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This dissertation is composed of three essays related to Financial Architecture. The first essay, analysed in the first chapter of the thesis, contributes to the literature on Efficient Market Hypothesis and in particular in understanding several issues associated with how prices are determined for individual stocks. The chapter, in particular, provides further evidence of price and volume effects associated with index compositional changes by analysing the inclusions (exclusions) from the French CAC40 and SBF120 indices, as well as the FTSE100. I find evidence supporting the price pressure hypothesis associated with index fund rebalancing, but weak or no evidence for the imperfect substitution, liquidity and information hypotheses. The results improve on recent evidence from the S&P500 index. The evidence for the FTSE100 additions shows, in particular, that markets learn about an imminent inclusion and incorporate this information into prices, even before the announcement date.The other two essays of this thesis relate to Corporate Governance issues. Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, analyze some aspects of two corporate governance mechanisms: ownership concentration and managerial labour market. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the evolution of control in listed Slovenian corporations and evaluates the impact of the current changes in ownership on firm performance. Ownership and control has been concentrating in most transition countries. This consolidation of control introduces changes in the power distribution within privatised firms and, most importantly, redirects the corporate governance problem to a conflict between large and small shareholders. The chapter evaluate the ownership changes in Slovenian privatised firms through an analysis of stock price reactions to the entrance of a new blockholder (the shared benefits of control) and through an estimation of the premiums paid for large blocks (the private benefits of control). It provides evid, Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Traditionally economics is based on very narrow presumptions about human behavior, namely selfishness. In the last 20 years, however, experimental research has accumulated overwhelming evidence that is at odds with these classical assumptions. It has been shown that people very often care about the distributional consequences of their actions and intentions.Against this background, in this thesis the impact of broader models of human behavior on decision making and human interactions is studied, for example the impact of indirect reciprocity on human relationships. If educational expenditures of parents into children depend on grandparents' investments into the parent’s education, then private educational spending is inefficiently low and should be supported by the state. This finding stands in contrast to earlier results that show that parents might invest optimally into the education of their children out of pure altruism or strategic transfer motives., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

We consider a hyperbolic discounting individual who has the ability to make promises which are costly to break. We first identify conditions under which promises made are kept, and conditions under which they are (partially) broken. Second, we provide microeconomic foundations for the effectiveness of contractual promises. Specifically, we show how the cost of breaking promises can be reinterpreted in terms of either a reputation loss in the presence of incomplete information or a financial loss under monitoring and explicit contracting. The results imply that strategic interactions between hyperbolic discounting individuals may serve as a commitment mechanism against intrapersonal conflicts. © Journal compilation © 2008 by the Royal Economic Society., SCOPUS: ar.j, FLWIN, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

http://www.editions-universite-bruxelles.be/fiche/view/2418, Le fichier attaché à cette référence, version publiée de l’œuvre, est librement accessible, sans embargo, en accord avec les Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This PhD thesis takes a ’micro’ perspective on the production of higher education and research. More precisely, I use tools of industrial organization to study two individual institutions involved in their production process. The second chapter studies universities, the main producers of higher education and research, and the third and fourth chapters analyze scientific journals, which are central in the production and the dissemination of science. Besides being crucial nodes in the production and transmission ofknowledge, these institutions, interestingly, share other common characteristics: they both emerged before the Industrial Revolution, their importance increased over the centuries and they seem unavoidable today, and many actors are private not-for-profit., Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

SYL-008095 = Deuxième partie - Volume 1 ;SYL-9873 = Exercices, INGE1 - ECON-D-103, info:eu-repo/semantics/published, 4

We analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices, their quality measured by their citation counts, their age, as well as conduct of publishers. The database covers 22 scientific fields and over 2600 among the most highly reputed and cited journals in 2003. We show that (a) for-profit journals charge roughly 3 times more than journals run by scientific societies; (b) the number of citations has a positive impact on prices; (c) there are large differences in prices across fields that vary from 1 and 6; these are highly (and positively) correlated with the degree of concentration in the industry.

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La thèse est une collection de cinq articles académiques, chacun apportant une contribution originale à la connaissance et à la recherche scientifique dans le domaine de l’économie de l’imposition du capital et des sociétés. Les travaux empiriques de Gaëtan Nicodème se situent dans le contexte de la concurrence fiscale en Europe.Le premier chapitre ‘Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand? (Publié dans International Taxation Handbook) revisite la problématique de la concurrence fiscale dans l’Union Européenne, discute la littérature économique théorique et empirique sur la question et analyse les réponses politiques qui y sont apportées. Après avoir remis la problématique dans son contexte institutionnel, l’auteur compare les résultats provenant de la littérature avec les caractéristiques propres à l’Union Européenne, notamment en termes de l’étendue et des conséquences de la concurrence fiscale. Il passe ensuite en revue les questions théoriques et de mise en œuvre pratique que soulèvent une possible harmonisation et consolidation des bases fiscales de l’impôt des sociétés en Europe. Tout en gardant à l’esprit la diversité des solutions qui existent dans la mise en œuvre, il montre que l’harmonisation des bases fiscales est à même de générer des gains économiques. Le deuxième chapitre ‘Comparing Effective Corporate Tax Rates’ (à paraître dans Frontiers in Finance and Economics) passe en revue les méthodes de calcul de taux effectifs de l’impôt des sociétés. Le mérite de la contribution est non seulement d’offrir une typologie des ces taux mais également de montrer que leurs résultats sont très différents selon la méthode utilisée, que ce soit en niveau ou en classement des pays. L’auteur calcule également ces taux pour un échantillon de pays Européens avec une désagrégation sectorielle. Le troisième chapitre ‘Do Large Companies have Lower Effective Corporate Tax rates ?A European Survey’ utilise ces, Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of education and migration. The first essay analyzes the effects of remittances on public education spending in migrants’ source countries. The second essay studies the impact of migration on public education expenditures in migrants’ destination countries. The third essay investigates the effects of public education expenditures on subsequent human capital inequality., Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Résumé de la thèse d’Alexandre Janiak intitulée « Essais sur la mobilité géographique, sectorielle et intra-sectorielle en périodes de changement structurel »Le changement structurel est un processus nécessaire qui améliore considérablement les conditions de vie dans nos sociétés. Il peut découler par exemple de l'introduction de nouvelles avancées technologiques qui permettent d'augmenter à long terme la productivité agrégée dans nos économies. En retour, la hausse de la productivité a un impact sur notre consommation de tous les jours. Elle nous permet notamment de vivre dans un plus grand confort. Les individus peuvent alors s'épanouir dans leur ensemble. Il est évident que le changement structurel peut prendre d'autres formes que celle du changement technologique, mais il est souvent issu d'une transformation des forces qui influencent les marchés et en général aboutit à long terme à une amélioration du bien-être global.Mais le changement structurel est aussi un processus douloureux. Il peut durer plusieurs décennies et, durant cette période, nous sommes beaucoup à devoir en supporter les coûts. Comme nous allons l'illustrer dans ce chapitre introductif, le changement structurel a pour conséquence une modification du rapport aux facteurs de production, ce qui alors mène à modifier l'ensemble des prix relatifs qui caractérisent une économie. En particulier, la modification des prix est due à une transformation des demandes relatives de facteurs. Ces derniers se révèlent alors inutiles à l'exécution de certaines tâches ou sont fortement demandés dans d'autres points de l'économie.Souvent, le changement structurel entraîne alors un processus de réallocation. Des pans entiers de travailleurs doivent par conséquent se réallouer à d'autres tâches. Les lois du marché les incitent ainsi à devoir s'adapter à un nouveau contexte, mais elles le font pour un futur meilleur.Cette thèse s'intéresse à cette problématique. Elle suppose que tout proces, Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for ba, Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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This paper discusses the introduction of incentive considerations in a model of costly communication. It starts from a simplified version of a team-theoretic model due to Dessein and Santos (2003), which relates the design of an organization to its adaptiveness to environmental uncertainty. Incentives are introduced in this setting, following an approach developed by Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). Doing so enriches the analysis by allowing for the coexistence of various forms of communication, in particular cheap talk versus costly communication. © 2006 by the European Economic Association., SCOPUS: ed.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers. However, competition policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing "wasteful" spending, regardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved. Although it is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid control but rather for better domestic political accountability, this paper argues that wasteful spending may be a by-product of accountability, not a symptom of its absence. Specifically, we describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence, and voters rationally reward them for this. We discuss implications for the role of state aid control mechanisms. © 2006 by the European Economic Association., SCOPUS: cp.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

SYL-009993 = Première partie, Volume 2, INGE1, ECON1 - ECON-D-103, info:eu-repo/semantics/published, 3

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In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. © 2004 by the European Economic Association., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

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Volume 1: 1. Auctions and efficiency Eric Maskin; 2. Why every economist should learn some auction theory Paul Klemperer; 3. Global games: theory and applications Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin; 4. Testing contract theory: a survey of some recent work Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Bernard Salanie; 5. The economics of multidimensional screening Jean-Charles Rochet and Lars A. Stole; Discussion of papers by P. A. Chiappori and B. Salanie and by J.-.C Rochet and L. A. Stole Patrick Legros; 6. Theories of fairness and reciprocity: evidence and economic applications Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt; 7. Hyperbolic discounting and consumption Christopher Harris and David Laibson; Discussion of papers by E. Fehr and K. M. Schmidt and by C. Harris and D. Laibson Glenn Ellison; 8. Agglomeration and economic theory Masahisa Fujita and Jacques-Francois Thisse; 9. Non-market interactions Edward Glaeser and Jose A. Scheinkman. Volume 2: 1. Sorting, education, and inequality Raquel Fernandez; 2. Wage equations and education policy Kenneth I. Wolpin; Empirical and theoretical issues in the analysis of education policy: a discussion of the papers by Raquel Fernandez and Kenneth I. Wolpin Costas Meghir; 3. Toward a theory of competition policy Patrick Rey; 4. Identification and estimation of cost functions using observed bid data: an application to electricity markets Frank Wolak; 5. Liquidity, default, and crashes: endogenous contracts in general equilibrium John Geanakoplos; 6. Trading volume Andrew W. Lo; Discussion of papers by John Geanakoplos and by Andrew Lo and Jiang Wang Franklin Allen; 7. Inverse problems and structural econometrics: the example of instrumental variables Jean-Pierre Florens; 8. Endogeneity in nonparametric and semiparametric regression models Richard Blundell; Discussion of papers by Jean-Pierre Florens and by Richard Blundell and James Powell Manuel Arellano. Volume 3: 1. Contracting constraints, credit markets, and economic development Abhijit V. Banerjee, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

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This paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor's and the receiver's incentives to cooperate in the future. We define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible (contractible control actions) or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible (transferable control actions). Under incomplete information, when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party, in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

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