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The study of European Union (EU) politics has matured in important ways in the past two decades. In place of the grand yet vague focus on the study of European integration writ large, scholars have increasingly organized themselves into research communities focusing on particular aspects of European Union governance. With this specialization, scholars in each community have advanced towards agreement on definitions and conceptual characterizations. These ground rules are essential to the collective research enterprise and the advancement of knowledge. However, we are concerned that this advancement is retarded unnecessarily by the dearth of public and systematically collected data on EU politics. In short, such data are essential if the field endeavours to move toward normal science. It is our opinion that too little attention has been given to disseminating information about available data and, more fundamentally, to the collection of such data. In this essay, we argue that the cumulation of knowledge in the study of European Union politics depends crucially on expanding the amount of public systematic data. We then describe the data currently available a broad range of research communities. In so doing, we hope this provides an effective means of disseminating information about available data. We intend to provide a continuously updated list of such data sets our journal website. Finally, we describe an agenda for future data collection, focusing on a variety of areas in which data are particularly scarce.

Starting from the assumption that the EU can be analysed as a comparative political system, Simon Hix draws on basic considerations of comparative constitution for a 'multi-ethnic, continental-scale political system' (Lijhart) two basic issues have to be addresses: the vertical design, i.e. the power relations between the centre and the states (allocation, separation/fusion of policy competences, resolution of competence disputes) and the horizontal dimension, i.e. the representation in and accountability of the central institutions (executive-legislative relations, organisation of representation and decision-making, selection of legislature and executive). Reaching the conclusion that the Treaty of Nice has led to a growing centralisation of policy competences and to increasingly fused majorities for selecting executive power and for enacting legislation, Hix stresses two major questions to be addressed by the newly launched 'Constitutional Convention': should there be fused/centralised or separated/judicialised institutions and should these institutions be majoritarian or allow for multiple-veto-players and divided government?

Discusses the issue of accountability. Argues that the holders of political power in the EU institutions must be made more accountable. The so‐called ‘permissive consensus’, in which Europe's leaders can build a European polity without requiring a priori consent from their voters, no longer exists. The challenge for the EU institutions is that a central element of the practice of democracy in all political systems is the ability of citizens to ‘throw out’ the holders of executive office through the process of competitive elections. The EU has, however, a ‘dual executive’. On the one hand, national governments possess long‐term executive power; on the other hand, in the everyday making of EU social and economic policies, the EU Commission exercises considerable executive power. In the exercise of these powers, moreover, whereas the Council is a true ‘collegial executive’ with a rotating president, the Commission is more like a national cabinet, where the Commission President is the primus inter pares, the ‘first among equals’. Prior to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, neither of these branches of the dual EU executive was accountable via the classic indirect or direct methods. In concluding, the chapter suggests that the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have increased the democratic accountability of at least one part of the EU executive. However, critical questions remain to be addressed, e.g. has this quasi‐parliamentary model of EU executive selection really allowed Europe's voters to choose the EU executive? Can European citizens throw out the Commission President? Or is more fundamental institutional reform needed?

Hix (European and comparative politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK) presents an introduction to the political system of the European Union. Assessing a variety of explanatory theoretical models, he describes the organization and operation of executive, legislative, and judicial governance. He then offers separate chapters analyzing the influence of public opinion, parties and elections, and interest representation on EU politics. Finally, he looks at the formation of policy in the areas of market regulation, expenditures, economic and monetary union, citizen freedom and security policies, and foreign policy.

Defence date: 1 December 1995 Examining Board: Prof. Maurizio Cotta, Università degli Studi di Siena, Supervisor ; Prof. Giandomenico Majone, EUI, co-supervisor ; Prof. Peter Mair, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden ; Prof. Roger Morgan, EUI ; Prof. Alberta Sbragia, University of Pittsburgh First made available online: 5 August 2016 Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the limitations of the traditional approaches to parties and politics in the EU, and introduces an alternative framework which combines the theory and method of ‘comparative politics’. In Chapter 2, the two theoretical levels are brought together in a “comparative politics theory of parties in the European Union”. This theory is subsequently tested in three empirical chapters, each covering a different aspect of party federation behaviour in the EU: party organisational development (Chapter 3); the changing shape of party policy competition (Chapter 4); and the ability of parties to reap policy rewards from the European Council (Chapter 5). A description of the data and the methods used in the analysis is set out in a series of Appendices. Finally, the empirical and theoretical conclusions of the research are drawn together in Chapter 6.