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This paper deals with the question of coalition formation in n-person cooperative games. Two abstract game models of coalition formation are proposed. The core and the dynamic solution of these abstract games are then studied. These models assume that there is a rule governing the allocation of payoffs to each player in each coalition structure called a payoff solution concept. The predictions of these models are characterized for the special case of games with side payments using various payoff solution concepts such as the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set M sub 1 superscript (i). Some modifications of these models are also discussed.

This paper proposes a theory of coalition formation in simple games. The process of coalition formation is modeled as an abstract game. Two solutions of abstract games, the core and the dynamic solution, are used as the predictions of our model. Two classical theories of coalitions in sociology due to Caplow and Gamson are reformulated in a more general and mathematical setting. These theories are then analyzed using the techniques of our theory.

In this paper, we study the committee decision making process using game theory. The committee is modeled as a game. A new solution concept called the one-core is introduced and studied. The concept of a bargaining set, first introduced by Aumann and Maschler in the context of games with side payments, is defined with appropriate modifications for committee games. These solution concepts are compared with two other well known solution concepts - the core and the Condorcet solution. (Author)

The theory of n-person cooperative games presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern is a mathematical theory of coalition behaviour. A fundamental problem posed in game theory is to determine what outcomes are likely to occur if a game is played by rational players. Given an n-person cooperative game and assuming rational behaviour, it is natural to inquire which of the possible coalitions can be expected to form and what will be the final payoffs to each of the players. However, most of the research in game theory has been concerned explicityly with predicting player's payoff and only implicityly (if at all) with predicting which coalitions shall form. In this investigation, the primary emphasis is on the first aspect of coalition behaviour, namely the formation of coalitions.

The world oil market is modelled as a 2-person non-zero-sum game in normal form. The two players are the oil importing nations and the oil exporting nations. The solution of the game is investigated in the noncooperative sense using the Nash's equilibrium point concept and in the cooperative sense using von Neumann and Morgenstern's negotiation set and Nash's bargaining point solution.

The world oil market is modelled as a 3-person cooperative game in characteristic function form with and without side payments. The three players are the oil importing countries, the group in OPEC led by Iran and the group OPEC led by Saudi Arabia. Various solutions of the side payment game and the non side payment game are studied. (Author)

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Contents have not been copyrighted, https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/1039/thumbnail.jpg

Contents have not been copyrighted, https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/1039/thumbnail.jpg

Contents have not been copyrighted, https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/1039/thumbnail.jpg