Search

The article analyses the global social risks related to the expansion of information technologies, mass digitalisation, and the accessibility of sources of all information. The possibility of risky situations arising in different areas of society under postmodern conditions has been demonstrated. This is due to the massive spread of information and Internet technology, global changes in the structure of values of modern society, and the reassessment of a number of historical events and characters by some social groups. The focus is on the destruction of traditional mechanisms for transmitting social experience and memory and the transformation of perceptions of history through the use of virtual forms of communication. A different, own interpretation of historical events, the liberation of historical knowledge from politicisation and mythologisation can lead to risks of distortion of historical memory and even to conflicting situations of interpretation of the past. Case studies show that this, in turn, can lead to a set of risks in the economic sphere, for example: the risk of a situation of global redistribution of economic resources, the risk of losing the source of legitimacy of an economic resource, the risk of loss the reputation of a memory entity. These processes negatively affect social stability in society and distort the integrity of historical memory.Particular attention is paid to the topic of cognitive transformation risk related to the mass use of virtual media in the educational process. On the one hand, they are an effective teaching tool based on rapid search, transformation and storage of learning information. But, on the other hand, practice shows that knowledge loses its consistency and becomes “mosaic”, “clichéd”. The consequences of these processes are of a lasting nature and require further in-depth study by the scientific community, including psychologists, educators, and sociologists.

Previous research suggests that people may develop stronger causal illusions when the existence of a causal relationship is consistent with their prior beliefs. In the present study, we hypothesized that prior pseudoscientific beliefs will influence judgments about the effectiveness of both alternative medicine and scientific medicine. Participants (N = 98) were exposed to an adaptation of the standard causal illusion task in which they had to judge whether two fictitious treatments, one described as conventional medicine and the other as alternative medicine, could heal the crises caused by two different syndromes. Since both treatments were completely ineffective, those believing that any of the two medicines worked were exhibiting a causal illusion. Participants also responded to the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale (PES) and some questions about trust in alternative therapies that were taken from the Survey on the Social Perception of Science and Technology conducted by FECYT. The results replicated the causal illusion effect and extended them by revealing an interaction between the prior pseudoscientific beliefs and the scientific/pseudoscientific status of the fictitious treatment. Individuals reporting stronger pseudoscientific beliefs were more vulnerable to the illusion in both scenarios, whereas participants with low adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs seemed to be more resistant to the illusion in the alternative medicine scenario.

In the 21st century, which is often characterized by fake news and pseudoscientific claims, it is important that students should engage with the tenets of science, and how it differs from pseudoscience. The Rationality Index for Plant Use (RIPU) tool, introduced in this article, could be used in a problem-based and cooperative learning activity, where students explore the tenets of respectively science and pseudoscience. During such a learning activity, students will engage with scientific literature to either find support for hypotheses, or to nullify it. The activity also holds affordances to sensitize students toward the processes of science and the realization that scientists publish their findings in high-quality, peer-reviewed journals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Homoeopathy is commonly recognised as pseudoscience. However, there is, to date, no systematic discussion that seeks to establish this view. In this paper, we try to fill this gap. We explain the nature of homoeopathy, discuss the notion of pseudoscience, and provide illustrative examples from the literature indicating why homoeopathy fits the bill. Our argument contains a conceptual and an empirical part. In the conceptual part, we introduce the premise that a doctrine qualifies as a pseudoscience if, firstly, its proponents claim scientific standing for it and, secondly, if they produce bullshit to defend it, such that, unlike science, it cannot be viewed as the most reliable knowledge on its topic. In the empirical part, we provide evidence that homoeopathy fulfils both criteria. The first is quickly established since homoeopaths often explicitly claim scientificity. To establish the second, we dive into the pseudo-academic literature on homoeopathy to provide evidence of bullshit in the arguments of homoeopaths. Specifically, we show that they make bizarre ontological claims incompatible with natural science, illegitimately shift the burden of proof to sceptics, and mischaracterise, cherry-pick, and misreport the evidence. Furthermore, we demonstrate that they reject essential parts of established scientific methodology and use epistemically unfair strategies to immunise their doctrine against recalcitrant evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reflects on public discourses about science and pseudoscience, proposing the same discursive structure for both—the Esperantist-Epideictic genre. This genre of discourse might bring together characteristics that we understand as constituents of the public discourse on science. It also enables us to depict the process by which to maintain cohesion on a group's values. The discursive activity points to science as neutral, free, and independent of social influences captivating those already in this discursive sphere. The discursive hermeticity appears in the Esperantist content and the Epideictic form by avoiding the dialogical situations where there is no epistemological and axiological dispute. We thus, show that the Esperantist-Epideictic genre helps to understand the process of maintaining a cohesive group whose beliefs about the Flat Earth appear in social media. We use data from three sources: transcriptions from seminars held at that 1st FlatCon Brazil, most viewed videos on YouTube where affirmationists talk about Flat Earth, and semi-structured exploratory interviews conducted at FlatCon. Our findings indicate that some conceptions of validation of knowledge, scientific method, science bias, reality, and truth compound a distinct part in the current conversations about the Flat Earth movement. Moreover, the Esperantist-Epideictic genre of discourse can be an analytical tool for framing the echo chamber in social media while defending or attacking the Flat Earth movement. We conclude that in a time where there is a growing consensus that science is under attack, the ways in which its defenders are trying to stand up to it may be causing some harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID -19 pandemic represents a global health crisis, so adherence to government guidelines and public health advice is critical in reducing transmission rates. Despite this, it has been reported that a minority of people do not comply with the governmental guidelines. When considering the reasons why some people do not comply with preventive measures, previous studies have shown that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories negatively predict responsible pandemic-related behaviour. This, in turn, could seriously undermine success in combating the pandemic. Our aim was, therefore, to further investigate the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and adherence to official COVID-19 medical guidelines by including mediating roles of beliefs in pseudoscientific information and trust in government officials. A total of 1882 adults from Croatia provided sociodemographic information and completed several scales related to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, beliefs in pseudoscientific information, trust in government officials, and adherence to official COVID-19 guidelines. A multiple mediation analysis revealed a direct negative effect of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs on compliance with the preventive measures. In addition, conspiracy beliefs were indirectly related to compliance via trust in government officials. The present study builds upon emerging research showing that conspiracy beliefs may have significant social consequences and pose a potential risk to public health. Practical implications of these findings are discussed further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As of now, the COVID-19 pandemic has become uncontrolled and is spreading widely throughout the world. Additionally, new variants of the mutated viral variants have been found in some countries that are more dangerous than the original strain. Even vaccines cannot produce complete protective immunity against the newer strains of SARS-CoV-2. Due to such a dreadful situation, lots of fear and depression have been created among the public. People are looking for the treatment of the disease at any cost and there is a race in the market to provide treatment and make money, whether it is effective or not! In such a condition, many fraud products, remedies, and myths have come into the market, which is falsely claimed to be effective for the disease and can harm the patients. Hence, FDA has banned such products and remedies. In this review, we have compiled all such fraudulent and pseudosciences identified for COVID-19. Currently, in the pandemic time, health agencies are approving the repurposed medicines based on the small-scale clinical data for emergency uses that become ineffective (most of the cases) after large randomized clinical studies. Proper vigilance strategies need to be defined by the regulatory agencies of the nation and routine awareness programs shall be arranged for educating the people and healthcare workers on routine updates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs in our societies negatively influences relevant areas such as health or education. Causal illusions have been proposed as a possible cognitive basis for the development of such beliefs. The aim of our study was to further investigate the specific nature of the association between causal illusion and endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs through an active contingency detection task. In this task, volunteers are given the opportunity to manipulate the presence or absence of a potential cause in order to explore its possible influence over the outcome. Responses provided are assumed to reflect both the participants' information interpretation strategies as well as their information search strategies. Following a previous study investigating the association between causal illusion and the presence of paranormal beliefs, we expected that the association between causal illusion and pseudoscientific beliefs would disappear when controlling for the information search strategy (i.e., the proportion of trials in which the participants decided to present the potential cause). Volunteers with higher pseudoscientific beliefs also developed stronger causal illusions in active contingency detection tasks. This association appeared irrespective of the participants with more pseudoscientific beliefs showing (Experiment 2) or not (Experiment 1) differential search strategies. Our results suggest that both information interpretation and search strategies could be significantly associated to the development of pseudoscientific (and paranormal) beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I respond to Sven Ove Hansson's [2020. "Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve these issues by proposing some modifications to his definition. I shall address the four main points of the discussion: whether the primary definiendum ought to be 'pseudoscience' or 'pseudoscientific statement' (I make a moderate case for 'pseudoscience'), whether 'discipline' is an apt category for the definiens (it is, extensionally), and how to go about debunking pseudoscience (it is complicated). And, perhaps most importantly, whether Hansson's definition of pseudoscientific statement subsumes examples of bad science, and thus science. I present a case study of efforts at correcting unreliable models proliferating in the research literature. This case demonstrates how bad science can satisfy Hansson's criteria for pseudoscientific statement, including the criterion of deviant doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim. The aim of this paper is to examine the criteria and the current procedures in the procurement of unreliable nonfiction materials in public libraries observing two fundamental selection principles: principles of a publication value (quality) and principles of demand (existing or anticipated user needs). Approach/methodology. The first part of the paper gives a theoretical overview of the particularities of developing and assessing of collections of nonfiction materials in public libraries, taking into account international and Croatian library documentation and publicly accessible guidelines on collection development. The second part presents the options and challenges in the assessment of unreliable nonfiction materials on the example of five publications. The methods used for this assessment were selected from those focused on collections - comparison to reference materials lists, citation analysis and expert opinion; and those focused on users - data on circulation, reservations and interlibrary loans. Results. The application of several methods of qualitative and quantitative assessment on the five selected examples of unreliable nonfiction materials, and especially the analysis of their loan data, which is considered the best performance indicator of collection development in public libraries, demonstrates the incredible complexity of the procurement of such materials and the need to be especially attentive so that librarians can surmount the rift between the criteria which they encounter during their procurement and assessment. Originality/value. In the Croatian library science field, there are few papers describing the assessment of public library collections, whereby this is the first paper on the topic of developing library collections focusing on the procurement of unreliable nonfiction materials. Considering that the nonfiction materials collections in public libraries also include publications presenting ideas and theories which are not expertly and scientifically grounded and which spread disinformation and fake news, this paper draws attention to the need to systematically assess such materials since, on the basis of the obtained indicators, it is possible to understand more objectively the scope, depth and level of usefulness of collections, on which future collection planning and development can be grounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasing sense that capitalism may have broken time itself and now is rushing human society toward a catastrophic extinction event. But despite a substantial body of literature on capitalist temporalities and another on the ruptures in historicity that attended the French Revolution, there has not yet been an exploration of the fact that the two intersect in the figure of Georges Cuvier. He and his followers formed a school of "catastrophists," who raised questions about the finitude of time and of the natural world. Their ideas were ultimately defeated, relegating catastrophism to the category of pseudoscience until it returned under a variety of different scientific, philosophical, and political guises in the 1980s. Since capital is predicated on future returns, capitalism on continual growth, and continual growth on unlimited natural resources, the lost "chrono-economics" of finitude and catastrophe offers a repressed alternative to the intellectual preconditions for industrial capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Although cloud seeding is a commonly used and plausible method for rainfall enhancement, its practical efficacy has not been established for seeding of convective clouds with hygroscopic materials. Other methods of rainfall enhancement are viewed as much less plausible. Thus, although increased electrical charge has been shown to enhance precipitation in cloud chamber experiments, exactly how ionisation of clouds can increase rainfall in the open atmosphere remains conjectural. A trial of the efficacy of ionisation for rainfall enhancement in the Hajar Mountains of Oman was carried out over 2013–2018. This paper provides some background to this non‐mainstream approach to increasing rainfall, showing how statistical modelling of rainfall data might be used to nudge rainfall enhancement via ionisation towards a more scientifically acceptable status. Analysis of the data collected in the trial shows that ionisation led to a statistically significant enhancement in positive rainfall in gauges located up to 70 km downwind of the ionisers. A headline analysis specified prior to commencement of the trial resulted in an estimate of 16.23% enhancement relative to rainfall that would have fallen without any ionisation, while a more sophisticated after the event analysis increased this estimate to 17.64%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charges of scientism in mainstream psychology are on the rise among theoretical psychologists, yet not much attention has been paid to the diverse meanings and applications of the term "scientism." In examining scientism's relation to such contrast classes as pseudoscience, bad science, and antiscience, I focus on whether allegations of psychology's scientism are made with the goal of supplementing mainstream ontological and epistemological frameworks and their methodological implications, or supplanting them altogether. The former suggests supplying a mainstream that is seen as thinly conceived with essential missing nutrients, whereas the latter suggests overturning a mainstream that is seen as irreparable and/or irredeemable in its disregard of lived experience. In light of the scientific reform sought by theoretical psychologists, many of whom now turn to the humanities for remedy, I question whether applying the term "scientism" to mainstream psychology is likely to help in achieving theorists' disciplinary goals, and I suggest alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an integrative model for the endorsement of pseudoscience: the explanation-polarisation model. It is based on a combination of perceived explanatory satisfaction and group polarisation, offering a perspective different from the classical confusion-based conception, in which pseudoscientific beliefs would be accepted through a lack of distinction between science and science mimicry. First, I discuss the confusion-based account in the light of current evidence, pointing out some of its explanatory shortcomings. Second, I develop the explanation-polarisation model, showing its explanatory power in connection with recent research outcomes in cognitive and social psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis within the framework of Moberger's characterisation of pseudoscience as bullshit with scientific pretensions. The central question addressed is whether Freudian psychoanalysis qualifies as "bullshit," following Moberger's guideline of looking for systematic fallacies. The analysis centres on two fundamental critiques against psychoanalysis: one posited by Popper, contending that psychoanalytic interpretation is excessively flexible, and another by Glymour, asserting that Freud's interpretative method baselessly posits associations as causes. This paper argues that both criticisms rest on misunderstandings and asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis does not commit the alleged fallacies. It also offers positive evidence that Freud was not a bullshitter. The conclusion drawn is that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as bullshit, and hence does not qualify as pseudoscience on Moberger's criteria. Consequently, the paper suggests that Freudian psychoanalysis deserves a fairer hearing then many have given it., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Background: Scientific misinformation is a much-discussed topic, and the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of reliability in science and research. However, limiting misinformation is complicated because of the growing number of communication channels, in which scientific and nonscientific content are often mixed., Methods: This case study combines the examination of references, online observation, and a content and frequency analysis to investigate the dissemination of scientific misinformation in the interplay of different genres and media., Results: Using the example of the claimed existence of 34,000 human emotions, this study demonstrates how questionable statements are spread in science, popular science, and pseudoscience, making it particularly challenging to track and correct them., Conclusions: The findings highlight epistemic authority, trust, and injustice within and between scientific and nonscientific communities. The author argues that, in the digital age, researchers should defend and monitor scientific principles beyond academia.

Sharks are among the most endangered nonhuman animals on the planet because of industrial fishing, the shark meat and fin trade, expanding recreational fishing, and other anthropogenic causes. White sharks (Carcharodon carcharias), the most visible in popular culture, remain vulnerable (VU, IUCN Red List) and understudied, although population recovery is having a measure of success in regions like the Eastern Pacific and the Northern Atlantic of the United States. As numbers rise, Jaws associations also remain in vogue in programming that emphasizes human–wildlife** conflict such as Shark Week’s Great White Serial Killer Lives. Network marketing typically promotes this content by hyping shark science. Textual analysis, however, suggests that exposure to pseudoscientific narratives and unethical fear-inducing images is counterproductive to wider support for conservation programs and public recognition for sharks’ rights to their habitats.

Abstract Aim To synthesize the most recent evidence investigating the effectiveness and safety of therapeutic touch as a complementary therapy in clinical health applications. Design A rapid evidence assessment (REA) approach was used to review recent TT research adopting PRISMA 2009 guidelines. Methods CINAHL, PubMed, MEDLINE, Cochrane databases, Web of Science, PsychINFO and Google Scholar were screened between January 2009–March 2020 for studies exploring TT therapies as an intervention. The main outcome measures were for pain, anxiety, sleep, nausea and functional improvement. Results Twenty‐one studies covering a range of clinical issues were identified, including 15 randomized‐controlled trials, four quasi‐experimental studies, one chart review study and one mixed methods study including 1,302 patients. Eighteen of the studies reported positive outcomes. Only four exhibited a low risk of bias. All others had serious methodological flaws, bias issues, were statistically underpowered and scored as low‐quality studies. No high‐quality evidence was found for any of the benefits claimed.

The COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to all types of beliefs, theories, and explanations, whether scientific, religious, or conspiratorial. At the beginning of the pandemic, science did not yet have a medicinal product for this new disease, and alternative medicines offering “miracle cures” were acclaimed by some citizens looking for an effective treatment for COVID-19. This article aims to study a specific “miracle cure”, namely, chlorine dioxide, a bleaching agent for textiles or paper that also has disinfectant properties (water, surfaces). The dissemination of information about chlorine dioxide to French-speaking people on the social network Twitter from 1 December 2019 to 30 November 2021 is analyzed using a graph network. The results show that messages promoting misinformation, even if they are likely to be quantitatively less numerous, spread more widely than those based on more reliable information. In addition, this article shows that chlorine dioxide was promoted as an effective cure by medical doctors and peer-reviewed articles, which consequently increased the dissemination of this belief in the social space. Consequently, the process of misinformation entered the sphere of scientific controversy. The boundary between science and misinformation is becoming blurred to the point that it is no longer possible until proven otherwise to call chlorine dioxide a “false miracle cure” but a controversial treatment against COVID-19.

Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents some reflections on the teaching of physics. It is assumed that all students in higher grades have gone through basic education and, consequently, have studied all the scientific subjects that make up the educational curriculum. One imagines, therefore, that all of them have an adequate scientific background, sufficient to guarantee them a greater and more precise knowledge of nature and physical phenomena than their ancestors of other times. It is also expected that the educated individuals of contemporary society are relatively protected from quackery, obscurantism, scientific denialism and pseudoscience [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience, although old, it was made central to debates about the nature of science in 1962 by Karl Popper. In this current climate of the pandemic, anti-vaccine theories and fake news, it is imperative that one distinguishes between science, bad science and pseudoscience. In this paper I analyse and discuss a number of arguments related to this debate mainly from Sven Ove Hansson's paper, 'Science and Pseudo-Science' (2021). The Swedish thinker argues for the importance of identifying subtle differences between bad science, non-science, un-science and pseudoscience. I claim that in this debate the starting point is a careful analysis of well-known examples. I conclude that understanding the demarcation between those domains and the unmasking of pseudoscientific theories is vital for negotiating both the social and the scientific landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Conexão Letras is the property of Conexao Letras and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Soter: Journal of Religious Science / Religijos Mokslo Žurnalas is the property of Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Theology-Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For a long time, philosophers of science have expressed little interest in the so-called demarcation project that occupied the pioneers of their field, and most now concur that terms like "pseudoscience" cannot be defined in any meaningful way. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of philosophical interest in demarcation. In this paper, I argue that, though the demarcation problem of old leads to a dead-end, the concept of pseudoscience is not going away anytime soon, and deserves a fresh look. My approach proposes to naturalize and down-size the concept, anchoring it in real-life doctrines and fields of inquiry. First, I argue against the definite article "the" in "the demarcation problem", distinguishing between territorial and normative demarcation, and between different failures and shortcomings in science apart from pseudoscience (such as fraudulent or faulty research). Next, I argue that pseudosciences can be fruitfully regarded as simulacra of science, doctrines that are not epistemically warranted but whose proponents try to create the impression that they are. In this element of imitation or mimicry, I argue, lies the clue to their common identity. Despite the huge variety of doctrines and beliefs gathered under the rubric of "pseudoscience", and the wide range of defects from which they suffer, pseudosciences all engage in similar strategies to create an impression of epistemic warrant. The indirect, symptomatic approach defended here leads to a general characterization of pseudosciences in all domains of inquiry, and to a useful diagnostic tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of neuroscience has seen significant growth and interest in recent decades. While neuroscience knowledge can benefit laypeople as well as professionals in many different areas, it may be particularly relevant for educators. With the right information, educators can apply neuroscience-based teaching strategies as well as protect themselves and their students against pseudoscientific ideas and products based on them. Despite rapidly growing sources of available information and courses, studies show that educators in many countries have poor knowledge of brain science and tend to endorse education-related neuromyths. Poor English skills and fewer resources (personal, institutional and governmental) may be additional limitations in Latin America. In order to better understand the scenario in Latin America's largest country, we created an anonymous online survey which was answered by 1634 individuals working in education from all five regions of Brazil. Respondents stated whether they agreed with each statement and reported their level of confidence for each answer. Significant differences in performance were observed across regions, between educators living in capital cities versus the outskirts, between those teaching in private versus public schools, and among educators teaching different levels (pre-school up to college/university). We also observed high endorsement of some key neuromyths, even among groups who performed better overall. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a detailed analysis of the profile of a large group of educators in Brazil. We discuss our findings in terms of efforts to better understand regional and global limitations and develop methods of addressing these most efficiently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Bigelow Institute contest rewarding the "best" evidence for life after death epitomizes much of what's wrong with the current state of survival research, its participants constituting a who's who list of contemporary survival researchers. Cases that are regularly hyped as among the best evidence for an afterlife are all too often easily susceptible to normal explanations--if only survival researchers would give them a chance. The consistently negative results of 121 years of experimental survival research ought to have spurred soul-searching questions for survival researchers by now. And if we treat discarnate personal survival as a scientific hypothesis, then researchers are rationally obliged to seriously consider biological facts that tell against it, too. Limiting one's inquiry to attempts to only collect data that might confirm survival is one of the chief hallmarks of pseudoscience, and it's sadly a feature, not a bug, of the survival literature. This systematic review reveals that survival researchers would better serve science by setting aside their feelings and heeding what the data are telling them, for the probabilities should drive our beliefs, not the other way around. Is discarnate personal survival likely to occur in light of the total available evidence? The overall evidence doesn't even make personal survival more probable than not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sir Francis Galton singlehandedly instigated the navigational settings for the discipline of psychometrics by presupposing that mental attributes are measurable. In turn, this presupposition became the defining pillar of the psychometric paradigm. There were no scientifically sound reasons for adopting this presupposition and those Galton gave beg the question every time. So, what drove him to endorse this presupposition? Two considerations steered him in this direction: first, his Pythagorean philosophy of science according to which measurement is a necessary feature; and second, his desire to present eugenics as a science, which, given his Pythagorean vision, entailed that eugenics must involve measurement of relevant mental attributes. The quantitative presupposition guiding psychometrics throughout its history was, therefore, a spin-off from Galton's marketing strategy for the pseudoscience of eugenics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines elements of a negative history of science. For historians wishing to get a fuller picture of scientific practice both internally and externally, there is a lot to be gained by considering the dialectical constitution of scientific knowledge. To fully comprehend this relationality, historians should, therefore, trace the negative relations science maintains. Through oppositions, such as known/unknown; success/error; consideration/ignorance; and inclusion/exclusion, scientific knowledge emerges and disappears, and the social position of scientific practice is both established and contested. To exemplify our argument, we present four areas: the unknown, errors, ignorance, and the "pseudosciences". Taken together, this approach allows us to understand how science constitutes itself epistemically and socially across different locations and historical periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]