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QS 20120314

QC 20100715

The overall aim of this thesis is to present a model for rational goal-setting and to illustrate how it can be applied in evaluations of public policies, in particular policies concerning sustainable development and environmental quality. The contents of the thesis are divided into two sections: a theoretical section (Papers I-IV) and an empirical section (Papers V-VII). Paper I identifies a set of rationality criteria for single goals and discusses them in relation to the typical function of goals. It is argued that goals are typically set to enhance goal achievement. A goal that successfully furthers its achievement is “achievement-inducing”. It holds for each of the identified criteria that, ceteris paribus, improved satisfaction of a criterion makes a goal better in the achievement-inducing sense.Paper II contains an analysis of the notion of goal system coherence. It is argued that the coherence of a goal system is determined by the relations that hold among the goals in the system, in particular the relations of operationalization, means and ends, support, and conflict. Paper III investigates the rationality of utopian goals. The paper analyzes four arguments that support the normative criterion of attainability: that utopian goals are (1) too imprecise and (2) too far-reaching to guide action effectively, (3) counterproductive, and (4) morally objectionable. A tentative defence of utopian goal-setting is built on counter-arguments that can be put forward to weaken each of the four objections. Paper IV investigates the nature of self-defeating goals. The paper identifies three types of situations in which self-defeating mechanisms obstruct goal achievement: (1) situations in which the goal itself carries the seeds of its own non-fulfilment (self-defeating goals), (2) situations in which the activity of goal-setting contributes to goal failure (self-defeating goal-setting), and (3) situations in which disclosure of the goal interferes with progress (self-defea, QC 20100715

The general aim of this thesis is to present and analyse traffic safety from an ethical perspective and to explore some conceptual and normative aspects of moral responsibility. Paper I presents eight ethical problem areas that should be further analysed in relation to traffic safety. Paper II is focused on the question of who is responsible for traffic safety, taking the distribution of responsibility adopted through the Swedish policy called Vision Zero as its starting point. It is argued that a distinction should be made between backwardlooking and forward-looking responsibility and that Vision Zero should be understood in terms of this distinction. Paper III discusses responsibility ascriptions in relation to public health problems like obesity and lung cancer. It is argued that what makes discussions about who is responsible for such problems complicated is that we have two aims when ascribing responsibility to someone. First, we want responsibility ascriptions to be fair and morally justified. Second, we also want to achieve progress and solve problems through ascribing responsibility to someone. It is argued that the two aims influence debates concerning who is responsible for problems like obesity and lung cancer and that we should attempt at striking a balance that is both perceived as fair and that is efficient. Paper IV discusses two potential arguments against the suggestion that alcohol interlocks should be mandatory in all cars, namely 1) that it displaces the responsibility of individual drivers, and 2) that it constitutes a paternalistic interference with drivers. The first objection is found unconvincing, while the second only has limited bite and may be neutralized if paternalism is accepted for the sake of greater net liberty. It is argued that if technological development can make mandatory interlocks cost-efficient, the policy seems a commendable public health measure. In Paper V, the question discussed is to what extent individuals should be as, QC 20100831

Edited by janet Broughton and John Carriero

Volume 2, Climate Capabilities

The paper deals with the problem of axiomatizing three formal systems of Deontic Logic / Normative Logic in a sense derived from Alchourron & Bulygin (1973) and Alchourron (1969). First of all we consider a version DL of their Deontic Logic (= Logic of Norms), secondly a version NL of their Normative Logic (= Logic of Norm-Propositions), to which they add a number of definitions generating certain normative operators "proper". Thirdly, we deal with a third system NOBL constructed with a view to isolating the normative fragment of NL which arises as a result of adding those definitions to NL. The main outcome of this paper is then a representability result to the effect that the set of sentences provable in NOBL is exactly the set of the sentences which are provable in NL on the basis of those definitions. The distinction Logic of Norms vs. Logic of Norm-Propositions is explained and discussed rather informally both in the introduction and in the concluding section of the present paper.

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The global shortage of organs for transplantation and the development of new and better medical technologies for organ preservation have resulted in a renewed interest in non-heart-beating donation (NHBD). This article discusses ethical questions related to controlled and uncontrolled NHBD. It argues that certain preparative measures, such as giving anticoagulants, should be acceptable before patients are dead, but when they have passed a point where further curative treatment is futile, they are in the process of dying and they are unconscious. Furthermore, the article discusses consequences of technological developments based on improvement of a chest compression apparatus used today to make mechanical heart resuscitation. Such technological development can be used to transform cases of non-controlled NHBD to controlled NHBD. In our view, this is a step forward since the ethical difficulties related to controlled NHBD are easier to solve than those related to non-controlled NHBD. However, such technological developments also evoke other ethical questions., Original Publication:Kristin Zeiler, E Furberg, G Tufveson and Stellan Welin, The ethics of non-heart-beating donation: how new technology can change the ethical landscape., 2008, Journal of medical ethics, (34), 7, 526-529.http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jme.2007.021568Licensee: BMJ Publishing Grouphttp://group.bmj.com

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http://www.santerus.se/1100/1100.asp?id=1576

QS 20120319

Safety factor rules are used for drawing putatively reasonable conclusions from incomplete datasets. The paper attempts to provide answers to four questions: “How are safety factors used?”, “When are safety factors used?”, “Why are safety used?” and “How do safety factor rules relate to decision theory?”. The authors conclude that safety factor rules should be regarded as decision methods rather than as criteria of rightness and that they can be used in both practical and theoretical reasoning. Simplicity of application and inability or unwillingness to defer judgment appear to be important factors in explaining why the rules are used., QC 20101110. Uppdaterad från Accepted till Published (20101110).

QC 20100915

QC 20101104

The aim of this thesis is to characterize and discuss two kinds of influences on the outcome of a toxicological risk assessment. One kind of influence has to do with values and the role played by value-based judgment. Currently, many toxicological risk assessments are characterized by scientific uncertainties. When this is the case, risk assessors are to some extent dependent on assumptions and judgment, and this has consequences for the outcome of the assessment. Another other kind of influence comes from the quality and accuracy of the empirical studies that risk assessments are based on. If toxicological research and testing are affected by systematic errors (bias), this will influence the ensuing risk assessment. In order to improve toxicological risk assessments work must be done both on understanding and dealing with the impact of values and on getting better and more efficient methods for gathering facts. The two papers that make up this licentiate thesis may be seen as a contribution to each of these objectives. Article 1: Values in science and risk assessment It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains valuejudgments, i.e. decisions made on the basis of values. This paper clarifies the concepts involved in this claim and explains its implications for risk assessment. It is explained why values are necessarily a part of science and of risk assessment. A certain type of values that contribute to the aim of science, so-called epistemic values, are identified as rationally justified as basis for judgment in science. It is argued that the aims of pure science and risk assessment differ in some aspects and that consequently pure science’s epistemic values are not sufficient for risk assessment. I suggest how the epistemic values may be supplemented in order to align better with the aim of risk assessment. Article 2: Bias in toxicology In this article, the potential for bias in toxicological research and in the performance of standardized toxic, QC 20101119

QS 20120319

he subject of this thesis is ethical aspects of decision-making concerning social risks. It is argued that a model for risk management must acknowledge several ethical aspects and, most crucial among these, the individual’s right not to be unfairly exposed to risks. Article I takes as its starting point the demand frequently expressed in the risk literature for consistent risk management. It is maintained that a model focusing on cost-benefit analysis does not respect the rights of the individual. Two alternative models are outlined. They evolve around the separateness of individuals, rights, and fair risk taking. It is claimed that a model that focuses on a fair procedure for risk decisions seems most fruitful to develop. Article II discusses the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) conflict. The ethical premises behind the negative characterization of the NIMBY concept are investigated. It is argued that a collective weighing of risks and benefits ignores individuals’ rights not to be unfairly exposed to risks in siting scenarios. Article III presents a three-party model tool for ethical risk analysis. The focus in such analysis is a discussion of three parties that are involved in risk decisions: the risk-exposed, the beneficiary, and the decision-maker. Seven crucial ethical questions are discerned by combining these parties pairwise. Article IV discusses a model for procedural justice for risk decisions. Two theories of deliberative democracy are explored. The first focuses on a hypothetical contract, the second argues for the actual inclusion of affected parties. It is maintained that hypothetical reasoning should mainly serve as a guide concerning risk issues that affect people who cannot be included in the decision-making process. Otherwise an interactive dialogical reasoning is to be preferred. Article V explores the claim that there are no real, objective risks – only subjective descriptions of them. It is argued that even though every risk can be described in diffe, QC 20100714

This dissertation is a philosophical contribution to the theories on trust and on risk communication. The importance of trust in risk communication has been argued for and empirically studied since the 80s. However, there is little agreement on the notion of trust and the precise function of trust. This thesis sets out to study both aspects from a philosophical point of view. The dissertation consists of five essays and an introduction. Essay I is a comment on risk perception theory and the psychometric model in particular. The essay argues that sometimes individuals take risks simply because they are in a vulnerable position and have no other choice. Four factors are identified as crucial in risks from vulnerability: poor outset conditions, lack of reasonable options, hope and liability to disinformation. Essay II addresses the democratic approach to risk communication and the ideal of risk communication as a dialogue between more or less equal stakeholders. The essay develops a typology of different risk communication practices and influence distributions and concludes that the form of risk communication most commonly referred to in the literature is of the most imbalanced kind where all three types of influence falls to the same party. Essay III argues that trust can be understood as comfortable defocusing. Trust as comfortable defocusing means that when a person trusts, he or she is comfortable with letting certain things be in the hands or in the control of the trusted other. Departing from this idea a definition of trust is proposed consisting of three elements: (i) the truster’s comfortable defocusing from the trusted person’s part of caring for X, based on a (ii) belief about the trusted person’s care for X, concerning (iii) something of concern to the truster. Essay IV explores the concept of trustworthiness and under which conditions trust can be betrayed in a morally justified way. It is argued that two aspects are essential for every reasonable notion of, QC 20100712

Det övergripande syftet med denna c-uppsats är att skapa klarhet i begreppet kritiskt tänkande, vilket görs genom att studera olika kritiska traditioners syn på begreppet samt dess förekomst i lärostadgor från 1900-talets början och framåt med avseende på gymnasieskolan. De första tecknen på ett kritiskt förhållningssätt kan vi se redan under antiken, men det var först under 1700-talet som Immanuel Kant utvecklade innebörden av begreppet, vilket senare kom att influera Karl Popper, vars filosofiska idéer inspirerade de informella logikerna, som har uttalat sig om just kritiskt tänkande i relation till pedagogiken och skolvärlden. Under 1940-talet kan vi se de första formuleringarna som innehåller begreppet kritiskt tänkande i de svenska lärostadgorna för gymnasieskolan och sedan dess har begreppet getts ett större utrymme allt eftersom nya läroplaner har utvecklats. De första formuleringarna kan härröra från den amerikanska aktivitetspedagogiken, medan nuvarande läroplan gör en viss koppling mellan kritiskt tänkande och det klassiska bildningsbegreppet, så som det formulerades inom den tyska bildningsfilosofin i slutet av 1700-talet.

This paper studies the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein during his years (1920–26) as an elementary school teacher in remote Niederösterreich, Austria. The paper gives a survey of his life, and also a brief account of three of his main works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Attention is given to his alphabetical word list, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen, published for educational use in elementary schools. The study is focused on Wittgenstein’s educational practise, and establishes a connection between his experience as a teacher and his late philosophy.

I min yrkesverksamhet som Levande verkstadpedagog behöver jag ofta förklara vad det är jag arbetar med eftersom min yrkesgrupp inte är så känd. Då jag behöver samarbeta och samverka med olika yrkesgrupper är jag beroende av deras medverkan för att det jag vill uppnå med verksamheten inte skall motverkas. Tidigare har jag använt mig av förklaringar som formulerades vid starten av Levande verkstad 1968, men funnit att mycket av det jag sade inte stämde med min erfarenhet. Den upplevda oförmågan att uttrycka mig kring mitt arbete har lett mig till magisterkursen i praktisk kunskap. I uppsatsen har jag tagit hjälp av Aristoteles begreppsvärld för att undersöka vad som ligger bakom det jag gör d.v.s. vilka intentioner jag har med det jag gör då det borde ha betydelse för mitt handlande. Hur konstruerar jag min värld och hur ger jag mening åt mitt handlande? Och hur stämmer mina resonemang överens med mina egna intentioner? För att få svar på dessa frågor utgick jag ifrån en berättelse från den tiden när jag arbetade inom ett språkprojekt för språksvaga invandrarkvinnor. Berättelsen gav mig möjlighet att reflektera kring olika episoder från min egen erfarenhet och pröva dem mot olika teoretiska resonemang. Genom att kritiskt granska hur jag resonerade kring ett personligt möte med en kvinna och hennes livsberättelse fann jag att mina medvetna intentioner inte alltid stämde överens med hur jag handlade och tänkte. Intentionen att låta människor få komma till tals på sina egna villkor motsades till viss del av att jag i vissa situationer, ovetandes hade intagit en vertikal position i förhållande till kvinnorna i språkprojektet. Jag fann också att jag i andra sammanhang tenderat att värdera skapande kommunikativa uttryck enbart som konstformer i stället för att se deras mening som en viktig del i genuint personliga livsberättelser.