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Author(s): Thomas Schramme [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0004 1936 8470, grid.10025.36, Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, , Liverpool, UK Psychiatry has always had a contentious standing. In contrast [...]

This article revisits a Platonic idea that has been formative for the history of aesthetics and then explores how this idea can be reinterpreted meaningfully in today's aesthetic context. The Platonic idea I discuss (which Plato introduces in Ion and Phaedrus) is that artistic creation and its appreciative reception involve a form of divine possession. After exploring how this nonrational, supernatural idea has been critically countered yet repeatedly recurs in important subsequent theories of aesthetic experienced proposed by rational thinkers, my presentation suggests how we might give the notion of possession a more naturalistic explanation. I exemplify this through an analysis of performance art presented in The Adventures of the Man in Gold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a key analytic framework, challenging paradigms that consider gender, race, class, sexuality, and other categories as separate and instead conceptualizing them as interconnected. This has led most authors to assume mutual constitution as the pertinent model, often without much scrutiny. In this essay we critically review the main senses of mutual constitution in the literature and challenge what we take to be a problematic assumption: the problem of reification, here understood as the conceptualization of social categories as entities or objects. We then present the properties framework, together with the emergent experience view, which conceptualizes categories and social systems in a way that maintains their ontological specificity while allowing for their being deeply affected by each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following David Lewis (1986) , Ted Sider (2001) has famously argued that unrestricted first-order quantification cannot be vague. His argument was intended as a type of reductio : its strategy was to show that the mere hypothesis of unrestricted quantifier vagueness collapses into the claim that unrestricted quantification is precise. However, this short article considers two natural reconstructions of the argument, and shows that each can be resisted. The theme will be that each reconstruction of the argument involves assumptions which advocates of vague quantification have independent reason to reject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the alleged misplaced ambiguity in U.S. patent laws. Topics include the vagueness in the laws, the alleged purposeful adoption of ambiguity in patent doctrine to allow flexibility in patent applications, the patent jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, and some cases like Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International.

In the fall of 2016, users of Google Translate working from French to English and English to French saw a marked improvement in the quality of the translated texts. Google Translate was beginning to develop from a purely phrase-based statistical machine translation system into a system that uses deep learning and artificial neural networks that can adapt and learn in reaction to all they encounter. The Google Translate development team has been working on expanding and strengthening the system's capability of pragmatic analysis. This capability entails extracting useful information from a text so that its meaning can be accurately inferred in an attempt to overcome the vagueness and ambiguity inherent in language, which have remained the greatest hurdles to effective machine translation. This article explores the potential of Google Translate to provide increasingly competent translations of literary texts. Using passages from the works of Voltaire translated by Google Translate into English, this article explores both the successes and the ongoing problems faced by new generations of Google Translate, and of machine translation systems in general, as their developers seek to overcome the hurdles of identifying and rendering style, nuance, and ambiguity in language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of Pythagorean fuzzy sets possesses significant advantages in handling vagueness and complex uncertainty. Additionally, Pythagorean fuzzy information is useful to simulate the ambiguous nature of subjective judgments and measure the fuzziness and imprecision more flexibly. The aim of this research is to develop the concept of the Pythagorean fuzzy ideal of a near ring and discusses their desirable properties. Based on the ideas, this paper introduces a novel concept of homomorphism of pythagorean fuzzy ideals of near rings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does moral vagueness require ontic vagueness? A central challenge for nonontic treatments of moral vagueness arises from the referential stability of moral terms across small changes in how they are applied: if moral vagueness is not ontic vagueness, it's hard to explain this referential stability. Pointing to this challenge, Miriam Schoenfield has argued that moral vagueness is ontic vagueness, at least for a moral realist. I disagree. I argue that a moral realist can use a conceptual role semantics for moral terms to give a purely semantic treatment of moral vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as "war" and "peace" and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Walter Bryce Gallie's notion of "essentially contested concepts" from a viewpoint that has hitherto been neglected, namely its relation to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. As a matter of fact, Gallie was an authoritative reader of the American philosopher. All areas of his work are influenced by his attempt to take up and further articulate a major insight of Peirce's semiotics, namely the idea that symbols are inherently vague, and that their meaning is in a state of perpetual growth. At the same time, Gallie rejected another crucial tenet of Peirce's philosophy, that is, the idea that the growth of signs is regulated by the possibility of a final agreement among sign‐users. Examining this ambivalent relation between the two authors will help us shed light on a question that was of crucial importance for Gallie: to what extent should we let our appreciation of concepts or beliefs depend on a historical examination of their meaning? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that the interpretation of sentences like John is not very Adj depends on whether Adj is vague. We argue that this follows from a constraint on the interaction between vagueness and conversational implicature, a domain that has not been studied extensively. The constraint states that implicatures are not drawn if they lead to "borderline contradictions" (see Ripley 2011 ; Alxatib & Pelletier 2011 ; a.o.), a natural extension of the idea that implicatures should not contradict assertions (Hackl 2006 ; Fox 2007 ; a.o.). Experiment 1 establishes that not very Adj gives rise to the implicature Adj for the non-vague absolute adjective late, but not for the vague relative adjective tall (in the terminology of Kennedy & McNally 2005a). Experiment 2 generalizes this result to three relative adjectives in the positive form (tall, hot, fast), against those same adjectives in their (non-vague) comparative forms (taller / hotter / faster than the average X). We also constructed quantitative meaning representations for complex predicates of the form Adj |$ \wedge \neg $| very Adj, using fuzzy logic to model the contribution of boolean connectives and our experimental data to represent the meanings of adjectives. The results of these analyses suggest that strengthening not very Adj with Adj leads to a more contradictory interpretation when Adj is vague than when it is not, as expected on our theory. While our results apply directly to only a specific set of lexical items, we hypothesize that they reflect a more general pattern among gradable predicates. This motivates more systematic investigation into the role that vagueness can play in the derivation of conversational implicatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spatial hierarchy of part-whole relationships is an essential characteristic of the platial world. Constructing spatial hierarchies of places is valuable in association analysis and qualitative spatial reasoning. The emergence of large amounts of geotagged user-generated content provides strong support for modelling places. However, the vague nature of places and the complex spatial relationships among places make it intractable to understand and represent the hierarchies among places. In this paper, we introduce a fuzzy formal concept analysis-based approach to uncovering the spatial hierarchies among vague places. Each place is represented as a concept that consists of its extent and its intent. Based on the place concepts, the spatial hierarchies are generated and expressed as a graph that is easy to comprehend and contains abundant information on spatial relations. We also demonstrate the rationality of our result by comparing it with the result of a questionnaire survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the location of affect in human experience by situating the concept in relation to attention and to different degrees of propositional structuring. By bringing together extended mind theories, the affect philosophies of Spinoza and Deleuze, and Whitehead's theory of intensities, the article seeks to mediate between different strands of affect theory; especially between what has been termed 'non-representational' theories of affect and those that couple affective processes with intentional and perceptual contents. The article will end by discussing vagueness as an important empirical interface in both trajectories of theorizing affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On some accounts of vagueness, predicates like "is a heap" are tolerant. That is, their correct application tolerates sufficiently small changes in the objects to which they are applied. (So, according to tolerant views, if a given object is a heap, it will necessarily remain a heap after one grain of sand is removed.) Of course, such views face the sorites paradox, and various solutions have been proposed. One proposed solution involves banning repeated appeals to tolerance, while affirming tolerance in any individual case. (So, you may always remove one grain of sand safely, but you mustn't make a habit of it.) In effect, this solution rejects the reasoning (rather than the premises) of the sorites argument. This paper discusses a thorny problem afflicting this approach to vagueness. In particular, it is shown that, on the foregoing view, whether an object is a heap will sometimes depend on factors extrinsic to that object, such as whether its components came from other heaps. More generally, the paper raises the issue of how to count heaps in a tolerance-friendly framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity. Some proponents of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitution avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion. I argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied to the phenomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and temporal vagueness. There are what I call 'mid-extension' vagueness cases, in which the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It goes without saying that as a pragmatic phenomenon, vagueness has over the past few years been a topic of extensive research. However, a huge gap still exists when it comes to the investigation of how vagueness is expressed across different languages and cultures. In the present study, we have put under scrutiny the pragmatic functions of 'sort of', a vague expression, in Persian conversation with a view to making cross-linguistic comparisons between different languages possible. Besides confirming the fact that the vague item 'sort of' enables interactants to fulfil a wide variety of functions in interactional settings, particularly in face-to-face interactions, the current study reveals that the expression in question can also serve to signal 'a moment of awkwardness' as well as the presence of 'inferable information'. With the former function, 'sort of' signals that the speaker is experiencing a feeling of inconvenience and embarrassment. When used as an inferable information signal, however, 'sort of' indicates that the utterance has been inferred from the previous or current exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to develop a pragmatic-discursive analysis of the metaphors deployed in the Spanish newspaper headlines about rare diseases. The corpus comprises the news published during two time periods: from July to September of 2014 (776 articles), and from January to May of 2015 (2,521 articles). The description of the semantics and pragmatics of the metaphors identified in the corpus was performed by combining the predictions from Relevance Theory and from Cognitive Metaphor Theory. A complementary discursive analysis in the framework of Critical Analysis of Metaphor was also conducted. The results showed that the conceptual and expressive content conveyed by two main conceptual metaphors -ILLNESS IS A CONTEST, and ILLNESS IS A JOURNEY- set a specific conceptual and ideological frame to make sense of these illnesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q 51:76-82, 2001, Noûs 36:249-275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531-553, 2010). In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief. Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, philosophers often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this article is to show that arguments based on the second direction of the test are misguided: ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically contested ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity provides no meaningful evidence for an absence of ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Signalling games are popular models for studying the evolution of meaning, but typical approaches do not incorporate vagueness as a feature of successful signalling. Complementing recent like-minded models, we describe an aggregate population-level dynamic that describes a process of imitation of successful behaviour under imprecise perception and realization of similar stimuli. Applying this new dynamic to a generalization of Lewis's signalling games, we show that stochastic imprecision leads to vague, yet by-and-large efficient signal use, and, moreover, that it unifies evolutionary outcomes and helps avoid sub-optimal categorization. The upshot of this is that we see 'as-if'-generalization at an aggregate level, without agents actually generalizing. 1 Introduction 2 Background 2.1 Sim-max games and conceptual spaces 2.2 Vagueness in sim-max games and conceptual spaces 2.3 Vagueness, functional pressure, and transmission biases 3 Imprecise Imitation 3.1 Replicator dynamic in behavioural strategies 3.2 Noise-perturbed conditional imitation 4 Exploring Imprecise Imitation 4.1 Setting the stage 4.2 Simulation set-up 4.3 Measures of interest 4.4 Results 5 Discussion 5.1 Levels of vagueness 5.2 Evolutionary benefits of imprecision 5.3 Related work 6 Conclusion Appendix [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some recent works on negative polarity, exhaustivity is posited as the single defining property of all negative polarity item (NPI) and free choice item (FCI) paradigms. Chierchia (2006; 2013), and Chierchia & Liao (2015) are the best-known implementations of this theory. They stipulate that all NPIs and FCIs must be exhaustified, and posit a covert O(nly) and a syntactic feature [+Σ] to derive exhaustification and licensing respectively. In this paper, I challenge the exhaustivity hypothesis and find it, after careful empirical investigation, to be inadequate to explain the distribution and interpretation of NPIs in Greek, Korean, and Mandarin, which have been described in the literature as non-exhaustive. We also find the theory to be unable to derive the actual distribution of any in nonveridical contexts. Analytically, the problems with exhaustification are twofold. First, the use of covert O(nly) fails to account for why NPIs are licensed. Licensing is a grammaticality condition, and in order to capture it the syntactic feature [+Σ] is stipulated, NPI-licensing thus amounting to checking the [+Σ] feature. The stipulation of [+Σ], without a coherent characterization of its semantics, is a regression to a Klima-esque (1964) syntactic account, and faces precisely the challenges that that account faced. Second, for any variant of the Chierchia system to work for the data discussed here, the system built around it must posit additional ad hoc rules on a case-by-case basis. This produces a system with very little predictive power beyond each specific case because of the ad hoc nature of the rules posited. Our overall conclusion will be that the exhaustivity hypothesis, as formulated in the works discussed here, is a falsified, therefore unnecessary, hypothesis for NPIs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an investigation of the ways in which speakers' subjective perspectives are likely to affect the meaning of gradable adjectives like tall or heavy. We present the results of a study showing that people tend to use themselves as a yardstick when ascribing these adjectives to human figures of varied measurements: subjects' height and weight requirements for applying tall and heavy are found to be positively correlated with their personal measurements. We draw more general lessons regarding the definition of subjectivity and the ways in which a standard of comparison and a significant deviation from that standard are specified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociocultural Pragmatics / Pragmática Sociocultural is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The control of the construction quality is very important in the construction industry. In this paper, the fuzzy reliability and construction quality are linked together to establish a specific quantitative evaluation model, which not only can help to make up for the lack of the traditional reliability qualitative evaluation methods, but also can avoid the inaccuracy of fuzzy quantitative evaluation of construction quality to a certain extent. This paper firstly selects some influencing factors of construction quality, and then makes use of complex vague soft expert set theory to study the construction quality and reliability. By the operational relationship and quantitative evaluation index, the membership functions of each subset are obtained, and different evaluation intervals are divided, it is helpful to draw the quantitative evaluation results of quality within a reasonable range and improve the accuracy of the quality and reliability. The presented hybrid method and detailed steps can provide some references for the reliability evaluation of construction quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreeing with most authors on vagueness, the author proposes a solution that he calls ‘three-valued semantic pluralism’ to the age-old sorites paradox. In essence, it is a three-valued semantics for a first-order vague language with identity with the additional suggestion that a vague language has more than one correct interpretation. Unlike the traditional three-valued approach to a vague language, three-valued semantic pluralism can accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and the phenomenon of penumbral connection when equipped with ‘suitable conditionals’. The author also shows that three-valued semantic pluralism is a natural consequence of a restricted form of the Tolerance principle (TR) and a few related ideas, and argues that (TR) is well-motivated by considerations about how we learn, teach, and use vague predicates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spectrum argument purports to show that the better-than relation is not transitive, and consequently that orthodox value theory is built on dubious foundations. The argument works by constructing a sequence of increasingly less painful but more drawn-out experiences, such that each experience in the spectrum is worse than the previous one, yet the final experience is better than the experience with which the spectrum began. Hence the betterness relation admits cycles, threatening either transitivity or asymmetry of the relation. This paper examines recent attempts to block the spectrum argument, using the idea that it is a mistake to affirm that every experience in the spectrum is worse than its predecessor: an alternative hypothesis is that adjacent experiences may be incommensurable in value, or that due to vagueness in the underlying concepts, it is indeterminate which is better. While these attempts formally succeed as responses to the spectrum argument, they have additional, as yet unacknowledged costs that are significant. In order to effectively block the argument in its most typical form, in which the first element is radically inferior to the last, it is necessary to suppose that the incommensurability (or indeterminacy) is particularly acute: what might be called radical incommensurability (radical indeterminacy). We explain these costs, and draw some general lessons about the plausibility of the available options for those who wish to save orthodox axiology from the spectrum argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a discussion of Delia Fara's theory of vagueness, and of its solution to the sorites paradox, criticizing some of the details of the account, but agreeing that its central insight will be a part of any solution to the problem. I also consider a wider range of philosophical puzzles that involve arguments that are structurally similar to the argument of the sorites paradox, and argue that the main ideas of her account of vagueness helps to respond to some of those puzzles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn't have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why exactly the problem is so hard to solve. In this article I attempt to explain just why it is that the problem – the sorites paradox – is so intractable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Boundary Stones of Thought (2015), Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author reflects on comments of Crispin Wright and Richard Zach on his book "The Boundary Stones of Thought." Topics include their objections to his treatment of vagueness; categoricity and determinacy in mathematics; and indefinite extensibility. It discusses analysis of the Burali-Forti Paradox may have revisionary consequences for classical logic.

In this paper I develop a semantic theory of vagueness that is immune to worries regarding the use of precise mathematical tools. I call this view semantic quietism. This view has the advantage of being clearly compatible with the phenomenon of vagueness. The cost is that it cannot capture every robust semantic fact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with moral issues regarding future people and the environment. When it comes to the future, we have deontological and epistemic limitations. The closer to the present, the higher the certainty and the knowledge we have about facts. Thus, when we intend to find moral clarity regarding a future scenario, we deal with an inverse relation between certainty and time (the further to the future, uncertainty gets higher). The main problem is that most ways of dealing with moral issues about future scenarios do not address this relation, and rather focus on things that seem to simplify and clarify the uncertainties of the future. In response to this, I propose a different approach, one that operates neutrally and timelessly dealing with the uncertainties of the future while providing moral groundings that can help to clarify the future's state of moral vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]