151. "Israel's Bomb: The Decision to Go Nuclear and The Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity.".
- Author
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Ziv, Guy
- Subjects
- *
NUCLEAR weapons , *PRIME ministers , *NUCLEAR energy , *PEACE - Abstract
In the 1950s, Israel's policy-making elite came to embrace a highly controversial decision of great magnitude: the establishment of a nuclear program. This decision was shaped by a unique set of circumstances entailing a prime minister in constant fear of Arab designs, his determined - even zealous - aides, and a historic opportunity that enabled them to transform Israel into a nuclear power despite major financial and political difficulties, including intense domestic opposition. Then Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, was able to secure Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's backing to tap into his clandestine and highly significant "French connection," in order to acquire the technology needed to turn Israel into a nuclear power. Israel has always maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, the wisdom of which has been critiqued by a number of political scientists over the past twenty-five years. This policy has come under fire again recently in response to unfolding events in the Middle East. I will argue that Israel's decision to go nuclear was an important strategic and political decision which, combined with its policy of nuclear ambiguity, has played a critical role in the Arab world's strategic calculus vis-à-vis Israel, in particular Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's decision to make peace with Israel. The policy of nuclear ambiguity very likely played a dual role of convincing Arab leaders of Israel's military superiority while, at the same time, shielding them from public pressure to become nuclear powers themselves. Indeed, since the early 1970s, when Israel was widely understood to be in possession of nuclear weapons, Arab leaders have, in practice, reconciled themselves to Israel's existence, creating the possibility for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through peace diplomacy. To the extent that they have taken up arms against Israel, they have done so with limited objectives in mind rather than intending for Israel's destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2005