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Za ekonomski tržni sistem je pomembno, da ima vzpostavljen varen in zanesljiv plačilni sistem. Plačilni sistem se oblikuje glede na potrebe trga in more rast trga dohajati, zato je pomembno, da je pri tem zmožen nuditi stabilnost in varnost. Udeleženci plačilnih sistemov so centralna banka, poslovne banke in druge kreditne institucije. Primarna funkcija centralne banke je izdaja gotovine, poslovna banke pa sprejemajo depozite in dajejo posojila. Plačilni sistem je skupek postopkov, pravil, instrumentov in standardov, ki se uporabljajo za poravnavo obligacijskih postopkov. V Evropi je sistem TARGET2 nadomestil plačilni sistem TARGET. To je bruto sistem poravnave v realnem času, preko katerega banke obdelujejo plačilne naloge. Slovenija je vključena v ta sistem od leta 2007. Evropske države še so vključene v plačilne sisteme EURO1, STEP2 in SEPA. Pomemben del plačilnega sistema so plačilni instrumenti. Delimo jih na gotovinska in negotovinska plačila. Po pravni obliki pa jih delimo na kreditna in debetna plačila. Največ maloprodajnih poslov se plača z gotovino, negotovinska plačila pa predstavljajo največji del celotne vrednosti plačil v današnji ekonomiji. Za plačevanje spletnih storitev se uporabljajo spletni plačilni instrumente. Delimo jih na sisteme lastniških računov in sisteme na osnovi bančnih računov. Spletni plačilni instrumenti na osnovi lastniških računov omogočajo interne transakcije brez posredovanja banke, pri sistemih bančnih računov pa transakcije potekajo preko računov, ki so v lasti bank. Vsi plačilni instrumenti uporabljajo varnostne elemente, ki zagotavljajo varnost in zasebnost pretoka podatkov. Spletni plačilni instrumenti, ki so trenutno na voljo, so plačilne storitve elektronskega bančništva, plačilne kartice, e-denarnice in Moneta. Plačilne instrumente smo med seboj primerjali s pomočjo primerjalne tabele, kjer smo uporabili različne kriterije in tako ugotovili prednosti in slabosti določenih spletnih plačilnih instrumentov. A safe and reliable payment system is an important part of the economic market system. Payment system is designed by market needs and it must keep up with growth of the market. It is therefore important that it can provide stability and security. Participants of payment systems are the central bank, business banks, and other credit institutions. The primary function of the central bank is system monitoring and management, whereas the function of business banks is the execution of the payment system, accepting deposits and giving out loans. Payment system is a set of procedures, rules, instruments and standards that are used to settle obligatory procedures. In Europe, TARGET2 has replaced the TARGET system. It is a real-time gross settlement system that banks use for payment processing. Slovenia has been included in the system since 2007. European countries also use EURO1, STEP2, and SEPA payment systems. Important part of the payment systems are the payment instruments. They enable the execution of cash and non-cash payments. Legally they are divided by credit and debit payments. Online payment instruments are used for paying online goods and services. They are divided into proprietary account systems and bank account based systems. Proprietary account systems allow internal transactions without intervention of banks while bank account based systems provide transfers over accounts owned by banks. All payment instruments use security elements that assure safety and privacy of data transmission. Online payment instruments currently available are electronic banking payment services, payment cards, e-wallets, and Moneta. The comparison of payment instruments was carried based on multiple criteria and with the use of a comparing table. This way the properties of specific online payment instruments were presented and compared.

This study shows that Target2 net claims are a poor measure of Bundesbank loss exposure, and even more so of German loss exposure to the rest of the Eurozone. This is true even under plausible assumptions about a comprehensive break-up scenario that leaves Germany as the only member of the euro area and the Bundesbank as the sole owner of the ECB. In this implausible scenario, the discrepancy between the Bundesbank’s Target2 net credit balance and its likely loss exposure has two principal sources. First, the 16 national central banks (NCBs) that exit the Eurosystem (which will on balance be net Target2 debtors) and their sovereigns will not automatically walk away completely from their Target2 debts - defaulting on their debts with a zero recovery rate for the Bundesbank. Legally, the Target2 claims are not extinguished by exit from the Eurosystem by the debtor NCBs. Politically and realistically, many of the exiting NCBs would be able and willing to honour their obligations to Target2 in part or even in full. Second, in the comprehensive break-up scenario, future seigniorage revenues of the Bundesbank would likely go up, as it would be left with a larger share (in our example 100 percent) of the ownership of the ECB. Changes in German exposure to the rest of the euro area (or to the periphery) can differ in magnitude and in sign from Bundesbank exposure.

The Eurosystem’s TARGET2 payments system has featured heavily in academic and popular discussions in recent years. Much of this commentary had described the system as being responsible for a “secret bailout” of Europe’s periphery which has led to huge credit risks for the Bundesbank should the euro break up. This paper discusses the TARGET2 system, focusing in particular on how it impacts the balance sheets of the central banks that participate in the system. It concludes that the TARGET2 is largely innocent of the charges that have been levelled against it. Arguments that TARGET2 facilitated a bailout of the periphery or that the system is playing a key role in facilitating peripheral current account deficits turn out to be wide of the mark. Risks to Germany due to the loss of TARGET2‐related revenues for the Bundesbank after a euro break‐up turn out to relatively small because these revenues are limited and because there are potentially large gains from new seigniorage revenues in this scenario. Many criticisms involving TARGET2 turn out, on closer examination, to be criticisms of the ECB’s core principle of treating credit institutions across the euro area in an equal manner. Proposals that the ECB adopt procedures that discriminate between banks in different countries (or that restrict the operation of payments systems in certain countries) are likely to be incompatible with the continuation of the euro as a common currency. Not applicable

The Eurosystem’s TARGET2 payments system has featured heavily in academic and popular discussions in recent years. Much of this commentary had described the system as being responsible for a “secret bailout” of Europe’s periphery which has led to huge credit risks for the Bundesbank should the euro break up. This paper discusses the TARGET2 system, focusing in particular on how it impacts the balance sheets of the central banks that participate in the system. It concludes that the TARGET2 is largely innocent of the charges that have been levelled against it. Arguments that TARGET2 facilitated a bailout of the periphery or that the system is playing a key role in facilitating peripheral current account deficits turn out to be wide of the mark. Risks to Germany due to the loss of TARGET2?related revenues for the Bundesbank after a euro break?up turn out to relatively small because these revenues are limited and because there are potentially large gains from new seigniorage revenues in this scenario. Many criticisms involving TARGET2 turn out, on closer examination, to be criticisms of the ECB’s core principle of treating credit institutions across the euro area in an equal manner. Proposals that the ECB adopt procedures that discriminate between banks in different countries (or that restrict the operation of payments systems in certain countries) are likely to be incompatible with the continuation of the euro as a common currency.

TARGET2 ist seit gut einem Jahr Zielscheibe massiver akademischer Kritik. Wir legen dar, dass TARGET2 keiner Veränderungen bedarf. Die Salden sind keine echten Kredite und sollten nicht als solche betrachtet werden. Die zugrunde liegenden ökonomischen Probleme sind weder hinreichend noch notwendig mit dem Zahlungssystem verknüpft und können deswegen darüber nicht sinnvoll angegangen werden. Die geforderten Modifikationen stellen zudem keine überzeugenden Alternativen dar, insbesondere auch nicht für den Fall eines Auseinanderbrechens der Eurozone. Dann sind sie im Übrigen auch nur ein Teilproblem der zu regelnden Desintegration der Zentralbankbilanzen.

This article deals with the macro-economics of the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). It is shown that TARGET2 contrib-utes to a misallocation of real resources. The discussion high-lights that there are no tendencies for rebalancing TARGET2 claims and liabilities, but rather a dynamic towards infinite and prolonged TARGET2 imbalances in the form of hysteresis.

The Eurosystem has been pursuing a crisis management policy for more than four years now. This policy aims primarily at maintaining financial stability in the euro area by providing vast liquidity support to commercial banks that are operating in nationally segmented banking systems. As a side effect, the national central banks substitute money market operations for cross-border capital flows. The national central banks are thus increasingly engaging in substantial balance-of-payments financing, and financial risks are being shifted from investors to European taxpayers via the Eurosystem. Symptomatically, this shows up in exploding TARGET2 positions in the national central banks' balance sheets. The longer this process continues, the stronger the centrifugal forces become that ultimately might break up the single currency. Instead of a fiscal union, a euro-area-wide regulatory approach is required. In addition to establishing a uniform scheme for banking regulation, supervision and resolution, we recommend that contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) be introduced to provide a major source of refinancing for the banking industry. Since CoCos cannot be introduced overnight, national and European banking resolution funds would be needed in the short run. These funds would not rescue banks but they would kick in as soon as a bank's equity is depleted in order to wind up failing banks in a systemically prudent way.

This article deals with the macro-economics of the Trans-European Automated Re- al-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). Originally, the TARGET2 was in-tended to solely function as a monetary arrangement for liquidity issues. It is shown that the TARGET2 contributes to a substantial misallocation of real resources within the Eurozone (EZ). The discussion highlights that there are no tendencies for rebalancing TARGET2-claims and liabilities, but rather a dynamic towards infinite and prolonged TARGET2-imbalances in the form of hysteresis.

Central bank credit has expanded dramatically in some of the euro area member countries since the beginning of the financial crisis. This paper makes two contributions to understand this stylized fact. First, we discuss a simple model of monetary policy that includes (i) a credit channel and (ii) a common pool problem in a monetary union. We illustrate that the interaction of the two elements leads to an inflation bias that is independent of the standard time-inconsistency bias. Secondly, we present empirical evidence that is consistent with the view of fragmented monetary policy and changing policy objectives among the national cen-tral banks in the euro area. We show that after 2007, central bank credit has been highly correlated with unemployment, but not with inflation in the respective countries.

The recent increase of interest rate spreads in Europe and their apparent detachment from underlying fundamental variables has generated a debate on multiple equilibria in the sovereign bond market (see De Grauwe and Ji (2012)). We critically evaluate this hypothesis, by pointing towards an alternative explanation: the increasing share of senior lenders (IMF, ECB, EFSF, etc.) in the total outstanding government debt of countries in crisis. We illustrate the close relationship between senior tranche lending – including Target2 balances – and recent developments in the sovereign bond market, both graphically and in a formal regression analysis.

The paper scrutinizes the reasons for the European debt crisis, the implications for TARGET2 imbalances and options for surplus liquidity absorption within an asymmetric EMU. It is argued that starting from the turn of the millennium diverging fiscal policy paths and diverging unit labour costs were the driving force of rising intra-European current account imbalances within the euro area, which were enhanced by post-2001 low interest rate policies and changing financing conditions for the German banking sector. The paper shows how since the outbreak of the crisis the adjustment of intra-EMU current account imbalances is postponed by a rising divergence of TARGET2 balances, as the repatriation of private international credit and deposit flight from the crisis economies is substituted by central bank credit. Given that this process has brought Deutsche Bundesbank into a debtor position to the domestic financial system, we discuss options for liquidity absorption by Deutsche Bundesbank to forestall asset price bubbles in Germany.

The public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the eurosystem, rose from €47.8bn to €180.5bn between January 2010 and September 2011. €17.1bn of the rise in eurosystem debt was due to an 86% increase in the Greek issue of euro banknotes. If EU/IMF loans to Greece cease, they will be replaced by larger Greek borrowing from the eurosystem, for as long as Greece stays in the euro. Eurozone governments would only escape from lending to Greece if access of the Bank of Greece to eurosystem credit were restricted. But this would impede the clearance of payments out of Greece, it would imply that cross-border payments by means of euro banknotes would also have to be restricted, and it would force Greece out of the euro.

It has recently been argued that intra-eurosystem claims and liabilities in the form of TARGET2 balances would raise fundamental issues within the European monetary union. This article provides a framework for the economic analysis of TARGET2 balances and discusses the key arguments behind this recent debate. The analysis is conducted within a system of financial accounts in which TARGET2 balances can arise either due to current account transactions or cross-border capital flows. It is argued that the recent volatility of TARGET2 balances reflects capital flow movements, while the previously prevailing current account positions did not find a strong reflection in TARGET2 balances. Some recent statements regarding TARGET2 appear to be due to a failure to distinguish between the monetary base (a central bank liability concept) and the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central bank (a central bank asset concept). Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of TARGET2 for the stability of the euro area and points out that the proposal to limit the size of TARGET2 liabilities essentially contradicts the idea of a monetary union.

Germany is a reluctant supporter of the EU funds which are being used in the ‘bailout’ of Ireland, and it insists on strict ‘austerity’ conditions, concerned about risk and moral hazard. However, through its central bank, Germany is lending €325bn (December 2010) to other central banks in the eurosystem. The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) has borrowed €146bn from the eurosystem in order to support its banks. This ‘bailout’ of Ireland via the eurosystem is larger than its official EU ‘bailout’ (€146bn as against €67bn) and much cheaper (1% interest as against 5.8%), but it exposes Germany to similar risks.

It has recently been argued that intra-eurosystem claims and liabilities in the form of TARGET2 balances would raise fundamental issues within the European monetary union. This article provides a framework for the economic analysis of TARGET2 balances and discusses the key arguments behind this recent debate. The analysis is conducted within a system of financial accounts in which TARGET2 balances can arise either due to current account transactions or cross-border capital ows. It is argued that the recent volatility of TARGET2 balances reflects capital flow movements, while the previously prevailing current account positions did not find a strong reflection in TARGET2 balances. Some recent statements regarding TARGET2 appear to be due to a failure to distinguish between the monetary base (a central bank liability concept) and the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central bank (a central bank asset concept). Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of TARGET2 for the stability of the euro area and points out that the proposal to limit the size of TARGET2 liabilities essentially contradicts the idea of a monetary union.

This thesis analyses the interbank payment systems in the Czech republic and Slovak republic. First chapter includes the definitions and basic characteristics of payment system and payment services. Both analysed countries are members of the European Union, next chapter so defines its payment systems and their legislation background, with the focus on TARGET2 system. Chapter 3 and 4 concentrate on characteristics of Czech and Slovak payment systems from different points of view. In Slovakia, there are two payment systems, large-value system TARGET2-SK and retail system SIPS. In Czech Republic operates only one payment system CERTIS for both types of transactions. The last and main part of thesis is devoted to detailed analysis of statistical data for these payment systems concerning the period from 2006 to 2011.

Die Staatsschuldenkrise einiger Länder in der EWU ist letztlich doch eine Währungskrise. Nur im gemeinsamen Währungsraum war es überhaupt möglich, die Schuldaufnahme stark auszuweiten. Andererseits treten bei Zweifeln an der finanziellen Solidität von Schuldnerstaaten kumulative Instabilitätsprobleme auf, die in der internationalen Geldwirtschaft aus der Konstellation "Verschuldung in fremder Währung" bekannt sind. Die regulär nicht vorgesehene Kurspflege nationaler Schuldtitel seitens der EZB und endogene Liquiditätsengpässe im nationalen Banksystem bei einem massiven Umstieg der Anleger in Papiere mit besserer Reputation erzeugen eine durchaus rationale Insolvenzerwartung. Ironischerweise galt die Konstellation einer alleinigen Abhängigkeit der nationalen Finanzpolitik von Kreditanbietern auf dem Euro-Finanzmarkt als erwünschtes ordnungspolitisches Disziplinierungsprinzip; sie erweist sich nun als nicht tragfähig. Die Alternative sind permanente Rettungsschirme oder Euro-Bonds. In beiden Fällen wird die währungspolitisch schwache Stellung nationaler Schuldner durch implizite Zinszahlungen und Vermögensgarantien wirtschaftlich stärkerer Länder kompensiert. Die damit verbundenen Einkommens- und Vermögensverluste sind der Preis, den exportorientierte Länder wie die Bundesrepublik für die Bewahrung des Euro zahlen müssen.

Področje elektronskih plačilnih sistemov je v razvitih tržnih gospodarstvih v neprestanem preoblikovanju. Tehnološki napredek povezan z informacijskim in komunikacijskim sistemom zahteva od bančnega sektorja neprestano razvijanje hitrejših, varnejših in zanesljivejših plačilnih sistemov. Evropski plačilni sistemi obdelujejo plačila velikih in malih vrednosti, ki so določena z mejno vrednostjo 50.000 evrov. Kljub določenemu mejnemu znesku lahko plačilni sistem, ki je zasnovan za procesiranje plačil velikih vrednosti, obdeluje tudi plačila malih vrednosti. Najpomembnejša evropska plačilna sistema sta sistem TARGET in TARGET2, ki omogočata avtomatizirane hitre izvršitve. Plačila velikih vrednosti so obdelana v sistemih TARGET2 in EURO1, obdelava plačil malih vrednosti pa poteka predvsem v plačilnih sistemih STEP1 in STEP2, ki ju je razvilo bančno združenje EBA. Vključevanje držav v EU ni odpravilo razlik med domačimi in čezmejnimi plačili, kar je ovirale inovacije in konkurenco. Proces integracije evropskih držav v EMU je povzročil večjo konkurenco med ponudnicami plačilnih storitev. Tako so se morale evropske banke soočiti z nižjimi prihodki, za svoje komitente pa morajo ponujati nove plačilne storitve. Območje SEPA obsega integriran trg plačilnih storitev, v katerem ni razlikovanja med domačimi in čezmejnimi plačili. V območju tako razvijajo SEPA plačilne instrumente kreditnih plačil, direktnih bremenitev in kartičnega poslovanja. Podjetja se lahko vključujejo v sisteme elektronskega denarja preko sistemov Ecash in Netcash, ki opredeljujeta plačila zelo malih vrednosti. Za plačila velikih vrednosti so zasnovani sistemi elektronskih čekov, za plačila malih vrednosti pa se uporabljajo sistemi elektronskega bančništva in pametnih kartic, ki jih opredeljujeta sistem Mondex in Geldkarte. The scope of electronic payment systems in developed merket economies in constant transformation. Technological advances related to information and communication system required by the banking sector is constantly developing faster, safer and more reliable payment systems. European payment systems process payments of large and small values, which are determined by the threshold of 50.000 euros. Despite some threshold amount for a payment system that is designed to process large-value payments, process the payment of small value. The most important European payment systems are TARGET and TARGET2 system, which enable rapid automated enforcement. Large-value payments are processed in TARGET2 and EURO1, meanwhile processing of small-value payments is predominantly in payment systems STEP1 and STEP2, developed by the banking association of EBA. Integration of countries in the EU has not eliminated the differences between domestic and cross-border payments, which impede innovation and competition. The process of integration of European countries in the EMU has led to increased competition among providers of payment services. Thus, European banks have to cope with lower revenues for its clients and have to offer new payment services. SEPA area is an integrated market for payment services, in which there is no distinction between domestic and cross-border payments. The area is developing SEPA payment instruments of credit transfers, direct debits and card business. Companies may be involved in the systems of electronic money, through Ecash and Netcash, which define the value of micro-payments. For large-value payments are designed electronic checks systems, for small-value payments are used electronic banking and smart cards, which define the Mondex and Geldkarte systems.

We study the impact of tiered settlement on relative intraday liquidity use (liquidity consumption) for settlement banks in TARGET2. We estimate a panel data model employing transaction-level data from 2010 to 2019 which shows that a higher share of tiered payments from client banks reduces relative liquidity consumption by settlement banks. Metrics on timing, delay, and payment priorities suggest that settlement banks can make use of more leeway in settling tiered payments from client banks compared to their own payments. Payment timing as a proxy for external delay suggests that tiered payments are used to smooth settlement banks' liquidity positions. Results on payment delay within the system show no clear dynamic over time, whereas payment priorities are consistently lower for tiered payments. We conclude that to some degree settlement banks employ tiered arrangements to manage intraday liquidity more effiiently. To a certain extent this hints to "free riding" or higher recycling of liquidity from client banks' payments. However, the results are also consistent with settlement banks' monitoring role or tiered payments potentially exhibiting different characteristics which may be attributable to contractual arrangements.