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While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect of ubiquitous chaos in the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics is rather missing. Here, we present a deterministic eco-evolutionary discrete-time dynamics in generation-wise non-overlapping population of two types of harvesters—one harvesting at a faster rate than the other—consuming a self-renewing resource capable of showing chaotic dynamics. In the light of our finding that sometimes chaos is confined exclusively to either the dynamics of the resource or that of the consumer fractions, an interesting scenario is realized: The resource state can keep oscillating chaotically, and hence, it does not vanish to result in the tragedy of the commons—extinction of the resource due to selfish indiscriminate exploitation—and yet the consumer population, whose dynamics depends directly on the state of the resource, may end up being composed exclusively of defectors, i.e., high harvesters. This appears non-intuitive because it is well known that prevention of tragedy of the commons usually requires substantial cooperation to be present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A world-famous classroom exercise gives students the choice between 2 points (the communal option) or 6 points (the overconsumption option) of extra credit toward an assignment in their course, but if more than 10% choose 6 points, no one receives any points. In the current variation, students (N = 795) were also given a third option--to sacrifice their own potential points to take away points from another randomly selected student who chose 6 points. Across seven course sections, 19 students chose this option based on the concept of "altruistic punishment," with many expressing concern about the entire class losing points. Most students had a positive attitude toward the exercise, viewing that it helped them understand new material and increased their interest in psychology, believing that psychology can help solve social problems. This exercise effectively demonstrates group cooperation dilemmas.

Illegal fishing in small-scale fisheries is a contentious issue and resists a straightforward interpretation. Particularly, there is little knowledge regarding cooperative interactions between legal and illegal fishers and the potential effects on fisheries arising from these interactions. Taking the Chilean king crab (Lithodes santolla; common name centolla) fishery as a case study, our goal is twofold: (i) to model the effect of illegal-legal fishers’ interactions on the fishery and (ii) analyze how management and social behavior affect fishery’s outcomes. We framed the analysis of this problem within game theory combined with network theory to represent the architecture of competitive interactions. The fishers’ system was set to include registered (legal) fishers and unregistered (illegal) fishers. In the presence of unregistered fishers, legal fishers may decide to cooperate (ignoring the presence of illegal fishers) or defect, which involves becoming a “super fisher” and whitewashing the captures of illegal fishers for a gain. The utility of both players, standard fisher and super fisher depend on the strategy chosen by each of them, as well as on the presence of illegal fishers. The nodes of the network represent the legal fishers (both standard and super fishers) and the links between nodes indicate that these fishers compete for the resource, assumed to be finite and evenly distributed across space. The decision to change (or not) the adopted strategy is modeled considering that fishers are subjected to variable levels of temptation to whitewash the illegal capture and to social pressure to stop doing so. To represent the vital dynamics of the king crab, we propose a model that includes the Allee effect and a term accounting for the crab extraction. We found that the super fisher strategy leads to the decrease of the king crab population under a critical threshold as postulated in the tragedy of the commons hypothesis when there are: (i) high net extraction rates of the network composed of non-competing standard fishers, (ii) high values of the extent of the fishing season, and (iii) high density of illegal fishers. The results suggest that even in the presence of super fishers and illegal fishers, the choice of properly distributed fishing/closure cycles or setting an extraction limit per vessel can prevent the king crab population from falling below a critical threshold. This finding, although controversial, reflects the reality of this fishery that, for decades, has operated under a dynamic in which whitewashing and super fishers have become well established within the system.

Why did COVID-19 hit some countries harder than others? While this question is usually answered based on demographics (e. g., population age), health policy (e.g., quarantine), or economic factors, we argue that cultural variance across countries is just as crucial in understanding how susceptible a society is to the COVID-19 outbreak. To test this hypothesis, we first analyzed data collected across 69 countries and examined the relationship between culture and the impact of COVID. Next, we conducted two studies to validate our findings further and explore the mechanism at hand. As expected, we found that the more individualistic (vs. collectivistic) a country was, the more COVID-19 cases and mortalities it had. We also found that the more individualistic participants were, the higher the chances they would not adhere to epidemic prevention measures. These findings are important in understanding the spread of the pandemic, devising optimal exit strategies from lockdowns, and persuading the population to get the new vaccine against the virus.

The development of rural tourism presents the complexity of the industry, environment, governance, and coordination structure. In tourism development, due to the high dispersion and fragmentation of property rights of the resource objects themselves, as well as the involvement of many “atomic” property rights and other stakeholders, coupled with the lack of strong organization and leadership, the full development and utilization of rich tourism resources in rural areas is becoming problematic. It is difficult to realize the “rental value” of tourism resources, which leads to the tragedy of anti-commons. Taking the case of China, this paper explores the occurrence of anti-commons tragedy in the development of rural tourism, identifies the problems caused by the tragic governance of the anti-commons in the current environmental development, and further examines the governance path of the anti-commons tragedy in the tourism sector. The purpose of the study is to optimize the development environment of rural tourism and build a healthy space suitable for industry, residence, and tourism.

A fast developing industry worldwide, tourism demands a monumental extent of resources, and at times devastates and condemns the very own environments that are fundamental to the economic survival of organizations and the sustainability of travel destinations. The purpose of the study is to link three established scientific themes on survival and sustainability to empirical results in the field of economic decision and behavior. The discussion of this link may also represent the originality value of the paper. Departing from the results of a series of decision games obtained under a quasi-experimental design, behavioral patterns were analyzed and extrapolated to explore the terminal effects of competition trends on the survival and economic viability of organizations and travel destinations in restricted environments. The findings show that the identified competition tendency neutralized an important share of the economic potential offered by the decision game, with significant negative effects on the economic efficiency. If persistent, the competition tendency is expected to produce long term effects on the sustainability and economic survival of organizations and travel destinations in restricted environments.

Fine root density in the soil is a plant functional trait of paramount importance for plant ecology and agriculture. Fine root proliferation by plants involves complex plant strategies that may depend on various abiotic and biotic factors. Concretely, the root tragedy of the commons (RToC) is a behavioral strategy predicted by game theory models in which interacting plants forage for soil resources inefficiently. Generally, researchers assume that the RToC is a proactive competition strategy directly induced by the non-self roots. In this opinion, I recall Hardin’s original definition of the tragedy of the commons to challenge this notion. I argue that the RToC is a suboptimal phenotypically plastic response of the plants based on the soil resource information exclusively, and I discuss how this alternative perspective carries important implications for the design of experiments investigating the physiological mechanisms underlying observable plant root responses.

Abstract We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against “defectors”, or alternatively, significantly rewarding “cooperators”, theoretical models typically predict a system collapse in a way that is reminiscent of the “tragedy-of-the-commons” metaphor. Drawing on a dynamic network model, this paper demonstrates how cooperation can emerge when the social-pressure is mild. This is achieved with the aid of an additional behavior called “hypocrisy”, which appears to be cooperative from the external observer’s perspective but in fact hardly contributes to the social-welfare. Our model assumes that social-pressure is induced over both defectors and hypocritical players, though the extent of which may differ. Our main result indicates that the emergence of cooperation highly depends on the extent of social-pressure applied against hypocritical players. Setting it to be at some intermediate range below the one employed against defectors allows a system composed almost exclusively of defectors to transform into a fully cooperative one quickly. Conversely, when the social-pressure against hypocritical players is either too low or too high, the system remains locked in a degenerate configuration.

The Black Queen hypothesis describes the evolutionary strategy to lose costly functions in favour of improving growth efficiency. This results in mutants (cheaters) becoming obligately dependent upon a provider (black queen) to produce a necessary resource. Previous analyses demonstrate black queens and cheaters reach a state of equilibrium in pair-wise systems. However, in complex communities, accumulation of cheaters likely poses a serious burden on shared resources. This should result in a Tragedy of the Commons (ToC), whereby over-utilisation of public resources risks making them growth-limiting. With a collection of differential equations, microbial communities composed of twenty prokaryote ‘species’ either from rhizosphere, characterised by abundant carbon and energy sources, or bulk soil, with limited carbon and energy supply, were simulated. Functional trait groups differed based on combinations of cellulase and amino acid production, growth and resource uptake. Randomly generated communities were thus composed of species that acted as cellulolytic prototrophic black queens, groups that were either cellulolytic or prototrophic, or non-cellulolytic auxotrophic cheaters. Groups could evolve to lose functions over time. Biomass production and biodiversity were tracked in 8,000 Monte Carlo simulations over 500 generations. Bulk soil favoured oligotrophic co-operative communities where biodiversity was positively associated with growth. Rhizosphere favoured copiotrophic cheaters. The most successful functional group across both environments was neither black queens nor cheaters, but those that balanced providing an essential growth-limiting function at a relatively low maintenance cost. Accumulation of loss of function mutants in bulk soil risked resulting in loss of cumulative growth by ToC, while cumulative growth increased in the rhizosphere. In the bulk soil, oligotrophic adaptations assisted species in avoiding extinction. This demonstrated that loss of function by mutation is a successful evolutionary strategy in host-associated and/or resource-rich environments, but poses a risk to communities that must co-operate with each other for mutual co-existence. It was concluded that microbial communities must follow different evolutionary and community assembly strategies in bulk soil versus rhizosphere, with bulk soil communities more dependent on traits that promote co-operative interactions between microbial species.

Rangeland use rights privatisation based on a tragedy of the commons assumption has been the backbone of state policy on rangeland management and pastoralism in China. Through an empirical case study from Pelgon county, Tibet Autonomous Region in China, this paper provides an empirical analysis of rangeland use rights privatisation. It shows that the tragedy of the commons is not the correct model to apply to Tibetan pastoralism because pasture use in Tibet has never been an open-access institution. Thus, when the tragedy of the commons model is applied as a rationale for rangeland use rights privatisation, the result is not what is intended by the policy, but rather a misfit to features of pastoralism and thus disruption of the essence of pastoralism, i.e. mobility and flexibility. The paper further shows that a hybrid institution combining household rangeland tenure with community-based use with user fees is a restoration of the pastoralist institution. This demonstrates the capacity of pastoralists to create adaptive new institutions congruent with the interdependent and integrated nature of pastoralism consisting of three components: pastoralists, livestock, and rangeland.

A colony of the queenless ant species, Pristomyrmex punctatus, can broadly be seen as consisting of small-body sized worker ants and relatively larger body-sized cheater ants. Hence, in the presence of intercolony migration, a set of constituent colonies act as a metapopulation exclusively composed of cooperators and defectors. Such a setup facilitates an evolutionary game-theoretic replication-selection model of population dynamics of the ants in a metapopulation. Using the model, we analytically probe the effects of territoriality induced hostility. Such hostility in the ant metapopulation proves to be crucial in preventing the tragedy of the commons, specifically, the workforce, a social good formed by cooperation. This mechanism applies to any metapopulation-not necessarily the ants-composed of cooperators and defectors where interpopulation migration occurs asymmetrically, i.e., cooperators and defectors migrate at different rates. Furthermore, our model validates that there is evolutionary benefit behind the queenless ants' behavior of showing more hostility towards the immigrants from nearby colonies than those from the far-off ones. In order to calibrate our model's parameters, we have extensively used the data available on the queenless ant species, P. punctatus.