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The article discusses the challenges, changes and lessons that the U.S. forces appear to have learnt following their pullout from Iraq. The counter-insurgency challenges faced by the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) following six years of war in Iraq has led to several tactical and institutional changes.

The Marine Corps achieved a major victory in Fallujah in 2004 with the help of their command and control principles based on urban close air support (CAS). Victory was achieved with minimal casualties to civilians while terrorist hideouts and arsenals were destroyed.

The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) has exposed the Marine Corps to asymmetrical warfare with devastating effects. The Marine Corps personnel should use the concept of civil-military operations (CMO) for better effectiveness and interoperability between forces.

The reasons for the creation of the Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (MarSOF) military occupational specialty (MOS) are presented. The personnel trained in SOF are different from conventionally trained forces and no comparison can be made between the skills.

Guidelines to a commander for effective fire support guidance to his troops and a review of the Marine Corps doctrine is presented.

The role of the Marine 81mm mortar platoons is to implement every tactic, technique and procedure (TTD) available in the fire direction center (TDC) in the counterinsurgency fight when faced with enemy firing from mortars is presented.

The U.S. should enhance the Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) to permit better participation in humanitarian assistance during natural calamities thus strengthening and fostering better relations globally.

The author exposes the shortcomings and tactical failures of the U.S. Marine Corps in addressing the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The reasons for the importance to transfer security control in Iraq to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from coalition forces in the Al Anbar region are discussed. This is expected to instill a sense of security among the people.

The article presents the strategy that the U.S. should adopt to prepare, plan and train the Marine Corps force to conform to the vision of ADM Michael G. Mullen's as outlined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

The importance of regionalization and creation of an effective Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) is discussed. Regionalization is defined as the deployment of SC MAGTF units with previous operational experience in the region.

The relationship between Marine expeditionary units (MEU) and Marine special operations companies (MSOCS) is important and has much to offer the Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command (USSOCom). The relationship proves to be a revolutionary improvement in the Marine Corps and USSOCom's approaches to combined arms warfare and helps in closing the gap between conventional forces and special operations forces.

The Marines are lacking in naval surface fire support (NSFS), which is expected to be met through the rapidly fielding systems being developed by Quantico.

The author shares his experiences and observations following completion of his deployment in Iraq, which he believes, will be of help to Marines to be deployed to the area.

The mission responsibilities of forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC(A)s) in the Operating Forces of the Marine Corps are presented.