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This paper analyses the extent and determinants of rural household poverty in the eastern highlands of Ethiopia. We study 216 households using a household consumption expenditure approach. We are particularly interested in the effects of location-specific and institutional factors (networks) in determining the probability of being poor. Our findings suggest that poverty is location-specific, depends on access to irrigated land (not land per se) and access to non-farm income. Results also indicate that household wellbeing is negatively affected by household size, and positively affected by age of household head. Involvement in governance, social and production related networks is also found to be strongly associated with the probability of a household be poor.

This paper presents a conceptual framework on how institutions of property rights and collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including through external interventions and action by poor people themselves. The first part of the paper examines the initial conditions of poverty, highlighting the role of assets, risks and vulnerability, legal structures and power relations. The latter part investigates the decision-making dynamics of actors—both poor and non-poor—and how they can use the tangible and intangible resources they have to shape their livelihoods and the institutions that govern their lives. The paper concludes with a discussion of how attention to property rights and collective action can improve the understanding of outcomes in terms of changes in wellbeing.

"This paper presents a conceptual framework on how institutions of property rights and collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including through external interventions and action by poor people themselves. The first part of the paper examines the initial conditions of poverty, highlighting the role of assets, risks and vulnerability, legal structures and power relations. The latter part investigates the decision-making dynamics of actors—both poor and non-poor—and how they can use the tangible and intangible resources they have to shape their livelihoods and the institutions that govern their lives. The paper concludes with a discussion of how attention to property rights and collective action can improve the understanding of outcomes in terms of changes in wellbeing." authors' abstract

Ethiopia experiences a fierce political debate about the appropriate land tenure policy. After the fall of the socialist derg regime in 1991, land property rights have remained vested in the state and only usufruct rights have been alienated to farmers – to the disappointment of international donor agencies. This has nurtured an antagonistic debate between advocates of the privatization of land property rights to individual plot holders and those supporting the government’s position. This debate, however, fails to account for the diversity and continuities in Ethiopian land tenure systems. This paper reviews the changing bundles of rights farmers have held during various political regimes in Ethiopia, the imperial, the derg and the current one, at different times and places. Our analysis indicates the marked differences in tenure arrangements after the fall of the empire, but identifies some commonalities in land tenure regimes as well, in particular between the traditional rist system and the current tenure system.

In Ethiopian development policies, pastoralist areas have recently attracted more attention. However, much debate and policy advice is still based on assumptions that see a sedentary lifestyle as the desirable development outcome for pastoralist communities. This paper investigates current practices of collective action and how these are affected by changing property rights in the pastoralist and agro– pastoralist economies of three selected sites in eastern Ethiopia. We describe forms of collective action in water and pasture resource management and analyze how changing property rights regimes affect incentives for collective action. We illustrate the distributional effects these practices are having on (agro–) pastoralist communities and how these practices are being influenced by the broader political and economic dynamisms of the area.

This report analyzes land issues in Sri Lanka, which cannot be seen in isolation from the ethnic and political conflict and, at the same time, even though land conflict is often linked with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a large number of land conflicts in the North and East can be resolved prior to a full and national political solution to the ethnic situation. This report analyzes constraints and opportunities for an effective governance framework for land access and land tenure security in the conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka, develops a comprehensive typology of land-related conflicts to inform policy dialogue and to identify types of conflict that may be resolvable in the current situation and to distinguish them from those which are not, identifies policy criteria to further ensure a conflict-sensitive approach in a post-conflict and post-tsunami context whereby regional, religious and ethnic balances in the allocation and/or restitution of land and property rights are to be addressed. The report synthesizes existing studies, mainly qualitative assessments of limited scope and outreach, but a more in-depth quantitative assessment may be conducted later on, when the political situation is conducive to do so.

Capitalizing on the mobility of livestock is one of the major ways in which pastoralists have managed ecological uncertainties and risks, as it enables them the opportunistic use of the resources. However, agricultural encroachment onto rangelands by nearby agro-pastoralists has led to a shortage in grazing area and threatened the mobility of the pastoralists. As this process leads to a significant disruption and weakening of the risk-management systems of pastoralists, they seek for various institutional arrangements with agropastoralists to enable them access to common grazing land. Based on an exploratory survey and data derived from interview of 146 households in ea stern Ethiopia, this paper uses an adaptation of the sequential rationality game theoretical model and institutional analysis to discrete choice models. The analytical framework, in its entirety, presents a simple model of household and community level decision-making, in which they are concerned about t heir welfare along many different dimensions. Choice of institutional arrangement, namely no opinion, reciprocal, sharing milk and the right to use milk, is modelled using multinomial logit discrete choice procedure. The model chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1% level of probability. For all arrangements, there are three to five observable characteristics of household that provide statistically significant predictive power for practicing a given arrangement. The paper argues resource scarcity may enhance the bargaining position of asset-poor members of an agro-pastoral society and urges the wealthier agropastoralists to comply with a non-violent resolution of competing claims towards a resource sharing arrangement.

It is often argued that environmental scarcity was a trigger and source of violent conflict, in particular in African countries. At the root of such arguments is a simple environmental determinism, which understands scarcity as undermining co-operative relationships between competing resource users. Robert Kaplan popularised this thesis in his argument about "The Coming Anarchy", where he interpreted recent civil wars in Africa as an advent of a fundamental environmental crisis. In our view, this conception disregards the crucial role of local-level institutions in governing competing resource claims. In this paper, we present a case study from the violence-prone Somali Region, Ethiopia. We analyse how agro-pastoralist communities develop sharing arrangements on pasture resources with intruding pastoralist communities in drought years, even though this places additional pressure on their grazing resource. A household survey investigates the determinants for different households in the agro-pastoralist community, asset-poor and wealthy ones, to enter into different types of sharing arrangements. Our findings suggest that resource sharing offers asset-poor households opportunities to stabilise and enhance their asset-base in drought years, providing incentives for co-operative rather than conflictive relations with intruding pastoralists. We conclude that it may depend on potential incentives arising from institutional arrangements, whether competing resource claims in periods of environmental scarcity are resolved peacefully or violently.

"It is often argued that environmental scarcity was a trigger and source of violent conflict, in particular in African countries. At the root of such arguments is a simple environmental determinism, which understands scarcity as undermining co-operative relationships between competing resource users. Robert Kaplan popularised this thesis in his argument about 'The Coming Anarchy', where he interpreted recent civil wars in Africa as an advent of a fundamental environmental crisis. In our view, this conception disregards the crucial role of local-level institutions in governing competing resource claims. In this paper, we present a case study from the violence-prone Somali Region, Ethiopia. We analyse how agro-pastoralist communities develop sharing arrangements on pasture resources with intruding pastoralist communities in drought years, even though this places additional pressure on their grazing resource. A household survey investigates the determinants for different households in the agro-pastoralist community, asset-poor and wealthy ones, to enter into different types of sharing arrangements. Our findings suggest that resource sharing offers asset-poor households opportunities to stabilise and enhance their asset-base in drought years, providing incentives for co-operative rather than conflictive relations with intruding pastoralists. We conclude that it may depend on potential incentives arising from institutional arrangements, whether competing resource claims in periods of environmental scarcity are resolved peacefully or violently." (author's abstract)

This paper seeks to address the question: why does poverty persist in rural Ethiopia? We argue that it is largely a lack of entitlements to fundamental livelihood assets which urges poor rural farmers into livelihood diversification to make a living. We base our findings on empirical work, which is based on information gathered from a three-round survey of 149 rural households in Ethiopia during 1999/2000 cropping season. The FGT poverty index is employed to examine the extent and severity of rural poverty and reveals that nearly 40% of the sample households live below poverty line with average poverty gap of 0.047. The binary logit estimates shed light on factors behind the persistence of poverty and indicates that rural poverty is strongly linked to entitlement failures to crucial assets such as land, human capital and oxen. The study also reveals that poor households attempt to smooth their consumption and income through livelihood diversification, among which petty trading, charcoal making and fuelwood gathering for sale, brewing and craftsmanship are the significant ones.

In the light of a growing number of unstabilized regions of warfare or post-war conditions, this paper investigates how civilians survive in the context of a civil war. It analyzes livelihood strategies of farmers in the war-torn areas of Sri Lanka. The analytical framework is based on a revised form of DFID's sustainable rural livelihoods approach placing particular attention on the institutional reproduction of household capital assets in the war economy. The paper delineates a three pillar model of household livelihood strategies focusing on how households (i) cope with the increased level of risk and uncertainty, (ii) adjust their economic and social household assets for economic survival, and how they (iii) use their social and political assets as livelihood strategies. Empirically, the paper analyses four local case studies from the east of Sri Lanka. A key conclusion from the empirical studies was that even though the four case studies were located geographically very close, their livelihood outcomes differed considerably depending on the very specific local political geography. The role of social and political assets is thereby essential: While social assets (extended family networks) were important to absorb migrants, political assets (alliances with power holders) were instrumental in enabling individuals, households or economic actors to stabilize or even expand their livelihood options and opportunities. Hence, civilians are not all victims, some may also be culprits in the political economy of warfare. From a perspective of war-winners and losers, war can be both, a threat and an opportunity, often at the same time.

The present paper investigates how ethnic violence and civil war in Sri Lanka have affected local property rights institutions . I use local case studies to analyze the institutional relations and alliances between civilians and combatants in the emergent society of violence that shapes local communities in civil war. My focus will be on how civilians from different ethnic groups utilize social and political capital assets to secure entitlements to natural resources. The findings of my research suggest that resource entitlements in Trincomalee are "ethnicised" in the sense that opportunities and access to resources are unequally distributed among the three ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims), because these groups are unequally endowed with political capital. Patron-client networks based on ethnicity shape the relative bargaining power of local actors. This system reproduces perceived grievances among the different ethnic groups and thus reproduces the conditions for ethnic violence.