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In this paper, I argue that limitarian policies are a good means to further political equality. Limitarianism, which is a view coined and defended by Robeyns (2017), is a partial view in distributive justice which claims that under non-ideal circumstances it is morally impermissible to be rich. In a recent paper, Volacu and Dumitru (2018) level two arguments against Robeyns' Democratic Argument for limitarianism. The Democratic Argument states that limitarianism is called for given the undermining influence current inequalities in income and wealth have for the value of democracy and political equality. Volacu and Dumitru's Incentive Objection holds that limitarianism places an excessive and inefficient burden on the rich in ensuring political equality. The Efficacy Objection holds that even if limitarianism limits excessive wealth it still fails to ensure the preservation of political equality. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections fail, but on separate grounds. I argue that the Incentive objection fails because one could appeal to limitarian policies that are different from the ones discussed by Volacu and Dumitru and which escape the problem of reduced productivity. I argue against the Efficacy Objection that limitarian policies are a partial but highly valuable step towards establishing political equality, and that they can and should complement or be complemented by other strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is Confucian democracy philosophically justifiable? In recent decades, prominent Confucian theorists have answered this question in the negative, arguing that the political system that is consistent with Confucianism is political meritocracy or elite rule. This position presupposes an antithetical relation between democracy and Confucianism. In order to counter such a position, this article proposes a philosophically justifiable normative conception of Confucian democracy. By carefully examining democracy theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Carl Schmitt in the civic humanist republican tradition and Confucian political philosophy in the Mencian tradition, this article demonstrates that the substantive value of democracy as popular sovereignty is a fundamental idea undergirding and safeguarding the ideal Confucian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In democratic political systems, political equality is often defined as an equality of opportunity for influence. But inequalities in resources and status affect the capacity of disadvantaged citizens to achieve an effective political equality. One common thread running through recent democratic innovations is the belief that appropriate institutional devices and procedures can alleviate the impact of background inequalities on the presence and voice of the disadvantaged within those designs. My objective is to achieve a clearer understanding of the conception of political equality that informs a specific subset of these designs: deliberative mini-publics. I focus firstly on the methods of participant selection advocated to secure equal presence. According to what principle is participation distributed? If it is according to the 'equal probability' principle, rather than 'equal opportunity', what difference does this make in terms of political equality? Secondly, achieving equality of voice is usually conceived in terms of equalising opportunities for influence among participants. How is this objective understood and what does this say about the underlying conception of political equality? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I aim to provide an introductory overview of limitarianism -- a novel philosophical view advanced by Ingrid Robeyns, which maintains that individuals should not be excessively wealthy -- and its main conceptual features to the Romanian landscape. Second, I argue that one way of conceptualizing limitarianism, as a merely moral (non-political) view is problematic, since the presumed duty to avoid being excessively wealthy is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for satisfying the underlying moral duties upon which limitarianism is predicated. The implication is that limitarianism makes sense as a self-standing view only in its political interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation from low- to high-choice media environments has triggered concerns of rising inequalities in news media use. This concern has been buttressed by research showing that motivational factors have become more important predictors of news media use. Less attention has been paid to how changes in media environments have altered the impact of socioeconomic status on news media use. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the changing impact of socioeconomic status on newspaper and television news consumption, empirically focussing on Sweden between 2000 and 2016. Among other things, results suggest that the impact of socioeconomic status on news media use has increased with respect to reading morning newspapers but decreased for reading tabloids and watching television news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs and the two distinct limitarian views which these arguments give rise to. We claim that strong limitarianism, which is supported by the democratic argument, should be rejected as it fails to fully instantiate the value of political equality, while having some other unattractive implications as well. By contrast, we argue that weak limitarianism, which is supported by the argument from unmet urgent needs, should be endorsed, albeit in a qualified version which also takes responsibility constraints into consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of who ought to be included in the demos is distinct from, and yet related to, the question of how to distribute decisionmaking power among those who are included. Political equality is the most common answer to the former question within democratic theory. In democratic practice, it is usually realized through one person one vote. Within democratic theory, there is not as much agreement as to what the answer to the latter question should be. The answer that has attracted most attention within the scholarly literature is that all those who are affected should be included. However, prominent scholars have argued that this all-affected principle is incompatible with political equality and therefore an unattractive answer to the question of inclusion. This article challenges this critique and argues that it is based on a misconception of political equality and a narrow reading of the all-affected principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two democratic values: the value of mutual justifiability and the value of equality of opportunity for political influence. Reliance on political testimony is characterized by a reliance on the assertions of others directly on a political question the citizen is asked to answer as part of a formal democratic decision procedure. Reliance on expert testimony generally, even in the context of political decision-making, does not similarly conflict with democratic values. As a consequence of the argument, citizens have a pro tanto reason to rely on their own political judgment when determining their vote, and democratic societies have a reason to only ask citizens questions they are able to answer without reliance on political testimony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the limitations of the ideal of political equality under non-ideal circumstances and focuses specifically on the way in which structurally unjust social contexts endanger individuals' perception of their own worth. Starting from Rawls' definition of the social bases of self-respect as a primary good to be fairly distributed, the paper main goal is to provide normative arguments in favor of a power sensitive theory of political agency. A power sensitive theory, in fact, proves to be necessary as it sheds a light over the way in which power relationships affect the very possibility, for some members of the constituency, of fully enjoying the status of political reflexive agents. Against this background, in the paper I defend two main theses. First, I argue that the contemporary debate concerning the implementation of the ideal of equality within liberal democracies has been overlooking the epistemic dimension of the basis of political equality. Second, I claim that specifying the epistemic dimension of political equality has at least two important effects. a. It is important from the perspective of conceptual analysis, as it allows to properly distinguish between the normative job played by moral arguments on the one hand, and the epistemic aspects of political equality on the other hand. b. The specification of the epistemic aspects of political equality has at least on important normative upshot, namely the possibility to show that epistemic forms of injustice are detrimental to the very ideal of political equality as an essential feature of liberal conceptions of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the world's most extensive assessment of student scholastic abilities, included in its 2015 cycle a human-agent measure of collaborative problem-solving skills (CPS). To better understand the development of collaboration proficiency in youth, we assess the effects on CPS of several individual, mezzo, and national level variables, focusing on intra-school and inter-school wealth inequality. The results of the three-level hierarchical linear models on 46 countries show that both types of inequality have negative effects on CPS individual scores. In the case of intra-school inequality, the negative effect holds after controlling for individual differences in science performance. Generalized trust and political equality, measured at the national level, counteract these effects independently, reaffirming the importance of education to democratic citizenship and institutions. • We assess how school inequality impacts collaborative problem solving (CPS). • Intra-school and inter-school inequality have negative effects on CPS. • Sub-national indicators of inequality reveal impacts that national measures miss. • Generalized trust moderates the negative impact of inequality on CPS. • Political equality also moderates the negative impact of inequality influences CPS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neste artigo procuro responder a uma questão específica: é possível recuperar o valor e papel determinante do conceito de soberania popular, na condição das democracias contemporâneas? Presumindo de que é ainda possível (e também desejável) recuperar este ideal e princípio regulador, quero explorar que condições temos à nossa disposição hoje que nos permitam fazê-lo. Isso implica, antes de mais, expor criticamente os perigos eminentes trazidos pela globalização e pelo novo imperialismo neoliberal, que põem em cheque as aspirações democráticas fundamentais de liberdade, igualdade e justiça social. Neste sentido, questionar sobre as condições de possibilidade da soberania popular significa questionar as condições de possibilidade para a própria democracia. Só conseguiremos recuperar a democracia se redefinirmos: a) a relação entre indivíduo e comunidade; b) a relação entre nações democráticas e organizações globais não-democráticas; c) o espaço onde a democracia deve acontecer (da nação-estado para comunidades locais). Assim, este artigo tem quatro momentos. Primeiro, ofereço uma leitura do conceito de soberania popular na modernidade, tendo como ponto de referência a obra de Rousseau. No segundo momento caracterizo a constelação democrática contemporânea, a partir das leituras oferecidas por Bernard Manin (1997) e Nadia Urbinati (2006). No terceiro momento concentro-me na tensão entre ideais democráticos e hegemonia neoliberal. Por fim, questiono as condições de possibilidade para recuperar a democracia, e com ela, o conceito de soberania popular.

In one broad construal, corruption consists of deriving benefit from power over others in morally objectionable ways. The charge that capitalism is corrupt is usefully understood as a claim that modern capitalist economies inevitably and pervasively generate corrupt gains, in this sense, through conduct that does not transgress capitalist norms for individuals' economic conduct. Modern capitalism has two features that would figure prominently in such an indictment: gains from the inferior bargaining power of most workers and gains from the superior political influence of those in the best economic situations. The taint of corruption should be reduced by political measures that move capitalist commerce toward Adam Smith's commercial ideal of gains from exchanging help for help and that show appreciation of the equal importance of everyone's presumed desire to have a life shaped by directives that he or she willingly accepts. Through such measures, capitalism could, in principle, become non-corrupt. In practice, unequal political influence will prevent this. Ending the corruptness of capitalism is an unattainable yet productive goal of reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we review the intrinsic democratic flaws in electoral representation, lay out a set of principles that should guide the construction of a sortition chamber, and argue for the virtue of a bicameral system that combines sortition and elections. We show how sortition could prove inclusive, give citizens greater control of the political agenda, and make their participation more deliberative and influential. We consider various design challenges, such as the sampling method, legislative training, and deliberative procedures. We explain why pairing sortition with an elected chamber could enhance its virtues while dampening its potential vices. In our conclusion, we identify ideal settings for experimenting with sortition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing rise of inequality and the outbreak of the economic crisis since 2008 have fueled the debate about the effects of macro-economic processes on democracy in general, and on political participation in particular. Whereas the effect of economic disparity is well documented in the literature, the implications of the economic downturn have not been sufficiently evaluated so far. The article addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive overview of the impact of these macro-economic factors on individual political participation in Europe. Using data from the first six rounds of the European Social Survey, it shows that income inequality reduces participation and enlarges the participatory gap between better- and worse-off. In contrast, economic contraction has no effect on the overall level of participation and makes the poor participate more and the rich less. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The aim of the article is to examine civic education in Sweden with regard to equality, by comparing curricula and textbooks for social studies in different tracks in upper-secondary school. Method: The study is based on qualitative text analysis, with quantitative features. The analysis maps themes covered, the extent and depth of thematic coverage, and amount of emphasis on conceptual understanding and analytical training. Findings: The results point to some similarities between the tracks; limited attention is given to democratic values and civic engagement, apart from voting. Clear differences are found in amount of information and complexity. The most basic textbooks target the vocational track, while (some of) the textbooks for the academic track have an elaborated focus on complex conceptual understanding and analytical training. Practical implications: The findings indicate different expectations in civic education. Vocational students receive more limited opportunities to develop civic abilities, which might negatively affect the exercise of citizenship and increase political inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines theories on the relationship of market and democracy. Four theorems may be distinguished: (1) The necessity theorem: market (M) is the necessary condition of democracy (D) ([M→D]+). (2) The inequality theorem: market undermines democracy ([M→D]-). (3) The optimality theorem: democracy is the optimal condition of market ([D→M]+). (4) The disability theorem: democracy undermines the market ([D→M]-). My question is whether these theorems include or exclude each other. After the reconstruction of the four theorems I examine the six possible combinations of them. My conclusion is that the theory stating that market and democracy mutually reinforce each other is compatible with the theory discussing the conflicts between market and democracy: the two theories do not constitute a logical contradiction. This analysis assists in understanding why the relationship of capitalism and democracy may be relatively stable: the selectivity of democracy and the political restrictions of market do not undermine, do not eliminate economic and political freedom, but sustain it in a modified form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between economic and political inequality has long concerned social scientists, but research remains limited in scope. Most studies focus on isolated cases, highly restricted subsamples, or subunits within countries. Using data for up to 136 countries between 1981 and 2011, this study analyzes whether and how income inequality affects the distribution of political power for, and respect for the civil liberties of, a society’s rich and poor people. When income inequality is high, do rich people command greater political power and enjoy stronger civil liberties than poor people do? To answer these questions, the study uses both pooled regression analyses and two-stage models with instrumental variables to identify causal effects. The results are decisive: income inequality is inimical to both political and civil equality. These findings hold for developed as well as developing countries and for democratic as well as nondemocratic countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presence, of bodies and ideas, is often taken as the primary indicator of political equality and, hence, democratic health. Intersectionality and constructivism question the validity of measuring presence. Turning theory into practice, we propose a comparative reflexive design guided by two research questions: (1) Who are the groups? and (2) What are their problems? This reveals both prototypical and non-prototypical groups and interests, from the perspectives of politicians (from above) and citizens (from below). We suggest concrete qualitative and quantitative methodological strategies to study these questions empirically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The article elaborates an original intertwined reading of republican theory, deliberative democracy and political equality. It argues that republicans, deliberative democrats and egalitarian scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a number of features present in these bodies of scholarships that relate them in mutually beneficial ways. It shows that republicanism and deliberative democracy are related in mutually beneficial ways, it makes those relations explicit, and it deals with potential objections against them. Additionally, it elaborates an egalitarian principle underpinning the resulting model that I label Equality of Access and Deliberation. The upshot of these considerations is a novel and mutually reinforcing interrelated three‐tiered theoretical and institutional proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though falling turnout in recent decades has been recognised as a problem for democracy, the solutions that have been proposed have mostly been drawn from the realms of the marketplace and society, rather than that of democracy. The inadequate empirical theory that subtends many policy initiatives designed to improve turnout accounts for why these initiatives have largely failed to achieve their stated aims. I argue that electoral participation should be seen through the conceptual lens of collective action, and that this approach suggests mandatory electoral participation as an equitable and effective coordination device. I further argue that compulsory turnout offers a good fit with democratic norms of equality, rights and political obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather than according to a substantive standard of competence. The alternative avoids standards objections to Mill’s proposal. Moreover, reflection on the alternative plural voting scheme disrupts our intuitions about what counts as an egalitarian voting system. Undue emphasis on Mill’s version of plural voting obscures three important reasons to reject plural voting in favor of strictly egalitarian voting systems: (1) that certain choices that generate inequalities of political power are morally impermissible; (2) that even chosen inequalities may undermine the potential epistemic benefits of democratic decision-making; and (3) that such choices may undermine citizens’ commitments to democracy understood as a joint project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]