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Most studies define states as small, middle, or great in relation to the power of other states. However, how the capabilities of a particular category of state allow it to respond to challenges from armed non-state actors, has rarely been studied. This article focuses on the Republic of Kazakhstan to give empirical evidence of what patterned course of action middle states undertake to oppose terrorism. In addition, it explores the most prominent causes of Kazakhstan's failure in the fight against armed non-state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream literature on weak status quo states' diplomacy tends to identify their regional security roles in terms of dealing with non-traditional security issues. This article argues that such a limited approach is not sufficient to explain the current security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. This article reviews the literature on weak status quo states' influence on regional order. It then identifies a security environment in which they are more likely to exert some impact on maintaining and building a regional order. After contextualising these discussions in the Asia-Pacific setting, the article examines the experience of South Korea and Singapore as secondary powers in the East Asian region. Although both countries enjoy high levels of security cooperation with the US, both have also been able to exercise a certain amount of influence in advancing their own geostrategic interests amidst the growing Sino-US geostrategic competition. Yet their exploitation of Sino- US geostrategic competition is neither a simple balancing strategy against China nor a simple bandwagoning with the US, since both South Korea and Singapore have been increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how Australia has managed its relationship with China. It looks at the broad trends in the relationship, with a focus on the decades after recognition in 1972. The second part examines the recent past, and particularly the ways in which Australia's active courtship of China has begun to be tempered by concerns about the destabilizing security and strategic consequences of the country's return to power. It assesses the options Australia faces and the growing polarization of opinion between security "hawks" and economic "doves" in public debate about Australia's future, and then charts where Australian policy is currently placed. The paper concludes by explaining why Australia finds taking a nuanced position in relation to its engagement with China so difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how role theory can enhance the middle-power literature in understanding the role preferences of middle powers. Rather than treating it as merely a function of material capability or good international citizenship, this article resituates middle power as a concept of international status that states aim to pursue through the enactment of role conceptions. Thus, it reinstates a conceptual distinction between 'middle-power status' and 'middle-power roles'. The article suggests that the notion of role conceptions can analytically connect the status-seeking behaviour of middle powers with their foreign policy agenda. In so doing, it provides a more nuanced explanation of middle-power behaviour, which might differ between one middle power and another. Using Indonesia and South Korea as case studies of middle power, this article contends that foreign policymakers have strategically conceptualised and enacted several main roles that aim to capture historical experience, as well as ego and alter expectations, in order to pursue middle-power status. These role conceptions determine the foreign policy agenda of states in articulating their middle-power status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop scholarship on status in international politics by focusing on the social dimension of small and middle power status politics. This vantage opens a new window on the widely-discussed strategies social actors may use to maintain and enhance their status, showing how social creativity, mobility, and competition can all be system-supporting under some conditions. We extract lessons for other thorny issues in status research, notably questions concerning when, if ever, status is a good in itself; whether it must be a positional good; and how states measure it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace is the property of Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation, Center for Foreign Policy & Peace Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines the South China Sea disputes and primarily focuses on developments since 2013 when the Philippines filed for international arbitration. The article argues that the South China Sea situation involves two fundamental and interdependent considerations: (1) the right of sovereign states to access their legal entitlements unimpeded and (2) the extent to which Asia and the international community value a rules‐based regional order. Before there is any possibility of redress on the issue, the article contends that other key stakeholder states (such as Japan, the United States, Australia, and India) will also need to be more strongly engaged with the issue and support claimant countries through a diverse array of activities ranging from investments in capacity building to the use of the claimant country's respective coastguards (if invited) to police and protect resources within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones, as clarified by the July 2016 Arbitral Ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the middle power identities of Australia and South Korea during the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard (2007–2013) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations. Considering the problems in the existing position, behaviour, impact and identity-based definitions of middle powers, examining how self-identified middle powers have constructed such an identity would offer useful insights into the middle power concept. Relying on a framework that captures an identity's content and contestation, this paper argues that while Australia and South Korea have assumed a middle power identity, their visualisations of this identity are slightly different. Australia has understood its middle power identity in both economic and security terms, whereas South Korea appears to have connected such an identity more with the economic dimension. These differences affect how they envision their respective middle power roles in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the evolving power distribution and the strategic behavior of states in the Eastern Mediterranean, focusing on the critical uncertainty of regional security. Topics include the relations of medium and small states including Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, the Syrian refugee crisis and presence of the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS), and the intense interstate competition for the exploitation and control of energy reserves.

Many observers recognize policy continuity as a prominent feature of India’s statecraft, but practitioners see fundamental changes in the last quarter century. In this article, we explain how India’s economic expansion because of sustained economic growth altered its statecraft. That prosperity is a prerequisite to sustain power has been well recognized through history by major thinkers of strategy. We examine the relationship between India’s economic strategy and its congruence with its foreign policy strategy. In particular, we illustrate how India has viewed geoeconomics, defined here as “the use of economic instruments to achieve specific geopolitical results.” We highlight the degree and instruments of India’s economic statecraft as an integral component of its foreign policy, and its strengths and limitations relative to other rising powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavioural model comprises a major theoretical tradition in the field of middle powers since it identifies the distinct behavioural patterns in the diplomacy of these states. Its relevance, however, has been questioned since it continues to rely on older definitions of middle power behaviour and places emphasis on diplomatic preferences rather than influence. To strengthen the relevance of the behavioural model, this article proposes an additional distinctive category that prioritises ideational influence and entrepreneurial effectiveness as key prerequisites for identifying middle powers. The article examines the cases of Brazil and South Africa to argue that states classified as middle powers must not only pursue the diplomatic preferences and strategies that comprise middle power internationalism, but also display the capacity to advance and secure their preferred outcomes at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

ABSTRACT This article uses the concept of entrepreneurial powers to discuss how and under what circumstances Brazil successfully accomplishes its goals in international crises. The concept of entrepreneurial power focuses on systematic evidence of middle-power behavior and its relation to foreign policy tools. Brazil resorts to three agency-based foreign policy tools that are the substance of its entrepreneurial power. These instruments are always mediated by a structural condition, the dominant power pivotal position in the crisis. This study applies qualitative comparative analysis methodology to 32 international crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil played a role. It finds that for regional crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is sufficient for success, regardless of the dominant power position; and for global crises, the use of only one agency-based tool is a necessary and sufficient condition for Brazil to accomplish its goals, despite the dominant power position on the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Leave camp and prominent Brexiteers typically present regaining political control over international trade policy after Brexit as one advantage of leaving the European Union. A newly autonomous UK government, so the argument goes, will be free to negotiate wide-reaching and ambitious trade agreements with the world and will not be restricted by the compromise-culture inherent in supranational, Brussels-based deliberations. In the absence of clear formulations of Britain’s post-Brexit trade political agenda, much of the debate remains hypothetical at this point. Yet, from a global governance perspective, it is clear that the institutional and legal architecture for international trade cooperation is currently fragmented. Given WTO negotiating deadlocks, the institutional strain resulting from parallel country-by-country negotiations, regulatory clash in the existing network of preferential trade agreements, and the UK’s new position as a middle power in the trade regime, this essay argues that Britain may find it more difficult to push its own trade agenda internationally than is currently conceded in the debate. With the global trade regime currently shifting back towards more power-based forms of international interactions, regaining trade policy autonomy post-Brexit may turn out to be a pyrrhic victory for the new trade middle power Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study proposes a conceptual model that depicts middle power mediation as a foreign policy strategy in the context of asymmetric alliance dynamics. It expands on Touval's (2003) mediation-as-foreign policy perspective and argues that once mediation is conceived of as a viable political option in the conduct of foreign policy, engaging in mediation activity enables middle powers to create an extra space of political power not otherwise available. The article introduces an analytical model that explains the dynamics of mediation-as-foreign policy approach and the mechanisms that translate mediation engagement into political leverage. The analysis focuses on aspects of Turkish mediation efforts between 2002 and 2009 in the context of Turkish- US/EU relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To deal with the wide range of states that are considered middle powers, scholars distinguish between traditional middle powers on the one hand, and emerging, non-traditional or Southern middle powers on the other. This article examines the middle power concept in light of such diversity. It rejects middle power conceptions based on a ranking of size, power or position, on performing morally commendable international actions, on playing niche roles in international diplomacy, or on national self-identification. The article then considers a conception of middle powers as international stabilisers. The difficulty with this latter conception is that new middle powers exhibit a counter-hegemonic streak and a preference for multipolarity. Both of these are destabilising. The proposed solution is to jettison adjectives such as ‘emerging’ or ‘Southern’ with regard to middle powers, to stop classifying mid-range states with counter-hegemonic tendencies as middle powers, and to restrict the middle power term to mid-range states that actively support the liberal hegemonic project. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Renewed interest in middle powers since the late 2000s has seen a surge in research. Yet an agreed definition is more elusive than ever. This compromises the ability to pursue meaningful research programs, communicate practical policy advice, and instruct future generations. Why is an agreed definition so elusive and how can this challenge be overcome? The author contends that the definition of the term ‘middle power’ has evolved to be less about discovering either ‘the meaning of a word’ or ‘the nature of a thing’ in the pursuit of knowledge, and more about persuasion, influence, coercion and, ultimately, the exercise of power. An alternative approach to definition offers the best hope to address this challenge. With this objective, the author first looks into the nature and criteria for definition in the social sciences. Second, he looks at the structure of contemporary attempts to redefine the term. Third, he analyses definitional ruptures to shed light on the rhetorical import of contests. Finally, the author turns to rhetorical theory to offer an alternative approach to the definition of the term ‘middle power’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article gives an overview of the involvement of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji in peacekeeping operations with attention to motives, experience and ‘lessons learnt’. Australia and New Zealand have been strongly influenced by regional considerations and an understanding of good international citizenship. Fiji’s contribution has been determined less by regional considerations and more by its position as a small developing country whose peacekeeping activities bring economic benefits, although it could be argued that by providing a basis for extending military forces they have contributed indirectly to political instability. Police contributions have been increasingly important to Australia and New Zealand and they have advocated a stronger role for police in other situations around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing consensus that the international system needs to be reformed to reflect the changing distribution of power with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). The Group of Twenty (G20) has been at the centre of these discussions. Within the G20, emphasis has been on great powers or rising powers and their capacity to drive reform. Less attention has been given to the preferences and strategies of middle powers in the G20 and their capacity to shape global governance reform. Drawing on interviews with G20 officials, this paper considers the role of Australia as president of the G20 in 2014. Australia’s presidency presents a unique opportunity to examine the behaviour of a middle power as it balances the competing global governance claims of the USA and the BRICs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article attempts to understand the properties, potentials and limits of middle-power activism in a changing global order. Extensive debate on the rise of emerging powers notwithstanding, the potential contributions of emerging middle powers in regional and global governance, and the imminent challenges they face in their struggle for an upgraded status in the hierarchy of world politics, is an understudied issue. This study aims to fill this gap by offering a broad conceptual framework for middle-power activism and testing it with reference to the Turkish case. In this context, the authors aim to address the following questions: What kind of roles can emerging middle powers play in a post-hegemonic international system? What are the dynamics, properties and limitations of emerging middle-power activism in regional and global governance? Based on an extensive study of the Turkish case, the authors’ central thesis is that emerging middle powers can make important contributions to regional and global governance. Their ultimate impact, however, is not inevitable, but depends on a complementary set of conditions, which are outlined in this study. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many middle powers in East Asia-particularly South Korea and Malaysia-are affected by the strategic relationship between the USA (hereafter the USA) and China. Therefore, I would like to examine the strategic behaviors of the middle powers in East Asia from a hedging strategy perspective. The hedging strategy extends the logic of the traditional balance of power theory while maintaining a strong emphasis on structural incentives, which critics have found lacking in the soft balance approach. Most East Asian states have calibrated their security measures and strategies in response to the changing US-China relationship. The purpose of this article is to compare the hedging strategies of South Korea and Malaysia, which are middle powers, that affect the East Asian security order. This article, thus, aims not simply to explain specific instances of the hedging strategies of middle powers but also, based on this theoretical foundation, to establish a new frame of analysis for the hedging strategies of middle powers through objective and critical assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a liberal-institutionalist conceptual framework drawn from Middle Power theory to analyse Australian foreign policy approaches towards Asia Pacific regionalism. Building on precedents set by the former Keating administration, the Labor government of Rudd/Gillard (2007–13) undertook high-profile efforts not only to engage, but to champion, the regionalism process in the Asia Pacific. This enterprise became fused with a self-proclaimed identity as a ‘creative middle power’. Through an analysis of regional community building, regional security architecture and regional order, the article identifies the strong linkages between the theory and practice of ‘middle power’ diplomacy, and the concept of ‘regionalism’ itself, in Australian foreign policy. The article thus contributes to the theoretical literature by exposing the important intersections between the two concepts and concludes that despite Rudd’s prolific attempts to harness Australia’s middle power credentials, Canberra was not able to significantly affect the process of Asia Pacific regionalism unilaterally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although South Africa led the UN to adopt its first resolution on sexual orientation in 2011, in recent years, South Africa has made various sharp foreign policy reversals on issues related to sexual orientation and human rights. This article discusses five such policymaking episodes over the period 2010–2016 and considers the wider implications of South Africa's flip-flopping. For one, South Africa's recent behaviour on international sexual orientation issues suggests that the foreign policymaking environment in South Africa is weak, unstructured and porous. Moreover, the sexual orientation issue exposes the limited scope South Africa has to act as a representative of Africa, as a leader in the developing world and as a bridge-building middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Orthodox thinking ascribes the middle-power moniker "good international citizen" to South Korea as a nuclear power. Such thinking designates a good international citizen as a state that upholds the norms and regimes of the international state system in normative and behavioral terms. Such a designation may be warranted in strategic terms, considering South Korea is a non-nuclear weapons state in East Asia. However, the designation is rarely applied to South Korea's civil nuclear program in such theoretical terms. The aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on South Korea's international, civil nuclear policies in terms of human security. The paper juxtaposes South Korea’s normative international profile in nuclear regimes, assessed in traditional middle power terms, with its international, civil nuclear policy choices assessed in human security terms. It concludes that South Korea’s designation as a good international citizen has reason to be questioned, when it comes to international, civil nuclear policy. Policy prescriptions are therefore offered to better align Seoul with its rhetoric of being a responsible middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to discuss the appropriation of the concept of emerging power to the field of international relations, the theoretical impact it inflicts on the discipline, and the duality of its formation as a theoretical category. The adjective emerging has been appropriated into the vocabulary of international relations, but such lexical novelty comprises a debate with earlier theorisations on intermediate states. It is argued that this dialogue between the transience in the narratives of change, brought up by the qualifier emerging powers, and the stasis from the theoretical accumulation on the condition from which it breaks through is a constitutive foundation for the concept as an analytical device for international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses South Korea's distinctive rise in status in the international order, exploring the domestic, international, and sectoral perspectives. Topics discussed include South Korea as a rising middle power and its significance in international influence and regional and global status, components of domestic power, and the role played by economic development in sustaining middle power status.

Copyright of International Journal of Canadian Studies is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article argues that middle power diplomacy can be identified as having gone through three distinct waves. The first is connected with the immediate post-1945 global order, with a focus on multilateralism via the United Nations and related bodies. The second moved to ad hoc bursts of activism related to specific issue area niches. The third and current wave, by contrast, is embedded in the informal institutionalization associated with the G20. Just as the BRICS have used the G20 as a catalyst for differentiated activities both around and independent of the G20, the “missing middle” in the G20 (countries increasingly portrayed as middle powers beyond both the BRICS and the G7) have begun to explore the possibility of collective action. MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia), while possibly a significant advance in global governance, has the potential of hardening the categories of countries identified as middle powers. At the same time, the MIKTA countries face a number of serious constraints in terms of this global reach. Institutional elevation is compromised by practice limitations, most notably the hold of regional imperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle power conceptualization has been reinvented over the years as the structural weight of this cluster of countries changes. Moreover, the means by which middle powers project normative values and operational diplomatic approaches has morphed with the evolution of the global order. A constant, however, has been the unwillingness of middle powers to embrace some form of institutionalization. The focus has been multilateralism and/or specific functional issue areas or niches. This article argues that the combination of a world of diffuse power and a new type of informalism opens the possibility of collective action. Although MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) is in an early stage of development, this formation provides a significant test of the meaning and modalities of middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to identify possible new roles for intermediary actors in the changing global architecture by focusing on Turkey’s middle power capacity in the nascent middle power network of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia (MIKTA). It looks at an overarching embedded analytical triad of goals, means, and impact, superimposed over positional, behavioural, and ideational sublayers. It tests the assumption that the more a state holds together its middle power goals, means, and impact in a combined way, the more leverage it can have as a middle power in the changing international political economy. After reviewing the existing literature on middle powers, the first part of this paper outlines this embedded analytical framework. The second and the third parts seek to operationalize this framework, in particular at institutional and state levels in the example of MIKTA and Turkey. The fourth part delves into the opportunities and challenges that Turkey faces in its MIKTA trajectory (in the light of the conclusions drawn from the second and third parts). The study concludes that while Turkey possesses fairly compatible goals and impact with those of MIKTA, it is still far from channelling all of its capabilities to this new network due mainly to the domestic and regional impediments it faces—as well as the lack of a comprehensive roadmap in relation to MIKTA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a framework to help understand Indonesia’s rise. Although the study of emerging powers has flourished in recent years, much discussion is devoted to explaining large emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). Indonesia’s rise is overlooked because its material capabilities are less than those of the BRIC countries. In order to characterize the emergence of Indonesia, this article establishes a set of parameters to distinguish Indonesia from BRIC and middle powers. The parameters are: (1) attitude toward the international order; (2) performed role; and (3) nexus between regional and global roles. This article argues that Indonesia displays three characteristics that distinguish it from BRIC and middle powers—(1) soft-revisionist; (2) normative bridge building; and (3) accommodative regional leadership. The third and fourth sections of this article test these characteristics through G20 and climate change case studies. This article concludes that the characteristics of Indonesia’s emergence are located in a conundrum between those of BRIC and middle powers. Although it shares some characteristics with BRIC countries, Indonesia is carefully trying to keep a distance from BRIC and to maintain strategic autonomy in relations with other international actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenges for middle powers relate directly to their unstable positional status in the international system. Yet this unique position in the international Goldilocks Zone of having not too much power but power enough also gives them unique opportunities. Successful middle powers recognize their middle power status and then formulate a strategic diplomacy suited to this status in which they accept the centrality of great power interests and roles. Too many middle powers fail to do this because they entertain delusions of grandeur, and when those delusions are revealed they fall into isolation or disengagement from global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whilst identification of Korea's Arctic issue agenda and motives has been established, there is little examination as to determining why certain issues and partnerships are being developed at certain points in the context of regional geopolitical shifts. I argue that Korea's role in the Arctic represents a shift in Korea's middle power strategy from bridge nation to pivot nation. Korea's current Arctic strategy links to a wider transcontinental strategy. As a result, conventional middle power criteria are being challenged by a strategy based on network centrality rather than 'middle' structural location or resource concentration. This shift represents not just 'middle power' leverage but opens potentially different understandings and expectations over what counts as middle power leverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea has emerged as a new middle power that plays a significant role in a wide range of important global issue areas and supports liberal international order with its leadership diplomacy. Even though regional challenges will continue to demand large foreign policy resources including time, human resources, and budget, the middle power orientation of South Korean foreign policy behaviour and strategy—for example, multilateralism, the rule of law, and promotion of cooperation and compromise—will remain in place even in the conduct of regional foreign policy.This optimism is based on the fact that South Korea is a middle power not only in global governance but also in the East Asian region. Even on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the most important foreign policy challenge of the day, the South has accepted the regionalization of the issue and, over time, its middle power role. It has relied on the middle power strategy of mobilizing international pressure on the North rather than deploying and strengthening its unilateral options such as the use of force or massive economic aid.In order to fully realize the promise and potential of middle power diplomacy, however, South Korea must make strong efforts to alleviate structural constraints on a middle power strategy. First, Korean leaders should undertake a full-scale campaign to de-nationalize Korean education and, thus, Korean foreign policy orientations. Second, a strong domestic consensus should emerge giving the national interest precedence over group interests when dealing with foreign policy challenges. Finally, political leaders and diplomats must create new opportunities in global governance and deliver tangible national benefits through middle power diplomacy. Middle power diplomacy, like all foreign policy strategies, will not be sustainable without strong domestic support; and domestic support cannot be built on goodwill and commitment to universal values alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author presents the account of his time as New Zealand high commissioner in India. Topics include on the foreign policy front, in the 1990s India at long last seemed interested in developing a more engaged approach towards Southeast Asia and the Asia–Pacific region, and the Indians were indiscreetly scornful about what they saw as its middle power pretensions and its close alliance with the U.S.

The issue of bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy is not often substantially addressed. The country's relations with the world appear to exhibit strong continuity regardless of the political party in government. And yet, when it comes to engagement with African states and issues, the last two decades have seen highly prominent partisan differences in Australian foreign policy. This article utilises the example of Australia's foreign policy engagement with Africa to argue that there may be two levels of understanding bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy. On the one hand, aimed at relationships and issues perceived to be of primal and significant security and economic well-being for the country, Australian foreign policy does indeed appear to be bipartisan. However, aimed at relationships and issues that have traditionally been perceived as holding minimal security and economic interest and importance for the country, Australian foreign policy does exhibit partisanship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an altering global power architecture, South Korea has the national capacity to contribute to resolving transnational issues and has the potential to support a global common good. But in the discourse of South Korea's role, the pivotal question has always been "how" to be a responsible middle power. Until now, South Korea has implemented its middle power in four different aspects: (1) Balancing Act in Northeast Asia; (2) ODA policy; (3) UN PKO; and (4) Global agenda setting. However, among the four, South Korea's focus on balancing in Northeast Asia and ODA policy has been disproportionately concentrated in Asia due to national interests. This paper argues that in order to be a responsible middle power, South Korea should avert from a myopic Asian standpoint and concentrate more on global agenda setting through international institutions and the G20 platform. South Korea's inherent structural constraints hamper a more proactive engagement in UN PKO. Therefore, global agenda setting is a more appropriate sphere to contribute to the world as a responsible middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper argues that MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) are middle, regional, and constructive powers that can serve as providers of global governance in the international system. In order to support this idea, the paper first reviews the literature on these concepts, arguing that they can be complementary. Then, it explains why the MIKTA countries can be defined as middle, regional and constructive powers. To do so, it describes what MIKTA is, as well the common characteristics, objectives, and strategies that the countries that compose this mechanism share. Finally, it argues that in order for MIKTA countries to serve as middle, regional, and constructive powers, they need to consolidate the support of all relevant State and non-State actors in their countries, allowing MIKTA to become a relevant mechanism to promote and generate public goods in the international system, specially global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of global environmental governance South Korea stands out. Since 2005 it has been the initiator and central node in a majority of international networks and organizations promoting green growth. Based on new theoretical approaches and empirical analysis, this article highlights the significance of Korea's middle power diplomacy in relation to green growth governance, establishing it as a 'GreenMiddle Power.' Middle power analyses of Korea usually portray it as a regionally constrained and secondary actor in global governance. This article supplements middle power theory's behavioral approach with a strategic action approach inspired by Bourdieu's practice theory, which it applies to an original database of >1,000 sources, 18 interviews, and 10 participatory observations. The article argues that Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance by demonstrating how Korea has established a subfield of green growth governance through a wide range of strategic moves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]