The purpose of this article is to analyze the association between board remuneration and the probability of disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures by Brazilian companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - [B]3, in the period from 2010 to 2020. The analyzed sample is composed of 271 companies, with 2,093 firm-year observations. To achieve the proposed objective, two econometric procedures were used. Initially, to analyze the probability of EBITDA disclosure, a model with Logit estimation was used. Then, to give robustness to the results, the data were rotated using Ordinary Least Squares with fixed effects and sector control. The variables used in the study were collected from documents filed with the CVM, and Refinitv Eikon? was also used. To identify the disclosure or not of EBITDA by the companies, the press releases published and filed on the IR website or at the CVM were analyzed. The results of the econometric models showed that the remuneration of the board of directors increases, on average, the probability of the firm disclosing the non-GAAP EBITDA measure by 26%. However, the probability of EBITDA disclosure is reduced by 41% when the firm has a loss for the year and this loss is greater than the loss of the previous year. The other GAAP variables were not statistically significant, so it can be concluded that the increase in earnings did not directly influence the EBITDA disclosure. In addition, quantitatively, there is a reduction in the disclosure of EBITDA in the years 2019 and 2020. In this way, this study contributes to the various users of accounting information, in particular, it takes a look at the agency problem, by providing evidence related to the agent's remuneration and the disclosure of information - reduction of information asymmetry, to the principal. In addition, it provides evidence on non-GAAP measures for accounting standards bodies, nationally and internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]