Search

Copyright of All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace is the property of Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation, Center for Foreign Policy & Peace Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ictimaiyat is the property of Ictimaiyat and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Turkey's foreign policy in the first decade after the collapse of the bipolar system retained features of its continuity in comparison with the Cold War: the Kemalist principles of laicism and the choice in favor of further Westernization, with its orientation towards cooperation with the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures remained firmly in place. However, the post-bipolar period demonstrated a significant change in Turkey's foreign policy. The existing explanations for this phenomenon often start either from the appeal to the Islamic identity of the Justice and Development Party as the main reason for the changes, or from the approaches that prioritize Turkey's economic interests and emphasize Turkey's attempts to strengthen economic interdependence with neighbors in the region. Given the increasing complexity of the domestic and foreign policy nexus and the increasingly fluid characteristics of the international environment, it seems that an analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the post-bipolar period requires an alternative conceptual and methodological approach that allows the changes in Turkey's foreign policy to be viewed along three dimensions. In this article, the author resorts to just such an approach. It includes the study of domestic policy, the international context and the transformation of the ideological and institutional support of foreign policy. This approach makes it possible to explain the logic of Turkey's «sudden» reorientation from cooperation with the EU and Western countries in general to attempts to consolidate its leading role in the Middle East and establish itself as a regional hegemon in relation to situational alliances with various state and non-state actors in the broader international context.

The paper analyses the phenomenon of populism and its impact on Turkish foreign policy in three dimensions: institutional, instrumental and ideological. The research scrutinizes a wide selection of party manifestos and public speeches of Turkish politicians with primarily focus on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements during his incumbency as the prime-minister and the president. The embeddedness of populism in political culture of Turkey provided it with ideological flexibility and made populism almost a universal instrument for engaging with electorate. Starting from Turkey’s transition to multiparty system the majority of political actors have resorted to populism in one or another way. Erdoğan has not only continued this tendency but mastered the populist rhetoric. The character and content of Erdoğan’s populism fluctuated following the changing domestic and international environment. In the 2000s it was hinged on the loose concept of conservative democracy. At the turn of the 2000s and 2010s the dreams for the EU membership gave way to ideas of ‘civilizational expansionism’ which had the concept of Islamic/Ottoman civilization as its core. From the mid-2010s ultra nationalism has come to the forefront of the populist rhetoric. Eventually, the populist binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘they’ took a definite shape of global confrontation between Turkey as a defender of Islam and the ‘adverse’ West. Populist rhetoric helped Erdoğan to justify his almost two-decades-long incumbency and evade direct responsibility for economic hardships of the 2010s. Populism has become an effective instrument to monopolize the foreign policy in the hands of Erdoğan. Utilizing negative rhetoric against Turkish professional diplomats within the last decade Erdoğan has managed to cement his clout over the foreign-policy making. Institutionally the expansion of populism in the sphere of foreign policy led to its ‘domestication’ and ‘nationalization’ while its impact on the foreign policy discourse manifested itself in the spread of civilizationism. Making both domestic and foreign policy process more personalized Erdoğan has reinforced ‘personal authoritarianism’ at the expense of the state institutions. Thus their decline led to the ‘Erdoğanization of the Turkish politics’. The declarative pursuit of Turkey to get more independent and autonomous position in the international system resulted in the strategy of development with primarily focus on the bilateral relations with different states. Consequently Turkey, previously known as a consistent advocate of regional cooperation and integration, in many respects has become a regionally isolated state.

State identity not only defines how elite decision-makers, as well as the informed public, identify their governmental affiliation but also informs the actions of the policymakers in the conduct of their foreign policy. There are numerous studies dealing with the role of ideas, identity and norms in international relations by scholars belonging to the constructivist school of thought in International Relations Theory. This study purports to offer such a constructivist analysis of Turkish foreign policy behaviour based on the gradual change of Kemalist state identity from a secular Western-oriented identity to that of a religious-based affiliation under the current Justice and Development Party (2002-2020). While realist variables are significant for explicating major events of Republican Turkey, such as its alignment with the United States after World War II, Turkey’s policy decisions towards Cyprus and the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union cannot be explained by purely materialist factors. For an adequate understanding of these policies, we need to resort to analytical eclecticism employing both realist and constructivist variables for a more sophisticated analysis of Turkey’s foreign relations. When it comes to the JDP government, however, constructivist variables trump realist explanations as Turkish foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, has been clouded and shaped by an Islamically-framed Weltanschauung.

After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party evoked the 'glory' of the Ottoman past, seeking to expand Turkey's cultural sphere of influence to the former territories of the Ottoman Empire – a phenomenon commonly referred to as neo-Ottomanism. While neo-Ottomanism is generally discussed as a component of foreign policy, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's (TIKA) intervention in the heritage dynamics of foreign countries was intimately linked with domestic policies. This paper discusses how neo-Ottomanist policies selectively created transnational heritage sites, and how these sites have dialectically become instruments of domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains Turkey's hard power usage in Syria, Azerbaijan, and Libya. We argue that gaining a respected status forms the basis of Turkish foreign policy and the main cause of Turkey's hard power usage was the failure of Turkey's previous status-seeking strategy. Turkey had followed a cooperationist strategy since the early 1990s by pursuing membership in the EU, strengthening ties with the West, and leading regional mediation efforts. However, this strategy failed due to the changing the security environment in the early 2010s and the discord between the interests of West and Turkey. This led Turkey to be more prone to using hard power, through which Turkey could achieve status and influence in multiple regions. This study provides an insight into the status-seeking strategies of Turkey, as an emerging middle power, by unpacking its priorities and contributes to the ongoing debates on Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish foreign policy has undergone a distinctive transformation in the last two decades, placing a greater emphasis on trade relations with her neighbours, which had previously been beyond the scope of Turkish foreign policy. In this respect, Turkey's relations with Russia improved dramatically due to strong trade relations, which not only contributed to the development of these countries but also resulted in peace-inducing effects. This study aims to highlight and analyse the role of economic interests and gains in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy from a political economic perspective. The study suggests that economic interests brought Turkey and Russia together, making hostilities less likely among the two countries. We make also policy recommendations, which take peculiarities of Russia into consideration in order to highlight further gains in trade relations with this country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Recent Period Turkish Studies / Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları is the property of Recent Period Turkish Studies / Yakin Donem Turkiye Arastirmalari and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Alternative Politics / Alternatif Politika is the property of Alternatif Politika and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the mid-2000s, Turkey’s almost forgotten and invisible Africa-rooted Turkish citizens, the Afro-Turks, have come to the surface. Because of their small number, they have never been conspicuous before. However, since 2003, with Turkey’s opening to Africa policy, they have become much more discernable in the Turkish public sphere with festivals and activities. Ankara has also officially supported their activities financially and technically. This article argues that there is a strong link between their emergence as an ethnic minority in Turkey and Ankara’s assertive Africa policy to deepen relations with the continent. The case of Afro-Turks indicates that when foreign policy inclination is matched with domestic policy, even a tiny minority can become more discernable and visible in the political arena.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, extensive academic research has echoed one popular opinion, 'Turkey is back to the Balkans'. These studies have been scrutinizing the complicated role of Turkey in the Balkans, usually drawing upon the use of soft power by the former. This impact in the region remained intact during the 2010s, although the overall Turkish foreign policy in the 2010s has been highly securitized and de-Europeanized, losing its soft power character that had been its trademark starting from the early 2000s. In this regard, this paper aims to decipher different dimensions of Turkey's foreign policy in the Balkans through a more general exploration of the de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy in the 2010s. Through more than 80 semi-structured interviews, which were conducted between 2016–2020, with political actors, diplomats, religious leaders, scholars and journalists in Turkey and the Balkans, we address the question of whether the divergence of Turkish foreign policy from a soft power perspective and its concomitant de-Europeanization tendency had been crystallized in its policy towards the Balkans within the context of the 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ataturk Yolu Journal / Atatürk Yolu Dergisi is the property of Ataturk Yolu Journal / Ataturk Yolu Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines at what level Turkish foreign policy of late years is being implemented. It aims to delineate that contrary to the regional level policy in the first decade of the 2000s, a differentiated foreign policy is being pursued at the global level aiming to increase Turkish marine research activities at the two poles. Getting involved in science diplomacy in recent years, Turkey plans to strengthen its power capacity and evaluate it at the global level. Thus, in this paper, it is concluded that Turkey's involvement in both the Arctic and Antarctic signifies that its foreign policy target is no more limited to regional dynamics. Significant paces in the two poles could be best understood via its foreign policy at the global level. Moreover, Turkey's involvement in science diplomacy in parallel with polar engagement strengthens its power capacity on behalf of the global level. Consequently, it is asserted that Turkish foreign policy has been in transition from regional to global standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many scholars working on Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s, Italy is taken as the greatest threat to the newly-established Republic and one that dominated Turkish foreign policy making in this period. Italy did adopt a threating stance with the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese islands and its expansionist aims in Asia and Africa, which were a cause of concern for the Turkish government. A re-examination of the Turkish-Italian political and economic relations within the broader context of the Mediterranean and the great power politics of the period, however, demonstrates that the bilateral relations, at least officially, functioned without any significant and lasting crisis until the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939. What motivated and drove Turkish thinking and decision-making in the international arena was not Italy's actions per se but the insecurity in the Mediterranean and beyond of which Italy was a part. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of developing Turkey-Africa relations began with the 1998 African Action Plan. In the following period, relations intensified with the 2005 declaration as the Year of Africa as a result of changes in Turkish foreign policy. Since 2008, Turkish-African relations have reached high levels. In 2011, Somalia, where state authority could not be established after 1991 and the first famine of the 21st century was experienced, has become one of the important areas of action of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey-Somalia relations started with the focus of humanitarian diplomacy and the process has reached a stage where soft power tools are applied within public diplomacy and included in the state building process. In this article, Turkey’s Somalia policy has been assessed by taking into account Turkey’s activities in Somalia since 2011. Turkey’s activities in Somalia were conceptualized as the Turkey Assistance Model, and it was seen that Turkey is the most successful actor in Somalia in terms of humanitarian diplomacy, according to Somalians and many researchers. At the same time, it was found that Turkey’s positive image in the eyes of Somalians grants Ankara a range of taking actions that no other actor in Somalia has. It was found that what is required to achieve peace and establish state authority is to deepen and continue these activities. In the study, press reports, policy-makers’ statements, academic books, articles and reports on the activities of Turkish institutions operating in Somalia were used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Strategic Review / Przeglad Strategiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies (EJPSS) is the property of Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies (EJPSS) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article aims to examine and explore with pros and cons of High-Level (“Strategic”) Cooperation Councils (HLSCC) mechanisms in Turkish foreign policy and evaluate its effectiveness in foreign trade, foreign policy cooperation, and crisis management capacity of Turkey concerning the relations with Russia. Turkey has already started to establish High-Level Cooperation Councils to build institutional infrastructure for strategic partnerships in foreign policy and strengthen institutional power in the bilateral cooperation after 2006. The study of Turkish foreign policy is an academically attractive topic mostly in terms of its geopolitical dimensions. The institutional mechanisms that enable the country to interact with other states in a dynamic regional and international environment remain less researched heretofore. The article attempts to highlight the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in terms of institutional changes in the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The article applies a case study method with descriptive analysis examining Councils’ functions such as foreign policy coordination and determination of collective commitments and official bilateral targets in the case of Russia - Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council. The article found out that these institutional mechanisms partly justified themselves as a coordination mechanism, but they were relatively weak for achieving the pledged commitments. The Councils were flexible and innovative cooperation mechanisms of the foreign policy to develop bilateral and multilateral ties in the age of the global power restructuring and the volatile conjuncture in world politics.

1923 tarihli Lozan Barış Antlaşması’yla birlikte yeni Türk devletinin sınırları büyük ölçüde belirlenmişti. Ancak Irak’la olan sınırın belirlenmesi sonraki bir tarihe bırakılmıştı. Suriye sınırı ise fiilen son şeklini almamıştı. Bu çalışmada bu iki devletin yanı sıra İran ile Türkiye’nin 1923-1940 yılları arasındaki sınır ilişkileri ele alınmıştır. Bu ilişkilerin seyrini etkileyen en önemli hususlar Türkiye ile sınırların çizilmesinin gecikmesi, Irak ve Suriye’de kurulan İngiliz ve Fransız mandater yönetimlerin Türkiye aleyhtarı politikalarının yanı sıra devrin ve bölgenin kendine özgü koşullarıdır. Çalışma sonunda görülmüştür ki komşuluk ilişkilerinin düzelmesi ve alınan diğer tedbirlerle birlikte sınırlarda emniyet ve huzur ortamı sağlanabilmiştir.

The author examines the demonstrations carried out by university students in Istanbul on December 4, 1945 and the raid on the printing operations of the pro-Soviet Tan newspaper, known as the Tan Raid, in light of U.S. State Department documents, namely the related fi les in National Archives Records Administration. The infl uence of the Tan Raid on Turkey’s international relations is discussed in the context of Turkish-American and Turkish-Soviet relations. The Raid is regarded as a signifi cant incident since it coincides with the post WW2 period when Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union had already deteriorated due to Moscow’s demands to revise the Montreux Convention by 19th of March 1945. Furthermore, Turkish-American diplomatic contacts in the aftermath of the Raid show Washington’s perspective on policy towards Soviet Union, as U.S. offi cials advised a moderate line to their Turkish counterparts. On the other hand, preparations for the Raid seem highly controversial since Turkish government offi cials did not strongly condemn the event and the police did not intervene against the protestors despite of their violent actions towards Tan and some left leaning bookstores. The slogans during the demonstration show its anti-Soviet character, which Ankara denied in order to decrease tensions with the Soviets by arguing that it was Tan ’s owner, the Sertel couple to whom the anger was directed, not the Soviet Union. The intelligence obtained by diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, the meetings they conducted with Turkish politicians, their conclusions regarding the process leading up to the raid, and their opinions on Turkish-Soviet relations provide the background for the analysis.

Çalışmada, Orta Doğu gibi çatışmacı bir coğrafyada kendilerini seküler ve demokratik olarak tanımlayan ve bölgedeki Arap kimliğinden farklı etnik kökenlere sahip iki ülkenin ilişkileri AK Parti dönemi açısından ele alınmıştır. Tarihsel arka planına bakılacak olduğunda İsrail’i ilk tanıyan Müslüman ülke olan ve İsrail'le bölge de savaşmamış az sayıdaki ülkelerden birisi olan Türkiye’nin, günümüzde İsrail ile ilişkilerinin bu seviyeye nasıl geldiği ilgi çekicidir. AK Parti hükümetlerinin İsrail ile yaşadığı krizlerin başlıca nedenlerinin Filistin Sorunundan ziyade olmadığı çalışmada vurgulanmak istenmiştir. Özellikle Davutoğlu’nun Başbakanlık Danışmanlık görevi ile Başbakanlığı arasındaki süreç boyunca TDP’de ortaya koyduğu birtakım doktrinler açıkça İsrail tarafından olumsuz olarak karşılanmıştır. Bu doktrinler kapsamında Orta Doğu’daki Müslüman aktörlerle geliştirilen ilişkilerin, kuşkusuz Türkiye-İsrail ilişkilerinde Mavi Marmara’ya kadar varan krizlerin gebe kalması ile de bağlantılı olduğu düşünülmektedir. Ayrıca daha önceki hükümetlerin aksine özellikle 2008’den sonra AK Parti döneminde Türk karar alıcıların İsrail’e karşı kullandığı sert söylemler, Türkiye-İsrail ilişkilerindeki diplomatik gerilimi tetiklemiştir. Hiç şüphesiz AK Parti'nin yıllar itibariyle İsrail'e karşı daha muhafazakar bir kimlikle yaklaşmasının bu söylemlerde etkisinin olduğu düşünülmektedir. AK Parti, her fırsatta Filistin halkının yanında olduğunu ortaya koyduğu pro-aktif eylemlerle göstermiştir. İsrail ise realist bir tavırla hareket ederek, AK Parti’nin dış politikalarını kendi iç politikasına müdahale olarak görmüştür. İsrail de aynı şekilde AK Parti'nin sert retoriğine karşı kendi diplomatik hamleleri ile krizi daha üst seviyeye çıkarmakta tereddüt etmemiştir. İsrail’in bu tavrında, hiç şüphesiz İsrail’in tecrübe ettiği 4 büyük Arap-İsrail savaşının getirdiği yalnızlık ve mağdur devlet psikolojisinin de etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Fakat, buradan iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin bir anda bozulduğu gibi bir sonuç çıkarılmamalıdır. Nitekim, ilişkilerdeki bozulmalar kendi içinde belirli periyodlardan geçerek büyümüş ve olgunlaşmıştır. Örneğin, AK Parti Orta Doğu’daki pro-aktif politikası doğrultusunda HAMAS gibi aktörler ile ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. İkinci olarak, Filistin halkının gördüğü mezalim AK Parti tarafından uluslararası arena da her fırsatta sertçe eleştirilerek ortaya koyulmuştur. Tüm bu politikalar İsrail’i ciddi şekilde rahatsız etmiştir ve etmeye devam etmektedir. Tüm bu gelişmeler kısa bir süre içinde iki ülkenin devlet başkanları birbirlerini “Hitler”, “terörist” ve “soykırım” gibi ciddi söylemler kullanabilecek noktaya getirmiştir.

Compared to previous decades, we observe a dramatic increase in international trade between Turkey and the Middle East between 2002 and 2012. Turkish exports to the Middle East and FDI from Arab countries to Turkey have increased 13 and 4.5 times, respectively. What explains such changes? I argue that the transformation in Turkish state identity resulted into a change in interest conceptualization. Since what the “Middle East” meant has changed with the new identity, previously "unseen" economic interests became visible.

The conventional literature on the role of middle powers emphasises the importance of soft power, niche diplomacy and coalition building. This article explores a case of unusual middle power activism with a focus on recent Turkish foreign policy behaviour. It demonstrates how the interaction of domestic politics and external dynamics produced an unusual degree of foreign policy activism, going well beyond conventional middle power behaviour, with the government increasingly employing coercive diplomacy and militaristic methods. We demonstrate that unusual middle power activism in a shifting international order yielded 'populist dividends' to the ruling elite in the short run but led to a 'triple governance crisis' in the economy, politics and foreign policy, with each element feeding into the others in a path-dependent fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the Second World War, the measures taken against revisionist states in the Balkans were insufficient. Greece and Turkey who wanted to address this issue, signed a new treaty in 1938, in addition to cooperation arising from the expansion of the Pact in the 1930 Treaty of Friendship and the 1933 Sincere Agreement. As a security system with political and military dimensions, the treaty was the culmination of Turkish-Greek relations in the Ataturk period. According to the provisions added to the existing regulations, the soldiers of the state attacking the other state under the conditions would not pass through the other state’s territory. If necessary, it would be countered with a gun and remain neutral. Thus, the two states strengthened the security of their lands against an attack from the middle of the Balkans. They would also prevent attempts to disturb each other’s security or change their government on their land. The alliance regime that was established aimed not only to be suitable for the spirit of the Balkan Pact but also to develop this spirit. Sincere Agreement Pact and Balkan Pact were the results of Turkey’s pacifism and Ataturk’s far-sighted policy. The 1938 Additional Treaty, has been an extension and also the furthest point of his policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Academic Social Science Studies is the property of Journal of Academic Social Science Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Turkish Studies - Economics, Finance, Politics is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Hypermasculine hegemonic masculinities have become the norm to dominate the foreign policies all around the world. As the populist foreign-policy visions, the byproducts of androcentric norm-creation, undermine the established rules for peace, diplomacy and co-existence in the international system, other experiences have faded away from the narratives that have defined and contributed to foreign policies. The accelerating urgency of the national security agendas of the hypermasculine states seek to cancel feminist definitions, practices and theories for the sake of physical force and state control. Nevertheless, more than any other period in history, it is these conflicting times that necessitate Cynthia Enloe's 'curious feminist' questions the most. Turkish foreign policy of the last decade has become a quintessential example of hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity, especially within the context of the S-400 crisis with the US, NATO and Russia; its feminist critics are distressingly rare. This paper aims to offer an alternative reading of Turkey's S-400 saga from a feminist perspective to contribute a Turkish case to feminist International Relations. First a definition of feminist International Relations will be provided. Then, the hypermasculine character of the Turkish hegemonic masculinity and its reflection on the current Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed. Lastly, the S-400 crisis of Turkey's decision to buy Russian defense missiles as a NATO member will be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the study, it was aimed to examine the events that started in Cyprus and led to the first great rupture in the alliance relations between Turkey and the United States of America, which was following a positive course in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the changed perception of the USA in Turkey following the correspondence recorded in history as "the Johnson Letter." Turkey, which attempted to be included in the Western bloc in order to eliminate the threat from the Soviet Union that emerged right after the end of World War II and needed the support of the USA in this regard, shaped its foreign policy on a single axis based on dependence in line with the wishes of its allies as stipulated by the conditions of the alliance after its joining the NATO. However, the events that started in Cyprus forced Turkey to face the reality. Turkey, which had to deal with Cyprus due to its strategic importance and the future of a considerable number of Turks living on the island, wanted to carry out military intervention in the island by using its legitimate right stemming from the international law in order to prevent the assimilation policies of the pro-Greece Greek administrators. The attempt to intervene led to a great rupture in Turco-American relations. The letter written by US President Lyndon B. Johnson in order to prevent a potential military intervention of Turkey in the island created a huge shocking effect in the administration of Turkey. Both the objection of its allies, which Turkey saw as friends, to the authority that Turkey wanted to use in a matter it was right about and given to it within the scope guarantor agreement in order to prevent the escalating violence on the island and the clear statement that its allies would not help Turkey and leave it on its own in case the Soviet Union initiated an attack on Turkey despite its being under the umbrella of the NATO are important in that these facts showed Turkey how wrong it was to shape its foreign policy on a single axis. The relations that were believed to be proceeding in a friendly and allied relationship between the governments until the Johnson letter was now going through a confidence crisis, and the letter irreversibly destroyed the sympathy for the USA in the eyes of the public as it was thought to prevent the intervention aimed at Cyprus. By screening the news published in the national press in addition to the written primary resources, the document analysis method was used in the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments from the dynamic fronts of Turkish foreign policy indicate that the military plays a significant role in all national issues (the Kurdish problem, relations with neighboring countries, the Eastern Mediterranean, relations with the Great Powers, energy, and more). After the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was radically reorganized and any attempt to criticize the Erdogan government’s political line on domestic issues was quashed, representatives of the Turkish military began marked intervention in the area of diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Belgi Dergisi is the property of Pamukkale University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The field of international relations is recently witnessing an inflation of attention toward political leaders and personalities. Yet, while political leaders mattered to understand foreign policy behaviors, the question is how much they do and under what conditions. This article argues that how leaders and personalities affect foreign policy is up to the variables that can be analyzed at the state and international levels. To illustrate this argument, I use the example of two strong, influential, and revisionist Turkish leaders: Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The results point out that the main determinative on Turkish foreign policy on these leaders’ period is not their personality as argued. Instead, the main variables we should analyze are the presence domestic and international constraints such as dominant foreign policy actors, economic capacity, political polarization, and international conjunctures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balkans, due to its geographical proximity and historical, social and cultural ties, represents one of the regions where Turkey has shown special interest. Throughout history, Turkey has played a decisive role in the Balkans for nearly 550 years, and its policies and actions have been instrumental both in shaping the region and at the same time in determining the course of history. The Balkans – which geographically constitute Turkey’s opening gate to the European continent – is also of importance for its special status in the historical process in which the Turkish nation took shape and for its potential for the future in terms of regional integration and security. As a result, the Balkans have been and remain Turkey's main strategic objective regarding the balance of power in this area and European security. Although relations between Turkey and the Balkan neighbours were severely affected during the Cold War, their historical links have continued, in various ways, to this day. From the ethnic and cultural perspective of Turkey, the Turks living in this region belong to both Turkey and the Balkans, such that their dual belonging is considered as being particularly important. In this respect, the emerging / potential emergence of crises in the region has a major significance for Turkey in terms of the sustainability and stability of peace. The Balkans is therefore much more than a neighbouring region for Turkey as a state that has always advocated stability in the Balkans and supported the state integrity. In this study, the main structural factors (historical ties, Balkan Muslims and Turkish minority, geopolitics, security) that make the Balkans important for Turkey’s Foreign Policy will be addressed.

ABSTRACT: Turkey’s security-oriented foreign policy during the 1990s, which changed dramatically by the 2000s towards a more liberal mode and which can also be considered as the “Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy”, returned to its re-securitized phase in the 2010s by resorting to hard power. This article aims at explaining this reversal by analysing changes in the intensity of Turkey’s internal and external threats. In this analysis, it will mainly concentrate on the ongoing civil war in Syria, as an enabling factor for the revival of PKK terror in Turkey and terrorist attacks from ISIS. Consequently, the unstable political and security environment surrounding the South-eastern borderline of Turkey has led to the use of hard power in national foreign policy. In contrast with the previous decade, the use of military power has become inevitable in the pursuit of national security interests against intra-country and cross-border terror threats. ÖZ: Türkiye’nin 1990’lardaki güvenlik odaklı dış politikası 2000’li yıllarda Türk dış politikasının Avrupalılaşması olarak da nitelendirilebilen daha liberal yönde bir değişim geçirmiştir. Ancak bu dış politika, 2010’larda sert güce başvurulmasıyla yeniden güvenlikleştirme sürecine yönelmiştir. Bu makale söz konusu yönelimi, Türkiye’ye yönelik iç ve dış tehditlerin yoğunluğundaki değişimi analiz ederek incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu analizde temel olarak, Suriye’de devam eden ve Türkiye’deki PKK terörünün yeniden ortaya çıkışına olanak sağlayan iç savaş ve DAEŞ’in terörist saldırıları üzerinde durulacaktır. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye’nin güney doğu sınırını çevreleyen istikrarsız siyaset ve güvenlik ortamı, ulusal dış politikada sert gücün kullanılmasına yol açmıştır. Önceki on yılın aksine, ülke içi ve sınır ötesi terör tehditlerine karşı askeri güç kullanımı, ulusal güvenlik çıkarları açısından kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir.

Turkey and Iran are two Middle Eastern neighbors building their relationship on the basis of competition and cooperation. Both countries aim at the position of regional leader and want to offer their own «model» of development to the Middle East. Historical neighborship has provided Turkey and Iran not only with the experience of struggle for influence, but an ability to interact in the spheres of overlapping interests as well. Turmoil in the Middle East attracts the attention of researchers to the issue of Turkish-Iranian relations. The article deals with the key areas of regional relations of the two countries reflecting their efforts to keep the power balance though they have contradicting interest. Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 has put Turkish and Iranian «models» in adversary positions to one another emphasizing religion vs secularism.The Turkish side has broadened the range of its instruments after Justice and Development Party coming to power in Ankara, although its aim remains to be the promotion of Western concepts in the Middle East. The Party’s strategy to expand Turkish influence in the region takes into account the Ottoman heritage, which modern Ankara seeks to popularize in order to reinforce its claims to regional leadership. The competitive arsenal of the Turkish leadership includes historical ties with the peoples of the region and the experience of the Europeanization of the Muslim state.Iran is promoting its vision of Muslim democracy, positioning itself as a staunch fighter against the expansionism of the West and, despite the decline in warlike rhetoric, does not refuse to export the values of the Islamic revolution. Ankara is at odds with Western countries on private issues or methods, but generally it shares the same strategic approaches. Tehran, on the contrary, rejects the ideological rapprochement with the West and the borrowing of Western development models, advocating maintaining its own path. In fact, Iran and Turkey offer Middle Eastern countries alternative political transformation options.Iraq and Syria represent both the sphere of Turkish-Iranian competition and the possibility for tactical alignment on the basis of converging interests. The events of recent years have demonstrated that at the times when the Turkey and Iran sense common threats, they put their contradictions on the back burner. Pragmatism and rivalry in Turkish-Iranian relations are not alternatives but exist in parallel as a way of maintaining a regional balance of power between the two countries. This explains the ability of Ankara and Tehran to seek compromises. At the same time, the various approaches of these states to the future structure of the Middle East region will continue to hinder the creation of a stable alliance between them. These realities must be taken into account when assessing the prospects for the development of the regional situation and the potential of Turkish-Iranian relations, the study of which is especially important for Russia, taking into account trilateral cooperation to resolve the crisis in Syria.