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Concerning issues in first language acquisition, the present paper explores positions in theory- making, asyntacticity of early child language, Piaget's idea about children's logical thinking, Vygotsky's and Chomsky's controversy over the origins of language, the relationship between communicative competence and other abilities, the stage where child's utterance is counted to be communicative, reflecting on the relationship between language and thought, the idea of modularity, the role of emergentism in language acquisition, and the authors’ perspectives about different explanations on language acquisition in general.

I look at some central positions in the mental causation debate – reductionism, emergentism, and nonreductive physicalism – on the hypothesis that mental causation is intelligible. On this hypothesis, mental causes and their effects are internally related so that they intelligibly “fit”, analogous to the way puzzle pieces interlock, or shades of red fall into order within a color sphere. The assumption of intelligibility has what I take to be a welcome consequence: deciding among rivals in the mental causation debate could end up to be largely an empirical matter.

This work aims to contribute to the discussion of mind-brain interactions from an emergentism point of view of the Philosophy of Mind, using some of the naturalized theories. Some proposed bridges between mind and brain based on experimental naturalization are neuro-psychoanalysis, mirror neurons, and psychosomatics, among others. Naturalization can be achieved by earching for the link between psychological and biological processes. This biological-based approach can be developed avoiding mplification and reductionism of psychological processes. We discuss the access to new insights about the mind-brain relationship and its implications through neurophenomenology, from an emerging and interactionist point of view.

Este estudo investiga a aquisição das fricativas do português brasileiro, focalizando a relação entre a frequência lexical e segmental de dois “corpora”, retirados do banco de dados LIDES (Linguagem Infantil em Desenvolvimento), coletados durante a interação adulto-bebê: um “corpus” da fala adulta direcionada à criança e um “corpus” com dados de produção de fala de seis bebês de um a três anos. O objetivo foi comparar as características de ambos à luz da visão emergentista da aquisição da linguagem, enfatizando o papel da frequência linguística na aquisição desses segmentos. Comparamos as correlações existentes na fala dos bebês e cuidadores, no processo de interação, e interpretamos as informações estatísticas buscando explicar os resultados de produção de fala numa perspectiva dinâmica de aquisição da linguagem.This study investigates the acquisition of fricatives of BrazilianPortuguese, by focusing on the relationship between lexical and segmental frequency in two corpora of data collected during adult-child interaction: a corpus of adult child-directed speech and a corpus of the words produced by six babies aged 1-4 year-old. The aim was to compare, in an emergentist perspective, type and toke frequency of fricative segments in the lexicon of both corpora, and the results regarding speech production are interpreted according to a dynamic view of language acquisition.

The theory of integrative levels provides a general description of the evolution of matter through successive orders of complexity and integration. Along its development, material forms pass through different levels of organization, such as physical, chemical, biological or sociological. The appearance of novel structures and dynamics during this process of development of matter in complex systems has been called emergence. Social neuroscience (SN), an interdisciplinary field that aims to investigate the biological mechanisms that underlie social structures, processes, and behavior and the influences between social and biological levels of organization, has affirmed the necessity for including social context as an essential element to understand the human behavior. To do this, SN proposes a multilevel integrative approach by means of three principles: multiple determinism, nonadditive determinism and reciprocal determinism. These theoretical principles seem to share the basic tenets of the theory of integrative levels but, in this paper, we aim to reveal the differences among both doctrines.First, SN asserts that combination of neural and social variables can produce emergent phenomena that would not be predictable from a neuroscientific or social psychological analysis alone; SN also suggests that to achieve a complete understanding of social structures we should use an integrative analysis that encompasses levels of organization ranging from the genetic level to the social one; finally, SN establishes that there can be mutual influences between biological and social factors in determining behavior, accepting, therefore, a double influence, upward from biology to social level, and downward, from social level to biology.In contrast, following the theory of integrative levels, emergent phenomena are not produced by the combination of variables from two levels, but by the increment of complexity at one level. In addition, the social behavior and structures might be contemplated not as the result of mixing or summing social and biological influences, but as emergent phenomena that should be described with its own laws. Finally, following the integrative levels view, influences upward, from biology to social level, and downward, from social level to biology, might not be equivalent, since the bottom-up processes are emergent and the downward causation is not.

Although both emergentism and skill acquisition theory developed in the same field (cognitive theories) and as an attempt to replace Universal grammar-based approaches, there are some differences between these two theories. The differences lie under their different models of knowledge representation and their diverse degree of emphasis on the role of input. In addition, skill acquisition considers the process of learning while emergentism considers input and output and what goes on in between has not been considered. Finally it should be mentioned that these two theories take different views towards the learning process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the usage-based approach to children’s language learning, language is seen as emerging from children’s preverbal communicative and cognitive skills. Children construct more abstract linguistic representations only gradually, and show uneven development in all aspects of their language learning. I will present results that show the relationship between children’s emerging linguistic structures and patterns in the speech addressed to them, and demonstrate the effects played by the consistency of markers, the complexity of the construction in question, and relative type and token frequencies within and across constructions. I highlight the contribution made by research that employs naturalistic, experimental, and modelling methodologies, and that is applied to a range of languages and to variability in the errors that children make. Finally, I will outline the outstanding issues for this approach, and how we might address them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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I shall explore in this article the metaphysical possibility of powers' strongly emerging from relations. After having provided a definition of emergent powers that is also based on the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power, I shall introduce different sorts of Relations that Ground Emergence, both external and internal. Later on, I shall discuss some examples of powers that are grounded on their instantiation. Finally, I shall examine the consequences of accepting such relations within a physicalistic ontology and I shall defend them against two objections based on the notion of bruteness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Origin of Species (1859), Darwin argued that his revolutionary theory of evolution by natural selection represented a significant breakthrough in the understanding of instinctive behaviour. However, many aspects in the development of his thinking on behavioural phenomena indicate that the explanation of this particular organic feature was by no means an easy one, but that it posed an authentic challenge – something that Darwin himself always recognized. This paper explores Darwin's treatment of instincts within his theory of natural selection. Particular attention is given to elucidate how he tackled the difficulties of explaining instincts as evolving mental features. He had to explain and demonstrate its inheritance, variation, and gradual accumulation within populations. The historical and philosophical aspects of his theory are highlighted, as well as his study of the case in which the explanation of instincts represented a ‘special difficulty’; that is, the sterile castes of social insects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based in contemporary neuroscience, Jean Knox's 2004 JAP paper 'From archetypes to reflective function' honed her position on image schemas, thereby introducing a model for archetypes which sees them as 'reliably repeated early developmental achievements' and not as genetically inherited, innate psychic structures. The image schema model is used to illustrate how the analyst worked with a patient who began life as an unwanted pregnancy, was adopted at birth and as an adult experienced profound synchronicities, paranormal/telepathic phenomena and visions. The classical approach to such phenomena would see the intense affectivity arising out of a ruptured symbiotic mother-infant relationship constellating certain archetypes which set up the patient's visions. This view is contrasted with Knox's model which sees the archetype an sich as a developmentally produced image schema underpinning the emergence of later imagery. The patient's visions can then be understood to arise from his psychoid body memory related to his traumatic conception and birth. The contemporary neuroscience which supports this view is outlined and a subsequent image schema explanation is presented. Clinically, the case material suggests that a pre-birth perspective needs to be explored in all analytic work. Other implications of Knox's image schema model are summarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Poliana is the property of Studia Poliana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, emergentism has resurfaced as a possible method by which to secure autonomous mental causation from within a physicalistic framework. Critics argue, however, that emergentism fails, since emergentism entails that effects have sufficient physical causes, so they cannot also have distinct mental causes. In this paper I argue that this objection may be effective against supervenient emergentism, but it is not established that it is effective against mereological emergentism. In fact, after demonstrating that two founding emergentists, Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, are mereological emergentists, I show how mereological emergentism provides fresh responses to the causal exclusion problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jaegwon Kim's argument against non-reductive physicalism is well known. Many philosophers take Kim's argument to also apply to emergentism. But this does not necessarily follow. In this paper, I will first briefly show why Kim's argument against non-reductive physicalism need not apply to emergentism. Next, I will present a physicalistic account of emergentism offered by Jason Megill in his paper 'A Defense of Emergence.' This will be followed by an examination of some of the limitations of Megill's account, in particular, his failure to adequately account for the causal powers of higher level physical properties independent of realization. Finally, I will offer a suggestion on how Megill might avoid the difficulties raised by appealing to the concept of wide realization espoused by Robert Wilson in his paper 'Two Views of Realization.' The overarching theme of the paper centers on the idea that the realization requirement is where the action is, in terms of making emergentism compatible with physicalism, and is capable of being tinkered with by the emergentist and physicalist alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main message of this paper is that systemism is best suited for transdisciplinary studies. A description of disciplinary sciences, transdisciplinary sciences and systems sciences is given, along with their different definitions of aims, scope and tools. The rationale for transdisciplinarity is global challenges, which are complex. The rationale for systemism is the concretization of understanding complexity. Drawing upon Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s intention of a General System Theory, three items deserve attention—the world-view of a synergistic systems technology, the world picture of an emergentist systems theory, and the way of thinking of an integrationist systems method.

The theory of integrative levels provides a general description of the evolution of matter through successive orders of complexity and integration. Along its development, material forms pass through different levels of organization, such as physical, chemical, biological or sociological. The appearance of novel structures and dynamics during this process of development of matter in complex systems has been called emergence. Social neuroscience (SN), an interdisciplinary field that aims to investigate the biological mechanisms that underlie social structures, processes, and behavior and the influences between social and biological levels of organization, has affirmed the necessity for including social context as an essential element to understand the human behavior. To do this, SN proposes a multilevel integrative approach by means of three principles: multiple determinism, nonadditive determinism and reciprocal determinism. These theoretical principles seem to share the basic tenets of the theory of integrative levels but, in this paper, we aim to reveal the differences among both doctrines. First, SN asserts that combination of neural and social variables can produce emergent phenomena that would not be predictable from a neuroscientific or social psychological analysis alone; SN also suggests that to achieve a complete understanding of social structures we should use an integrative analysis that encompasses levels of organization ranging from the genetic level to the social one; finally, SN establishes that there can be mutual influences between biological and social factors in determining behavior, accepting, therefore, a double influence, upward from biology to social level, and downward, from social level to biology. In contrast, following the theory of integrative levels, emergent phenomena are not produced by the combination of variables from two levels, but by the increment of complexity at one level. In addition, the social behavior and structures might be contemplated not as the result of mixing or summing social and biological influences, but as emergent phenomena that should be described with its own laws. Finally, following the integrative levels view, influences upward, from biology to social level, and downward, from social level to biology, might not be equivalent, since the bottom-up processes are emergent and the downward causation (DC) is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been a shift in terminology used to describe gift and talent. This has resulted in widespread adoption of the term high ability to describe more able pupils. This shift has promoted a more inclusive ethos in terms of the concept of encouraging talent development, but it has also highlighted tensions between teachers’ more inclusive approaches to nurturing talent and the concept of identifying talent. This issue is particularly relevant to music teaching where musical ability is often identified through specific aptitude tests. This article discusses a small-scale study that explored the perceptions of music teachers and instructors (n= 35) about musical ability and how it might best be nurtured in school pupils and conservatoire students. By comparing the views of participants with findings from the research literature, it is suggested that musical ability should be developed by taking an inclusive approach to music learning, focusing on providing enriching music activities for all children. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I argue for the usefulness of pragmatism as a framework within which to develop the theological application of emergentist theory. I consider some philosophical issues relevant to the recent revival of interest, across various disciplines, in the concept of emergence and clarify some of the conceptual issues at stake in the attempts to formulate the philosophical position of emergentism and to apply it theologically. After highlighting some major problems arising from the main existing ways of formulating emergentism, I build on the work of Sami Pihlstrom, outlining a less problematic, alternative proposal. I attempt to show that the philosophical problems can be circumvented by an appeal to the pragmatist tradition, which is a useful philosophical framework within which to develop an emergentist theory fit for theological application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay that follows discusses an ordered series of situated environmental "fields" that comprise John Dewey's "emergent naturalism." These fields include nature, experience, mind, subconscious, consciousness, and cognitive thought. I propose an order to these fields, and provide an overview of the ways in which fields that are larger in scope stand as the conditions for those that are more limited. I also suggest ways in which cognitive thought further emerges through the process of inquiry. This emergent scheme culminates in a type of inquiry where an agent actively creates conflict in order to enrich experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kwame Nkrumah invokes the doctrine of emergentism in the hope of reconciling theism - a tenacious part of the African worldview - with materialism. However, in this article I seek to show that this reconciliation is not only ultimately unsuccessful, but is actually impossible. Towards this end, I identify weaknesses in what I call the six argumentative pillars of Nkrumah's theory of emergentism (which he calls "philosophical materialism"), namely, his arguments regarding the origin of the cosmic material, the primary reality of matter, idealism, categorial convertibility, dialectic change, and the self-motion of matter. The article should provide not only alternative perspectives to Nkrumah's metaphysics, but also highlight some broader metaphysical implications for both strong and weak emergentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I diagnose the current debate between epistemological and ontological emergentism as a Kantian antinomy, which has reasonable but irreconcilable thesis and antithesis. Kantian antinomies have recently returned to contemporary philosophy in part through the work of Luciano Floridi, and the method of levels of abstraction. I use a thought experiment concerning a computer simulation to show how to resolve the epistemological/ontological antinomy about emergence. I also use emergentism and simulations in artificial life to illuminate both levels of abstraction and theoretical challenge for building intelligent agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper points to a more viable theory of interpretation on the basis of opposing the missteps in Arthur Danto's theory. By noting the incongruities in Danto's theories of art and interpretation, a theory of interpretation emerges which unifies its varieties on the basis of the view of the human person as a culturally embodied and enlanguaged primate. A feature notably absent from Danto's own account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies two central modes of discourse in contemporary pragmatist aesthetics: Cultural Emergentism and Experiential Somaesthetics. Whereas Cultural Emergentism focuses on developing a non-reductive ontology of culture, Experiential Somaesthetics preserves the traditional pragmatist emphasis on embodied experience and examines the place that the care and cultivation of the living soma has in improving our aesthetic transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comprises three main points. First it concisely presents some of the basic characteristics of the notion of emergence in the field of philosophy of mind. The second part describes Popper's concept of emergence, as presented in his book The Self and Its Brain (1997). The main object of analysis is the notion of evolution and downward causation. The third part develops three separate lines of critique related to: the ambiguity of Popper's concepts; the lack of valid arguments for the metaphysical postulation of the three worlds; and the special status that Popper grants to human consciousness in our world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, aligned with contemporary thinking in terms of patient-centered care and co-creation of patient care, highlights the limitations of the reductionist approaches to psychiatry, offering an alternative, "emergent" perspective and approach. Assuming that psychopathological phenomena are essentially relational, what kind of epistemological framework and 'logic of discovery' should be adopted? I review two standard methods I call ' ticking boxes ' and ' drafting arrows '. Within the ticking boxes framework, the clinician's main goal is to discover whether a patient showing psychopathological phenomena meets pre-given diagnostic criteria. The process of discovery can be compared to two people assembling a puzzle where the patient has the pieces and the interviewer has the image of the completed design. Drafting arrows consists in constructing pathogenetic diagrams that display linear causative relationships between variables connected by an arrow to other nodes. These explanatory narratives include psychodynamic (motivational) and biological (causal) diagrams. I argue for a third approach called 'linking dots', a method of discovery based on the emergent properties of psychopathological phenomena. I build on and develop the approach to images and discovery devised by art historian Aby Warburg in his atlas of images Bilderatlas Mnemosyne . The visual constellations created by Warburg in the panels of the Bilderatlas can be understood as a method to reveal the layers of memory and the web of relationships manifested in them, inviting the viewer to participate in the production of meanings, forging ever new connections between the images. It is the viewer's acts of perception that draw relationships between singularities. I suggest that this method is of enormous significance in the context of today's socio-cultural transformation processes and related forms of psychopathological conditions, which can no longer be comprehended using the categories of existing knowledge systems.