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This study is an attempt at combining James Phelan's rhetorical approach to narrative, particularly his theory of narrative progression, and Nie Zhenzhao's theory of the Sphinx factor. It takes as its subject of study the appellations of the protagonist in 《陆犯焉识》(Prisoner Lu Yanshi, 2011) by Yan Geling, a major overseas Chinese female writer. It delineates how the narrative progression of the novel is governed by the dynamics of Lu Yanshi's varied appellations which are bound with varied ethical identities and ethical duties. It argues that the varied appellations serve as the instabilities of the narrative. At the story level, the protagonist transforms from a proud saint to a humble human being, as a result of the discovery of his animal factor which comes to the surface under extreme circumstances. At the level of discourse, circuitous narration and double focalizations create tensions between the protagonist's understanding of and readers' responses to the ethical implications of the appellations, thus helping the readers to see the ethical message conveyed by the novel - a complete human consists of both the human factor and the animal factor; he is defective when solely controlled by either of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The eudaimonic orientation (seeking authenticity, meaning, excellence, growth) and hedonic orientation (seeking pleasure, comfort) are two of the primary ways in which people define and pursue a good life (Huta & Waterman, 2014). Research has shown that eudaimonic and hedonic orientations have substantial but different impacts on people's lives: the two orientations relate to somewhat different aspects of personal well-being; and a eudaimonic orientation relates much more to promoting the well-being of other people, while a hedonic orientation occasionally relates to having a negative impact on others. Thus, it is important to understand what leads people to pursue a eudaimonic or hedonic orientation (or both) in the first place. We expected worldviews, which are an individual's fundamental beliefs about how things work and what is true and real, to be pivotal in predicting eudaimonic and hedonic orientations. Koltko-Rivera (2004) compiled the most comprehensive list of worldviews to date. We created a survey of worldviews that was predominantly based on Koltko-Rivera's (2004) review and to which we added some further concepts. In an exploratory study containing a single item per worldview, we compared eudaimonic and hedonic orientations in terms of their correlations with worldviews in a sample of 749 undergraduates. We report results that appeared with some consistency across similar themes, providing preliminary insight into the different patterns of worldviews that may shape hedonic versus eudaimonic orientations. Overall, a eudaimonic orientation related to more worldviews than a hedonic orientation. A eudaimonic orientation was more related to beliefs that there is greater purpose to people and the universe, that the purpose of life is excellence and contribution, that there is a spiritual dimension to life, and that people can impact the world directly, as well as a belief in moral absolutism. In contrast, hedonia had stronger relationships with moral relativism and fatalistic beliefs about the outcomes in people's lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I motivate and defend the distinction between an objective and a subjective moral sense of 'ought.' I begin by looking at the standard way the distinction is motivated, namely by appealing to relatively simple cases where an agent does something she thinks is best, but her action has a tragic outcome. I argue that these cases fail to do the job-the intuitions they elicit can be explained without having to distinguish between different senses of 'ought.' However, these cases are on the right track-I argue that more sophisticated versions of the cases provide strong motivation for the distinction. I then discuss two important problems for the distinction: the 'which 'ought' is more important?' problem, and the 'annoying profusion of 'oughts'' problem. I argue that each of these problems can be solved in several different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality. To show this, I will provide a general diagnosis of the difficulty together with its application to the arguably best attempt at a solution, namely to ground moral equality in a form of subjectivity. In his recent book Equality for Nonegalitarians, George Sher advances the view that 'we are moral equals because we are equally centers of consciousness. ...The fact that we are equals in this respect-that each is a world unto himself-...explains why each person's interests are of equal moral importance'. Yet the worlds we are unto ourselves can no more withstand the force of differentiation than previous candidates suggested in the literature, and the reasons why run deeper than even some critics have recognized. The prospects for vindicating universal moral equality remain bleak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anomie, as defined by sociologists, refers to a state of society characterized by deregulation and erosion of moral values. In the present conceptual analysis, we bring the concept of anomie under a social psychological spotlight. We explore the conditions under which anomie arises and develop a model outlining various responses to anomie. We define anomie as a shared perception of the state of society and propose that two conditions must be met for anomie to emerge. First, a society's social fabric must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of trust and erosion of moral standards). Second, a society's leadership must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). We highlight two key responses of individuals to an anomic situation: a contraction of the personal self and a contraction of the social self. We discuss how a psychology of anomie can inform and advance broader theorizing on group processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assuming that some moral variables can play a role in explaining intimate partner violence (IPV) and its treatment, this study explores the evolution of the relationship between some moral variables, which have recently been connected to IPV, and sexist attitudes in 160 men convicted of violence against the partner. The general hypothesis is that the moral variables can change during psychological treatments, and therefore be intervention targets, because they are related to more traditional variables in the field of IPV, such as sexist attitudes. To test this idea, we took pretreatment and posttreatment measures on moral variables (moral absolutism and moral foundations) and sexist attitudes (benevolent and hostile sexism) and analyzed their relationships and their changes after the completion of a prescribed psychological treatment. The results showed that (a) the moral variables were significantly correlated with the sexist attitudes before and after the treatment; (b) the men convicted of violence against the partner held with less certainty their general beliefs about morality and their particular beliefs about the binding moral foundations (in-group, authority, and purity) after the unspecific psychological treatment; and (c) their moral absolutism before the treatment predicted the remaining sexist attitudes after the treatment. Practical implications can be drawn to better understand this kind of prevalent violence and eventually to improve the psychological treatments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper Hildebrand's moral ontology is discussed. It is shown that his moral ontology is, in essence, Platonic rather than Aristotelian. Although Hildebrand's language differs from that of Plato, the ideas are very similar, given that both are moral absolutists who think that moral eidê are ante rem rather than in re. They agree on the structure of the moral realm and have identical views on participation of the ideal in the real. They also have similar ideas on man's relationship towards the moral realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the case against absolutism focusing on the conception of relationship between language and the world being represented by the language and how the conception can be used to reinforce a non-absolutist picture of ontology. Topics include remarks on realism and ontology, existential quantification as a form of disjunction, and the role of representation theorems in facts first conception of the association of language and the world being represented.

Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain - aesthetic discourse - which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position (Humean absolutism) is an improvement over previous absolutist responses to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy as the absolute knowledge has been studied from two different but closely related approaches: historical and logical. The first approach exposes four main stages in the history of European metaphysics that marked out types of "philosophical absolutism": the evolution of philosophy brought to light metaphysics of being, method, morals and logic. All of them are associated with the names of Aristotle, Bacon/Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Then these forms are considered in the second approach that defined them as subject-matter of philosophy as such. Due to their overall, comprehensive character, the focus of philosophy on them justifies its claim on absoluteness as far as philosophy is aimed at comprehension of the world's unity regardless of the philosopher's background, values and other preferences. And that is its prerogative since no other form of consciousness lays down this kind of aim. Thus, philosophy is defined as an everlasting attempt to succeed in conceiving the world in all its multifold manifestations. This article is to try to clarify the claim of philosophy on the absolute knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religion is increasingly significant in UK society, and is highly significant for many patients and primary care practitioners. An important task for the practitioner is to ensure that the place of religion in the patient/practitioner relationship is treated with the same ethical seriousness as every other aspect of that relationship. The article finds the ‘four principles of biomedical ethics’ to be applicable, and recent GMC guidelines to be consistent with the four principles. The article applies the four principles to the particular case of practitioners wearing religious symbolism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ϕ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ϕ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (that is, a theory that includes such constraints) to say about whether it would have been permissible for her to have ϕ-ed? In this paper, I canvass various possible approaches to answering this question and I argue that teleology offers the most plausible approach—teleology being the view that every act has its deontic status in virtue of how its outcome (or prospect) ranks, relative to those of its alternatives. So although, until recently, it had been thought that only deontological theories can accommodate constraints, it turns out that teleological theories not only can accommodate constraints, but can do so more plausibly than deontological theories can. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Maduro's article is seen to constitute a powerful and moving autobiographical study through which his cardinal principles of rigorous relationality, affectivity, and the courage to know have emerged. Building on Maduro's suggestion that the intersubjective can serve as analogue to resolving incommensurable paradigms, I have proposed the more general thesis that inter-conceptual incommensurabilities inevitably carry the traces of an underlying clash of experiential worlds. I have also suggested that absolutisms are not universals but arise out of specific trauma informed relational contexts. Coburn's article is seen to be a clinical study of apparently incommensurable experiential worlds. By bringing the abstract and lived forms of complexity theory into a playful relational dance, the analytic dyad was able to create a third world whereby resolution of intersubjective impasse was accompanied by a more nuanced understanding of a complexity sensibility that takes into account individual agency. The discussion concludes with a brief comment on dialogic possibilities between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the academic focus on Muslim women’s dress and comportment has enriched our understanding of the multifaceted formation of pious femininities, there has been much less consideration of the embodied practices of Muslim men. What work does exist on Middle Eastern men’s piety, sexuality, and everyday conduct too often falls back on established categories, such as traditional, Western, or Islamic identities. Yet it is crucial not only to critically examine how we conceptualize masculinity in the Middle East, but also to recognize the political and cultural importance of how masculinities are enacted through everyday practices. In this article, we argue that questions of dress and bodily practice are relevant to an understanding of how young devout Muslim men navigate the complex spatiality of piety, morality, and masculinity in contemporary urban Turkey. Drawing on fieldwork with young devout men in Konya and Istanbul, we illustrate how multiple, competing devout Muslim masculinities participate in the production of uneven moral geographies in these two very different Turkish cities. Further, we find that the possibility of different ways to enact devout masculinity opens questions about the universality of Islamic knowledge and practice. We suggest that the embodied construction and regulation of the looking-desiring nexus tethers male sexual desire to the public performance of Islamic morality. Our intervention is thus to demonstrate how different versions of masculinity and Islamic piety striate the moral geographies of these two Turkish cities, and thereby to further recognition of the contingency and plurality of both masculinity and Islam. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Corporate philanthropy in the U.S. has emerged since the mid-19th century. This essay takes a historical and interpretive perspective on its practice. The author categorizes corporate philanthropy into four ethical models to examine each model's communicative priorities and ethical concerns. These communicative priorities and ethical concerns become more complex as corporate philanthropic entities utilize social media. To this end, the potential for what Coombs and Holladay (2012) called a "paracrisis" emerges. This essay examines the potential for community partners to be affected by a corporation's presence on social media (and vice versa) through the interpretive lens of the paracrisis. The paper concludes with recommendations for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article poses the following questions: Do digital intermediaries (sites such as Facebook or Twitter) have a duty to prevent or ameliorate harm to victims of vile speech? Or do they have a duty to ensure that as much speech as possible gets published on their platforms? To dissect this dilemma, this article offers ethical rationales behind these competing goals. The rationale for promoting speech is founded on a concern for the facilitation of discourse democracy, while the rationale for preventing harm is based on a concern for human dignity. The article concludes by discussing issues of accountability in digital intermediaries’ self-regulatory regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper looks at the phenomenon of ethical vagueness by asking the question, how ought one to reason about what to do when confronted with a case of ethical vagueness? I begin by arguing that we must confront this question, since ethical vagueness is inescapable. I then outline one attractive answer to the question: we ought to maximize expected moral value when confronted with ethical vagueness. This idea yields determinate results for what one rationally ought to do in cases of ethical vagueness. But what it recommends is dependent on which substantive theory of vagueness is true; one can't draw conclusions about how to reason about vagueness in ethics in the absence of concrete assumptions about the nature of vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An Institution is the Lengthened Shadow of One Person. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," 1841 The leader of an organisation determines the ethical platform of the firm. Many of the managerial decisions taken by the business leaders tend to involve their ethical considerations and preferences. With the growing complexity and dynamism in business, business leaders are urged to choose the path of convenience when faced with an ethical dilemma. The less critical judgement leading to greater tolerance of unethical practices can be attributed to an individual's ethical perceptions. These perceptions are nurtured over a period of time and are shaped by several independent factors. The present study is aimed at understanding the ethical perceptions of business management students during the two years of preparation for the industry. This study examines the key factors guiding the ethical perceptions of management graduates and also explores the role of factors such as gender, undergraduate background and school board in influencing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a reply from the author Joel Robbins of the article "What is the matter with transcendence? On the place of religion in the new anthropology of ethics". It also mentions that author believes in ordinary ethics and that religion helps in shaping the everyday life. The article also mentions that the ethical sensibilities of some people and groups of people, moral laws, rules, and obligations play a crucial role.

This article proposes that Hobbes runs two different arguments for sovereignty in Leviathan. The one is polemical and takes up the notion of a covenant from early-modern resistance theory in order to redeploy it in the cause of absolutism. The other is biblical and constructs an image of the sovereign whose authority is a Mosaic legacy. The one argument is addressed to the unruly subject and teaches obedience, whereas the other is addressed to the sovereign and sets out the positive vocation of a Christian ruler. The conjunction of secular materialism and divine right in Leviathan becomes less puzzling when the book’s addressees are differentiated. By depriving the subject of any right of appeal to God in protest against the sovereign, Hobbes dismantles one of the bulwarks of early-modern resistance. This motive for secularism has understandably no role to play in Hobbes’ conception of the sovereign. Indeed, as far as facilitating the sovereign’s biblically framed vocation is concerned, the secularism of Leviathan is arguably simply a means to an end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper I criticize a view of functional localization in neuroscience, which I call 'computational absolutism' (CA). 'Absolutism' in general is the view that each part of the brain should be given a single, univocal function ascription. Traditional varieties of absolutism posit that each part of the brain processes a particular type of information and/or performs a specific task. These function attributions are currently beset by physiological evidence which seems to suggest that brain areas are multifunctional-that they process distinct information and perform different tasks depending on context. Many theorists take this contextual variation as inimical to successful localization, and claim that we can avoid it by changing our functional descriptions to computational descriptions. The idea is that we can have highly generalizable and predictive functional theories if we can discover a single computation performed by each area regardless of the specific context in which it operates. I argue, drawing on computational models of perceptual area MT, that this computational version of absolutism fails to come through on its promises. In MT, the modeling field has not produced a univocal computational description, but instead a plurality of models analyzing different aspects of MT function. Moreover, CA cannot appeal to theoretical unification to solve this problem, since highly general models, on their own, neither explain nor predict what MT does in any particular context. I close by offering a perspective on neural modeling inspired by Nancy Cartwright's and Margaret Morrison's views of modeling in the physical sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global turn in media ethics has presented a tough challenge for traditional models of moral theory: How do we assert common moral standards while also showing respect for the values of those from outside the Western tradition? The danger lies in advocating for either extreme: reason-dependent absolutism or cultural relativism. In this paper, I reject Cliff Christian’s attempts to solve the problem and propose instead a moral theory of universal standards that are discovered via a mix of rationally grounded methods. Such universality refutes relativism but, because it is grounded in evolutionary naturalism and life-world philosophy—as opposed to a Kantian or theological transcendentalism—it also avoids absolutism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to contribute to the growing literature on pragmatism in political theory by revisiting the role of moral absolutes in politics. More specifically, it proposes the idea that pragmatism can support a particular defence of the ban on torture. In contradistinction with deontological accounts, it will be argued that the principles underlying the ban on torture should not be construed as transcendental values that impose external constraints on political action, but as constitutive rules that emerge from, and are sustained by, a web of intersecting social practices. While pragmatists vehemently reject the introduction of absolutes in politics, their anti-foundationalist conception of reasoning crucially hinges on the sustainability of adjustable banisters along which judgements are formed. The article suggests that the torture prohibition ought to be reinterpreted as one such banister. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisions in democracy are binding not in virtue of being true or good, but on account of being an outcome of the majority voting procedure. For some, this is a proof of an intricate connection between democracy and moral relativism. The ‘militant democracy’ model, on the other hand, is premised on the idea that certain political actors and choices have to be banned for being fatally bad for democracy. This gives rise to the claim that protected democratic fundamental values of freedom and equality enjoy the status of absolute moral standards. This article dismisses the intuition that justification of ‘militant democracy’ depends on unpacking the relation between democracy and meta-ethics. Instead, following Bernard Suits’ analytical exposition of the important features of games, it demonstrates, first, how democracy is like a game and, then, it argues that a plausible justification of ‘militant democracy’ stems from its game-like character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bergson looks for the spiritual contact of sympathy with the real without imposing prefabricated categories. Jorge Manzano studies Bergson’s distinction between his own method and that of mere intelligence, which depends on life needs and, when absolutized, leads to relativism. Bergson’s method is intuitive or empirical and holistic: neither purely theoretical nor purely experimental, just the opposite of his contemporaries’ philosophical mindset, which Bergson opposed head-on. The Bergsonian way calls for asceticism: not thinking about reality from the outside with pre-formed concepts, but from the inside. That is the only way to do philosophy: by touching an absolute, reality as it is in itself, its inner being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the approach and notion of German philosopher Gottfried Willhelm Leibniz toward the modal status of absolute space and time. Topics include the disagreement of philosophers Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke to Leibniz' notion of space and time relations, the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke, and the views expressed by Leibniz and the consistent and philosophical thought developed in the correspondence.

An essay is presented which discusses and compares the concepts of relativism and absolutism. Topics discussed include argument made by philosopher Daniel Paksi in his essay, the author's claim and the logic of the dichotomy. Information on Paksi's explanation on the concept of emergentism is provided. Topics including materialism and idealism have been discussed.

The article discusses the concept of relativism and absolutism. Topics include the article "Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise" by philosophy professional David Bloor, his dichotomy and the Common Knowledge symposium. Information includes the concept of absolute knowledge as the basis of distinction between relativism and absolutism and the objective of knowledge. Topics including the snares of materialist relativism, scientific progress and Neo-Darwinism are discussed.

Through a semi-structured interview with 40 senior executives from Indian multinational enterprises (MNEs), we use virtue ethics theory to examine the types of virtues that are promulgated by religiosity and spirituality in shaping ethical behavior. The responses were coded in NVivo and the themes and concepts were organized into four categories (e.g., environmental context, individual religious virtues, individual non-religious spiritual virtues, and organizational ethical virtues). These categories contributed to ethical decision-making. The findings suggest that it is critical to understand ethical decision-making by identifying virtues that are important in religious, spiritual, and humanistic contexts in countries such as India, which are religiously and spiritually diverse. The study findings assist in the development of a framework of ethical decision-making that can be used for further empirical testing across both non-Western and Western contexts in multi-faith populations. Several theoretical, practical, and methodological contributions are presented along with suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What makes a morally right action morally right and a morally wrong action morally wrong? For clarity's sake, let us divide the question. First, what makes a particular action the morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally obligatory? Second, what makes a particular action a (but not the) morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally permissible (and optional)? And third, what makes a morally wrong action morally wrong (that is, morally impermissible) in some situation? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Chapter 10 of the book "The Enlightenment As Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century" by Paschalis M. Kitromilides is presented. It explores political thoughts of philosopher Iosipos Moisiodax connecting him with the theory of enlightened absolutism and earlier phase of the Greek Enlightenment. It highlights personal experience as second factor explaining Moisiodax's thought which he discovered through social mobility, education and intellectual growth.

Public confidence in the finance industry has been shaken by the numerous accounting scandals and corporate failures in recent years. These events have damaged the high regard and perceived integrity of professional accountants. As university students are prospective business leaders, it is important to develop their ethical reasoning and judgement to uphold the professionalism and justice in society. In this study, we examine the ethical judgement of final year accountancy students using brief vignettes that describe scenarios such as violations of codes of ethics, involvement in fraudulent activities, and earnings management. The various scenarios are commonly encountered by certified public accountants (CPA). In particular, we used a survey questionnaire to obtain 120 final year accountancy students' perceived ethical responses to 6 vignettes together with their whistleblowing responses to each vignette, from inaction to internal or external whistleblowing. After they completed their individual answers, the students were requested to form groups of three to four members to provide group responses to the same set of vignettes. The results of this study provide evidence that prospective CPA can be encouraged to think independently, work collaboratively and enhance their ethical sensitivity and judgement through participating in group discussions. The limitations of the study are identified along with suggestions for future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human amnion-derived mesenchymal stem cells (HAMSCs) are considered to be an important resource in the field of tissue engineering because of their anti-inflammatory properties and fewer ethical issues associated with their use compared with other sources of stem cells. HAMSCs can be obtained from human amniotic membranes, a readily available and abundant tissue. However, the potential of HAMSCs as seed cells for treating bone deficiency is unknown. In this study, HAMSCs were used to promote proliferation and osteoblastic differentiation in human bone marrow mesenchymal stem cells (HBMSCs) in a Transwell coculture system. Proliferation levels were investigated by flow cytometry and immunofluorescence staining of 5-ethynyl-2′-deoxyuridine (EdU). Osteoblastic differentiation and mineralization were evaluated in chromogenic alkaline phosphatase (ALP) activity substrate assays, Alizarin red S staining, and RT-PCR analysis of early HBMSCs osteogenic marker expression. We demonstrated that HAMSCs stimulated increased alkaline phosphatase (ALP) activity, mRNA expression of osteogenic marker genes, and mineralized matrix deposition. Moreover, the effect of HAMSCs was significantly inhibited by U0126, a highly selective inhibitor of extracellular signaling-regulated kinase 1/2 (ERK1/2) signaling. We demonstrate that HAMSCs promote osteogenic differentiation in HBMSCs by influencing the ERK1/2 signaling pathway. These observations confirm the potential of HAMSCs as a seed cell for the treatment of bone deficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a decided consensus that Kantian ethics yields an absolutist case against torture – that torture is morally wrong and absolutely so. I argue that while there is a Kantian case against torture, Kantian ethics does not clearly entail absolutism about torture. I consider several arguments for a Kantian absolutist position concerning torture and explain why none are sound. I close by clarifying just what the Kantian case against torture is. My contention is that while Kantian ethics does not support a variety of moral absolutism about torture, it does suggest a strong version of legal absolutism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of 'bizarre delusion' has come into question in contemporary anglophone psychopathology. In DSM-5, it no longer serves as a special criterion for diagnosing schizophrenia nor as an exclusion criterion for delusional disorder. Empirical studies influencing this development have, however, been relatively sparse and subject to methodological criticism. Major reviews have concluded that current conceptualizations of bizarre delusions may require rethinking and refinement. Defining bizarreness entails a return to Jaspers, whose influential views on the supposed incomprehensibility of bizarre delusions and schizophrenic experience are more nuanced than is generally recognized. Jaspers insisted we must 'get behind' three 'external characteristics' (extraordinary conviction, imperviousness, impossible content) in order to acknowledge a 'primary experience traceable to the illness' in the 'delusions proper' of schizophrenia. He also denied that one could empathize with or otherwise 'understand' this basis. Here, we focus on three features of bizarre delusions that Jaspers foregrounded as illustrating schizophrenic incomprehensibility: disturbance of the cogito, certitude combined with inconsequentiality, delusional mood. We link these with the contemporary ipseity disturbance model of schizophrenia, arguing that Jaspers' examples of incomprehensibility can be understood as manifestations of the three complementary aspects of ipseity-disturbance: diminished self-presence, hyperreflexivity and disturbed grip/hold. We follow Jaspers' lead in acknowledging a distinctive strangeness that defies ready comprehension, but we challenge the absolutism of Jaspers' skepticism by offering a phenomenological account that comprehends bizarreness in two ways: rendering it psychologically understandable, and fitting the various instances of bizarreness into a comprehensive explanatory framework. © 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Now that the uproar provoked by the disclosure of the National Security Agency's (NSA) surveillance programs has lessened, and the main protagonists, Edward Snowden and Glenn Greenwald, have had a chance to make the case for their actions, we are in a position to evaluate whether their disclosure and publication of communications intelligence was justified. To this end, this essay starts by clarifying the history, rationale, and efficacy of communications surveillance. Following this I weigh the arguments against surveillance, focusing in particular on the countervailing value of privacy. Next I explain why state secrecy makes it difficult for citizens and lawmakers to assess the balance that officials are striking between security and privacy. Finally, I turn to consider whether the confounding nature of state secrecy justifies Snowden's and Greenwald's actions. I conclude that their actions are unjustified because they treat privacy and transparency as trumps. Consequently, their actions embody a moral absolutism that disrespects the norms and procedures central to a constitutional democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn't true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any further available modal logics that don't commit her to the impossibility of the actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though constitutional doctrine is famously unpredictable, Supreme Court Justices often imbue their constitutional opinions with a sense of inevitability. Rather than concede that evidence is sometimes equivocal, Justices insist with great certainty that they have divined the correct answer. This Article examines this rhetoric of constitutional absolutism and its place in our broader popular constitutional discourse. After considering examples of the Justices' rhetorical performances, this Article explores strategic, institutional, and psychological explanations for the phenomenon. It then turns to the rhetoric's implications, weighing its costs and benefits. This Article ultimately argues that the costs outweigh the benefits and proposes a more nuanced, conciliatory constitutional discourse that would acknowledge competing arguments without compromising legal clarity or the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than a mere travel diary the account written by Francisco Raimundo Moraes Pereira of the voyage of the Portuguese viceroy Francisco de Távora to India offers an interesting description of how the long journey between Lisbon and Goa was the first stage of a long process that transformed an aristocrat into an alter ego of the monarch. This article explores how Moraes Pereira combined a travel diary, with detailed notes on the daily life of the Carreira da India, and a panegyric concerned in fabricating an ideal image of a viceroy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]