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We build a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to analyze costs and benefits of capital requirements in the short-term and long-term. We show that since increasing capital requirements limits the aggregate loan supply, the equilibrium loan rate spread increases, which raises bank profitability and the market-to-book value of bank capital. Hence, banks build up larger capital buffers which (i) lowers the public losses in case of a systemic crisis and (ii) restores the banking sector’s lending capacity after the short-term credit crunch induced by tighter regulation. We confirm our model’s dynamic implications in a panel VAR estimation, which suggests that bank lending has even increased in the long-run after the implementation of Basel III capital regulation.

The US dollar plays a dominant role in the invoicing of international trade, albeit not an exclusive one as more than half of global trade is invoiced in other currencies. Of particular interest are the euro, with a large role, and the renminbi, with a rising role. These two currencies are well suited to contrast the roles of economic fundamentals and policies, as European policy makers have taken a neutral stance in contrast to the promotion of the international role of the renminbi by the Chinese authorities. We assess the drivers of in- voicing using the most recent and comprehensive data set for 115 countries over 1999-2019. We find that standard mechanisms that foster use of a large economy's currency predicted by theory - i.e. strategic complementarities in price setting and integration in cross-border value chains - underpin use of the dollar and the euro for trade with the United States and the euro area. These mechanisms also support the role of the dollar, but not the euro, in trade between non-US and non-euro area countries, making the dollar the globally dominant invoicing currency. Fundamentals and policies have played a contrasted role for the use of the renminbi. We find that China's integration into global trade has further strengthened the dominant status of the dollar at the expense of the euro. At the same time, the establishment of currency swap lines by the People's Bank of China has been associated with increases in renminbi invoicing, with an adverse effect on dollar use that is larger than for the euro.

We analyze the effect of the geographic expansion of banks across U.S. states on the co-movement of economic activity between states. Exploiting the removal of interstate banking restrictions to construct time-varying instrumental variables at the state-pair level, we find that bilateral banking integration increases output co-movement between states. The effect of financial integration depends on the nature of the idiosyncratic shocks faced by states and is stronger for financially dependent industries. Finally, we show that integration increases the similarity of bank lending fluctuations between states and contributes to the transmission of deposit shocks across states.

With the advent of Basel III and other global and internal challenges, Indian banks have to address several issues simultaneously. Capital shoring up, financial inclusion requirements, risk mitigation and NPA issues are some of them. The common underlying factor among all of these is achieving, maintaining, protecting and growing profitability. To ensure sustainable advantage in all areas, it is essential that banks make all efforts to use every resource at their disposal towards this purpose. Huma resource has always been a key factor in success and profitability of banks. It also represents a major part of operating cost. Profitable deployment of HR cost will ensure both operating and financial advantage. Public sector banks in India have faced several challenges with respect to HR cost. The demand for competitive salaries and growth of business has led to substantial rise in HR costs of public sector banks in recent years. However there is a need to see if the costs are being deployed profitably. Profitable deployment of any cost indicates more efficiency in use of resources and hence a move towards better profitability. With the help of the HCROI ratio and statistical techniques, the study tries to find out if they have moved towards more profitable deployment of HR cost in the decade ending 2013-14.

We study the transmission channels through which shocks affect the global economy and the crosscountry comovement of real economic activity. For this purpose, we collect detailed data on international trade and financial linkages as well as domestic macro and financial variables for a large set of countries. We document significant international output comovement following U.S. monetary shocks, and find that openness to international trade matters more than financial openness in explaining cross-country spillovers. In particular, output in countries with a high share of exports and imports responds to U.S. monetary shocks significantly more than output in countries with a low share, whereas we do not find material heterogeneity depending on international investment positions or financial flows in the balance of payments. We further document strong network amplification associated with the patterns of bilateral trade flows, as indirect spillovers account for nearly half of the total effect. Studies that do not account for direct bilateral linkages between national economies - and the indirect linkages through the network they form - may thus present an incomplete view of international business cycles.

We document the evolution of labor markets of five Latin American countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, with emphasis on informal employment. We show, for most countries, a slump in aggregate employment, mirrored by a fall in labor participation, and a decline in the informality rate. The latter is unprecedented since informality used to cushion the decline in overall employment in previous recessions. Using a business cycle model with a rich labor market structure, we recover the shocks that rationalize the pandemic recession, showing that labor supply shocks and productivity shocks to the informal sector are essential to account for the employment and output loss and for the decline in the informality rate.

This paper assesses how globalisation has shaped the economic environment in which the ECB operates and discusses whether this warrants adjustments to the monetary policy strategy. The paper first looks at how trade and financial integration have evolved since the last strategy review in 2003. It then examines the effects of these developments on global productivity growth, the natural interest rate (r*), inflation trends and monetary transmission. While trade globalisation initially boosted productivity growth, this effect may be waning as trade integration slows and market contestability promotes a winner-takes-all environment. The impact of globalisation on r* has been ambiguous: downward pressures, fuelled by global demand for safe assets and an increase in the propensity to save against a background of rising inequality, are counteracted by upward pressures, from the boost to global productivity associated with greater trade integration. Headline inflation rates have become more synchronised globally, largely because commodity prices are increasingly determined by global factors. Meanwhile, core inflation rates show a lower degree of commonality. Globalisation has made a rather modest contribution to the synchronised fall in trend inflation across countries and contributed only moderately to the reduction in the responsiveness of inflation to changes in activity. Regarding monetary transmission, globalisation has made the role of the exchange rate more complex by introducing new mechanisms through which it affects financial conditions, real activity and price dynamics. Against the background of this discussion, the paper then examines the implications for the ECB's monetary policy strategy. In doing so, it asks two questions. How is the ECB's economic and monetary analysis affected by globalisation? And how does globalisation influence the choice of the ECB's monetary policy objective and instruments? ...

This paper studies the performance of interest limita- tion rules during business cycles. It employs register data on Finnish affiliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to study both thin-capitalization rules (TCRs) and earnings-stripping rules (ESRs). Both types of rules are found to become tighter in economic downturns: TCRs due to higher debt-to-equity ratios and ESRs due to lower company profits. Among equally tight interest limitation rules, TCRs are found to provide less variation and less pro-cyclical outcomes by increasing the compa- ny tax burden less than ESRs in an economic downturn. While ESRs increase the tax burden of Finnish compa- nies by 17.5%-19.3% following the 2008 global financial crisis, for TCRs the increase is less than 10%. Among the ESRs, we find that an EBIT rule induces tighter tax treat- ment in economic downturns than an EBITDA rule. How- ever, the differences between ESRs remain very small.

In economies with fixed exchange rates, the adjustment to government spending shocks is asymmetric. A fiscal expansion appreciates the real exchange rate but does not stimulate output. A fiscal contraction does not alter the exchange rate, but lowers output. We develop these insights in a two-sector model of a small open economy with downward nominal wage rigidity. We establish new empirical evidence that supports the predictions of the model along several dimensions: not only does the exchange rate regime shape the fiscal transmission mechanism as predicted by the model - in doing so it also interacts with economic slack and inflation.

The US economic expansion which began in 2009 was unusually prolonged but relatively weak. Profitability and investment strengthened between 2010 and 2015 but then began to falter. After Trump took office in 2017 there was a minor recovery in investment but the proceeds of major tax cuts were overwhelmingly used to finance pay outs to share owners. Unemployment fell steadily from 2010 but with a shift towards lower paid jobs. Median wages increased from around 2014, but while those for women had risen steadily since the 1980s, those for men only recuperated their 1980 level in 2018. By contrast, top incomes soared. The impact of the Covid19 epidemic was partly cushioned by huge government spending programmes, but unemployment among less skilled workers increased strongly, while the massive monetary response led to an unprecedented bonanza for the rich. The Biden government's first major initiative extended unemployment benefits and promoted a national response to the health emergency, but failed to secure an increase in the national minimum wage to $15 an hour.

This paper develops a threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country model (TG-VAR) to quantify the macroeconomic effects of Covid-19. We show that there exist threshold effects in the relationship between output growth and excess global volatility at individual country levels in a significant majority of advanced economies and in the case of several emerging markets. We then estimate a more general multi-country model augmented with these threshold effects as well as long term interest rates, oil prices, exchange rates and equity returns to perform counterfactual analyses. We distinguish common global factors from trade-related spillovers, and identify the Covid-19 shock using GDP growth forecast revisions of the IMF in 2020Q1. We account for sam-ple uncertainty by bootstrapping the multi-country model estimated over four decades of quarterly observations. Our results show that the Covid-19 pandemic will lead to a significant fall in world output that is most likely long-lasting, with outcomes that are quite heterogenous across countries and regions. While the impact on China and other emerging Asian economies are estimated to be less severe, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other advanced economies may experience deeper and longer-lasting effects. Non-Asian emerging markets stand out for their vulnerability. We show that no country is immune to the economic fallout of the pandemic because of global interconnections as evidenced by the case of Sweden. We also find that long-term interest rates could fall significantly below their recent lows in core advanced economies, but this does not seem to be the case in emerging markets.

The world economy has experienced four global recessions over the past seven decades: in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. During each of these episodes, annual real per capita global gross domestic product contracted, and this contraction was accompanied by weakening of other key indicators of global economic activity. The global recessions were highly synchronized internationally, with severe economic and financial disruptions in many countries around the world. The 2009 global recession, set off by the global financial crisis, was by far the deepest and most synchronized of the four recessions. As the epicenter of the crisis, advanced economies felt the brunt of the recession. The subsequent expansion has been the weakest in the post-war period in advanced economies, as many of them have struggled to overcome the legacies of the crisis. In contrast, most emerging market and developing economies weathered the 2009 global recession relatively well and delivered a stronger recovery than after previous global recessions.

We analyze whether financial integration between countries leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996-2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average but much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that some sectors are strongly affected by positive spillovers (wholesale & retail trade, industrial production), others only to a weaker degree (agriculture, construction, finance), while more nationally influenced industries show no evidence for significant spillover effects (public administration, arts & entertainment, real estate).

This study employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyse how oil price shocks affect macroeconomic fundamentals in emerging economies. Findings from existing literature remain inconclusive how macroeconomic variables fare towards shocks, especially in emerging economies. The objective of our study is to uncover if analysis by region (Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia) and resource intensity of economies (oil exporters, oil importers, minerals exporters, and less resource intensive). Our unique approach forms part of our contribution to the literature. We find that Latin America and the Caribbean are least affected by oil price shocks, while in East Asia and the Pacific the response of inflation and interest rate to oil price shocks is positive, and output growth is negative. Our analysis by resource endowment fails to show oil price shocks' ability to explain huge variations in macroeconomic variables in oil importing economies. Further sensitivity analysis using US interest rates as an alternative source of external shocks to emerging economies establishes a significant response of interest rate responses to US interest rate in Europe and Central Asia, and in inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean. We also find that regardless of resource endowment, the response of output growth and capital to a positive US interest rate shock is negative and significant in EMs. Our results are persuasive that resource intensity and regional factors impact the responsiveness of emerging economies to oil price shocks, thus laying a basis for policy debate.

This paper uses a data set covering the universe of French firm-level sales, imports, and exports over the period 1993-2007 and a quantitative multi-country model to study the international transmission of business cycle shocks at both the micro and the macro levels. The largest firms are both important enough to generate aggregate fluctuations (Gabaix 2011), and most likely to be internationally connected. This implies that foreign shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy primarily through the largest firms. We first document a novel stylized fact: larger French firms are significantly more sensitive to foreign GDP growth. We then implement a quantitative framework calibrated to the full extent of observed heterogeneity in firm size, exporting, and importing. We simulate the propagation of foreign shocks to the French economy and report one micro and one macro finding. At the micro level, heterogeneity across firms predominates: 40-85 percent of the impact of foreign fluctuations on French GDP is accounted for by the 'foreign granular residual'-the term capturing the fact that larger firms are more affected by the foreign shocks. At the macro level, firm heterogeneity dampens the impact of foreign shocks, with the GDP responses 10-20 percent larger in a representative firm model compared to the baseline model.

This paper presents the most comprehensive and up-to-date panel data set of invoicing currencies in global trade. It provides data on the shares of exports and imports invoiced in US dollars, euros, and other currencies for more than 100 countries since 1990. The evidence from these data confirms findings from earlier research regarding the globally dominant role of the US dollar in invoicing - despite the comparatively smaller role of the US in global trade - and the overall stability of invoicing currency patterns. But the evidence also points to several novel stylised facts. First, both the US dollar and the euro have been increasingly used for invoicing even as the share of global trade accounted for by the US and the euro area has declined. Second, the euro is used as a vehicle currency in parts of Africa, and some European countries have seen significant shifts toward euro invoicing. And third, as suggested by the dominant currency paradigm, countries invoicing more in US dollars (euros) tend to experience greater US dollar (euro) exchange rate pass-through to their import prices; also, their trade volumes are more sensitive to uctuations in these exchange rates.

Understanding gross capital flows is increasingly viewed as crucial for both macroeconomic and financial stability policies, but theory is lagging behind many key policy debates. We fill this gap by developing a 2-country DSGE model that tracks domestic and cross-border gross positions between banks and households, with explicit settlement of all transactions through banks. We formalize the conceptual distinction between cross-border saving and financing, which often move in opposite directions in response to shocks. This matters for at least four policy debates. First, current accounts are poor indicators of financial vulnerability, because in a crisis creditors stop financing debt rather than current accounts, and because following a crisis current accounts are not the primary channel through which balance sheets adjust. Second, we re-interpret the global saving glut hypothesis by submitting that US households do not finance current account deficits with foreigners' physical saving, but with digital purchasing power, created by banks that are more likely to be domestic than foreign. Third, Triffin's current account dilemma is not in fact a dilemma, because the creation of additional US dollars requires dollar credit creation by domestic or foreign banks rather than US current account deficits. Finally, we show that the observed high correlation of gross capital inflows and outflows is overwhelmingly an automatic consequence of double entry bookkeeping, rather than the result of two separate and synchronized sets of economic decisions.

The Swedish economy is strongly dependent on global economic developments, which is re‡ected in generally strong empirical relationships between Swedish and foreign macroeconomic variables. It is, however, diffi cult for standard open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to generate substantial cross-country spillovers; see e.g. the seminal paper of Justiniano and Preston (2010). We present a two-region DSGE model that better captures the dependence on global economic developments than previous models. It is estimated on data for Sweden and an aggregate of its main trading partners, the euro area and the United States, for the period 1995Q2-2018Q4. To capture the strong empirical relationships between Sweden and the foreign economy, we assume that global shocks to e.g. technology, real interest rates, financial risk, and firm and consumer sentiment directly affect both economies, while their impact on each economy may differ. We also allow for a ‡exible specification of the demand for Swedish exports to better account for the ‡uctuations in Swedish trade. Finally, headline and core in‡ation are distinguished by the introduction of consumption of energy goods, which allows for a more detailed and realistic analysis of in‡ation developments. This new model, named MAJA (Modell för Allmän JämviktsAnalys), is used by the Riksbank for interpretation of economic developments, forecasting, scenarios, and policy analysis. It builds on the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003) and the Riksbank's previous models, Ramses I and Ramses II (see Adolfson et al. (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2013), respectively).

The Covid-19 pandemic is not only endangering the health of people worldwide, but is also causing an economic recession. Given past experience, office markets, particularly the prime market, are reacting very strongly to economic downswings. This paper attempts to derive a likely scenario for the effects in selected European office markets. As a first step, the impact of the economic downturn on prime rents is estimated based on data provided by PMA (Property Market Analysis). As a result, prime rents could decrease by between 5 and 23 percent. In most cases, the reductions are comparable to developments in past crises and in some cases reductions exceed those of former crises. Yet, given the severity of the crisis, this is not implausible. The crisis will also affect expectations, which in turn will affect prices. Based on an analysis of the spreads, a likely effect on prices can be deduced. Prices will drop by 15 to 47 percent. Obviously, the results can be viewed critically, especially since local factors have not been taken into account. Thus, results for cities should be regarded with caution. Nonetheless, the broader view clearly indicates that the downturn in the office market looks set to be severe. In addition, there is the potential for a perfect storm in the office markets since structural changes are also likely. Specifically, workers will push for more remote work and employers are likely to favour this in order to save costs. Also, digitisation offers more potential for saving costs for staff. As a result, office demand could be impaired in the long term, posing challenges for owners and investors in the office market. Die Covid-19-Pandemie gefährdet nicht nur die Gesundheit der Menschen weltweit, sondern verursacht auch eine wirtschaftliche Rezession. Angesichts der bisherigen Erfahrungen reagieren die Büromärkte, insbesondere der Prime Market, sehr stark auf konjunkturell abstürzende Märkte. In diesem Papier wird versucht, ein wahrscheinliches Szenario für die Auswirkungen in ausgewählten europäischen Büromärkten abzuleiten. Basierend auf Daten von PMA (Property Market Analysis) werden in einem ersten Schritt die Auswirkungen des wirtschaftlichen Abschwungs auf die Büromieten im Prime Markt geschätzt. Infolgedessen könnten die Mieten in einer Spanne zwischen 5 und 23 Prozent sinken. In den meisten Fällen sind die Reduzierungen mit den Entwicklungen in vergangenen Krisen vergleichbar, in einigen Fällen übertreffen die Reduktionen diejenigen früherer Krisen. Angesichts der Schwere der Krise ist dies jedoch nicht unplausibel. Die Krise wird sich auch auf die Erwartungen auswirken, was sich wiederum auf die Preise auswirkt. Aufgrund einer Analyse der Spreads wird ein wahrscheinlicher Effekt auf die Preise abgeleitet. Die Preise werden demnach um 15 Prozent bis 47 Prozent sinken. Offensichtlich können die Ergebnisse kritisch betrachtet werden, zumal lokale Faktoren nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Daher sollten Ergebnisse für einzelne Städte mit Vorsicht betrachtet werden, aber dennoch zeigt der Blick auf die Gesamtergebnisse sehr deutlich, dass der Abschwung auf dem Büromarkt gravierend sein wird. Darüber hinaus besteht das Potenzial für einen "perfect storm" in den Büromärkten, da auch strukturelle Veränderungen wahrscheinlich sind. Insbesondere werden die Arbeitnehmer auf mehr Homeoffice drängen, und die Arbeitgeber werden dies wahrscheinlich befürworten, um Kosten zu sparen. Auch die Digitalisierung bietet mehr Kosteneinsparungen im Hinblick auf den Personaleinsatz. Dadurch könnte die Büronachfrage langfristig beeinträchtigt werden, was Eigentümer und Investoren im Büromarkt vor langfristige Herausforderungen stellt.

We analyse whether financial integration between countries leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996-2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average but much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronisation. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that some sectors are strongly affected by positive spillovers (wholesale & retail trade, industrial production), others only to a weaker degree (agriculture, construction, finance), while more nationally influenced industries show no evidence for significant spillover effects (public administration, arts & entertainment, real estate).

Although emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) weathered the global recession a decade ago relatively well, they now appear less well placed to cope with the substantial downside risks facing the global economy. In many EMDEs, the room for monetary and fiscal policies to respond to shocks has eroded; underlying growth potential has slowed; and the momentum for improving policy frameworks, institutions, and business climates seems to have slackened. The experience of the 2009 global recession highlights once again the critical role of policy room in shielding economic activity during adverse shocks. The subsequent decade of anemic growth underlines the need for sound policy frameworks, institutions, and business environments to promote sustained growth. With the global growth outlook weakening and vulnerabilities rising, the policy priority for EMDEs is now to improve resilience to shocks and to lift long-term growth prospects.

This paper studies the role of the exchange rate regime for trade of new products. It first provides VAR evidence that a rise in external productivity shifts trade away from new products and more so in fixed regimes. Then, it presents a model with firm dynamics in line with this evidence. We argue that exchange rate policy can affect firms&rsquo, entry decisions with consequences for the competitiveness of a country&rsquo, s exports well beyond the short run. In our setup, fixed exchange rates can foster the competitiveness of firms that trade new products, while flexible rates favor firms that produce mature products.

Fiscal policy and net capital inflows in developing countries are procyclical. A large amount of literature has examined this phenomenon and explored its consequences for aggregate fluctuations. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are an important source of external finance for governments and hence play a key role in financing the execution of fiscal policy. Hence, understanding the behavior of MDB flows is key to gauge their contribution to macroeconomic volatility. This paper investigates the co-movement of sovereign lending from MDBs and private creditors with government expenditure, and finds that multilateral sovereign lending follows government expenditure, and that this correlation does not change if the government is running a surplus or a deficit. This finding raises doubts on the feasibility of MDBs to be counter-cyclical, unless the governments themselves implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies.

In the current low interest rate environment in the euro area there is potential for a sudden increase in interest rates and heightened interest rate risk (IRR). By using a sample of 81 euro area banks during the period 2014Q4-2018Q1 and a confidential supervisory measure of IRR, this paper identifies which bank-specific characteristics can amplify or weaken the impact of a 200 basis points positive shock in interest rates. We find that banks reliant on core deposits, that hold more floating-interest rate loans and that diversify their lending, either by sector or geography, are less exposed to a positive change in interest rates. Interestingly, we discover that banks that did not exploit the exceptional financing provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) reveal greater IRR exposure. These findings advance the debate on the impact on euro area banking of a possible return to a normalised monetary policy.

This paper jointly analyses two major challenges of the canonical NOEM model: i) combining a relatively important exchange rate pass-through at the border with low pass-through at the consumer level, and ii) generating significant endogenous international business cycle synchronization. These issues have been separately analysed in the literature, with extension of the NOEM with a distribution sector for mitigating the exchange-rate pass-through, and foreign input trade for spillovers. We show that introducing input trade for price-maker firms rehabilitate the model regarding the pass-through disconnect, which is especially helpful to model very open economies, while adding a distribution sector lacks flexibility to do so. Moreover, these two extensions of the canonical model mitigate the expenditure switching effect, with implications in terms of international synchronization.

Nach seiner Wahl hat Donald Trump recht schnell seiner angekündigten America-First-Strategie Taten folgen lassen. So standen aggressive Interventionen im Zentrum von Trumps Handelspolitik. Ihm ging es vor allem darum, Produktionsstätten und Arbeitsplätze, die ins Ausland verlagert wurden, wieder zurück in die USA zu holen und Handelsbilanzdefizite zu senken. Es zeigt sich aber, dass die zahlreichen handelspolitischen Interventionen nur begrenzt Spuren in den Handelsströmen mit den wichtigsten Partnern hinterlassen haben. Lediglich beim Handel mit China ging das Defizit kurzzeitig etwas zurück. Die 2018 eingeführten Importzölle auf chinesische Güter haben auch dazu geführt, dass das verarbeitende US-Gewerbe, das auf Importe aus China als Vorleistungen angewiesen ist, dadurch mit höheren Produktionskosten zu kämpfen hat. Auch für den neuen US-Präsidenten Joe Biden ist China der größte Konkurrent im Welthandel. Während Trump allerdings auf Alleingänge setzte, beabsichtigt Biden, internationale Allianzen zu suchen, um die Verhandlungsposition gegenüber China zu verbessern. Diese Chance sollte die Europäische Union rechtzeitig ergreifen., DIW Wochenbericht

We construct a news-based viral disease index and study the dynamic impact of epidemics on the world economy, using structural vector autoregressions. Epidemic shocks have persistently negative effects, both directly and indirectly, on affected countries and on world output. The shocks lead to a significant fall in global trade, employment, and consumer prices for three quarters, and the losses are permanent. In contrast, retail sales increase. Country studies suggest that the direct effects are four times larger than the indirect effects and that demand-side dominate supply-side contractions. Overall, the findings indicate that expansionary macroeconomic policy is an appropriate crisis response.

We identify the spill-over of demand shocks between the world's two largest advanced economies; the US and the euro area. We estimate a Bayesian VAR with sign restrictions, using standard restrictions for the domestic impact of the shock but a novel approach to identify the geographic location of the shocks and rule out common shocks. For the latter, we use the relative performance of small open economies that are neighbors of the US and the euro area, respectively Canada and Sweden, in addition to restricting the relative effects on the US, the euro area and the rest of the world. We find that demand spill-overs of US and euro area demand shocks become smaller on average when imposing relative restrictions, while they become larger in periods which are well-known to be specific to the US (global financial crisis) or the euro area (euro area sovereign debt crisis). Our results are confirmed by running a "placebo test" where we replace the euro area with a small euro area economy, which should not have an independent effect on the US economy due to its small size.

We provide evidence that industries' supply curves are convex. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a model, in which capacity constraints at the plant level generate convex supply curves at the industry level. The industry's capacity utilization rate is a sufficient statistic for the supply elasticity. Using data on capacity utilization and three different instruments, we estimate the supply curve and find robust evidence for an economically sizable degree of convexity. The nonlinearity we identify has several macroeconomic implications: Responses to shocks are state-dependent, the Phillips curve is convex, and higher welfare costs of business cycles than Lucas (1987).

Multidimensional connections between innovative activity of enterprises and business cycle phases result in the ambiguous nature of this relationship. The main aim of the article is to analyze the impact of business cycle phases on inputs and outputs of innovative activity of enterprises. The innovative performance of companies was examined during periods of recession and recovery in the EU countries and in Norway in the years 2002–2014. Empirical verification of theoretical assumptions confirmed the complex nature of the relationship between the innovative activity of enterprises and business cycles. Różnokierunkowe powiązania między działaniami innowacyjnymi przedsiębiorstw a fazami cykli koniunkturalnych wywołują problemy z jednoznacznym określeniem charakteru tej zależności. Głównym celem artykułu jest ocena wpływu faz cyklu koniunkturalnego na nakłady oraz na efekty działań innowacyjnych podmiotów gospodarczych. Dlatego przeprowadzono badanie aktywności innowacyjnej firm w krajach UE i w Norwegii w latach 2002–2014, zarówno w okresach recesji, jak i w czasach ożywienia gospodarczego. Empiryczna weryfikacja teoretycznych założeń potwierdziła złożony charakter relacji między działalnością innowacyjną przedsiębiorstw a cyklami koniunkturalnymi. Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej

Economic fluctuations have always fascinated researches regardless of the approach the took to explain them. It is the human nature to seek for patterns in various areas, economy being one of them. For this the attempt was taken to investigate the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the economic cycle of Poland. This paper aims at answering whether the morphology before and after the crisis changed and whether they follow theoretical model of classic/modern cycles. The research results clearly show that the pace of growth of the Polish economy has been lower after the crisis. However, Polish economy never faced recession. Because almost all cycles lasted approximately 3.5-4 years, while their morphology was subjected to changes, they can be partly classified as modern cycles. It can be also expected that morphological characteristics of future cycle will be more and more similar to modern ones. The added value of this research is that it clearly shows that the morphological characteristics of the economic cycles in Poland did change in terms of their amplitude in the period analyzed. What is more similar approach can be taken to investigate other economic aggregates. The results might be useful to those in whose interest is future economic performance of Poland. Fluktuacje gospodarcze, ich analiza i próba zrozumienia przyczyn od stuleci fascynują ekonomi-stów, niezależnie od tego, jaki nurt ekonomii reprezentują. Pomimo różnego rodzaju podejść naukowych, ludzie zawsze wykazywali chęć zrozumienia prawidłowości rządzących cykliczną naturą gospodarki, w tym także kryzysami ekonomicznymi. W niniejszej pracy podjęta została próba porównania charakterystyki morfologicznej cykli koniunkturalnych w Polsce przed i po kryzysie finansowym z roku 2008. Zweryfikowana została także spójność cech morfologicznych tychże cykli z teoretycznymi modelami cyklu klasycznego oraz współczesnego. Wyniki jasno wskazują, że w badanym okresie gospodarka Polski nie znalazła się w recesji, lecz jej wzrost jest znacznie mniej dynamiczny niż przed kryzysem. Ponieważ prawie wszystkie badane cykle trwały około 3–4 lata, a ich charakterystyka morfologiczna, uległa przemianom i częściowo spełniona jest charakterystyka cyklu współczesnego, należy oczekiwać, że kolejne cykle w coraz większym stopniu będą pokrywały się z charakterystyką cyklu współczesnego. Znaczenie niniejszej pracy jest o tyle ważne, iż jasno pokazuje ona, że cykliczna natura polskiej gospodarki zmieniła się na przestrzeni badanego okresu w zakresie amplitud jej cykli. Otrzymane rezultaty mogą okazać się użyteczne dla badaczy chcących przeprowadzić analogiczne badanie innych agregatów ekonomicznych, jak i wszystkich tych, w których interesie jest projekcja ko-niunktury gospodarczej.

This paper examines the business cycle properties of Visegrad group countries. The main objective is to identify business cycles in these countries and to study the relationships between them. The author applies a modification of the Fourier analysis to estimate cycle amplitudes and frequencies. This allows for a more precise estimation of cycle characteristics than the traditional approach. The cross-spectral analysis of GDP cyclical components for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia makes it possible to assess the degree of business cycle synchronization between the countries.

The objective of this article is to derive a simple dynamic macroeconomic model of an open economy to show how an economy as a dynamic system can work. The proposed model is resulted from the traditional Mundell-Fleming model. Unlike the Mundell-Fleming model, we introduce a continuous dynamic and non-linearity. Non-linearity in our model is represented by a non-linear investment function. The non-linear investment function is introduced as the propensity to invest function, which is assumed to be captured by the logistic function of production. After that, the stability of the model is analysed using Hurwitz stability theorem. The behaviour of our non-linear macroeconomic model of open economy is demonstrated on two numerical examples in which two different sets of parameters are selected to examine the dynamic of the system with emphasis on the impact of export multiplier. The presented examples show that the model is able to generate very complex dynamic.

Understanding the relationship between national income GDP components is an essential part of macroeconomics. This study investigates quarterly real GDP component data for the U.S. and the U.K. and applies continuous wavelet analysis on cross comparisons of the data, from both within and between the two datasets. The results show that the cyclical interactions between consumption and investment are the most complex and most substantial at several different frequencies. The relationship of exports with other macroeconomic variables has also developed over time, likely due to the evolution of an international business cycle.