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In this study, we examine stock market reactions to corporate downsizing using a neo-institutional perspective. Over the course of the 1990s, a time period in which shareholder value orientation gained momentum, downsizing became an institutionalized management practice. We argue and propose that the growing legitimacy of this practice is displayed in investors' reactions to downsizing announcements. Using a sample of 391 downsizing announcements of the S&P 100 firms for the period 1990–2006, we show that the announcement year has a positive (diminishing) effect on the abnormal stock market return and that prior downsizings in the focal firm's institutional field have a positive linear impact on abnormal stock market return. In addition, we provide evidence that these relationships are positively moderated by proactive downsizing motives and firm size. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of the performance effects of corporate downsizing and investors' role in legitimizing this prevalent business practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses legal consequences of violations of law which may occur in the course of passing resolutions by shareholders or when convening the meeting. Such violations take the form of procedural infringements, as opposed to material defects which concern the subject matter of the resolution. Several jurisdictions were taken into account in order to demonstrate that illegality of the procedure does not need to imply nullity of resolutions. There are various instruments which, despite illegality, are intended to preserve the resolution. This is all about the balance of preferences: in company law there are definitely situations where legality should be less valued than stability and certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of RACE- Revista de Administraçâo, Contabilidade e Economia is the property of Revista de Administracao, Contabeis e Economia-RACE and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Corporate governance (CG) is a fundamental criteria for enhancing investors’ and stakeholders’ trust, relatively recently recognized in emerging markets. This study investigates the effects of CG practices on the firm-level financial performance of Borsa Istanbul XKURY-indexed companies during 2007–2019. Four specific aspects of CG are analysed: shareholders’ rights, public disclosure and transparency, stakeholders’ rights, and board of directors functioning, as defined by the Turkish Code of Corporate Governance, in line with international principles of CG issued by OECD. Alternative estimations of panel regression analysis indicate a positive association between stakeholder-oriented governance practices and firm-level financial performance expressed by accounting measures for both financial and non-financial companies. Shareholder protection policies have a negative influence on accounting-based performance, especially for non-financial industries, whereas the corporate practices related to board of directors and public disclosure vary between financial and non-financial entities. These findings contribute to international research on CG implications for emerging markets, providing evidence about the importance of stakeholders’ protection and the distinctive effects of CG dimensions for corporate financial performance.

Payment of profit shares means that the company's equity is decreased by the value of dividends paid. The article focuses on the issue of how foreign parent of Czech construction companies approach this. Whether they reinvest the profit and are interested in the development of the Czech subsidiary or whether and to what extent they draw on profits. The four largest construction companies were selected, of which one owned by Czech owners was selected for comparison, the other three companies are 100% owned by foreign capital. Within the EU, the Czech Republic is the country from which most funds go abroad in the form of dividends in relation to the size of GDP. How the construction industry contributes to this outflow and how the three largest foreign construction companies on the Czech market contribute to this, the article answers these questions.

Healthy financial markets require strong and sidlicient investor protection. The regulatory regime that heavily relies on regulatory and administrative measures taken by public bodies has proven ineffective and insufficient for investors protection. This article proposes that alternative approaches are needed. Shareholder activism by institutional shareholders and the China Securities Investor Service Centre could be a necessary monitoring force to combat management deviation and therefore protect securities investors from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al Bashaer Economic Journal is the property of Al Bashaer Economic Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the current era, the emergence of various types of Corporation and the expansion of their activities, has underlied the way for new legal issues regarding these individuals. One of these issues is the use of arbitration in intra-corporate disputes. Although arbitration in intra-corporate disputes is accepted in the legal system of most countries and is used in practice by many corporations, in some cases, this issue is associated with many complications due to the multiplicity of pillars or differences persons. One of the things that complicates the arbitration of internal disputes is when the arbitration is multiparty. For this reason, the present article examines multiparty arbitration in intra-corporate disputes. In this regard, after explaining the challenges of multiparty arbitration, the conditions for merging existing disputes have been examined. The findings of this study, based on a comparative study, indicate that in most legal systems, not only the use of general arbitration rules due to the specific characteristics of corporations, does not solve the existing challenges, but also there are not comprehensive rights and sufficient jurisprudence regarding these disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Geominas is the property of FUNDA-GEOMINAS. (Fundacion de Egresados d Amigos de la Escuela de Ingenieria Geologica y de Minas) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Shareholders and restructuring make a somewhat awkward pairing and yet this is one of the main features of the new Insolvency Law Reform. Of the various options in the Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, the Spanish lawmaker has opted for a hybrid or intermediate system. Restructuring plans often include measures that the debtor's shareholders need to approse through a resolution. The most common is a debt-for-equity swap, but there are many others, including structural modifications such as mergers or demergers. In these cases, these measures continue to require shareholder approval, but some special features have be introduced to favour such approval. And, if necessary, even if the measures are not approved, the plan may still go ahead and be imposed on the shareholders (shareholder cram-up). The amendments have thus been quite significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of capital companies is to continuously provide themselves, through their shareholders, partners, new investors and, of course, their profits, the social capital that will allow them to fulfill the purpose for which it was created. However, the law allows a company to become a shareholder of it; for which, it establishes limited assumptions and conditions. This permissiveness may present several risks to society, such as the loss of social capital and its effects that undermine the principle of capital reality, affecting the principle of parity of shareholders and other political and economic rights, incidence in the stock market and loss of control of the company by the shareholders. Due to the above, the present work aims to briefly analyze the fundamentals of the treasury stock, its positive aspects and, in a deeper way, the problems caused by the misuse of the acquisition of own shares by a corporation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The remuneration of the owners of the entity for the capital invested by them is of particular concern for the management of the company. It must be taken into consideration on one hand to serve the interest of the owners consisting in the gain of a part of the obtained profit in a short period of time, and on the other hand to revere the applicable accounting and tax regulations. Also, the management of the company is highly interested in carrying out this type of operations in terms of cost optimisation as far as obtaining the information is concerned, in order to determine the amount of dividends due to the shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims at highlighting the various concepts related to internal control system and corporate governance, and the relationship between them in the organization. To apply theoretical concepts in reality, we conducted a field study at the port of chlef in order to determine the extent of the contribution of internal control system inactivating governance system. We concluded that internal control system is one of the most important tools that help to activate the governance system, by ensuring the rights of stakeholders, integrity and transparency and free flow of information in the organization [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Croatian law, it is commonly accepted that the directors should manage the company in the interest of the company itself. It has, however, rarely been discussed what is exactly the purpose of a company. In comparative legal systems, the question of corporate purpose is, somewhat simplified, often portrayed as a conflict between shareholder and stakeholder approaches. According to the first approach, the company should be managed primarily in the interests of its shareholders, while according to the latter it should be managed in the interests of all its stakeholders. This paper reaches the conclusion that, in Croatian law, the shareholder approach should be given priority. Shareholders establish a company and bear the direct risk of their investment. On the other hand, the stakeholders are a diffuse notion, with diverse interests and no corporate mechanisms at their disposal. This enables the company directors to exercise wide powers and bear little responsibility. The shareholder approach, however, does not mean that the directors have to follow the wishes of the current shareholder majority. The shareholders' interests are the objective interests of all shareholders, including those who will become shareholders in the future. The corporate purpose is, thus, to increase their long-term financial benefit. Such interpretation does not have to be at the expense of the stakeholders. They should be protected on two different levels. One is top-down protection, where public regulations force companies to take minimum measures in the public interest. The other is bottom-up feedback from conscientious customers who demand that the company's conduct satisfies certain criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The confidence of Bottom 40 (B40) shareholders is crucial for cooperative’s sustenance within wider corporate governance. An in-depth study on cooperatives is needed, as they play a crucial role in the Malaysian economic system and contribute greatly to the country’s social development. However, in the current landscape, confidence among shareholders is at stake. This study aims to identify the research gap into corporate governance for cooperatives in relation to B40 shareholder confidence, as well as identify current study challenges and develop a conceptual framework for future research. Methods: We conducted a systematic literature review, with the use of agency theory to assess shareholders’ confidence. Emerald, ProQuest, InderScience, Scopus and Science Direct were the online databases used in this study to search five keyword phrases: corporate governance, confidence, cooperative, agency theory and Bottom 40% (B40) household. Tranfield’s five stages were used to conduct the systematic review. Results: Only 5 of the 324 studies assess shareholders’ confidence in cooperatives, as well as one paper on B40 and two papers on agency theory. Our review presents three major findings. First, research in the context of B40 shareholder’s confidence in cooperatives is scarce. Second, the challenges related to shareholders’ confidence in B40 are major issues in the context. Third, research on agency theory in the context of shareholders’ confidence within cooperatives and corporate governance is still scant. Conclusions: This review urges the research community to conduct more studies based on the highlighted research gaps.

Copyright of R&S: Research Studies Anatolia Journal is the property of Dr. Arif Yildiz and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The audit of fiscal obligations, or the fiscal audit, as it is also called in the specialized literature, can be considered both as an integral part of the financial audit of the annual financial statements, and as an independent audit. Fiscal obligations are obligations that all economic entities in Romania have and that have a special characteristic, respectively they bear interest and penalties for delay or non-declaration. These fiscal obligations are part of the budget revenues and represent the support of the expenses that the state administers. From another point of view, the level of these fiscal obligations and the way in which they are declared and paid, constitute reference points for the partners of the respective entities - state authorities, shareholders, banks, creditors, suppliers, customers, employees, and others. An entity that has up-to-date tax obligations, proves financial stability and security for all individuals and legal entities with which it interacts. even more so because of financial instability or even imminent bankruptcy.

A proper inquiry into the laws of the existence of a right in the name of the right of priority.It is the privilege and ability of a person to be able to do or gain privileges before others.One of the instances of this right is the right of shareholders of the joint stock companies referred to in Article 166 of the amended Bill of Trade Act of 1347 to include shareholders after the capital increase.However, less has been done on whether this right can be referred to as a specific right like any other recognized right, and by identifying the pillars and their status among the various rights of a person, he has attained his rights in terms of his right to be object or debt or religious, to be able to be transferred, detained, and detained?What is the basis for the exercise and effect of this right for shareholders?This article examines these cases.

Background: The confidence of Bottom 40 (B40) shareholders is crucial for cooperative corporation’s sustenance within wider corporate governance. An in-depth study on cooperatives is needed, as they play a crucial role in the Malaysian economic system and contribute greatly to the country’s social development. However, in the current landscape, confidence among shareholders is at stake. This study aims to identify the research gap into corporate governance for cooperative corporations in relation to B40 shareholder confidence, as well as identify current study challenges and develop a conceptual framework for future research. Methods: We conducted a systematic literature review, with the use of agency theory to assess shareholders’ confidence. Emerald, ProQuest, InderScience, Scopus and Science Direct were the online databases used in this study to search five keyword phrases: corporate governance, confidence, cooperative, agency theory and Bottom 40% (B40) household. Tranfield’s five stages were used to conduct the systematic review. Results: Only 5 of the 324 studies assess shareholders’ confidence in cooperatives, as well as one paper on B40 and two papers on agency theory. Our review presents three major findings. First, research in the context of B40 shareholder’s confidence in cooperative corporations is limited. Second, the challenges related to shareholders’ confidence in B40 are major issues in the context. Third, research on agency theory in the context of shareholders’ confidence within cooperative corporations and corporate governance is still scant. Conclusions: This review urges the research community to conduct more studies based on the highlighted research gaps.

Background: The confidence of Bottom 40 (B40) shareholders is crucial for cooperative’s sustenance within wider corporate governance. An in-depth study on cooperatives is needed, as they play a crucial role in the Malaysian economic system and contribute greatly to the country’s social development. However, in the current landscape, confidence among shareholders is at stake. This study aims to identify the research gap into corporate governance for cooperatives in relation to B40 shareholder confidence, as well as identify current study challenges and develop a conceptual framework for future research. Methods: We conducted a systematic literature review, with the use of agency theory to assess shareholders’ confidence. Emerald, ProQuest, InderScience, Scopus and Science Direct were the online databases used in this study to search five keyword phrases: corporate governance, confidence, cooperative, agency theory and Bottom 40% (B40) household. Tranfield’s five stages were used to conduct the systematic review. Results: Only 5 of the 324 studies assess shareholders’ confidence in cooperatives, as well as one paper on B40 and two papers on agency theory. Our review presents three major findings. First, research in the context of B40 shareholder’s confidence in cooperatives is scarce. Second, the challenges related to shareholders’ confidence in B40 are major issues in the context. Third, research on agency theory in the context of shareholders’ confidence within cooperatives and corporate governance is still scant. Conclusions: This review urges the research community to conduct more studies based on the highlighted research gaps.

Copyright of Estudios Penales y Criminológicos is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Juridical & Political Science is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study analyzes the right regulated by Law no. 31/1990 on companies1 (hereinafter “Law no. 31/1990”) of the shareholders to request the court to appoint one or more experts appointed to write an expert report to verify certain facts and operations of the management of a company, specifically indicated by the claimant and registered with the competent court. The provisions of article 136 of Law no. 31/1990 govern the conditions under which one or more shareholders may proceed with such a request: (i) the shareholder or the shareholders must hold, individually or jointly, at least 10% of the company's share capital; (ii) the facts and/or operations that are to be analyzed to be specifically indicated by the claimant in the proposed objectives. The expert report will be formally submitted to the board of directors and the supervisory board, as well as to the company's internal auditors or censors, in order to be analyzed and to propose appropriate measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes a comparative analysis of the normative regulation of the Limited Liability Companies (LLC) in North Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo as the most popular form of business organization in continental Europe and beyond. According to the doctrinal analysis, the spread of this type of companies is due to its hybrid nature, i.e. the presence of the positive elements of personal and capital features. Namely, the idea behind is determined by the need to create a kind of "more flexible" space for individuals in a Joint Stock Company (JSC), but also to have more formal and less personal risk than in a public company. In the comparative law of companies, there are significant differences in terms of regulating the position of LLCs, so that in some countries the features typical of personal companies are more evident, while in other countries, the Joint Stock Companies as a personification of capital companies. Unlike a Joint Stock Company that engages large amount of capital, a LLC is featured by a smaller concentration of capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate charters, which vest power in a network of control centres, can offer advantages for directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The author describes how he reduced the cost of capital through the establishment of a "Senate" as a watchdog board to improve investor and director protection. A cybernetic analysis is used to indicate how the involvement of customers, employees, and suppliers in corporate governance, as found in U.S., Europe, and Japan, can provide competitive advantages and improve self-regulation. A theory of firms, and organizations, based on economizing information processing by individuals are introduced to provide a common foundation for other theories. Cybernetic laws of requisite variety are presented as a basis for designing self-governing social institutions with operating advantages to minimize the role and cost of government while improving the quality of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The company will conduct profit management with the aim to meet its personal interests and sometimes there is a relationship between the agent and the company so that the agent will participate in profit manipulation so that investors want to invest in the company and for investors who use the services of agents, if they fully trust the agent then the investor will want to invest in the company suggested by the agent, But with a high enough profit, investors will ask for a greater rate of return than usual. Therefore, management certainly chooses to beautify financial statements by maintaining their profits while investors want a large dividend from the company so that this difference in interest triggers profit management practices. The purpose of this study is to find out the effect of profit management and information asymptomatic on the cost of equity. This quantitative research uses secondary data and with sampling methods in the form of purposive sampling obtained by 100 consumer goods companies registered with the IDX from 2015-2019 as samples. Processing data analysis using SPSS software version 23. The results showed that profit management and information asymmetry partially had no significant effect on the cost of equity. Likewise, it also jointly shows that profit management and information asymmetry have no significant effect on the cost of equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governance plays an essential role in the functioning and performance improvement of companies, which define their governance structure in order to adapt to changes in the environment. Imposing identical governance rules on all companies can disrupt or even destabilize a governance system that is otherwise globally coherent and efficient. Choosing a system of governance means that the mechanisms of the company control the actions of the managers and analyze them as fulfilling their obligations to the principals, the shareholders. Thus, two groups stand out, namely the managers and the shareholders. So, how to satisfy all parties correctly? What management objectives should be attributed to managers? What guarantee can we have on the sincerity of the executive power on the social interest? This paper proposes to answer these three questions by examining governance through the study of a sample of 22 firms in French Guyana. It examines the literature on corporate governance, and the link between theories and contractualization, to conduct the quantitative investigation, and interpretation of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]