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At the crossroads of the word and the world stands the human being. But whereas in former decades especially the first of those terms would set the course for most investigative efforts within the humanities - epitomized by linguistic philosophy - recently it seems the notion of "world" has instead come to be the main beacon for social sciences, philosophy, and the arts alike. By now the 'nonhuman turn' has spread so widely that it has even become the specific topic of an international conference ('The Nonhuman Turn in 21st Century Studies,' University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2012). This eclectic "movement" denounces the purported centrality of the human from the most diverse perspectives, claiming equal epistemological, ontological, and ethical rights not only for other species, but even for objects and networks. In this paper, nevertheless, we take issue, somewhat subversively, with the anti-anthropocentrism underlying most approaches sailing under the flag of this 'turn,' ranging from Speculative Realism to Actor-Network Theory to neuroscience. However we do not target their critique of anthropocentrism in itself - which we endorse. Rather we make a plea for a humble recognition of the 'situatedness' (with a term deriving from Donna Haraway) of all of these frameworks - to be superposed upon them. This humbleness will lead us, paradoxically, to an almost arrogant affirmation of "our humanness," a stance we have dubbed "subversive anthropocentrism." We outline our position by way of the work of Marshall McLuhan, who himself abides eminently at the aforementioned crossroads. Unsuspectedly, notwithstanding his linguistic-structuralist propensities, McLuhan ties up really well with a possible "objective turn" - which is demonstrated by 'object-oriented philosopher' Graham Harman's reading of him. But at the same time, the deeply humanist foundations of his work cannot and should not be denied. Instead, we argue, they can amend the potentially all-too one-sided anti-anthropocentrism - that risks becoming a biasjust as much as its opposite term - and vice versa. We should give "the world" its right due, but forget not that "the word" is our habitat too. A playful illustration - involving the strange behavior of 'anting' exhibited by several species of birds - will guide our argument.

I dette kapitel giver jeg en introduktion til den herhjemme forholdsvis ukendte amerikanske fænomenolog Graham Harman (f.1968), hvor jeg sætter fokus på termen eksistens i Harmans forståelse. Et fokus der ikke retter sig mod menneskets eksistens, men tingenes. Ifølge Harman har termen eksistens, inden for den fænomenologiske tradition siden Husserl, været knyttet til, hvordan mennesket oplever og forstår sin egen eksistens. Dyrs og tings eksistens har været af sekundær interesse og har været forstået som afledte størrelser i forhold til menneskets eksistens. Harman kritiserer det han kalder antropocentrismen inden for fænomenologien, som han mener, afdækker en verden, der viser sig at være et spejlbillede af mennesket selv. I dette kapitel præsenteres Harmans delvise overtagelse og delvise afstandstagen fra især Martin Heideggers ”Dasein”-forståelse, samt en efterfølgende præsentation af Harman eget alternativ, som han kalder for en objektorienteret filosofi (”object-oriented philosophy”) - en venden sig mod tingenes eksistens.

Phenomenologically, we're not used to thinking of "the body" as a medium. Embodiment grounds our being-in-the-world, and from that base we interact with the world through media; why bother further? Yet hypothetically displacing our viewpoint from Dasein to the world impinging itself on us, we quickly realize how our bodies are channels and screens through and on which various entities project themselves. Air blows through us; heat and moist commute through our pores; microwaves penetrate our skin... In the emerging research on Intrabody Communication (IBC), the human body is even intentionally treated as a transmission medium for electronic signals. As these encroachments not only disrupt our most anthropocentric self-understanding, but also entail ethical questions revolving around, for instance, health issues, the body as literal medium deserves some philosophical elaboration. A preliminary and experimental attempt is endeavored in this presentation by way of insights from Marshall McLuhan, Martin Heidegger, and interpreter of both Graham Harman. The combination turns out less outlandish than it seems. The later McLuhan furnishes a controversial theory of media dynamics epitomized in the concept of the "tetrad," in which every human artifact is considered a medium, analyzable as such. Harman, however, suggests to expand the definition to every entity - fabricated and natural, organic and inorganic alike. The link is constituted by Heidegger, on whose tool analysis Harman founds his own "object-oriented philosophy." Blending these components, what happens when we analyze the body as a medium along the lines of a tetradic McLuhan-Harman-Heidegger ontology?

Filozofski pravac nedavno utemeljen pod imenom spekulativni realizam nastaje kao reakcija na antropocentrizam i idealizam postkantovske filozofije, tj. filozofije utemeljene na tzv. Kantovom kopernikanskom obratu u filozofiji. Quentin Meillassoux kao jedan od četvorice „očeva utemeljitelja“ spekulativnog realizma (ostala su trojica Ray Brassier, Graham Harman i Iain Hamilton Grant) ističe kako je Kantovu gestu smještanja čovjeka u središte filozofskog univerzuma točnije nazvati ptolomejskom kontrarevolucijom. Želi li se uistinu suočiti s izazovom koji Kopernikova revolucionarna gesta postavlja pred nju i čovječanstvo uopće, filozofija mora odgovoriti na pitanje: Kako je moguće misliti svijet bez misli? Upravo to pitanje leži u središtu filozofskih projekata Quentina Meillassouxa i Raya Brassiera.