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Influential theories indicate concern that campaign donors exert outsized political influence. However, little data have documented what donors actually want from government, and existing research has devoted less attention to donors' views on individual issues. Findings from an original survey of US donors, including an oversample of the largest donors, and a concurrently fielded mass survey document significant heterogeneity by party and policy domain in how donors' and citizens' views diverge. We find that Republican donors are much more conservative than Republican citizens on economic issues, whereas their views are similar on social issues. By contrast, Democratic donors are much more liberal than Democratic citizens on social issues, whereas their views are more similar on economic issues. Both parties' donors, but especially Democratic donors, are more pro-globalism than their citizen counterparts. We replicate these patterns in an independent dataset. Our findings have important implications for the study of American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates patronage in the Second Italian Republic by considering patronage a fundamental device able to guarantee a party presence in the governance of public bodies. The study sheds light on a particular area of party patronage, namely political appointments concerning legislators; it analyzes the factors which could determine whether a member of Parliament will be appointed to a state-owned enterprise's board of directors after a legislature, seeking to gain a better understanding of how political actors exploit this opportunity. Direct political connections can be conceptualized as instruments to control and reward politicians and/or strategies to enhance political control over the bureaucracy. The empirical investigation suggests that legislators' efforts in Parliament play a role in the likelihood of patronage appointments. Education does not seem to significantly increase the probability of receiving a nomination for a seat on public firms' boards, moreover our result casts doubt on the merits or competencies of the appointed politicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En el artículo se argumenta que el patronazgo político depende de la fuerza de negociación de la oposición en el Congreso. Esta hipótesis se pone a prueba a través del análisis del gasto público en salarios de los gobiernos estatales en México. Se combina información estadística sobre el salario del sector público por habitante para el periodo 2001-2012, con datos de la encuesta a expertos en política estatal en México, que considera la fortaleza e influencia de la oposición en las legislaturas estatales. El análisis especifica modelos jerárquicos lineales, y muestra que el nivel de patronazgo será mayor cuanto más limitado esté el Poder Ejecutivo por la oposición legislativa. Estos hallazgos contribuyen con una hipótesis original a los estudios acerca del patronazgo y de la relación entre la oposición en el Congreso y el Ejecutivo.

This study sought optimally to portrait and analyze the promotion pattern of bureaucracy official in the direct election era of regional head. The results showed that the pattern of patronage system (spoil system) in the official promotion of bureaucracy was still so dominant than Skills System (Merit System). This is a significant proof of the political official's strong interest, political forces and successful team in determining promotion. As a consequence, a lot of mindsets, attitudes, and acts of political officials who are directly contrary to the pattern of merit system (skills), the more powerful and growing reent-seeking bureaucrats, nepotism, like and dislike of the political officials interest point of view, infidelity (mutualism symbiotic relationship) between official of political and bureaucracy to be mutually reinforcing and beneficial, protect and secure the interests of pragmatic respectively, the right man on the right place principle is neglected, a lot of bureaucratic officials were unqualified, lack of initiative and afraid of taking policy or risks, the malfunction of the Advisory Board Positions and Rank (BAPERJAKAT) because it was replaced by the dominance of political forces and successful team who work behind the scenes signs or rules largely ignored, provided requirement of ranks are met, and each time if there would be a promotion or bureaucratic reshuffle of rank always raised a fidgety, intrigue behavior, feel persecuted, jealousy, frustration and decreased the work ethic of bureaucrats [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates factors that attract Chinese migrants into illegal small‐scale mining in Ghana, their role in the supply chain, and the impact of their involvement. This is accomplished via mixed qualitative techniques involving interviews with illegal small‐scale Chinese and Ghanaian miners, and relevant Ghanaian stakeholders. Although the majority of Chinese interests in African mining is state sponsored, the Ghana case demonstrates private Chinese agency that is mostly attracted to illegal small‐scale mining in Ghana due to push factors in the homeland and pull factors associated with Ghanaian state weakness. The Chinese dominate the supply chain of illegal small‐scale mining with their financial, technical, managerial acumen, the sale and transfer of gold proceeds, and political patronage. This dominance accounts for the massive negative social, economic, environmental, and political impact of illegal small‐scale mining in the country. Amid state weakness, Ghanaian civil society, exercising agency, remains a potent force against the phenomenon. Related Articles: Abdulai, Abdul‐Gafaru, Justice Nyigmah Bawole, and Emmanuel Kojo Sakyi. 2018. "Rethinking Persistent Poverty in Northern Ghana: The Primacy of Policy and Politics over Geography." Politics & Policy 46 (2): 233‐262. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12250 Davis, Charles. 2008. "Preemptive Federalism or Regulatory Dismantlement? The Bush Administration's Implementation of the Federal Coal Mining Reclamation Program." Politics & Policy 36 (3): 400‐418. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00114.x Kim, Eun Kyung. 2019. "Issue Ownership and Strategic Policy Choice in Multiparty Africa." Politics & Policy 47 (5): 956‐983. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12327 Related Media: The Guardian. 2013. "The Price of Gold: Chinese Mining in Ghana Documentary: Guardian Investigations." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohrrE1rjzLo Voice of Africa. 2015. "Illegal Mining in Ghana." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=822czuf-Xxk Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. 2017. "Ghana: Media Coalition Launches Campaign against Illegal Mining." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOwF_qYpwXI [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study (1 + 1)-dimensional integrable soliton equations with time-dependent defects located at x=c(t), where c(t) is a function of class C¹. We define the defect condition as a Bäcklund transformation evaluated at x=c(t) in space rather than over the full line. We show that such a defect condition does not spoil the integrability of the system. We also study soliton solutions that can meet the defect for the system. An interesting discovery is that the defect system admits peaked soliton solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the incidence and scope of political patronage in Paraguay, identifying the attitude of the electorate towards this phenomenon. Drawing from quantitative and qualitative data collected by a research group active in Paraguay between 2016 and 2018 it is argued that this practice, although based on material needs, cannot be understood without considering the social and affective bonds that support it. The analysis also indicates that patronage affects not only the electoral results, but also political processes on a daily basis. This has, in turn, an impact on the way politics are understood by the citizens and a bearing on the functioning of Paraguayan democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature in distributive politics suggests that parties are advantaged nationally when they control office at the local level. But is this invariably true? Whatever advantage control over the local patronage machinery may offer, local governments might under some conditions tarnish their parties' labels and thus hurt up-ticket candidates. Using a regression discontinuity design in mayoral races in Brazil, exogenous variation in fiscal resources, and a survey experiment, my analysis demonstrates the critical role that party labels play in linking national and local elections. I show that the presidential tickets of parties with strong brands suffer an electoral penalty in municipalities governed by copartisans, especially when voters are dissatisfied with the local government. Loosely organized parties with weak party labels do not suffer a similar disadvantage. Hence, this study shows that for programmatic parties with strong party brands, mayors can sometimes be a burden rather than an asset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malaysia's May 2018 elections saw the ignominious defeat of the long-dominant Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition at the hands of the alternative Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, Pakatan). Bolstered by communal sentiments, habit, and charisma, the BN also relied heavily on deeply penetrating clientelist networks and carefully pitched patronage. Opposition parties have long decried the BN's trading of infrastructure, projects, and payments for votes. Yet as these parties have gained greater power themselves, voter expectations have pressed them to rely on similar modes of cultivating support. Whereas diminished access to patronage resources has imperilled dominant parties elsewhere, Malaysia demonstrates a different dynamic. Here, long-term competitive electoral authoritarianism had fostered the emergence of duelling systems of enduring, well-nurtured clientelist ties, despite vastly unequal access to public resources. The demonstration effect of Pakatan performance, including sustained outreach and distributions in states it won substantially via programmatic appeals, reinforced its standing. This "relational clientelism" perversely both helped sustain the BN over decades and reassured voters that they could also rely on Pakatan. I consider Malaysia's intriguing relational clientelism in terms of networks, resources, and discretionary control over those resources, to assess the effects of these practices for electoral outcomes and governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incumbent parties are often able to control state resources in ways that allow them to garner support in a clientelistic fashion. When regulatory institutions cannot restrain the incumbent's discretionary control over these resources, monopolistic control can give these parties a major political advantage. Focusing on clientelistic strategies employed by Turkey's ruling AK Party in comparison to opposition parties, this paper discusses mechanisms through which the incumbent party garners advantages through clientelism. While doing so, it presents evidence from an original fieldwork conducted in an Istanbul neighbourhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ghana provides an interesting case of a democratic developing country in which clientelism is pervasive yet vote buying is rare. Drawing on fieldwork and recent scholarship, and situated within the comparative frame that animates this special issue, I characterize clientelism in Ghana as party-centred, with resources from the public sector and privately-held commodities, and with significant factionalism within major (party) networks. Building on secondary sources, I explain how the historical development of party and electoral institutions – especially during a period of democratization in the 1990s – enabled Ghana's two main parties to be so central in clientelist politics. Elections are won by either of two quasi-ethnic parties, so campaigns centre around maximizing turnout of likely voters as voters have limited ability to exit their party. Thus, where democratization leads to a strong party system, limited voter mobility may limit individual vote buying. The theoretical implication is that historical moments of institutional creation, rather than the mere institutions themselves, may prove consequential for the varieties of clientelism that endure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clientelistic vote mobilization is a prominent electoral strategy in many of the world's democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes. Yet the comparative study of this practice, which involves exchanging personal favours for electoral support, remains strikingly underdeveloped. This special issue makes the case that clientelistic politics takes different forms in different countries, and that this variation matters for understanding democracy, elections, and governance. By comparing clientelistic vote mobilization in several countries – Mexico, Ghana, Sudan to Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, Caribbean and Pacific Islands states, and Malaysia – we unpack the concept of political clientelism and show that it is possible to identify different types of patronage democracies. In this introductory essay, we develop a comparative framework for this endeavour, showing that clientelism can be fruitfully compared in terms of the character of the networks that facilitate clientelistic exchange, the benefits that politicians offer in exchange for votes, and the degree to which politicians, and especially parties, control the distribution of state resources. These comparisons lead to the identification of different types of patronage democracies, notably community-centred and party-centred varieties. Building on this framework, this special issue shows that the comparative study of clientelistic politics offers analytical promise for scholars of democracy and democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains the varieties of clientelistic vote exchange in contemporary electoral democracies. It distinguishes two commonly recognized modes of exchange according to their capacity to overcome the problem of opportunism – relational clientelism and spot-market "vote buying" clientelism – and relates them to attributes along which clientelistic varieties have been distinguished. It develops a metric of clientelistic profile differences that characterize parties' choices of clientelistic strategies and advances hypotheses about the conditions under which parties pursue different strategies. Drawing on an 88 country/506 party expert survey of clientelistic practices, more relational politics thrives in middle-income countries with simultaneously more programmatic competition. But there is also intra-country variance according to party capabilities: Parties with more formal organizational reach, slight less reliance on external local notables, and government incumbency deploy more relational clientelism, net of parties' electoral size or ethnocultural base. Even once all of these differences are accounted for, parties in Sub-Saharan Africa rely more on spot-market clientelism than those of any other global region. Unmeasured variables – such as state capacity and party institutionalization, as well as the persistence of traditional tribe-based modes of social coordination that endow polities with order and stability may account for the more ephemeral character of clientelism in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does urban brokerage differ in patronage democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? This article answers this question by providing in-depth comparison of Mexico City and Khartoum, two cities in which electoral competitiveness differs starkly. In both cities, brokers play fundamentally similar functions connecting residents and the state, and mobilizing similar abilities to deliver services for the urban poor. But there is one fundamental difference: brokered relationships between the state and poor people are competitive in Mexico City, whereas in Khartoum they are not. Due to the democratic opening that has unfolded in Mexico since the early 2000s, there are now multiple avenues through which brokers can access state resources. These multiple avenues, and the political competition over the resources they provide, produces multipolar brokerage: brokers can choose between different political patrons and play them off against each other. In electoral authoritarian Khartoum, by contrast, brokerage patterns are unipolar: all avenues lead to a single power source – the ruling party. In comparing urban politics in the two settings, the article concludes that democratization has strengthened brokers in Mexico City, providing them with greater bargaining power and the ability to threaten to take their clienteles to rival patrons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of clientelism increasingly focus on the brokers, networks and party machines that make clientelism work in mass democracies. This article highlights the different forms clientelistic politics can take by looking at small, rather than large, democracies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Countries in both regions experience considerable clientelistic politics, but without the same dependence on brokers, networks and party machines. Based on extensive fieldwork in 15 different Caribbean and Pacific small states, resulting in over 200 interviews, we uncover how clientelism is practised in these hitherto neglected cases. We find that the size of these states contributes to the emergence of clientelistic relations based on (1) the 'face-to-face' connections and overlapping role relations between citizens and politicians, (2) politicians' electoral dependence on a very small number of votes, and (3) enhanced opportunities for monitoring and controlling clientelistic exchanges. Smallness is furthermore found to limit, albeit not entirely dispense with, the need for brokers, networks and party machines, and to amplify the power of clients vis-à-vis their patrons, altering the nature and dynamics of clientelism in important ways. In a final section we discuss how clientelism contributes to other dominant trends in small state politics: personalism and executive domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since their transitions to democracy, electoral politics in Indonesia and the Philippines have become heavily clientelistic, marked by high levels of vote-buying and other forms of material exchange. In both cases, the organizational form taken by clientelism is similar: political candidates build informal pyramidal structures of brokers to connect them to voters, largely operating outside national parties. In the Philippines, these structures are local machines; in Indonesia, they are ephemeral organizations known as "success teams." Yet this similarity in form masks a deeper dissimilarity: in the Philippines, machines are built on a relational clientelism in which politicians cultivate brokers for the long-term; in Indonesia, the modal pattern is short-term transactional relationships. We demonstrate this distinction by drawing on fieldwork and broker surveys conducted in both countries, and attribute it to a combination of historical legacies and electoral rules. In particular, differences in electoral institutions shape the incentives and capacities of politicians to invest in lasting machines, encouraging coordination among candidates when building campaign structures and sharing resources in the Philippines; impeding such cooperation in Indonesia. Our analysis suggests that scholars of patronage politics need to look beyond parties and to consider differences between relational and transactional varieties of clientelism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the association between political patronage and bank financing decisions in a sample of 34 commercial banks operating in the Middle East and North Africa for the period 2003–2014. We collected information manually about the profiles and biographies of individuals on the boards of banks to identify which banks had political connections, which is the novel contribution of the study. Linear and nonlinear panel data analysis was used to investigate this relationship. The results reveal that politically backed banks tend to be more leveraged. The indirect effect of political patronage on leverage was not found to be large, but was significant through its interaction with profitability; that is, politically backed banks with higher profitability are positively associated with leverage. Our findings imply that the privileges resulting from political ties make banks more profitable, and that this also leads to higher leverage. In line with the related literature, we found that a strong political presence on the boards of banks can be considered an important intangible asset, and one of the factors driving bank financing decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, including Sri Lanka, control of sports is connected to political power of the state and therefore, the political patronage decisively influences sports, both in and out of the playground. This study looks at few identified areas relating to the impact of mal-governance and corruption in sports administration, and how general governance structure adversely affects sports integrity in Sri Lanka. The content analysis was performed on articles pertaining to the sport corruption in Sri Lanka. The analysis has shown that the sport corruption is a main and considerable issue in Sri Lanka due to the several reasons. The study recommended that the proper governance policy should be invented to the sport sector to prevent this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study provides an examination (and an evaluation) of the reforms of the civil service of Georgia since its independence. These are divided into five distinct periods. The first one encompasses the time immediately after independence until the adoption of the Law on Civil Service in 1997. The second lasts until the end of the President Shevardnadze's government as a result of the Rose Revolution in November 2003. The third period – until 2007 – marks important reforms that the new United National Movement (UNM) government was able to implement capitalizing on overwhelming public support it enjoyed. From the second half of 2007 to 2012, the fourth period, the UNM government's pace of reforms significantly decreased, and even stalled in some areas. The last, fifth period, starts from the end of 2012 and continues to this day. That is when the Georgian Dream Coalition (GD) won the Parliamentary Elections. In the fifth and last period the government showed a clear preference for an independent, Weberian civil service as opposed to New Public Management (NPM) principles preferred by the UNM in their most decisive reforms. Success of reforms irrespective of the type of civil service preferred seems to be highly dependent upon political will and favourable political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines conflicts and forest resource politics in Eastern Mau, which is part of the Mau forest complex in Kenya. Conflict hotspots are mapped based on geo-coded transect walks, observation points derived from a combination of qualitative interviews, and informal conversations with local residents. Conflicts are categorized in terms of their temporal, spatial and substantial dimensions; and connections between conflict hotspots and forest resource politics are discussed. The study documents drivers of conflict such as forest and land resources access, political patronage and competition among ethnic groupings. Political patronage related to the voter sourcing seems to be a key underlying driver of forest and land use conflict. There is need to improve forest resources governance in order to water down patronage and reduce conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the relationship between economic and political inequalities and access to public goods provisioning in Pakistan. We construct measures of political inequality and political patronage using voting data, and economic inequality measures using representative household data. Firstly, we find a strong concave relationship between economic inequality and access to residential supply of natural gas. Secondly, we find that the presence of strong-men who can capture large vote shares is associated with higher access to natural gas. We uncover an optimal size of patrons: Patrons have an insignificant positive effect on access when patrons capture less than 20% of the votes and an insignificant negative effect when they capture more than 30%. At 20%, they have a positive effect that is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba's 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer: even in authoritarian regimes, institutional settings shape voters' behaviour and candidates' strategies. When the number of candidates on the ballot equals the number of parliamentary seats and yet voters can express some preference among multiple candidates, valence can become a predictor of candidate performance. Voters reward high-quality politicians, but not incumbents or Communist Party members, while candidates have no incentives to actively distinguish themselves and converge toward the general support of the single united slate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the adverse impact of clientelist relations between political parties and campaign donors on parties' relations with voters. Clientelism is generally conceptualized as a vertical, pyramid structure, whereby resources are distributed from politicians to voters at the base through brokers or programmatic politics. As Gherghina and Volintiru1contend, what is often overlooked is that in tandem with this vertical relationship with voters there is a complementary horizontal relationship with party donors. Parties with a weak organizational base focus on relations with party donors, such as private contractors, at the expense of their relationship with voters. Drawing on fieldwork conducted during East Timor's 2017 parliamentary elections, I engage with Gherghina and Volintiru's framework to argue that a bi-dimensional approach is integral to both understanding electoral outcomes and economic trajectories in developing country contexts. In East Timor, despite a decade of rampant patronage politics, the incumbent CNRT party's prioritization of their relationship with party donors cost them the election. In turn, this focus on party donors has distorted policy and public spending priorities, with severe implications for future development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that political brokers pay particular attention to household size, and the age distribution of its members, when allocating scarce indivisible social benefits. Because people usually share their income with other household members, allocating a social benefit to an individual member of a household with n voters is likely to bring more political support than allocating the same benefit to an individual member of a household with n-1 voters. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers effectively collect information on family size and age composition and allocate scarce temporary public works programs to families with more voters, unintentionally discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective - The purpose of this research is to test the theory of capital structure by determining whether the relationship is affected by Political Patronage. The study will examine political support, capital structure and financial performance of the company. Methodology/Technique - The data in this research is in the form of financial ratios displayed in the financial report of each company listed from 2010 to 2016. The sample was selected using purposive sampling with as many as 70 companies indicated to have political support. The data was analysed using regression analysis. Findings - The results show that Political Patronage has an influence on capital structure and political Patronage has a weak effect on financial performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • We analyze the distributive politics of India's rural employment guarantee program. • We use constituency level data on state elections and program implementation 2009–16. • We find no difference in job allocation between core and marginal constituencies. • We find higher material expenditure in core constituencies of the ruling party. • Opaque electoral funding and power of special interest groups explain the results. Abstract This article analyzes the distributive politics of India's (and the world's) largest workfare program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. We use a unique dataset that includes census and MGNREGA implementation data at the single-constituency level for the state of Andhra Pradesh (2009–17) across an entire election cycle (2009–14). Using regression analysis, we find that the ruling party does not use the program to buy votes neither in swing, nor in core areas of support, as we find the distribution of jobs to be 'post-clientelistic'. We explain this result – surprising in a 'patronage democracy' – with the lobbying power of big farmers, an important special interest group in India's political economy. Our analysis also shows that the ruling party's distributive strategy consists of compressing job generation in core constituencies, in order to expand expenditure on materials needed for the execution of the projects. In this way, the ruling party can channel resources to contractors, who fund the electoral campaign of the party in return as our qualitative evidence suggests. The article reinforces arguments that predict that political parties will target core areas of support and develops a bi-dimensional model of clientelism that highlights the role of contractors and opaque electoral rules in determining distributive strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a new typology of clientelism and tests two explanations for why politicians would choose to use state versus non-state brokers, and inducements versus coercion, to incentivize voters, based on a survey conducted in 2014 in ninety-three villages in three Hungarian counties.

Since 2007, candidates for 50 of the most senior public appointments in the UK have been scrutinised by the relevant House of Commons Select Committee before ministers confirm their appointment. Committees regard pre-appointment scrutiny as a chore, but our research shows it has real impact. Candidates have not been appointed as a result, and others have been forced to resign. Since the Grimstone review in 2016 gave Ministers more scope for political patronage, parliamentary scrutiny is all the more important. Committees could be more effective if they were more selective, but also more systematic in their approach to pre-appointment scrutiny. They could range beyond the Cabinet Office list of the 'top 50' appointments; and they could use questionnaires to candidates to help decide the issues they wish to discuss, or whether to hold a hearing at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ubiquitous computer and its computing capabilities have given rise to many devices like PDAs, Note books, etc. which are now a part and parcel of our every days activities. Communication between each of such devices is supported by mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) through single and broadcasting techniques. Security of such communication has gained prominence and is being studied extensively to create progressively fail proof schemes. In the present scenario of the digital world, authenticity and reliability are the corner stones of conducting trillions of dollars worth of business transactions and hence cryptography with public and private keys sharing authentically has become the focal point as the adversary can digitally disguise, intrude and spoil the system. With the communication not limited between any two fixed parties, the ever expanding group of users need a mechanism where they can be authenticated and enable participation. A centralized authentication servers such as Kerebros and many implementable protocols presented ways for efficient implementation, system optimization in terms of authentication and group key distribution is to be aimed at all times. Wireless communication is always fraught with danger of impersonation and hence risk of loosing important and valuable data to adversary. In this context MANETS are required to authenticate and efficiently conduct the group communication through a group key distribution process. Our analysis and results demonstrate that this approach completely satisfies modern days requirements of authentication, scalability, efficiency and security for group communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • After several decades of rapid economic growth, growth slowed down in Malaysia and Thailand after the Asian Financial Crisis • We argue that political economy factors played a key role in explaining the growth slowdown in Malaysia and Thailand. • We argue that the nature of the relationship between the state and business became patronage based with the evolution of the political settlement after the AFC. Abstract Both Malaysia and Thailand were seen to be part of the miracle growth economies of East Asia and fast moving into high income status in the early 1990s. Following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of the mid 1990s, both countries have observed prolonged growth slowdowns. In this paper, we offer a political economy explanation of the growth slowdown in Malaysia and Thailand in their post AFC phases. We argue that the nature of the political settlement in these two countries determined a growth strategy that was predicated on offering open deals in the export-oriented manufacturing sector that were accessible to most firms, while at the same time, offering closed deals to politically connected firms in the natural resource and services sectors. As the political settlement moved to a vulnerable authoritarian one in both countries, such a dualistic deals strategy became patronage based over time and detrimental to growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes state-level data tor 1959-78 to determine whether the rapid growth of teacher unionism during those years was primarily a result or a cause of the public sector bargaining laws adopted during the same period. The author finds, contrary to the view of some scholars, that the enactment of laws requiring public sector employers to bargain with majority representatives of their employees was the single most important cause of the growth in the proportion of teachers covered by union contracts. Although the growth in teacher unionism in turn encouraged the adoption of some new or stronger bargaining laws, this effect was relatively weak. More important predictors of new bargaining laws included the extent of political patronage in a state and the bargaining laws adopted by neighboring states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the diffusion and institutionalization of change in formal organization structure, using data on the adoption of civil service reform by cities. It is shown that when civil service procedures are required by the state, they diffuse rapidly and directly from the state to each city. When the procedures are not so legitimated, they diffuse gradually and the underlying sources of adoption change overtime. In the latter case, early adoption of civil service by cities is related to internal organizational requirements, with city characteristics predicting adoption, while late adoption is related to institutional definitions of legitimate structural form, so that city characteristics no longer predict the adoption decision. Overall, the findings provide strong support for the argument that the adoption of a policy or program by an organization is importantly determined by the extent to which the measure is institutionalized -- whether by law or by gradual legitimation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the fundraising capabilities of corporate political action committees (PACs) and looks to see if business is now running politics or if the donations to candidates are just that. The authors consider the current and future trajectories of PAC growth and attempt to forecast the potential for internal growth of PACS in corporations. A determination on the possibilities of growth of PACS could be a major factor in resolving the controversy about how much of a political threat they pose. The authors found that the amount of money raised by PACS has been overestimated and they say as money raisers go, their record is modest. Just a handful of the largest PACs take in more than one hundred thousand dollars per year. Many function with total receipts of less than half that amount. To greatly increase their annual incomes these PACs must intensify their fund-raising efforts or greatly expand their solicitation universes. There is a movement on the part of the PACs to solicit greater numbers and to sell their programs through a more personal approach than a solicitation letter.