Global agricultural trade more than tripled between 2000 and 2014. That growth has been driven, in part, by increased demand for red meat, dairy, and poultry products, particularly in developing countries, and by increases in non-food uses of cereals, especially for biofuels. Currently, as much as 25 percent of global wheat consumption and 45 percent of global soybean consumption are supplied by imports. Even in the case of rice, for which most consumption is supplied domestically, the import share has doubled to 10 percent of consumption since 2000. These trends are projected to continue over the next 35 years, with global food demand expected to increase by as much as 50 percent from 2012-2013 levels by 2050. Much of this increased demand is projected to be met by imports. As global trade has grown over the past 20 years, an increasing share of exports and imports has come from developing countries. From 1995 to 2016, the share of total food imports and exports by developing countries grew from 26 percent to 39 percent and from 31 percent to 40 percent, respectively. If intra-EU trade is excluded, developing countries' imports and exports accounted for almost 60 percent of global food trade in 2016. In the coming decades, an increasing share of agricultural production to meet the world's growing food demand will likely come from developing countries. The challenges to meeting the growing global food demand--population and income growth and supply uncertainties complicated by climate change, environmental pressures, and water scarcity--all point to the increasing importance of trade and the need for a more, not less, open trading system. Growth in agricultural trade has been facilitated in part through the rules-based system established under the World Trade Organization (WTO), particularly the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The AoA was implemented in 1995 and brought substantial discipline to the areas of market access, domestic support, and export competition. However, progress since the Uruguay Round has been limited. While the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was launched with much anticipation in 2001, members failed to reach agreement in July 2008 and the trade agenda in Geneva has since advanced slowly. Despite the best efforts of many, the negotiating intensity seen in late 2007 and 2008 has largely dissipated, in part due to the global recession and the inevitable changes in governments that sometime shift the focus of negotiations. Serious efforts were made to renew the negotiations, but in the end, members have had to be content with harvesting the low-hanging fruit, such as trade facilitation and export competition. Although there have been significant accomplishments, they represent but a small portion of what was on the table during the DDA negotiations. In addition, negotiated settlements on the tougher issues, such as market access and domestic support, have become more difficult to obtain in isolation. The recent experience at the WTO's Eleventh Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires highlights the difficulties of reaching a negotiated settlement on domestic support in isolation from, say, market access. Given the increasing importance of trade in addressing food security needs and its critical role in efforts to eliminate malnutrition and hunger by 2030, achieving further progress in the liberalization of world trade is of paramount importance. So what can be done to move negotiations forward? A few modest steps are outlined in this paper: • Increase transparency through information exchange. Efforts have already begun within the Committee on Agriculture and with the WTO Secretariat Agriculture Division to provide more information on domestic support, market access, and export subsidies. Improving notification requirements, particularly in the area of domestic support, would enhance transparency. • On market access, the WTO risks becoming less relevant, as many of its members seek tariff reductions through preferential trade agreements. Focusing on a cut in the average bound rate across agricultural tariffs would be a simple way to provide market access and significantly curtail countries' ability to raise tariff rates when applied rates are significantly below bound rates. • To advance reforms in domestic support, cuts should be linked to market access reforms. Furthering reforms in domestic support could be accomplished by adopting a simplistic formula that focuses on capping and reducing Overall Trade-Distorting Support levels, with anti-concentration disciplines to prevent too much of a member's support being concentrated on a particular commodity. • With respect to green box reform, a review of Annex 2 of the AoA is warranted, as agricultural policies have evolved considerably since the provisions of Annex 2 were debated in the late 1980s. • Promote sectoral initiatives. • Discipline export restrictions. Export restrictions can significantly exacerbate price volatility in times of high prices and crop shortfalls and undermine confidence in the world trading system. This can often lead to further market disruptive behavior (preemptory purchases and hoarding) on the part of net food importers. • Eliminate the Special Agricultural Safeguard. This safeguard was proposed during the Uruguay Round to help mitigate the transition to tariffication, but 25 years later, it has arguably outlived its purpose. A Special Safeguard Mechanism remains controversial, but most concerns center on a volume-based safeguard. A limited price-based safeguard, operated on a shipment-by-shipment basis in the event of an import surge, may be more acceptable if it is accompanied by reforms in market access and domestic support. • Public stockholding becomes problematic for other members when stocks procured under such programs distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other members. Any compromise will need to address that reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]