split in the Muslim community of France between followers of moderate Islam, who supported the efforts of the government, and Islamists, who rejected the main provisions of the document. This article attempts to analyze a new stage of relations between the state and the Muslim community of the country – against the background of the decisions made by the senators. Accusing the French government of «Islamophobia»”, Islamic radicals appeal to the leadership of the European Union. Behind them, the figure of the Turkish President R.T. Erdogan, who is increasingly using religious rows in Europe for his own political purposes. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that the escalating confrontation in the Muslim environment and around it is acquiring more and more obvious political implications in France.

The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) which has a tendency towards Islam, but secular concurrently raises a question: what is the identity of the AKP? To date, this question is still being debated although generally, AKP has frequently been denoted as a party with an Islamic aspiration. Hence, this paper aims to revisit the identity of the AKP based on the framework of Islamic political movement. This paper fully adopted library research by examining sources related to the scope of the discussion. Ideologically, AKP makes conservative democracy as its ideology by harmonizing between conservative and liberal democratic values. The party also adheres to the secularism discourse although it meets almost all the characteristics of Islamic political movement for the Turkish context. Besides, it was found that the AKP has sided to religious interests in few issues. At the same time, AKP also has been resisted by military as the guardian of secular principle. This paper argues that the AKP is a party of its own identity, where it upholds the liberal version of secularism and tends to create an accommodative atmosphere for free religious practice. Finally, this paper offers some recommendations that can be considered for future studies.

In a post-industrial society, radical Islam has undergone significant evolutionary changes, that contributed to its transformation from a religious ideology to a political one. The key element of the updated doctrine was the idea of creating a world Islamic state - caliphate - through global jihad. This article explores a new stage in the history of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism, which has developed outside the Muslim world, where it has acquired features of a specific subculture. Global jihad is gaining popularity among young Muslims in Europe, the US, and Southeast Asia. A variety of cultural manifestations of Islamism, united by the term jihadi-cool, form an attractive image of a Salafist-jihadists through a special manner of clothing, new types of music (jihad rap and jihad rock), etc. Members of this subculture tend to join terrorist organizations, spread radical ideas among young people and attract new supporters. One of the most important causes of the radicalization of Muslims in Europe and the Americas is considered to be the complex socio-economic and cultural preconditions created by Western policies towards the States of the Middle East and the local Muslim diaspora. As part of the research, a historical-genetic analysis of the evolutionary transformations of Islamic radicalism has been conducted. The statistical method has been used to track the number of terrorist acts in the EU and the USA. Content analysis has been applied in the article in order to examine lyrics of jihad-rap musical compositions. The interdependence of jihad-rap popularity and the general interest in the ideology of jihad has been assessed based on the analysis of statistics of search queries. Biographical methods have been used to study the relationship between belonging to a jihadist subculture and joining radical Islamic organizations. The results of the study demonstrate, first of all, the high adaptability of Islamic radicalism to the changing conditions of the global world. Secondly, they indicate the specific evolution of a phenomenon that gradually overcomes sectarian differences. And third, they note increasing prevalence of this destructive doctrine in Europe, USA, South and Southeast Asia. All the results confirm that Islamic radicalism is not a local phenomenon, but a real threat to global political stability.

After the 1998 reformation era, PKB becomes one of the parties that gained a good reputation. Interestingly, unlike NU in the 1940s to 1970s, when it actively took a part in electoral politics by carrying out the agenda of formalizing Islam, PKB sought to synthesize the value of Islam and Indonesia in the context of a pluralistic state and pay attention to secular issues such as political education. In Probolinggo, the issue of political education became one of the post-reform political issues. This paper aims to formulate political education as designed in PKB's political program, as well as the changing of the political Islam articulation after the reformation. To get accurate data and results, a political sociology approach was used to understand political education within the PKB platform, and to measure the extent to which the ideational formulation is capable of being implemented at the practical and local levels in Probolinggo. The data obtained were analyzed in three contexts; the context of social and political configuration in Probolinggo, the context of political transformation in NU, and the context of the articulation change of post-reform political Islam. The results concluded that PKB political education in Probolinggo faced several constraints, both structural and non-structural, while the relevance was to provide contextualization of the reformation at the national level, marking a shift in NU's political paradigm, as well as the transformation of post-New Order political Islam.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, modernist Islamic reformers have proposed more “objectives of Islamic law” or maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah and argued that the maqāṣid-oriented approach indicates that Islamic priorities include the modern principles of democracy, social justice, human rights, and government accountability. This paper considers the evolution of maqāṣid and its relationship with the traditional framework of uṣūl al-fiqh. Subsequently, it addresses how the new maqāṣid discourse has been politicized. It analyzes the use of maqāṣid by Shaykh ‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah in his recent declarations concerning the UAE’s policies against regional democracy. This paper argues that Bin Bayyah’s interpretation of maṣlaḥah (legal benefit) and his adoption of the idea of absolute obedience to the ruler (walī al-amr) are not based on the traditional interpretation of the sacred texts that have been adopted by Salafists and Traditionalists. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the maqāṣid discourse and rational reasoning related to Islamic modernism. The article includes a comprehensive examination of Bin Bayyah’s justifications, as based on two basic points: first, the priority of peace as a higher objective (maqṣid) of sharī‘ah than rights and justice; second, the verification of the ratio legis (taḥqīq al-manāṭ). This paper argues that this ideological interpretation could shift the purpose-0riented basis of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah to result-oriented objectives, which focus on specific ideologies to satisfy contradicting political ends.

When under pressure do mainstream Islamist movements moderate more, or do they moderate less? Focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, I argue that religious framing and references are reaffirmed in the discourse and programmes of the movement (and its party) despite pressure, ensuing splits and internal disputes. Through field interviews, media and content analysis, I find that the movement reacted to pressure by adopting a conciliatory stand and appeasing rhetoric towards the Jordanian authorities. However, the movement also stresses its religious themes and references as a source for mobilization and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolutionary 1960s are often seen as the heyday of socialist theories and leftist movements. In the Middle East the period until the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 is regularly perceived as the pinnacle of secular, socialist Arab nationalism in the region, whereas the rise of various forms of political Islam is often presented as a phenomenon pertaining to a different era beginning in 1979. This article proposes a perspective which situates important Islamic thinkers in the intellectual environment of the revolutionary 1960s. Starting with the Algerian war in 1954 and lasting until the Iranian revolution of 1979, I argue that the 'long' 1960s were dominated not only by Marxist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. Muslim revolutionary intellectuals, such as Malek Bennabi, Amar Ouzegane, or ʿAli Shariʿati, also took part during the Algerian war in the shaping of a new discourse in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) is the only official political organisation in the country that propagates the political Islam agenda and strives to establish the Islamic state. In harnessing public support, the Qurʾān is extensively utilised by the party leaders to justify their political agenda. In this regard, it is important to note the significant contribution of its prolific president, Abdul Hadi bin Awang. Despite the extensive influence of his Qurʾānic exegesis, it has yet to be sufficiently analysed. Therefore, this paper discusses the methodological trend of his political interpretation of the Qurʾān and analyses its widespread impact on the society. Notwithstanding the complexity of the subject matter, it is hoped that the outcomes will shed some light on the role of Qurʾān as a scripture in the present-day political scene of Malaysia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerrannée is the property of Edisud and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The development of political Islam in Indonesia has been characterized by severe tension between Muslim intellectuals and ‘secular’ intellectuals. Since Indonesian independence to the Old Order, Muslim intellectuals focused on struggling the political Islam by establishing political parties and proposing Islam as the state foundation. This article aims to describe political Islam in the Indonesian New Order. This article uses historical approach and qualitative methods. In fact, the New Order regime had a negative view of political Islam. This view follows from its policy which prohibited Islamic parties. The New Order emphasized national stability, as well as economic development, as its main policies. The economic development under the New Order regime led to a new crop of Muslim intellectuals. This new generation of Muslim intellectuals was different from the older generation. They preferred strengthening their role in non-political organizations to playing a role in political parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Investigaciones Historicas is the property of Universidad de Valladolid, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The place religion should occupy in social life and how religious education should be conducted has so far been one of the controversial issues in Turkey. Considering the history of the Republican era, it may be said that religious education actively exists in the configuration of official education except for some periods. Religious education was not included in the earlier years of the Republic in the hegemony construction process of the state; yet, increasing internal contradictions as well as developments occurring in the international arena caused religious education to enter into the agenda through time. Religion and religious education fulfilled important functions in activating the grassroots in the struggle between dominant classes for hegemony. Religious education schools (imam hatip schools [IHSs]), which are the basic institutions offering religious education, have taken shape in parallel to the struggle for power, and they have developed in accordance with the attitudes of political powers. IHSs, which have been continuously growing except for short-term periods, are assigned the mission of raising a new generation today and special efforts are made to qualify those schools. This study evaluates the IHSs in terms of the roles they play in hegemony construction and considers the historical development and transformation of IHSs on this basis. First, the relationships between hegemony, state, and education are considered and then their historical development is evaluated and their roles in hegemony construction are analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay considers Ziya Gökalp, the received "spiritual father of Turkish nationalism", as an early mastermind of fascism in Greater Europe. During the 1910s, Gökalp acted as a prophet of expansive war and as a mentor of demographic engineering in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, which was a laboratory for new political styles in a crisis-ridden empire. Gökalp's thinking longed for a supreme leader in an army-like, disciplined and hierarchised society, while it rejected a social contract-based nation and state. An influential inspiration for and beyond the new élites in the capital, Gökalp combined the call for radical modernisation according to "European civilisation" with an assertive essentialism based on völkisch (cultural-racial-ethnic Turkish) and religious (political Islamic) references. He was the chief ideologist of the Young Turk party-state (1913–18) – side by side with Talaat Pasha, its main executive leader – and "the father of my thoughts" for Kemal Atatürk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zbornik radova Fakulteta islamskih nauka u Sarajevu is the property of Zbornik radova Fakulteta islamskih nauka u Sarajevu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Painful transformational processes taking place in the Middle East after the Arab Awakening pose not only new threats and challenges for regional actors, but also provide new opportunities for some of them to pursue their geopolitical ambitions and strengthen strategic positions, including through non-traditional methods and tools. In this regard, Turkey’s attempts to capitalize on the interest of some governments, which came to power on a wave of dissent, to learn from the Turkish experience in state building deserve independent consideration. These attempts were reflected in the concept of the so called Turkish model. In the early 2010s a particular interest in implementation of the Turkish model was shown by Egypt. The paper examines both the driving forces behind M. Mursi’s government special attention to Ankara’s example and the reasons that ultimately have led to the failure to operationalize the Turkish model in Egypt and the subsequent dramatic deterioration of bilateral relations. The first section of the paper identifies the key elements of the Turkish model. The author emphasizes that initially this model was aimed at identifying the optimal balance between religious and secular principles in public life. The second section explores M. Mursi’s government attempts to implement the Turkish model in Egypt in the first half of 2010s. The author shows that it was economic and political success of Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s including its rapid economic growth and the increase of foreign investments, as well as a successful inclusion of political Islam in the Western-style democratic institutions that primarily attracted the new Egyptian government. However, the author concludes that M. Mursi’s government failure to undertake profound economic, social and political reforms combined with a mixed attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood towards the Turkish model, growing popular discontent and a negative attitude of certain regional actors towards this proclaimed political course of the new Egyptian leaders have eventually led to the military coup and cessation of all attempts to learn from the Turkish experience. The third section outlines implications of the 2013 military coup in Egypt for the bilateral relations. The author concludes that the Egyptian case clearly demonstrates the limits of applicability of the Turkish model in the Middle East countries, as well as limitations of Turkey’s regional ambitions.

Political Islam has become an important factor of the international politics nowadays. By the beginning of the 21st century Islamist political groups have turned to be a matter of concern not only of the Middle East main stakeholders, but also the European and American ones. This circumstance has been aggravated even more, considering the fact, that, being a former metropolis, Europe had come to be a kind of cradle for the spread of Islam. The proportion of the Islamic population has been growing here year by year. Moreover, the migration waves following the 2011 Arab spring provoked even more tough migration crisis and posed a complicated challenge to the European society expressed in conciliation of freedom of religion within its Muslim community along with the preserving European values of secular democracy. The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood has always been considered to be a leading Islamist force not only in Arabic world but in the West as well. Indeed, if in the Middle East they position themselves rather as a political force, even though with wide representation, in Europe the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood claims to be a representative of the Muslim population of the region as a whole. Taking into account the growing Islamic presence in the continent, a certain anxiety in the European society cannot but exist, concerning the risk of conscious Islamic expansion. In this circumstances the question, whether this process is really taking place as well as which role the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood plays in it, came to the fore. This article tries to answer this question, analysing the different stages of the group’s ideological transformation and its influence on the group’s activity in Europe. The author comes to the conclusion, that being a movement, that has undergone substantial ideological transformation, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood has followed a similar scenario in Europe. Since the organisation itself has made a long way from a militant organisation with anti-Western discourse to a moderate movement, claiming to be democratically oriented and tolerant to the West, their European branch has transformed from a small Islamist group in temporary exile in the enemy camp, to the organisation, considering itself a representative of the European Muslim community, as well as accepting Europe as a motherland.

The article is devoted to the challenge of the modern constitutional system of Germany by Islamic organizations. Mass migration from Muslim countries and the formation of “parallel” Muslim communities led to the fact that it was in this environment that transnational Islamist organizations such as “Muslim Brotherhood” found their adherents and established their branches. The article analyzes the tactics of actions of the Muslim Brotherhood transnational Islamic organization and organizations affiliated with it in Germany. These organizations are considered as an active subject with their own civilizational project for the reconstruction of the world. Based on the materials studied by German intelligence agencies, conclusions are drawn on the creation of an extensive network of organizations controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, while publicly denying any connection with this movement. The tactics of this organization is to use all the capabilities of the “legal” institutions of a democratic state for ideological propaganda and political representation.The strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood remains unchanged - through the gradual “peaceful” Islamization of European society, come to a radical political reorganization of Europe on the principles of political Islam.

The article examines the origins of political Islam in the Middle East and the terminological aspect of the problem. The stages of the formation of the Egyptian Islamic organization Muslim Brotherhood were clarified and its key ideological tenets were established. The political and socio-economic circumstances in which the organization was formed are outlined. Attention is drawn to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the military and economic presence in Egypt of the United Kingdom, which consolidated political Islamic parties. The process of transforming the Muslim Brotherhood from a "group of like-minded people" into a political party is considered. The political and legal ideas of the founder of the organization Hasan al-Banna are covered. which became the main strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation of the organization in the 30's and 40's was analyzed during the attempt of Nazi Germany to turn the Brothers into their own puppet. The article reveals the role in the organization of its ideologist Said Qutb. His main ideas and views, which formed the basis of the radical Muslim Brotherhood branch, are analyzed. The link between the radicalism of the organization and the ultra-conservative trend of Islam - "Salafism" - was noted. The connection of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Free Officers organization, which came to power in Egypt in 1952, has been disclosed. It was stated that the Brothers supported General Gamal Nasser in the struggle for power, which allowed them to take part in the parliamentary elections. It is stated that the Brothers' criticism of the policies of Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat on Israel led to a ban of the organization's activities in Egypt. It has been established that under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the "Brothers" tried to enter parliament in other parties. The place and role of the organization during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, which led the Muslim Brotherhood to power, were examined. The main reasons for the failure of the organization are indicated.

In Morocco, as in Tunisia, the political integration of the two main Islamist parties has given rise to a project of «specialisation» aimed at introducing a distinction between partisan activities and associative and preaching activities. Starting from the trajectories of the Ennahdha party and the Moroccan PJD, this article proposes to highlight the differences in the «specialization» processes initiated by the two parties. This transformation is analysed here as referring to a separation between political activists and preachers. It underlines the complex relations between the PJD and the MUR, as well as between the militants of Ennahdha and the associative field in the light of the «specialisation». It also identifies the phenomenon of movement of members of different organisations between the political domain and the sphere of social and religious action. The analysis shows that in the two studied cases the «specialisation» does not lead to an effective separation between partisan action and social and preaching activity and does not eliminate the porosity of the limits between politics and religion.

The question of the correlation between Islam, political Islam and liberal democracy has so far been the most exposed topic in exploring the democratic capacity of political Islam and Islamic societies in general. What is particularly intriguing about the relationship between political Islam and liberal democracy is the fact of its westernized triviality that has received a pejorative tone in Islamic political circles. Simplified, the triviality of liberal democracy for the Islamic political campus implies imposing a model of democracy that cannot be fully compatible with the original Muslim notion of society and government. Hence, the following paper analyzes exactly the relations of political Islam to specific inherent categories of liberal democracy such as the rule of law, representative government, the separation of powers and secularism as diferenta specifica of liberal western democratic discourse. Through the methods of induction and deduction, the author will illustrate how appropriate tangent or divergence is illustrated and how this is reflected in the general ideological positioning of political Islam towards liberal democracy in Muslim countries through an axiological and praxeological perspective.

Muslim Brotherhood is listed as prohibited organization in a number of countries, including Russia. Nevertheless, in different periods and in different countries of the MENA region it turned out to be well represented in the legal political field. The temporary failures of this largest branch of political Islam of a radical nature have not yet led to a fatal loss of the organization in the competition between different Islamic groups, or to defeat as a result of repression. The author explores the problem of such stability of an extremist organization for many decades. He defends the hypothesis of its long­term strategic action planning along with the accepted tactics of waiting for a convenient moment for the realization of power ambitions. To analyze the strength of the social base, a variant of the deprivation theory is proposed, which was considered in detail in other works of the author. The historical origins of the organization are identified using published as well unpublished archival documents. A historical retrospective substantiates the assumption that a prototype of this structure used to be existed in Istanbul and Damascus back in the period immediately following the Young Turks revolution in the Ottoman Empire. The strongest external factor in the development of MB is emphasized. It is support throughout the history of the movement from forces outside the region, which have seen and continue to see the possibility for themselves of a tactical alliance with the Islamists of this direction to realize their own ideas and pursue their interests in the East.

In the article, the author uses the example of Islam to examine the interconfessional relations, developing in the Russian Federation in the context of return of religion and religious beliefs to public life (revival of religion). This process affects both institutional aspects (evolution of the state’s federal structure, political system, formation of civil society) and value aspects of religion, such as its influence on the political culture of society, ideology of federalism and change in the content of secularism of the state. J. Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, the concepts of post-secular society and federalism, as well as the civilizational approach are used as the methodological base of the research. The author justifies his conclusion about the necessity to ensure respect for religious values while preserving the secular nature of the Russian state as an asymmetric Federation.

This article analyses the use of religion in Indonesian elections. It fundamentally argues that religion has been utilized by both secular and religious politicians to boost their electoral gain. Focusing on national and local elections in the past five years of Indonesian politics, this study suggests that religion is a significant instrument in the electoral decision-making process, both from the perspective of voters and candidates. Much of the data in writing this article derive from my current research project funded by the Indonesian Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education. Other data come from leading survey institutes, particularly Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI), Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) and Indikator Politik Indonesia.

Using the case of the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), I seek to measure the actual impact of Islamist parties' moderation on their electoral performances and voter bases. Statistical analyses find that although PKS has experienced an influx of diverse voters since the early 2000s, the influx was offset by a gradual withdrawal of educated Islamist voters, who had been loyal to the party since its establishment. I further claim that this change in PKS's voter profile was attributable not to moderation per se but to normalization, manifesting in an adaptation of the party elites' behaviors to the existing patterns in Indonesian politics. The party's recent policy shift with a conservative tone was insufficient to regain votes from its original supporters, who already saw PKS as a run-of-the-mill party. PKS's case implies that it is necessary for Islamist parties to maintain their distinctiveness as an alternative voice in the party system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous researchers in the field of Islamic and Muslim Studies have proposed various typologies to categorize Muslims in relation to their understanding of and identification with Islam. However, to date few studies have conducted the necessary empirical work to determine the numbers of Muslims that identify with the typologies that have been constructed. This article is the first to present findings based on a comprehensive study of Muslims in relation to a spectrum of discursive typologies. The authors conducted a national survey of Islam in Australia among Muslim citizens and permanent residents in 2019. This article examines Muslim Australians across a spectrum of 10 typologies in relation to various demographic factors, questions concerning shariah and political Islam, sources of influence, preferences for interpreting the Qur'an, views on various ethical, social, and theological issues, engagement with non-Muslims, and openness to new knowledge about Islam. Contrary to stereotypical views of Islam and Muslims, the article's findings point to a strong presence for liberal and progressive typologies and interpretations of the Islamic tradition among Muslim Australians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentary argues the Saudi-Qatari tensions lie in con- flicting perspectives about the role of political Islam within the fabric of both states and their actions regionally. Fundamentally, the rivalry stems from contrasting relations between political and religious elites in each country which has taken on increasing political importance in tensions between Riyadh and Doha. Central to much of this are questions about the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood (and its various affiliates). More relatedly, the Saudi-Qatari rifts emerge out of competing understandings of authority and legitimacy, and with it, concern at the contestation of these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a year of becoming president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad had already confused much of the world. Explanations of his political ascent in a semi-peripheral country rely largely on the concept of charismatic authority. This is a non-explanation, however, as the charismatic historical figure who seemingly holds creative command over the social world also has to be created. Instead, I argue that Ahmadinezhad’s trajectory from an Islamist engineering student to the presidency of a post-revolutionary state highlights three mechanisms of social-political innovation that are bounded by space and time: the situated overlap of social capital, the paradox of vertical clientage, and the breakaway of the machine boss. These mechanisms are usually misread as timeless signifiers of national backwardness or as charismatic dei ex machina. By showing these mechanisms at work through biography, we can challenge scholarly and popular explanations of social change that implicitly rehash modernization theory.

This article traces the foundations, development, and evolution of Al-Shabaab's multi-tiered media and information operations through a historical lens from proto and early Al-Shabaab media in 2006 and early 2007 up to the beginning of 2021. Arguing that the group's media campaign is an integral part of its broader proto-state governance operations and kinetic actions, the article pays particular attention to central narrative frames aimed at domestic Somali, regional East African, and international audiences – both friendly and non-friendly – as well as to the role of media and information operations as part of the group's domestic governance operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) foreign policy has experienced substantial changes since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011. This paper describes the characteristics and main reasons of this transformation, as well as the possible consequences of a visible militaristic projection that goes beyond the limits of the Gulf region, the main scenario of Emirati diplomatic action until recently. Our framework takes into account, first of all, the traditional link between the United States and the UAE and how recent US administrations changed their perception about security in the Gulf; how Emir Mohammed bin Zayed has secured his grip over the country, and the relevance of his alliance with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman; the aim of neutralizing the democratic stream that emerged from the Arab revolutions and, from there on, the Emirati perception about how political Islam and particularly the current best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood was becoming the main beneficiary of the erosion of the traditional Arab regime. Moreover, this paper proposes that despite the convergence with Saudi Arabia in a number of scenarios, the UAE has kept a foreign policy based on its own interests, which strengthened its increasing role as a regional main contender in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes political parties' direction of change on the political spectrum? Under what conditions do Islamist movements moderate or shift towards a more radical stance? Drawing on the case of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, I argue that transformation of the Islamist parties should be analysed on par with that of the secular parties, by focussing on the parties' popular base and the target electorate rather than through a moderation–radicalisation framework. I find that Ennahda's shift to Muslim democracy, self-defined as specialisation, is owed to their need to be backed by the new urban middle class in order to rule while maintaining the support of the rural and urban poor to come to power. Through field interviews conducted with the members of Tunisian political parties as well as union leaders and activists, I show that the secular parties are going through a similar process under the pressure of the spatial and class-related dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on Ottoman defeat in the First World War. Topics include coming from the head of the Anglican Church himself at the onset of the British occupation of Istanbul; and Indian Muslim leaders and Ottoman diplomats where British government policy putting the integrity of the empire at risk by stoking resentment among Muslims.

Copyright of Central Asia & the Caucasus (14046091) is the property of CA & CC Press AB and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the creation of consensus around official and unofficial anti-communist activities in Turkey by focusing on the weekly periodical Yeniden Millî Mücadele/National Struggle Anew (1970-1980) as a case study. The magazine described itself as a publication that was anti-communist, anti-capitalist, anti-zionist and respectful towards religious beliefs, and was associated with the national islamist organisation Mücadele Birliği (Union for Struggle). After a brief historical outline, the paper discusses some of the basic ideas of the magazine, and shows that these were intricately connected with the ideological struggle against the supposed cultural hegemony of the left. It then illustrates how National Struggle Anew took advantage of myths and symbols of the Ottoman and Turkish past in order to construct an anti-communist discourse and the image of the nation’s enemies. The investigation has been conducted through a conceptual analysis of a selection of articles that appeared in the magazine, mainly in its first year of publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the Alevi-Sunni social conflict in Turkey through an examination of how the politically engaged youth of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) perceived the rights of the Alevi population around the time of the AKP's 'Democratic Opening'. Based on qualitative fieldwork involving 78 interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 in seven different cities, the research focuses on the boundaries of AKP identity concerning Alevis' democratic demands and different modes of reconciliation with these. The results show the issue of Alevi politico-religious rights to reveal the religious, institutional and national boundaries of AKP political identity. In addition, the demand for the construction of a museum to commemorate the 1993 Madımak Massacre in Sivas triggered the Sunni memory boundaries of young activists in that city. The AKP youth also presented some approaches that reconciled with Alevi demands, classified as pragmatic, political and subjective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]