Search

Abstract The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.

Based on the statistics, the agriculture sector is responsible for consuming more than 90 percent of water in Iran. To date, the growing demand for water in the agriculture sector has largely been met by mining fossil groundwater resources. Indeed, about 90 percent of groundwater use belongs to the agriculture sector. This unsustainable trend cannot continue for a long time since groundwater resources are limited. So, decision-makers need doing some urgent, effective actions to handle this problem. The main objective of this study is understanding the underlying cause of the problem and evaluating suggested policies to address the crisis. The model is based on “tragedy of the commons” theory and tries to explain how farms attempts to maximize their profits turns to a serious threat for sustainability of groundwater resources. In the following, the model has been used to evaluate various strategies for avoiding the depletion of groundwater resources. For this purpose, “gap analysis” has been used. In gap analysis, the future under the present strategy is forecasted. Then, objectives or desired future is identified and the gap between the objectives and the future conditions under the current strategy is determined. Finally, new strategies which will help to close the gap will be designed. In the end, it is concluded that; (1) irrigation efficiency is the leverage point of the system and by increasing it from 40% to 45% we can significantly remedy the problem (2) no single solution can solve the crisis and several policies should be adopted simultaneously

In a tragedy of the commons, individual competition over a resource can reduce the resource itself, and thus reduce the fitness of the whole group. An extreme example is evolutionary suicide, which is predicted to occur when the selfish interests of free-riders and cheaters overwhelm cooperative behaviors, and the social good on which they depend ceases to exist. Case studies cite many different and seemingly interacting factors for success. Here we propose an equation-based theoretical model to predict changes in this balance, which determine whether the tragedy of the commons is observed in a particular scenario. Using survey data from 20 Balinese subaks, we explore the explanatory power of two theoretical traditions that are currently used to analyze commons management institutions, revealing multiple regimes with correlated responses to environmental threats. To explore case studies from a comparative perspective requires both theory and methods that can account for differences between regimes and explore transitions between them.

The tragedy of the commons is one of the principal tenets of ecology. Recent developments in experiential computer-based simulation of the tragedy of the commons are described. A virtual learning environment is developed using the popular video game "Minecraft". The virtual learning environment is used to experience first-hand depletion of common property resources and to explore issues of sustainability and cooperation versus competition.

Plastic pollution has become the new millennium's tragedy of the commons. This is particularly true with the marine debris plastic pollution issue, which has seen significant global interest recently. There is long-standing acknowledgment of the difficulty in managing the commons, with regulations, economic and market based instruments and community-based solutions all having a role to play. We review the global plastic pollution issue in the context of governance and policy, providing examples of successes, opportunities and levers for change. We discuss the role of regulation, public perception and social license to operate (SLO) in managing waste that enters the ocean. We argue that while plastic pollution is a tragedy, there are many opportunities for reduction, management, and changes to the global community's relationship with plastic.

Background. Many believe antibiotic use results in a tragedy of the commons, since overuse may lead to antibiotic resistance and limiting use would benefit society. In contrast, mass antibiotic treatment programs are thought to result in community-wide ben