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This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel data sets with unprecedented country-year coverage – leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality – our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and collective labor rights. Once we control for the effect of labor market policy measures, however, we find that collective labor rights increase in the wake of IMF programs. We argue that this result is explained by the impact of union pressure on governments which, in such a context, are imbued with the policy space to respond to domestic interest groups. The study has broader theoretical implications as to when international organizations are effective in constraining governments' choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissident violence inflicts many costs on society, but some of the longest‐lasting consequences for civilians may be indirect, due to the government's response. We explore how government policy responses affect social welfare, specifically through budgetary shifts. Using subnational violence and budgeting data for Peru, we demonstrate that attacks on soldiers during the budget negotiation period drive a shift from local social services, especially health, to defense. One soldier fatality implies a 0.13 percentage point reduction in the local health budget share (2008–12). Health budget cuts due to a single soldier fatality result in 76 predicted additional infant deaths 2 years later. We show that the effect on health budgeting operates through decreases in women's use of health facilities and postnatal services. We offer evidence that Peru's coercive response indirectly harms civilians due to butter‐to‐guns budgetary shifts. Our results identify a budgetary mechanism that translates dissident violence into a deterioration in social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the impact of local tax autonomy on local fiscal discipline with data for more than 2,400 Polish municipalities, over the period 2002–2014. The novelty of this study is that we rely on a measure of "de jure" fiscal decentralization, given by the share of own taxes that the local authorities are entitled to collect, before any local tax policies have been implemented. This allows us to verify the systemic impact of local tax autonomy on fiscal balances, which is not affected by local policy choices that can simultaneously change budgetary outcomes. Our results uniformly show that fiscal autonomy is associated with higher fiscal prudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Claims that decentralization could improve government accountability and responsiveness led to its adoption as a policy objective across the globe. But recent empirical work finds little evidence of "tier effects" in practice; instead, significant variation exists even between most-similar bodies. Recognizing the value of Freedom of Information (FOI) in facilitating large-scale data collection, and that the UK's institutional diversity offers an important source of between - and within -tier variation, I compile a large new data set by emailing two separate FOI requests to 812 UK public bodies with an executive function. Identifying significant variation in timeliness and quality between UK territories, I argue that differing foundational motives can help explain patterns of responsiveness between institutions established by transparency-facing reforms and those designed to resolve conflict. A lack of evidence that lower-tier governments are generally more responsive reaffirms the recent challenges to the more fundamental claims about decentralization that informed academic debate and real-world practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long a staple in the toolkit of American politics, comparison among subnational territorial units has gained increasing currency in comparative politics. A growing portion of subnational research, especially in the monographic literature, employs comparisons of subnational territorial units within different countries. This approach to comparison, which I term transnational comparison, has the potential to build on and extend the advantages of subnational comparison. Despite the numerous added challenges it poses, transnational comparison offers a variety of ways to incorporate and leverage variations between countries as well as within them. Drawing on exemplary studies from the literature on subnational regimes and beyond, I outline a typology of successful transnational comparative strategies. The choice among these strategies depends on their distinctive properties, on the substantive questions asked, and on the stage of a research program. All have contributed to advancing the study of politics beyond nation-centered comparison. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper exploits an original database that spans 30-plus developed and developing nations between 1870 and 2010 to perform the first empirical analysis of the relationship between historical levels of intra-elite competition and fiscal development over the long run. We argue that the timing of industrialization affects the extent of historical competition between agricultural and capitalist elites, which in turn helps shape key initial decisions over fiscal size and structure. Under "early" industrialization, intra-elite competition levels tended to be greater, promoting fiscal development characterized by high overall taxation and tax progressivity. Under "late" industrialization, by contrast, agricultural elites were more likely to retain political dominance, promoting fiscal states characterized by low overall taxation and tax regressivity. We show evidence for a positive, statistically significant, and robust relationship between historical intra-elite competition levels and long-run fiscal development. This focus on intra-elite competition improves our understanding of the fundamental determinants of cross-national fiscal differences today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that party leader considerations drive governors copartisan with presidents toward fiscal discipline, while others argue that party reputation concerns guide their behavior. To demonstrate how to assess whether either of these mechanisms is at work, I extend this analysis to the municipal level. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are more disciplined than mayors aligned with presidents only, copartisan governors affect mayoral fiscal behavior through party leader considerations. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are just as fiscally disciplined as those aligned with presidents only, party reputation concerns drive mayoral fiscal behavior. Cross-sectional time-series analysis of debt used to finance fiscal excess in municipal Mexico reveals support for the party-leader-concern logic in this nation, but the party reputation logic (or both logics or neither logic) may be at work in others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key feature of federal systems is the representation of subnational units by "territorial representatives" in policymaking at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that policymaking under territorial representation should be systematically skewed toward opinion in those states where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. This claim is tested using a novel data set of policy change in the European Union (EU), covering 211 policy issues and 6,506 observations of opinion–policy dyads. Results show that measures weighting opinion across member states by how much national citizens care about an issue are better predictors of policy change than EU‐wide mean opinion. Moreover, congruence between state‐level opinion and EU‐level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear‐cut opinion in a member state is. These findings refine our understanding of the opinion–policy linkage under territorial representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian systems. This article helps advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on social provision. Using data from twenty-two OECD countries, the results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of social spending when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels of provision in proportional representation systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Sozialreform is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Fluctuations in the volume and the value of financial remittances received from abroad affect the livelihood of households in developing economies across the world. Yet, political scientists have little to say about how changes in remittances, as opposed to the receipt of remittance payments alone, affect recipients' political attitudes. Relying on a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010–2013 and a cross-sectional sample of 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, we show that when people experience a decrease (increase) in remittances, they become less (more) satisfied about their household economic situation and misattribute responsibility to the incumbent at home. Our findings advance the literature on the political consequences of remittance payments and suggest that far from exclusively being an international risk-sharing mechanism for developing countries, remittances can also drive fluctuations in incumbent approval and compromise rudimentary accountability mechanisms in the developing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments, decentralization has emerged as one of the most important global trends of the new century. Yet, there is still no consensus as to the benefits of decentralization and how to design institutions that can realize these benefits. We investigate the political conditions under which the decentralization of authority will improve the delivery of public goods. Building off Oates’ “decentralization theorem” to include inter-jurisdictional spillovers, we develop a new theory suggesting that the interaction of democratic decentralization (the popular election of sub-national governments) and party centralization (the power of national party leaders over sub-national office-seekers) will produce the best service delivery outcomes. To test this argument empirically, we develop a new dataset of sub-national political institutions. Our analyses, which examine educational and health service delivery in 135 countries across thirty years, provide support for our theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does diversification of an economy improve the chances of democracy? In theory, diversification may reduce elite cohesion and improve citizens’ outside options, making democracy more likely. This paper estimates the effect of export diversification on democracy, using data from 143 countries. We use variability within countries in fertile soil as an instrument for diversification, controlling for country size. To address the possibility that current fertile soil variability may have been influenced by historical country characteristics that could also have affected democracy today, we control for historical changes in land cover. We identify a statistically significant, positive effect of diversification on democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid expansion of electoral gender quotas in the past few decades has been met with considerable scholarly and public attention. Despite this, there has been little empirical work examining the global legislative consequences of gender quotas over time. Developing a unique time-series cross-sectional data set from 139 states during the peak period of quota adoption and implementation (1995–2012), we test whether and how quotas are associated with subsequent changes in government spending priorities. We find that substantial quota shocks—those associated with a large increase in women’s parliamentary representation—are followed by increased government expenditures toward public health. Further, we find that increases in health spending are offset by relative decreases in military spending and other spending categories. Our findings provide strong evidence that quota policies influence government priorities in historically feminized policy areas but principally when they are complied with and have substantial numerical consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nonnational elections are at least partially determined by factors pertaining to the national level, which is problematic for the democratic functioning of these nonnational policy levels. Recent scholarly work has begun examining the impact of the election campaign on voters’ tendency to vote “nationally". However, these studies focus almost exclusively on European Union (EU) elections, and their findings may not be generalizable to other contexts. Moreover, they assume campaigns affect all voters similarly. In contrast, this study examines whether campaigns affect voters’ tendency to vote nationally in a local election, and whether partisan preferences condition the effect. These expectations are tested using panel survey data and a media content analysis collected during the 2012 Antwerp local election campaign. The results indicate that the campaign affected voters, making local considerations more important. However, the impact was conditional upon voters’ partisan preferences: When a party put more emphasis on the national context, voters preferring that party became more likely to rely on national considerations throughout the campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars now argue for deemphasizing the importance of international anarchy in favor of focusing on hierarchy – patterns of super- and subordination – in world politics. We argue that only one kind of vertical stratification, governance hierarchy, actually challenges the states-under-anarchy framework. But the existence of such hierarchies overturns a number of standard ways of studying world politics. In order to theorize, and identify, variation in governance structures in world politics, we advocate a relational approach that focuses on three dimensions of hierarchy: the heterogeneity of contracting, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by central authorities, and the balance of investiture between segments and the center. This generates eight ideal-typical forms: national-states and empires, as well as symmetric and asymmetric variants of federations, confederations, and conciliar systems. We argue that political formations – governance assemblages – with elements of these ideal types are likely ubiquitous at multiple scales of world politics, including within, across, and among sovereign states. Our framework suggests that world politics is marked by a heterarchy of nested and overlapping political structures. We discuss broad implications for international-relations theory and comparative politics, and illustrate our approach through an analysis of contemporary China and the evolution of the British ‘Empire’ in the 19th and 20th centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines why credit rating agencies offered optimistic assessments of some US states during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Focusing on the creditworthiness of state governments, we argue that because states are procyclic spenders, growth in a state's economy is actually harmful to that state's ability to maintain its fiscal promises. As the federal government spends more heavily in a state, however, the procyclic tendencies of that state matter less to credit raters, and the negative effects of growth in a state's economy diminish. We test our theory in two ways. We first model the Great Recession as an intervention, finding that states receiving less money from the federal government are more likely to experience increases in their credit scores following the crisis. We then test whether this pattern holds outside of the financial crisis for the years 1990–2006. We observe that increases in gross state product are negatively correlated with credit ratings when there are little to no changes in federal dollars flowing into a state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many studies have shown that greater trade openness affects the overall size of social spending, this study emphasizes that it also affects types of social policies that a government prioritizes. When faced with deepening trade competition, governments tend to use different policy measures to address the opportunities and challenges stemming from their economic competitiveness in the international market. Policy makers in countries with high relative labor costs are likely to privilege social insurances and income transfer. This is because as high labor costs make their workers more vulnerable in the trade competition, governments seek to protect skilled labor in order to maintain their economic advantage in advanced industries. In contrast, when relative labor costs are low, human capital investment programs are likely to be emphasized to enhance productivity and the quality of labor to capitalize the cost competitiveness of a country’s workers. The findings from empirical analyzes of 26 OECD economies from 1991 to 2012 support these arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors generate financial fragility in open economies? Existing research assumes that the development of these conditions is more likely to emerge under some configurations of domestic economic and political attributes. We examine the development of financial fragility through the ontological lens of the new interdependence approach, which assumes that global factors can be as important as local factors in generating outcomes. We analyze global financial conditions from 1978 to 2009 and argue that contemporary global finance is an oscillating system that generates boom and bust capital flow cycles. The phases of this cycle are a consequence of the scale of US net borrowing on global markets: when the United States is a large net importer of foreign capital, other economies struggle to attract foreign capital and are substantially less likely to develop fragile financial positions; when US net capital imports fall, other economies receive an abundance of foreign capital, and financial fragility becomes more likely. In contrast, we find little evidence that cross-national variation in political institutions or financial systems explains why fragility develops, although some regional interdependencies are evident. We conclude that global conditions drive the probability of crises occurring someplace in the system, while local outcomes appear to be idiosyncratic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative research on Latin American welfare states recently has focused on the extension of non-contributory benefits to those outside the formal labor market. This extension of benefits constitutes a major break from past exclusionary welfare regimes. Yet there also are substantial areas of continuity, especially in the contributory social-insurance system that absorbs most of welfare budgets. We develop here a framework for studying changes in Latin American welfare states that reconciles these trends. We argue that Latin American governments enjoyed an “easy” stage of welfare expansions in the 2000s, characterized by distinct political coalitions. Bottom-targeted benefits could be layered on top of existing programs and provided to wide segments of the population. But many Latin American governments are nearing the exhaustion of this social-policy model. We explore policy and coalitional challenges that hinder moves to “hard” redistribution with case studies of unemployment insurance in Chile and housing in Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the determinants of social spending in Latin America during the period 1990-2012 and how they differed between the years of the Washington Consensus (1990-2000) and the period that followed (2001-2012). Special attention is also paid to the evaluation of convergence towards a common upper-bounded steady state (absolute beta convergence) or to specific steady states conditioned by their country's specific determinants (conditional beta convergence). We estimate a panel error-correction version of an autoregressive distributed lag model to identify the long-term relationships between social expenditure and its determinants. Generalised methods of moments estimators are used to control the endogeneity of the regressors. Results indicate that Latin American social spending follows a conditional beta convergence process over the Washington consensus period that was mainly driven by structural differences in fiscal burdens and external debt, while during the second period it was explained by conjunctural differences in the fiscal burden, GDP per capita and the growth of trade and capital openness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaders are assumed to face fiscal constraints on their ability to remain in office by competitively distributing public and/or private goods. However, many leaders can relax this constraint by borrowing on sovereign credit markets. This article argues that states with the fiscal flexibility offered by favorable credit terms have the resources necessary to (1) respond to citizen demands with policies other than widespread repression and (2) avoid agency loss that may result in unauthorized repression by state agents. Empirical analyses indicate that creditworthy states have greater respect for physical integrity rights and are less likely to suffer diminished respect for those rights when facing violent dissent or negative shocks to government revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effects of territorial government fragmentation on the quality of public services. We argue that an increase in the number of regional governments has two effects: (1) it redistributes fiscal and administrative resources to underserved regions and (2) encourages yardstick competition. Extreme government fragmentation, however, limits efficiency gains by reducing administrative capacity, economies of scale, and enabling capture. We test this argument using original data on the number of regional governments in sub-Saharan Africa (1960-2012). Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find robust evidence for an initial increase in the quality of services provision following regional government splits, which levels off at high levels of regional fragmentation. Three distinct difference-in-difference analyses of microlevel, georeferenced data on health outcomes in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda further support our theoretical argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do the member states of the world’s fourth-largest trading block incorporate only about two-thirds of all policies they adopt? This article argues that empty promises are an important reason for Mercosur’s incorporation problems and that Mercosur’s institutional design furthers such a defective behavior. Member governments easily sign agreements whenever they are rewarded for the mere act of doing so. However, if they expect high costs from implementing these policies, they try to avoid incorporation. Since only the last state to incorporate a policy triggers its overall legal validity, Mercosur’s members can easily veto any agreement ex post. In addition to empty promises, mismanaged drafting and incorporation and the abuse of negotiation power also pose important obstacles to incorporation. Free riding, however, does not play a role. Due to the incorporation rules, there can be no externalities that incentivize unilateral defection. The article substantiates the arguments empirically with the multivariate analysis of the complete incorporation record of 1,033 policies adopted between 1994 and 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed boom, known as the political business cycle. We challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the financial constraints faced by governments into an electoral framework. We argue theoretically that the extent of ownership dispersion among creditors has important effects for governments’ policy autonomy. Specifically, we contend that when highly indebted governments become more reliant on international bond markets—as opposed to traditional bank lending—politicians alter the way they respond to domestic constituents. In an econometric test of 16 Latin American countries, from 1961 to 2011, we show that financial decentralization breeds austerity. More specifically, we find that politicians exhibit more fiscal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through decentralized bond markets. Furthermore, we find this disciplining effect to be particularly strong during election periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many theories attempt to explain why some countries democratize and others do not. Existing accounts, however, focus almost exclusively on structural factors and ignore individual leaders. In this article, we argue that leaders educated at Western universities are more likely to democratize than other leaders because Western education socializes leaders to prefer democracy and creates transnational linkages that alter the strategic calculus of democratization. Utilizing an original data set on the specific colleges and universities world leaders attended, we show that Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively improve a country’s democratization prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effects of social spending on political participation and various forms of collective action conditioned on a state's level of respect for empowerment rights. It brings the language of rights to the more well-developed comparative study of voter turnout. I theorize that a state which spends more on social initiatives drives down economic and social barriers between individuals and the polls or participating in collective action. This increases the substantive use of rights guaranteed formally by the state. I find that spending helps most where rights are already respected. I also find that spending can negatively impact participatory democracy where these rights are less well established. Ultimately, I conclude that institutional strength has a greater effect on the substantive use of rights than social spending. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The race for the White House is at the top of the ticket, but voters will also choose more than 5,000 state legislators in November 2016. While voters elect and hold the president responsible for one job and state legislators for another, the outcomes of their elections are remarkably related. In analyses of elite and voter behavior in state legislative elections, I show that legislators affiliated with the president’s party—especially during unpopular presidencies—are the most likely to be challenged, and compared with individual assessments of the state legislature, changes in presidential approval have at least three times the impact on voters’ decision-making in state legislative elections. Thus, while state legislatures wield considerable policymaking power, legislators’ electoral fates appear to be largely out of their control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politics & Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An index of ethnic segregation conveys the extent of spatial mixing of ethnic groups, whereas an index of ethnic polarization and similar diversity measures show the overall balance between the groups. We present a game-theoretic model of conflict in which local success of one ethnic group encourages attacks by its co-ethnics in neighboring areas. Conditional on conflict breaking out, we find that for highly ethnically polarized societies, increasing ethnic segregation decreases the incidence and intensity of conflict. In contrast, in societies with low ethnic polarization, increasing segregation increases conflict. This is because segregation and polarization jointly determine the spread of conflict, an important channel that has been neglected previously. We find strong empirical support for model predictions in two very different conflicts: Hindu–Muslim riots in the 1980s and 1990s in India and the Bosnian Civil War from 1992 to 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the political and economic consequences of signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in authoritarian countries. Based on the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade and theories of inequality and regime transition, this paper argues that dictators sign PTAs as a means of consolidating their authoritarian rule. Specifically, PTAs help dictators reduce economic inequality by enriching poor laborers and thereby attenuating the threat of regime collapse. We support our theory with the data from seventy-odd authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 2006, and contribute to ongoing debates about the effects of both income inequality and economic globalization on autocratic resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advances an institutionalist perspective to address a subset of issues that led to the relative success of Brazil and the absolute failure of Argentina in confronting the financial crisis of the late 1990s. It adds to the literature on the politics of fiscal federalism, documenting that fiscal crises prompt policy responses whose effects are mediated by institutional choice and the broader political dynamics and the incentives both generate. By analysing the adoption of fiscal responsibility laws in two federal polities that had been challenged by similar financial and territorially induced constraints, it tentatively shows that success in containing subnational fiscal profligacy, which has been causally related to the national overall financial weakness to confront the late 1990s crises, is contingent upon the internalisation of the value of fiscal responsibility by subnational administrations. These findings suggest that prevailing views on subnational actors as debt-ridden and passive spectators of fiscal policies for which national governments had taken full responsibility should be reconsidered. Given favourable institutional incentives, subnational interests are not necessarily incompatible with national programmes of fiscal adjustment and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing countries are being confronted with severe fiscal challenges in the global economy. Over the last two decades, governments have been accepting significant reductions in trade taxes to support trade liberalization. This is particularly problematic for developing economies because trade taxes have been a key source of government revenues. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which international financial institutions (IFIs) successfully assist developing countries with recovering the lost revenue from trade liberalization by implementing various domestic tax reforms. We argue that regime type mediates the effectiveness of IFI assistance in developing economies, after trade reforms have been adopted. More specifically, IFIs will be more effective at assisting authoritarian regimes with domestic tax reforms as a substitute for trade taxes than they will be in poor democracies. Democratically elected leaders inadvertently undermine multilateral assistance with tax reforms because they are more susceptible to middle- and upper-class demands for lower taxes in a competitive global economy. In authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, IFIs such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund tend to be more effective because dictators are likely to experience far fewer political consequences for accepting IFI assistance and implementing tax reform in the global economy than their democratic counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Estudios Políticos is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article uses a representative sample of elections held in 80 countries (1992–2012) for a statistical analysis of societal and institutional factors of party system nationalization. The analysis demonstrates that high degrees of political decentralization, such as in federations and devolved states, exert a strong negative effect on party system nationalization. However, in the long-term federalism can accommodate highly nationalized party systems. Another factor that strongly contributes to party system nationalization is a high quality of democracy. The degrees to which different varieties of electoral rules support party system nationalization are associated with a lack of incentives for cultivating the personal vote. Countries with large populations and societies divided along linguistic and/or religious lines tend to have party systems that are less nationalized, but these factors are not as important as institutional determinants. The impact of some of the factors is mitigated by party system fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some ethnopolitical movements divided while others are relatively unified? A growing literature examines the consequences of internal divisions in ethnopolitical movements – and shows that it matters for a range of conflict outcomes – yet the mechanisms causing such divisions remain poorly understood. Our argument emphasizes competitive dynamics between states and self-determination movements and between rival factions within these movements as key determinants of fragmentation. Drawing from literatures on social movements, contentious politics, and civil war, we situate our argument vis-à-vis three alternative and complementary sets of explanations based on theories emphasizing transnational dimensions, political institutions, and structural factors within ethnopolitical groups. Using an original dataset, we test hypotheses explaining movement fragmentation over time and use a case study of Punjab in India to identify specific causal mechanisms and missing variables. Our findings show some support for three of these theories, suggesting that ethnopolitical movements divide as a result of complex and interactive processes. But our findings also underscore that central to explaining fragmentation dynamics are factors capturing competitive dynamics, including repression, accommodation of movement demands, the turn to violence, and the dynamic and changing nature of ethnopolitical demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people say that they trust local authorities, is it simply because they have generalized trust in national government? Or is trust in local government rooted in distinctive considerations, connected to the character of local communities and the balance of power across levels of government? We explore how trust in local and national government differs across individuals and across countries in western Europe. We find that people trust local government for different reasons than those that drive trust in national government. Cross-national differences in levels of trust in government reflect the character of national institutions. While both proportional representation systems and federal systems are power-sharing designs, each has distinctive consequences for trust. When opportunities for voice in local government are high, as in decentralized systems, people report greater trust in local government. When opportunities for voice in national government are limited, as in majoritarian systems, people report lower trust for national government and higher trust in local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses the unique role states play in the federal system and the constitutional issues surrounding their status. It reviews the causes and unpredictable outcomes of previous instances of state insolvency and considers the current fiscal health of states, giving a rough estimate of the liabilities they face and highlighting the main issues likely to affect their ability to meet future challenges. It reviews the recent debate over whether to create a formal procedure by which a state can restructure its liabilities, beginning with a review of Chapter 9 in the expectation that any new law to govern states will work in a similar manner. It also discusses two alternative avenues for handling insolvency: a federal bailout with or without conditions and a unilateral default similar to defaults that occurred in the distant past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange for developing economies. I argue that remittances, due to their compensation and insurance functions, will increase the general income level and economic security of recipients, thereby reducing their perceived income risk. Over time, this will dampen demand from recipients for government taxation and social insurance. Therefore, I expect increases in income remitted to an economy to result in reduced levels of social welfare transfers at the macro-level. This dynamic can help us to understand spending patterns in developing democracies, and the absence of demand for social security transfers in countries with high levels of inequality and economic insecurity. I test this argument with a sample of 18 Latin American states, over the period 1990 to 2009, and subject the central causal mechanism to a battery of statistical tests. The results of these tests provide strong support for this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past decade, Islamic Financial Institutions substantially increased their market share in Turkey, and demonstrated an impressive growth rate. In promoting this sector, Turkish entrepreneurs also make a moral claim, suggesting that their profit motivations are justified by a religious concern because wealth generated through halal means indirectly helps out the poor and the needy. Yet, though these entrepreneurs frequently invoke religious morals to justify their strategies, Islamic banks appear only occasionally engaged in systematic acts of charitable giving. Why do conventional banks in Turkey engage more systematically with social welfare-related philanthropy projects while their Islamic counterparts seem less interested in similar activities? The article brings state back in and finds that this variation is an unintended consequence of the current government's social policy reforms. After election into office in 2002, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) promoted greater private involvement in public goods provision in return for offering economic privileges to partisan business groups – including Islamic banks. During this process, the government encouraged religious business groups to work with faith-based NGOs and local government agencies, capitalizing on existing partisan and solidarity networks to increase political returns. Consequently, while Islamic banks rely on religious associations and channel their contribution through Islamic charity NGOs that command a broader geographic outreach in collaboration withlocalgovernment actors, conventional banks that are not part of similar societal networks either carry out independent corporate philanthropy schemes or collaborate with national government agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Do crises really lead to more institutional reforms? This paper explores the connection between financial crises and one type of reform frequently advocated during the recent global financial crisis, namely, fiscal institutional reforms. Some authors expect that crises lead to reforms, but we demonstrate that the relationship is not so straightforward. Using a data set of Latin American countries that experienced several crises and also several periods of reform in the period from 1990 to 2005, we find that the type of crisis and its duration matter. We argue that reforms are less likely during a banking crisis, whereas fiscal crises are most likely to lead to fiscal reforms. This means that the type of economic crisis is important for explaining the likelihood of reforms. We explore other possible explanations for reform, such as the partisanship of the president and whether a country is under an IMF program, and do not find confirming evidence for alternative explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This article shows that the institutional design of Argentine federalism allows for differences in the protective scope of the provincial domestic violence laws. It holds that the broad legislative capacities of subnational districts enable the working of political and social local factors, which, in turn, determine heterogeneity in these laws' protective scope. It analyzes, compares, and measures 37 laws on domestic violence sanctioned between 1992 and 2009. It advances a methodology to measure their differences and it evaluates the impact local factors have on legal variations across jurisdictions. The article shows that the protective scope of these laws is determined by the intensity of the local electoral competition and by the strength of women's organizational capacity. Results also show that time matters insofar as it allows for the diffusion of more protective laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais is the property of DADOS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)