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The authors examine how institutional context affects political decision making in Congress by investigating party leaders’ agenda construction strategies and members’ roll-call participation across regular and lame-duck sessions in the pre-Twentieth Amendment House (1877-1933). The authors find evidence to suggest that party leaders pursued relatively more partisan agendas in lame-duck sessions and did so successfully. Next, we investigate the effects such agendas had on roll-call participation. The authors find that returning (reelected) members significantly decreased their abstention levels, while departing (defeated and retiring) members significantly increased their abstention levels. Yet the authors also find that departing members could be drawn to participate on certain types of roll-call votes even in the face of strong incentives to shirk. Party leaders rely on the generally higher levels of participation by returning members as well as the selective participation of departing members to overcome “participatory agency loss” and pass surprisingly partisan lame-duck agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Numerous studies have examined the incidence of killer amendments in Congress, but most of these studies have been either case specific, focusing on the legislative maneuverings around a single issue or bill, or temporally limited, focusing on strategic activity in only one or two Congresses. In this article, we present the beginning of a comprehensive research agenda for the systematic study of killer amendments. Using roll-call data from the 83d through the 108th U.S. House (1953-2004), we identified those bills that (a) were successfully amended and (b) subsequently went down to defeat, a necessary condition for the existence of a killer amendment. We then examined these cases in greater detail, using both spatial analyses and case studies. Our analysis uncovered five cases, four of which are new, that appear to have the characteristics of true killer amendments, thus setting the stage for future analyses across time and legislative chambers and bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We disentangle constituent and partisan influences in Congress by taking advantage of a largely unexamined institutional setting¿lame-duck sessions. Lame-duck sessions of Congress are comprised of exiting members, who are freed from both constituency and party constraints, and returning members, who face a significantly reduced constituency constraint but a still strong party constraint. Comparing exiting and returning House members thus provides meaningful leverage in assessing the constraining influence of party. In the regularly occurring lame-duck sessions between 1877 and 1933, exiting House members exhibited greater movement away from the median party position than did returning members, consistent with expectations regarding party influence. In addition, party leaders' ability to apply pressure was significantly reduced in lame-duck sessions due to the presence of a large group of exiting members. Finally, majority-party leaders were able to exercise negative agenda control in lame-duck sessions when their party maintained control of the next Congress, but they often acted to roll their own party members (an occurrence we dub a "strategic roll") when their party lost control of the next Congress, as a way to minimize policy loss. In the post-1933 era, after the passage of the 20th Amendment, lame-duck sessions (those portions of the second session that stretch beyond the November elections) are more accurately characterized as extensions of regular sessions, with party leaders' ability to pressure members and exercise negative agenda control remaining virtually constant across sessions. Lower levels of turnover in the modern era appear to contribute to an enhanced ability of majority-party leaders to wield influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present evidence suggesting that the majority party in the U.S. Senate exercises significant negative agenda control. Furthermore, this majority party negative agenda control in the Senate is very similar, in empirical terms, to negative agenda control exercised by the majority party in the U.S. House of Representatives. This evidence comes from comparisons of majority party roll rates across legislative vehicles (S bills, confirmation votes, and conference reports) and across chambers of Congress. Majority party roll rates respond to disagreement with other political actors as if the Senate majority party does restrict agenda access. Moreover, the response of majority party roll rates to disagreement with other political actors is very similar across the two chambers. Given that explanations of majority party negative agenda control in the House are often predicated on chamber-specific factors with no clear analogues in the Senate, the results reveal a striking cross-chamber similarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the politics of the "Salary Grab" of 1873, legislation that increased congressional salaries retroactively by 50 percent. A group of New England and Midwestern elites opposed the Salary Grab, along with congressional franking and patronage-based civil service appointments, as part of a reform effort to reshape "who should govern Congress." Our analyses of congressional voting confirm the existence of this nonparty elite coalition. Although these elites lost many legislative battles in the short run, their efforts kept reform on the legislative agenda throughout the late nineteenth century and ultimately set the stage for the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the influence of political parties on the U.S. Congress. Research investigating party influence in Congress has exploded over the last decade. This trend has been due, in part, to concerns raised about what constitutes evidence of party influence. Traditionally, congressional scholars have viewed roll-call-based measures of partisanship, such as measures of party strength or party cohesion, as sufficient to make the case for strong party influence in Congress. In effect, majority party members delegate authority to central agents, who structure the legislative agenda to foster the success of the party. This is done in two ways. First, policy logrolls are constructed, with individual party members extracting district-specific benefits while supporting the partisan agenda as a whole. Second, gatekeeping is employed at the committee level, so that policies opposed by a party majority are not referred to the floor. To prevent defection from the partisan agenda, majority party leaders wield various "carrots and sticks" that can affect members' electoral fortunes. For example, prime committee assignments and privileged positions on the legislative calendar can be bestowed or taken away, depending upon the degree of partisan loyalty that members exhibit. At the extreme, members can be kicked out of the caucus.

Focuses on the decision of the U.S. House of representatives in 1839 to stop electing its Speaker by secret ballot. Reasons behind the decision of U.S. Representatives; Comparison of the procedures for electing Speaker of the House before and after 1839; Assessment of consequences of electing Speakers without secret ballot.

While much empirical research has been devoted to the study of “killer amendments” in recent years, few studies have explicitly examined the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to investigate why some killer amendment attempts are successful, when theory suggests that they should always fail. More specifically, we examine the practical political constraints on legislators’ abilities to neutralize the imminent threat of killer amendments through sophisticated voting. We also present two new cases, both occurring during the Reconstruction era, in which killer amendments were used successfully. In the end, our findings support previous research on all successful killer amendments detailed in the congressional literature: race was the issue under consideration at the amendment stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses United States members of Congress' establishment of ideological positions which they maintain throughout the entirety of their careers. Use of vote-scaling techniques and roll-call voting data from the Congress of the Confederate States of America; Low levels of cross-system stability among members who moved from the U.S. House to the Confederate House.

Explores the Republican Party's origins at the institutional level in the 34th U.S. House of Representatives. Application of the spatial theory of voting to the House balloting for Speaker; Determinant of vote choice throughout the two-month speakership battle; Impact of nativism on members' votes for speaker.

Investigates the influence of political parties on Congressional roll-call voting in the United States (US). Analysis of voting behavior in the US and Confederate Congress; Utilization of vote-scaling techniques; Comparison between roll-call voting in the party system and nonparty system; Application of the Snyder-Groseclose method.

Focuses on the rights on properties and the emergence of standing committee dominance in the nineteenth-century U.S. House. Heterogeneity of the Jeffersonian coalition; Machinations of the House Speaker; Production of an institutional change serving the needs of all major parties in the House.