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The effects of three factors on the reactions of group members toward a group decision and the support they subsequently accorded such decisions were examined. These factors were: (a) the decision process used by the group (majority rule with formal voting, discussion to unanimity, discussion to majority agreement, or choice by an experimenter appointed executor); (b) the level of prediscussion agreement among group members (concordance); and (c) the relative extent to which an individual's preferences were congruent with his group's decision (relative individual goal attainment, RIGA). Individual ratings of satisfaction with decisions, anticipated commitment to decisions, and the support accorded to decisions were highest in groups with initially high concordance and among individuals higher on RIGA. Members of groups required to reach unanimity and those run by executive choice exhibited comparable support for their groups' decisions across all levels of concordance. In groups required to discuss to majority agreement, support of the group decisions dropped markedly under low levels of concordance. Individual ratings of the difficulty experienced in reaching a decision were highest in groups required to reach unanimous agreement. However, members of these groups showed the greatest degree of postdecision change in the direction of their groups' decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study manipulated two variables, leadership involvement in subordinates' discussion of a problem and the importance of the subordinate's task as perceived by the subordinate, and assessed their impact on two measures (quantity and quality) of productivity and a set of affective questionnaire items. Undergraduate students led by graduate student leaders (whose involvement varied over four levels) discussed problems in their curriculum and individually suggested solutions to these problems. The results showed that: (1) individuals led by a more involved leader produced more than individuals led by a less involved leader; (2) a task rated as very important resulted in increases in both the quantity and the quality of performance; (3) a significant interaction between the two variables indicated that the poorest quality performance was evidenced when the leader was involved and the task was of low importance; and (4) both variables had an impact on affective responses (e.g., self-reports of satisfaction) in the expected direction. The findings were discussed with respect to the appropriate strategies for optimal performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents advice on group decision making in business. Identification of the problem; Selection of group members; Formulation of the agenda; Decision-making procedures; Techniques that yield more accurate solutions; Evaluation of the decision processes.

The article explores the causes and effects of defecting from a stable coalition. Defection from stable coalitions in the four coalition games studied here led to reduced benefits for both the defectors and the non-defectors. At the same time defectors fared better than non-defectors, with vulnerability reducing the defectors' benefits. Relative power, over all conditions, led to significantly more positive outcomes than relative equality or weakness. Coalition situations require a decision by a group of more than two actors and present individuals with the dilemma of mixed motives. Actors must deal with cooperative inclinations toward potential coalition partners and competitive inclinations toward individuals excluded from the coalition. As the size of a group increases, however, one suspects that more physical sanctions become necessary. Thus, even though defection from one's country clearly has psychological costs for an individual, most countries impose considerable penalties on defectors. Treason, for instance, is considered, at least by legislation, as one of the most heinous of crimes, with the severest of penalties.

Dilemmas have been modeled in many systems; the present study addressed human groups in an empirical comparison of Nuts and n-PD, two commons dilemma games. Results of a repeated measures design indicated similarity in first-period choices but less cooperation in n-PD play across periods. Results also substantiated predictions for the effect of individualistic or group-oriented instructions and for the probability of n-PD game continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the issue of how a researcher might evaluate the accuracy of theoretical predictions in the social sciences. Using theories of coalition systems as an example of specific and apparently easily testable models, the paper argues that judgment of the absolute accuracy of a prediction remains a value judgment. In addition, a strict value judgment can potentially lead to the rejection of a theory and its underlying assumptions even when those assumptions may have, at the very least, considerable heuristic value. While most models in the social sciences would benefit from greater specificity in their predictions, the general thrust of specific coalition models would benefit from greater attention. Combining a general conceptual structure with a set of specific, falsifiable predictions makes for excellent theory and potentially greater research progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces articles of the September 2002 issue of the "Journal of Management Inquiry."

Last August, the Academy of Management embarked on a new venture: art and poetry at annual meetings. Following professor Jean Bartunek's idea, the author solicited artwork and poetry from the academy's members. Almost 100 people submitted work. The artists displayed more than 60 of their pieces in Toronto. The exhibit was a huge success, as hundreds of academy members and guests attended the exhibits. In addition, as chair of this new "division," the editor heard nothing but positive feedback — people were delighted to see such clear displays of humanity in the academy.

How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a payoff that they would otherwise not receive (Studies 1-3) or they could overbill for their work (Study 4). We manipulated the number of cheating opportunities they expected but held the actual number of opportunities constant. The data showed that the likelihood of cheating and the extent of dishonesty were both greater when people believed that they were facing a last choice. Mediation analyses suggested that anticipatory regret about passing up a chance to enrich oneself drove this cheat-at-the-end effect. We found no support for alternative explanations based on the possibility that multiple cheating opportunities depleted people's self-control, eroded their moral standards, or made them feel that they had earned the right to cheat. The data also suggested that the cheat-at-the-end effect may be limited to relatively short series of cheating opportunities (i.e., n < 20). Our discussion addresses the psychological and behavioral dynamics of repeated ethical choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, when prompted to represent a conflict in matrix form, more than 70% of the people created 1 of 4 archetypal mixed-motive games (out of 576 possibilities): Maximizing Difference, Assurance, Chicken, and Prisoner's Dilemma. Study 3 demonstrated that these mental representations relate in predictable ways to negotiators' fixed-pie perceptions. Studies 4-6 showed that these mental representations shape individuals' behavior and interactions with others, including cooperation, perspective taking, and use of deception in negotiation, and through them, conflict's outcomes. Study 7 found that the games that people think they are playing influence how their counterparts see them, as well as their counterparts' negotiation expectations. Overall, the findings document noteworthy regularities in people's mental representations of outcome interdependence in conflict and illustrate that 4 archetypal games can encapsulate fundamental psychological processes that emerge repeatedly in conflict and negotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: People typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomes when this information is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this information and make attractive offers whereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal and make unattractive offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs'' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it increased prosocials'' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest that many people are not naturally inclined to reveal private information when they have an outcome advantage, but that fairness motives encourage revelation and, ironically, increase revealers'' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Research across disciplines suggests that bad is stronger than good and that individuals punish deception more than they reward honesty. However, methodological issues in previous research limit the latter conclusion. Three experiments resolved these issues and consistently found the opposite pattern: Individuals rewarded honesty more frequently and intensely than they punished deception. Experiment 2 extended these counterintuitive findings by revealing a divergence between evaluation and behavior: Evaluative reactions to deception were stronger than those to honesty, but behavioral intentions in response to honesty were stronger than those in response to deception. In addition, individuals wanted to avoid deceivers more than they wanted to approach honest actors. Experiment 3 found that punishment, but not reward, frequencies were sensitive to costs. Moderated-mediation tests revealed the role of different psychological mechanisms: Negative affect drove punishments, whereas perceived trustworthiness drove rewards. Overall, bad appears to be stronger than good in influencing psychological reactions, but good seems to be stronger than bad in influencing behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counter to the ‘start high, end high’ effect of anchors in individual judgments and dyadic negotiations, 6 studies using a diverse set of methodologies document how and why, in the social setting of auctions, lower starting prices result in higher final prices. Three processes contribute to this effect. First, lower starting prices reduce barriers to entry, which increase traffic and generate higher final prices. Second, lower starting prices entice bidders to invest time and energy (creating sunk costs) and, consequently, escalate their commitments. Third, the traffic generated by lower starting prices can lead bidders to infer value in the item, thereby explaining previous findings that traffic begets more traffic. The authors show that barriers to entry that limit traffic (e.g., a misspelled brand name) lead to anchoring's normal assimilative effect rather than its reversal. By broadening the understanding of anchors to extended social interactions and open markets, the authors identify when and why starting prices anchor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This experiment examines the impact of cheap talk in an ultimatum bargaining setting with two-sided imperfect information. In contrast to previous work, the experiment provides an opportunity for deceptions to be revealed and punished. Results show that lies about private information and (incredible) threats of future actions do influence bargaining outcomes (offers and responses) in both the short- and long-term. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The trade-off between mercy and justice is a classic moral dilemma, particularly for organizational leaders and managers. In 3 complementary studies, we investigated how resolving the "punishment dilemma" influences interpersonal trust. Study 1 used controlled scenarios to show that uninvolved observers trusted leaders who administered large or medium punishment more than leaders who administered no punishment when transgressors deserved punishment. At the same time, large punishment decreased trust more than medium or no punishment for less deserving targets. Study 2's similar scenarios showed that leaders who administered punishment lost trust when they subsequently received benefits even though it was not clear whether their benefits resulted from their act of punishment. Study 3 provided a behavioral replication of these results. These findings suggest that people trusted punishers more than nonpunishers, but only when punishers' motives were not personal revenge. In the discussion, we explore the practical and theoretical implications of these results for organizations. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

Few interpersonal relationships endure without one party violating the other's expectations. Thus, the ability to build trust and to restore cooperation after a breach can be critical for the preservation of positive relationships. Using an iterated prisoner's dilemma, this article presents two experiments that investigated the effects of the timing of a trust breach-at the start of an interaction, after 5 trials, after 10 trials, or not at all. The findings indicate that getting off on the wrong foot has devastating long-term consequences. Although later breaches seemed to limit cooperation for only a short time, they still planted a seed of distrust that surfaced in the end.

Groups and organizations face a fundamental problem: They need cooperation but their members have incentives to free ride. Empirical research on this problem has often been discouraging, and economic models suggest that solutions are unlikely or unstable. In contrast, the authors present a model and 4 studies that show that an unwaveringly consistent contributor can effectively catalyze cooperation in social dilemmas. The studies indicate that consistent contributors occur naturally, and their presence in a group causes others to contribute more and cooperate more often, with no apparent cost to the consistent contributor and often gain. These positive effects seem to result from a consistent contributor's impact on group members' cooperative inferences about group norms.

In the heat of competition, executives can easily become obsessed with beating their rivals. This adrenaline-fueled emotional state, which the authors call competitive arousal, often leads to bad decisions. Managers can minimize the potential for competitive arousal and the harm it can inflict by avoiding certain types of interaction and targeting the causes of a win-at-all-costs approach to decision making. Through an examination of companies such as Boston Scientific and Paramount, and through research on auctions, the authors identified three principal drivers of competitive arousal: intense rivalry, especially in the form of one-on-one competitions; time pressure, found in auctions and other bidding situations, for example; and being in the spotlight--that is, working in the presence of an audience. Individually, these factors can seriously impair managerial decision making; together, their consequences can be dire, as evidenced by many high-profile business disasters. It's not possible to avoid destructive competitions and bidding wars completely. But managers can help prevent competitive arousal by anticipating potentially harmful competitive dynamics and then restructuring the deal-making process. They can also stop irrational competitive behavior from escalating by addressing the causes of competitive arousal. When rivalry is intense, for instance, managers can limit the roles of those who feel it most. They can reduce time pressure by extending or eliminating arbitrary deadlines. And they can deflect the spotlight by spreading the responsibility for critical competitive decisions among team members. Decision makers will be most successful when they focus on winning contests in which they have a real advantage--and take a step back from those in which winning exacts too high a cost.