Search

The article discusses ignorance and organization studies, both as a topic of study and a basic problem of organization theory understood as design theory. How should we regard knowledge not yet known? Is the development of knowledge a straightforward illumination of a defined box, or does knowledge also have a dark side, growing even faster than the illuminated side? In this article, we propose that more extended research into ignorance in organization studies is needed. And since ignorance is a product of inattention, we draw on Herbert Simon’s investigation into the science of the artificial. Among the topics we explore are unpredictable environments, the interface between inner and outer environments, vagueness and unspecified ignorance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automotive remanufacturing companies are nowadays facing a wide range of challenges. Typical challenges from the point of view of suppliers, producers and customers. Several process steps are analysed and problem fields are dissected: From the core management, to disassembly and cleaning to machining and testing. The main fields of challenges analysed in this paper are: the vagueness in respect of fiscal value, environmental regulations and taxation of core parts, the important need for a continuing qualification of staff and engineers, an efficient core management, the adaption of pricing models and the competence to handle the growing variety and complexity. The focus of this analysis lies on activities of the independent after-market (IAM) for remanufactured products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the time of a killing concerns exactly when and where to locate our actions. It is a problem for many of our actions beyond killing, and there are versions of the problem that can be raised no matter where your theory locates actions in particular. To answer the problem, I claim that we should be guided to the referent of ‘the killing’ by examining the definition of ‘to kill.’ Once we have the correct definition, we can see that there are several candidate events that might be the referent of ‘the killing,’ but that the definition does not determine which of them is the referent. So, I argue that it is indeterminate or vague which event is ‘the killing.’ This solution is general across many action verbs, appeals to a minimally controversial type of vagueness, avoids the unintuitive results of views that determinately locate killings, and is compatible with different views about the location of actions. In the concluding section, I show how appealing to vagueness is distinct from and superior to appealing to ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Image fusion is the process of combining the properties of two images into one single image that will show the features of both the images. There are various methods available in the literature to fuse the images. In this paper, an intuitionistic fuzzy logic-based image fusion approach has been implemented for medical images that firstly suppresses the noise and enhances the input images, and merges them efficiently in Hue-Saturation-Intensity domain. Here, enhancement is included because these input images are not always well contrasted and may contain some noise due to the inherent properties of the modalities used for capturing the images. The intuitionistic fuzzy sets are incorporated to handle uncertainties that are often due to vagueness and ambiguity. The results certify that this method significantly improves the output fused image than the image obtained by existing technique both visually and metrically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the accuracy-based arguments for epistemic norms for credences related to the book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence." Topics discussed include specification of the legitimate measures of inaccuracy and mathematical theorem; philosopher Jim Joyce's on epistemic norm; and literature on the semantics of vague predicates.

Copyright of Análisis Filosófico is the property of Sociedad Argentina de Analisis Filosofico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the “dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory, that is, the thesis that the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. Lately, several philosophers have argued against this idea. In this paper I want to push this line of reasoning further by exploiting the hyper-Russellian scenario against the A-theory of time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the rapid growth in the scale and complexity of information networks, self-organizing systems are increasingly being used to realize novel network control systems that are highly scalable, adaptable, and robust. However, the uncertainty of information (with regard to incompleteness, vagueness, and dynamics) in self-organizing systems makes it difficult for them to work appropriately in accordance with the network state. In this study, we apply a model of the collective decision-making of animal groups to enable self-organizing control mechanisms to adapt to information uncertainty. Specifically, we apply a mathematical model of collective decision-making that is known as the effective leadership model (ELM). In the ELM, informed individuals (those who are experienced or well-informed) take the role of leading the others. In contrast, uninformed individuals (those who perceive only local information) follow neighboring individuals. As a result of the collective behavior of informed/uninformed individuals, the animal group achieves consensus. We consider a self-organizing control mechanism using potential-based routing with an optimal control, and propose a mechanism for determining a data-packet forwarding scheme based on the ELM. Through evaluation by simulation, we show that, in a situation in which the perceived information is incomplete and dynamic, nodes can forward data packets in accordance with the network state by applying the ELM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness (at least those who take a broadly Williamsonian line) should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it takes for a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis‐Sider argument from vagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non‐obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument from vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Die Ausgewanderten (1992), W. G. Sebald frames the act of storytelling in a way that draws on and reappropriates nineteenth-century narrative traditions, in particular the frame constructions typical of the German Novelle with which Sebald was familiar. Sebald portrays his narrator not only as a storyteller, but also as a witness, collector of stories, and reader of documents. This is a framing technique already utilized in the nineteenth century, sometimes to assert believability and authenticity, but also to reveal ironically the ambiguity and fragility of seemingly authentic stories. By using photographs and a seemingly autobiographical style, Sebald follows in this tradition in order to represent twentieth-century loss and tragedy, as well as to test the limits of this form of representation for life stories that revolve around death, loss, and the tension between capturing and erasing memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to discuss vagueness of denominal adjectives in English in their qualitative usage. Semantic indeterminacy will be illustrated for selected denominal adjectives with the suffix -ial, focusing on the lexeme professorial. The range of the qualitative senses of such adjectives will be exemplified by sentences culled from COCA and other linguistic corpora. It will be argued that typicality effects (as discussed by Lakoff 1987) are relevant to the identification (and flexibility) of meanings of denominal adjectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two options are 'incommensurate' when neither is better than the other, but they are not equally good. Typically, we will say that one option is better in some ways, and the other in others, but neither is better 'all things considered'. It is tempting to think that incommensurability is vagueness - that it is (perhaps) indeterminate which is better - but this 'vagueness view' of incommensurability has not proven popular. I set out the vagueness view and its implications in more detail, and argue that it can explain most of the puzzling features of incommensurability. This argument proceeds without appeal to John Broome's 'collapsing principle'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden's strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reflects on depictions of islands in two novels by the Austrian author Raoul Schrott (born 1964): his first novel, Finis Terrae: Manuscripts, from 1995, and the later Tristan da Cunha or Half of the Earth from 2003. I argue that Schrott's concepts and explorations of islands strongly influence the presentation and organisation of his texts. Finis Terrae and Tristan da Cunha exhibit distinctly different concepts of the insular. Whereas the earlier text accentuates a frail, fragmented, and almost mythical condition, the later novel Tristan evokes a plethora of Western topoi about islands and heavily relies on dualities. In both cases, island concepts are also reflected in narrative gestures: oppositions are central to interpreting and analysing Tristan da Cunha, and Finis Terrae revolves around fragmentation, vagueness, and loss. Islands are thus not only objects in the texts--they also determine the design and structure of the texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sorensen (1985) has argued that one can exploit the vagueness of an ordinary predicate like 'small' to induce a sort of vagueness in 'vague', by constructing a series of predicates of the form 'n-small', where x is n-small if and only if x is small or x < n. The resulting 'Sorensen'ed' predicates present a Sorites case for 'vague' ('1-small' is vague; if 'n-small' is vague, so is 'n+1-small'; therefore, '106-small' is vague); hence the vagueness of 'vague'. Hyde (1994) argues that this demonstrates that all vague predicates are higher-order vague. Others doubt whether Sorensen's series really delivers such a result, claiming Hyde's argument to be either: unsound, because it misidentifies the true source of vagueness in Sorensen's Sorites (Deas 1989, Hull 2005); invalid, because it fails to generalize to all vague predicates (Tye 1994); or circular, because it presupposes the very thing it tries to prove, namely, higher-order vagueness (Varzi 2003, 2005). This paper contributes to the Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi debate by clarifying the relations between vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness. I show how claims of higher-order vagueness are derivable from claims of vague vagueness (but not vice versa). This is the missing piece needed to complete Hyde's argument and overcome the objections presented by Deas, Hull, Tye, and Varzi. I then show how Sorensen's considerations, once properly generalized, pose more far-reaching consequences about the vagueness of 'vague' than either defenders or critics of Hyde's argument have appreciated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From Fine and Kamp in the 70's-through Osherson and Smith in the 80's, Williamson, Kamp and Partee in the 90's and Keefe in the 00's-up to Sauerland in the present decade, the objection continues to be run that fuzzy logic based theories of vagueness are incompatible with ordinary usage of compound propositions in the presence of borderline cases. These arguments against fuzzy theories have been rebutted several times but evidently not put to rest. I attempt to do so in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one's lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which are often (if not always) vague to some degree. I show that by combining the two models into one model, and understanding that model as a model of vague credence, a natural interpretation arises that suggests a hypothesis concerning how we can improve the accuracy of aggregate credences. I present empirical results in support of this hypothesis. I also discuss how this modeling interpretation of imprecise probabilities bears upon a philosophical objection that has been raised against them, the so-called inductive learning problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the idea that vague predicates like 'tall', 'loud' or 'expensive' are applied based on a process of analog magnitude representation, whereby magnitudes are represented with noise. I present a probabilistic account of vague judgment, inspired by early remarks from E. Borel on vagueness, and use it to model judgments about borderline cases. The model involves two main components: probabilistic magnitude representation on the one hand, and a notion of subjective criterion. The framework is used to represent judgments of the form ' x is clearly tall' versus ' x is tall', as involving a shift of one's criterion, and then to derive observed patterns of acceptance for borderline contradictions, namely sentences of the form ' x is tall and not tall', relative to the acceptance of their conjuncts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction provides some background to the contributions to this volume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This move allows to formally model probability and probability relations in essentially the same way as value and value relations. One of the advantages of the model is that we get a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilities, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between different types of incommensurability. It also becomes possible to draw a clear distinction between incommensurability and vagueness (indeterminacy) in probability comparisons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a new approach to the logic and semantics of vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We derive a probabilistic account of the vagueness and context-sensitivity of scalar adjectives from a Bayesian approach to communication and interpretation. We describe an iterated-reasoning architecture for pragmatic interpretation and illustrate it with a simple scalar implicature example. We then show how to enrich the apparatus to handle pragmatic reasoning about the values of free variables, explore its predictions about the interpretation of scalar adjectives, and show how this model implements Edgington's (Analysis 2:193-204,1992, Keefe and Smith (eds.) Vagueness: a reader, 1997) account of the sorites paradox, with variations. The Bayesian approach has a number of explanatory virtues: in particular, it does not require any special-purpose machinery for handling vagueness, and it is integrated with a promising new approach to pragmatics and other areas of cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of higher-order vagueness is usually associated with conceptions of vagueness that focus on the existence of borderline cases. What sense can be made of it within a conception of vagueness that focuses on tolerance instead? A proposal is offered here. It involves understanding 'definitely' not as a sentence operator but as a predicate modifier, and more precisely as an intensifier, that is, an operator that shifts the predicate extension along a scale. This idea is combined with the author's earlier approach to the semantics of vague expressions, which builds on the idea of a central gap associated with a predicate. The central gap approach is generalized to handle arbitrarily many iterations of 'definitely'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A framework of degrees of belief, or credences, is often advocated to model our uncertainty about how things are or will turn out. It has also been employed in relation to the kind of uncertainty or indefiniteness that arises due to vagueness, such as when we consider ' a is F' in a case where a is borderline F. How should we understand degrees of belief when we take into account both these phenomena? Can the right kind of theory of the semantics of vagueness help us answer this? Nicholas J.J. Smith defends a unified account, according to which 'degree of belief is expected truth-value'; this builds on his Degree Theory of vagueness that offers an account of the semantics and logic of vagueness in terms of degrees of truth. I argue that his account fails. Degree theories of vagueness do not help us understand degrees of belief and, I argue, we shouldn't expect a theory of vagueness to yield a detailed uniform story about this. The route from the semantics to psychological states needn't be straightforward or uniform even before we attempt to combine vagueness with probabilistic uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vagueness is an extremely common feature of natural language, but does it actually play a positive, efficiency enhancing, role in communication? Adopting a probabilistic interpretation of vague terms, we propose that vagueness might act as a source of randomness when deciding what to assert. In this context we investigate the efficacy of multiple sender channels in which senders choose assertions stochastically according to vague definitions of the relevant words, and a receiver then aggregates the different signals. These vague channels are then compared with Boolean channels in which assertions are selected deterministically based on classical (crisp) definitions. We show that given a sufficient number of senders, a linear stochastic channel outperforms Boolean channels when performance is measured by the expected squared error between the actual value described by the senders and the receiver's estimate of it based on the signals they receive. The number of senders required for vague channels to be at least as accurate as Boolean channels is shown to be a decreasing function of the size of the language i.e. the number of description labels available to the senders. Vague channels are then shown to be robust to transmission error provided the error rate is not too large. In addition, we investigate the behaviour of both Boolean and vague channels for a parametrised family of distributions on the input values. Finally, we consider optimal vague channels assuming a fixed number of senders and show that, provided there are more than two senders, a vague channel can be found that outperforms the optimal Boolean channel. In this context, we show that for channels with relatively low numbers of senders S-curve production functions are optimal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Lotfi A. Zadeh introduced the concept of fuzzy sets in 1965, many authors have devoted their efforts to the study of these new sets, both from a theoretical and applied point of view. Fuzzy sets were later extended in order to get more adequate and flexible models of inference processes, where uncertainty, imprecision or vagueness is present. Type 2 fuzzy sets comprise one of such extensions. In this paper, we introduce and study an extension of the fuzzy numbers (type 1), the type 2 generalized fuzzy numbers and type 2 fuzzy numbers. Moreover, we also define a partial order on these sets, which extends into these sets the usual order on real numbers, which undoubtedly becomes a new option to be taken into account in the existing total preorders for ranking interval type 2 fuzzy numbers, which are a subset of type 2 generalized fuzzy numbers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate 'phenomenally conscious': for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to the familiar claim that zombies are conceivable, and I argue that this claim entails that there can be no positive characterizations of borderline cases of 'phenomenally conscious'. By the Positive Characterization Thesis, it follows that 'phenomenally conscious' can not have any borderline cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present a modification of the scale-based framework of Sauerland & Stateva (2007, 2011) for modelling granularity--more precisely, of the so called granularity functions. Briefly, a granularity function maps a degree of a scale to an interval containing it such that the points within that interval are mutually indistinguishable. The proposed modification is a generalisation of the original framework suited for application in a wider range of domains, and it also fares better in overcoming some formal problems in modelling granularity-sensitive phenomena and vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin's second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal powerconferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Boolean many-valued approach to vagueness is similar to the infinite-valued approach embraced by fuzzy logic in the respect in which both approaches seek to solve the problems of vagueness by assigning to the relevant sentences many values between falsity (or 0) and truth (or 1), but while the fuzzy-logic approach postulates linearly-ordered values (or 'degrees') between 0 and 1, the Boolean approach assigns to sentences values in a many-element (including infinite-element) complete Boolean algebra. On the modal-precisificational approach represented by Kit Fine, if a (vague) sentence is indeterminate in truth value in some world (possibly the actual world), it is taken to be true in one precisified world accessible from that world and false in another. This paper points to a way to unify these two approaches to vagueness by showing that Fine's version of the modal-precisificational approach can be combined with the Boolean many-valued approach instead of supervaluationism, one of the most popular approaches to vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Comparative Literature / Primerjalna Književnost is the property of Slovenian Comparative Literature Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This is a paper about the nature of metaphysical laws and their relation to the phenomenon of vagueness. Metaphysical laws are introduced as analogous to natural laws, and metaphysical indeterminism is modeled on causal indeterminacy. This kind of indeterminacy is then put to work in developing a novel theory of vagueness and a solution to the sorites paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of the ongoing trend in literary and cultural studies to "contextualize" objects of study in relation to other material and for a certain purpose, the paper examines the notion of context in literary studies 1.) froma disciplinary point of viewand 2.) fromthe vantage point of the analytical topic of borderline vagueness and its (implicit) treatment in Peircean semiotics. After showing that the notion of context does not lack any sharpness of definition, and, therefore, cannot be any further clarified, it is argued that the persistent methodological shortcomings of contextualization are due to the inherent vagueness of the phenomenon of context itself. Any perceived uncertainty about correct procedures of contextualization is neither a matter of increase in precision nor of quantitative considerations, but the result of a fundamental indecisiveness rooted in the phenomenon of context. It is consequently best dealt with by an appeal to generality, understood in terms of Peircean semiotics as the further reduction of interdisciplinary and intersubjective boundaries. Borderline vagueness proper involves a lack of communication (and isolation of research), which is why the paper argues against any such psychologism and for the application of stricter procedures of semiotic generalization to any given approach to interpretation and terminological work in literary and cultural studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vagueness-based approach to the mass/count distinction was developed in Chierchia (2010). Liebesman (2015) argues against Chierchia's proposal developing four arguments against it. He furthermore tries to make a case that regardless of the details of C's proposal no vagueness-based account of the distinction is viable. In this paper I show that Liebesman's arguments against C don't go through and that a line of investigation on the mass count contrast in terms of vagueness is not only viable but also perhaps a source of insight on the nature of this much debated distinction and on the relations between grammar and metaphysics in general. The outcome of the present discussion is of interest beyond the question of who is right in this debate, as it puts into sharper focus several issues pertaining to mass vs. count, plural vs. singular, and the role of vagueness in natural language semantics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a 'vague object': it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn't make up our mind what the expression 'Kilimanjaro' applies to that we can truthfully say such things as 'It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro'. After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation- multiple reference-capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid development of natural scientific methods coupled with the recent popularity of new materialist philosophies in archaeological theory has raised discussion about the possibility of a return to empiricism in archaeology. While empiricism as a pragmatic philosophy is in line with archaeology’s hands-on character, the recent development has left some concerned about the vanishing role of vagueness and ambiguity in archaeological interpretation. In this setting, the exactitude of natural scientific methods is seen as a process of simplification that compromises the tacit dimensions of archaeological knowledge. This article discusses vagueness as an elementary part of all archaeological knowledge formation, with a particular emphasis on the role of perception and senses in finds analysis. Archaeological finds analysis is explored as an example of epistemologically vague and creative hypothesis formation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The problem of vagueness is arguably one of the most discussed topics in modern analytic philosophy and logic. The idea to use many-valued logic when trying to model vagueness of natural languages was one of the first attempt to construct a formal theory of vagueness. But recently other theories (for example, supervaluationism) took the center stage. The purpose of these article is to analyze the interpretation of vagueness and resolution of the problem of vagueness by three–valued and degree theories, as well as to analyze the prospects of many-valued theories as adequate theories of vagueness. Also in the focus of the article was the problem of higher-order vagueness and its reflection in many-valued theories as it constitutes one of the main hurdles for the project of constructing a formal theory of vagueness in general and many-valued theory of vagueness in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It's not clear what supervaluationists should say about propositional content. Does a vague sentence, e.g., 'Harry is bald', express one proposition, or a barrage of propositions, or none at all? Or is the matter indeterminate? The supervaluationist canon is not decisive on the issue; authoritative passages can be cited in favor of each of the proposals just mentioned. Furthermore, some detractors have argued that supervaluationism is incapable of providing any coherent account of propositional content. This paper considers each of the proposals for how many propositions are expressed by a vague sentence: none, some, all, or it's indeterminate. Most of these proposals turn out to be unworkable in the metalanguage. I conclude that orthodox supervaluationists-those who identify truth with supertruth-must either relax the standard requirement that propositions be bivalent, or else alter the standard relation between sentences and propositions in which a sentence inherits its truth-conditions from the proposition it expresses. The best option going forward for the orthodox supervaluationist is perhaps the most surprising-amend the requirement that propositions be bivalent. I argue that propositions having supervaluational truth-conditions are best suited to fill the propositional roles in the semantic theory of a vague language. These propositions admit of truth-value gaps, and gappy propositions are controversial, but I argue that they earn their keep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is discussed in the present paper is the assumption concerning a human narrowed sense of perception of external world and, resulting from this, a basically approximate nature of concepts that are to portray it. Apart from the perceptual vagueness, other types of vagueness are also discussed, involving both the nature of things, indeterminacy of linguistic expressions and psycho-sociological conditioning of discourse actions in one language and in translational contexts. The second part of the paper discusses the concept of conceptual and linguistic resemblance (similarity, equivalence) and discourse approximating strategies and proposes a Resemblance Matrix, presenting ways used to narrow the approximation gap between the interacting parties in monolingual and translational discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The approach of fuzzy multivariate analysis models to handling errors in a sample is similar to that of statistical models. However, it is not assumed that a possibility grade may include vagueness. Possibility distribution is exhibited by an interval model by its intervals. When a possibility degree is defined by a triangular membership function, degrees are defined by the relationship between a sample and the model. Furthermore, the shape of a model is defined by samples. Therefore, it is natural to consider that vagueness is included in a possibility grade. In this study, assuming that vagueness is included in a possibility grade, we construct a fuzzy regression model to remove distortion from the data distribution. By controlling the vagueness of a grade using numerical examples generated by random numbers, it was possible to eliminate the distortion of models. In numerical examples, since the model was able to adjust vagueness, the result is reported. In addition to the obtained models, models obtained by changing samples to an outlier are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses in concept of vagueness in philosophical context. It is said that vagueness and precision alike are characteristics that have to do with the relation between a representation and that which it represents. Vagueness is a feature of representations, or a feature of language or thought.